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CIA Estimates

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ON PAGE A-11WASHINGTON STAR
8 DECEMBER 1979Cord Meyer

Soviet radio and American silence

Stirred by the growth of public support for increased defense expenditures, some Carter advisers are urging the president to take advantage of the groundswell to strengthen the American ability to influence opinion abroad.

The gross disparity between the funds the Soviets spend on propaganda work and the U.S. allocation, is wider proportionately than the military spending gap and potentially as dangerous. But compared to the price of modern weaponry, the cost of the long-overdue improvements needed in official U.S. information programs is modest.

According to conservative CIA estimates, the Kremlin is reckoned to be spending more than \$2 billion annually on its propaganda apparatus. The U.S. spends about a third as much. In the words of a recent congressional study, the Soviet Union has become the world's leading international radio broadcaster, beaming more than 2,000 program hours a week in 82 languages over 285 shortwave transmitters to nearly every country.

To orchestrate its worldwide propaganda campaigns, the Soviets secretly subsidize 13 separate international front organizations, like the World Federation of Trade Unions. Each claims mass membership in

the millions. Although there have been a few defections, 75 of the world's Communist Parties still owe their primary allegiance to Moscow. Heavily subsidized, they are disciplined conveyors of the Soviet propaganda message with the advantage of operating from within non-communist societies.

In the U.S., this outpouring of Russian propaganda has virtually no effect. Few Americans bother to listen twice to the obviously biased voice of Radio Moscow, and Soviet magazines in English have to be given away for lack of buyers.

But in the far reaches of the Third World, where widespread illiteracy makes radio the prime means of communication, the steady denigration of American motives by Moscow's broadcasts has a cumulative impact. The consistent portrayal of American society as a capitalist monster bent on imperialist aggression wears away favorable attitudes toward the U.S. and creates a foundation of distrust on which local demagogues like Khomeini can later build their edifice of hate.

Behind the shield of this propaganda offensive, the Soviets have been getting away with murder. No neutral country raised its voice at the meeting of the non-aligned nations in Havana

to condemn the use of Russian helicopter gunships and napalm against the Moslem villagers in Afghanistan. No one protested the proven use of Russian nerve gas against the Meo tribes in Laos by the Soviets' Vietnamese allies. If these atrocities had been committed by the U.S., Moscow would have orchestrated a worldwide outcry.

Faced with this evidence of Soviet-Cuban ability to manipulate Third World opinion, some White House aides are urging a selective concentration on weak spots in the Soviet protective armor. They are not advocating a mindless return to the rhetoric of the cold war but a realistic recognition that the Soviets have never accepted a truce in ideological warfare as part of their definition of detente.

These Carter advisers specifically urge that the congressionally-funded Radio Liberty broadcasting to Soviet Central Asia be strengthened by the addition of powerful new transmitters. The present Radio Liberty broadcasts in the Turkic languages to the 40 million Soviet Moslems in Central Asia are so weak they cannot be heard above the jamming. Once the Soviet leaders realize they can no longer protect their restless Moslem population from accurate news of

events abroad they may be less willing to play with fire in the Middle East.

Similarly, the bland VOA broadcasting to Cuba needs to be stiffened with hard news of the heavy Cuban casualties in Angola to increase the domestic price to Castro of his African adventures.

The Cyrus Vance-Marshall Shulman axis in the State Department is reluctant to see even these modest improvements made. They have consistently relied on discreet diplomatic protests to Ambassador Dobrynin to restrain Soviet misbehavior — with remarkably little effect. And they have leaned over backwards to improve the chances for SALT by downplaying evidence of Soviet interventions.

The other source of opposition to any expansion of the U.S. information program is the Office of Management and Budget. Carter's bookkeepers ridicule contentions that a 5 per cent increase in the information effort may be as necessary as an increase in defense spending.

But there was a glint of steel in Carter's performance at his last press conference. The president can now count on a responsive Congress if he asks for the modest amounts needed to make the American voice more clearly heard.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 75

NEWSWEEK
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RUSSIA'S OIL PINCH

The spindly towers of oil rigs surround the Soviet city of Baku like some mammoth metallic forest, sprouting on stilts from the shallow Caspian seabed and ringing the rocky hills that rise from the shore. Years ago, Baku's spidery network of pipelines and causeways supplied two-thirds of the Soviet Union's petroleum. But Caspian Basin production has long since peaked: accessible fields are nearly exhausted, and the Russians do not have the technology to tap more difficult reserves. Similar problems plague Soviet energy efforts elsewhere. For the oil-consuming West, the implications are alarming: if the world's largest oil producer cannot sustain its output, the international oil crunch is sure to grow worse.

barrels a day. Already, in fact, Moscow has been avoiding any promises that it will step up supplies to meet its satellites' future demands. That could compel the Eastern bloc to turn to the world market, generating new competition for OPEC supplies. But most Western analysts are convinced that the Soviet Union simply cannot afford to cut back on the 1 million barrels a day it now exports to the West. More than 40 per cent of the nation's hard currency comes from such sales. Rather than lose that cash, which is badly needed for purchases of food and technology, the Soviet Government might decide to shortchange energy consumers at home.

Ironically, the Soviet Union may be far richer in oil than anyone had realized. A comprehensive new analysis by Petro Studies, a Swedish research firm specializing in Soviet petroleum, sets proven Soviet reserves at 150 billion barrels—five times greater than estimates by the CIA.

REMOTE WASTES: But to take advantage of their oil wealth, the Soviets will have to solve some formidable logistical problems. About 90 per cent of future onshore supplies lie east of the Ural Mountains in the remote wastes of Siberia and the deserts of Kazakhstan. Yet 80 per cent of all Soviet energy is consumed thousands of miles away in the western part of the country. Developing the new fields requires huge investments in transportation and equipment. And so far, development has not been very efficient. In western Siberia, about 30 smaller fields have been found near the giant Samotlor field, which has apparently reached its peak production. But, says Bruce McK. Everett, the U.S. Department of Energy's Soviet expert, "the Russians

have been consistently behind plan in getting their equipment in."

The Soviets also lag in deepwater-drilling technology. Thus, in the Caspian Sea, where many of the old shallow wells are nearly depleted, an estimated 3.7 billion barrels of oil and 35 trillion cubic feet of natural gas remain untapped farther offshore.

FOREIGN AID: For help, the Soviet Union is relying heavily on Japan and the industrialized West. A consortium of Japanese companies directed exploration of the Sea of Okhotsk off the Soviet east coast—and discovered a giant new field. And Soviet workers are now assembling a \$50 million semisubmersible rig to probe the Caspian's depths. Its designers: an American-Finnish consortium headed by Armco, Inc. Some analysts think that the Soviets will spend

\$24 billion over the next decade for offshore equipment alone—and that it is in America's best interest to provide as much as possible.

But it will be sometime before such investments pay off in the form of new supplies. Meanwhile, Soviet policymakers are stressing domestic conservation measures and are trying to hasten development of natural gas and nuclear power to replace oil use at home. The Kremlin may even accept a slightly lower rate of economic growth to keep exporting oil. If such policies don't work, however, the world oil market could soon have thirsty new customers putting greater pressure on prices and supplies.

MERRILL SHEILS with WILLIAM E. SCHMIDT in Moscow and WILLIAM J. COOK in Washington



William E. Schmidt—NEWSWEEK

Caspian Sea wells: Technological troubles ahead

There is considerable disagreement among experts over just how dangerous the Soviet predicament may be. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency predicts that production will peak this year or next at about 12 million barrels a day—and that it could drop by one-third by the mid-1980s. Some recent developments suggest that the CIA's gloomy scenario could come true. Last month, for example, an economic report to the Supreme Soviet acknowledged that 1979 production will fall 59 million barrels short of the Kremlin's target—and that the projection for 1980 output had been dialed back by 300,000 barrels a day.

Serious production problems would probably force the Soviet Union to cut exports to its Eastern-bloc allies, which now depend on the U.S.S.R. for 2 million

'By the Book' Soviet Factory Toils For Glory of Lenin— And Its Profit Goals

Lelia Clothing Plant, Bound
By Maze of Bureaucracy,
Still Heeds Its Customers

A Coat Bombs in Lithuania

By ERIC MORGENTHAU

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

VILNIUS, U.S.S.R.—“With the name of Lenin to the victory of communism,” reads the slogan painted across the front of the Lelia Clothing Factory.

And every working day, the 2,200 employees at the busy plant, on a shady street in the southwest part of Lithuania's capital, proceed toward that heady goal. They do it by sewing garments: suits and coats, dresses and slacks, of velvet and denim and cotton and wool—some 118 different items, up to 600 styles a year.

Much of the output goes to stores in Lithuania, one of the Soviet Union's 15 republics.

This is the first of two articles on how the Soviet Union produces and sells consumer goods.

for sale to an increasingly choosy clientele. Some items go to stores in other parts of the U.S.S.R.—transported in trucks hired by the purchasing stores. And all of the clothing—from the simplest scarf to the finest evening coat—helps thread a mighty machine: the economy of the Soviet Union.

It is the second-biggest national economy, after that of the U.S. In centralized diversity, it chugs along from Lelia's worktables in the Baltic north to the Tashkent Textile Factory in the Asian south, from the Pacific Ocean in the east to the Black Sea in the west, across one-sixth of the earth's surface and 11 of its time zones. It is enormous in its reach.

More and Bigger

The Soviet Union is the biggest producer of oil and has the biggest reserves of natural gas and coal. It pours more steel, mixes more cement, fells more trees, grows more wheat and churns more butter than any other country. Its airline, Aeroflot, is the world's biggest. One of its newspapers, Pravda, is the world's biggest. The country is rich in gold, silver, diamonds, platinum and chrome. It is believed to spend more on defense than any other nation does.

The Russians don't express most of their economic results in the same terms as Western countries do, and economists disagree over how the terms should be translated. However, the Central Intelligence Agency put the country's 1978 gross national product at \$1.25 trillion, compared with an Ameri-

Despite its enormous wealth, the Soviet Union is surprisingly poor—with what a French economist, Georges Sokoloff, calls “a semi-developed economy.” Mr. Sokoloff says it ranks 19th in Europe in per-capita GNP—far below any West European country and also below some East European ones. Soviet industry is notoriously inefficient, and agriculture is a continuing problem. The average Russian doesn't have a car, a television set or a phone.

Growth Slips

What's more, steam is going out of the Soviet machine. Economic growth has been slowing in recent years; and the CIA expects GNP to grow less than 1% this year, compared with the more than 4% planned by the Soviet government. Most Western analysts think Soviet growth will continue to slow in the 1980s—partly because of problems of energy supply and labor shortages—and cause serious problems for the leadership. One American firm, Predicasts Inc., recently predicted that Japan's economy, now about three-fourths the size of the Soviet one, will surpass it by 1990.

Soviet economic prospects are inextricably linked with the Soviet economic system, so it helps for Westerners to understand how it works. It is a Socialist leviathan, the world's biggest planned economy, in which every major decision involving production or allocation of resources is made by government. The system is completely different from the economies of the capitalist countries.

Since the first five-year plan was begun in 1929, the system has left its imprint on almost every aspect of Soviet economic life. You see it here at the Lelia Clothing Factory—a cluster of cream-colored buildings where tailors sew at long tables and kittens play in the courtyards. It is the reason, for instance, that the factory—which specializes in making coats and men's suits—sometimes turns out money-losing baby clothes.

Bargains for Babies

Lelia's production, like that of every other factory in the country, ultimately is directed by Gosplan, the sprawling state planning organization. And sometimes Gosplan orders Lelia to make items—such as five-ruble wraps for babies—that sell for less than the cost of making them. (The government, as a matter of policy, keeps the price of such children's items low.)

Lelia, however, is expected to turn a profit each year, so Gosplan tries to make such unprofitable efforts worthwhile. Lydia Hazova, the deputy head of the factory, says Gosplan usually follows such an order with a production request for higher-priced goods, such as 200-ruble fur coats, on which the factory can make a nice profit and offset the losses on the baby wraps.

At this factory, it all balances out nicely, for Lelia is a successful enterprise. Its garments win awards, productivity is increasing 3% to 4% a year, and in 1978 it earned about 15 million rubles. (A ruble officially is worth \$1.55; but because the currency doesn't trade freely on international markets, that's a meaningless figure.)

About half of Lelia's profits go to the government. Some of the rest is handed out in

CONTINUED

bonuses to workers, whose typical wage of 153 to 160 rubles monthly is roughly in line with the national average. Earnings also are used for buying new equipment and are applied to such projects as buying interests in various nurseries around town, to guarantee places for workers' children.

Lelia's business success is shared—engineered not only by its own workers (96% of them women) but also by a sprawl of official agencies. Many of them are, like Lelia, under the Ministry of Light Industry; and most of them are highly specialized.

Thus, when Lelia wants to buy wool, it goes through one government unit; when it wants to sell dresses, it goes through another. For guidance on fashion trends, it consults one official organization; for pricing policy, it consults another. If wages are the question, there is yet another body. If Lelia needs new equipment, there is an agency to do the buying—although Lelia foots the bill.

What's more, Lelia doesn't always deal directly with the major decision makers. Gosplan, for instance, is an extremely important organization, but Mrs. Hazova says Lelia usually doesn't work directly with it; rather, the Ministry of Light Industry usually deals with the planners on Lelia's behalf.

The government's control of all the official economic levers has its positive sides. It is the reason, for instance, that there is almost no unemployment in the U.S.S.R.—it is also why the state can keep prices low on such items as foodstuffs (which generally are cheap, though supplies are spotty) and baby clothes.

But, too, there are difficulties. Authority is fragmented, and one agency frequently doesn't know what another one is doing. Nonetheless, decision making within each fragment is highly centralized, and the center often is miles—or continents—away from the production site. Despite recurrent "reforms," the system and the bureaucracy remain resistant to change.

Like most far-flung systems, this one is rife with inconsistencies. For instance, the government recently raised the price of fur by 50%, but it didn't increase the price of Lelia's coats with fur trimmings. Such a change in raw-materials costs can "really make it hard to follow the fixed price," Mrs. Hazova says, but Lelia hasn't any choice. Now, it is trying to find cheaper materials or figure out how else to cut costs.

Nonetheless, the system is more flexible than many outsiders realize. There is room for give-and-take between supplier and customer or between planners and producers. Indeed, as the people at Lelia tell it, the give-and-take runs through the entire process.

It all begins some 18 months before the clothes come off the line at Lelia, with something called the Vilnius House of Fashion—a unit of the Ministry of Light Industry charged with keeping abreast of the latest in looks. The House of Fashion consults around—with the ministry, with local factories, with retailers—and then proposes a line of

clothing to be made in Lithuania. Those proposals bubble through the system, and gradually a production plan for Lelia and the other area producers takes shape.

"Sometimes the ministry requests something that's impossible," Mrs. Hazova says. "They might ask us to make a suit for which we would have to change all our production lines for suits. So we have to send back the plan and say, 'We're sorry, we can't do it'—but they can do it at another

factory that is situated in another place."

By May of each year, the Lelia factory and the ministry are "generally agreed" on the next year's plan, Mrs. Hazova says. By year's end, the plan is established in detail. As the production year unfolds, there might be minor adjustments in each quarter's plan. (A typical plan calls for a certain number of men's suits in a particular style and at a given price; it is up to the factory and its customers to work out such matters as sizes.)

Once the plan is broadly set, Lelia gets in touch with its suppliers and customers. One way it reaches those outside Lithuania is through trade fairs. Within the republic, it has longstanding relationships with a number of enterprises; it has two regular wool

suppliers, for example, and seven major retail customers—although even with them, it usually must work through official intermediary agencies. (Nonetheless, the retailers often suggest—and get—small changes in Lelia's styles to suit their own tastes.)

Like producers everywhere, Lelia is subject to the whims of consumers, who sometimes don't like its styles. Last year, one item—a loose-fitting woman's coat knit in wool—bombed in Lithuania; so Lelia shipped its unsold output to another part of the country, where the coat was a big success.

Undaunted, Lelia's designers kept working with the style and turned it into a more tailored coat. This year, they introduced the revised version in Lithuania. It was an immediate hit.

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ON PAGE II-10LOS ANGELES TIMES
10 DECEMBER 1979

Soviet Malaise: No Easy Cure

Stagflation is no respecter of ideological boundaries. In the Soviet Union, too, economic growth is slowing. Production goals for such key items as oil, coal, steel and foodstuffs are not being met. Hoped-for gains in productivity are not materializing. Consumer shortages persist. And prices are going up.

Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change, in its annual Global Political Assessment, concludes that the Soviet Union's economic performance in 1979 probably has been "the worst in all the years of Leonid I. Brezhnev's leadership."

The roots of the Soviet economic malaise are too fundamental to be cured easily.

The Kremlin's central planners devote 25% of national investment funds to agriculture, a far bigger slice than farming gets in the United States, and a disproportionate one-quarter of the Soviet work force works in the countryside. Yet there are chronic shortages of meat and fresh vegetables, and the Soviet Union is compelled to make massive grain purchases from the West.

Bad weather is obviously an important part of the problem. But so are the inefficiencies and disincentives that appear to be endemic to Soviet communism. It's worth noting that, more than 60 years after the Bolshevik revolution, the big state and collective farms produce only two-thirds of Russia's food. The rest comes from privately tilled plots that make up just 1½% of arable land.

Thanks in great part to demographic factors, the Soviet economy faces an increasingly serious labor shortage. Whereas an average of more than 2 million new workers entered the labor force each year during the 1970s, this will fall off to about 300,000 per year by the mid-1980s.

Making things worse, a disproportionate number of the new entrants into the labor force will come from the warmer, non-Russian regions of the south. They may not be easily persuaded to work in Siberia and other unattractive areas where they will be most needed.

Soviet industry is also afflicted by overcentralized planning and by bureaucratic managers who are averse to risk-taking and resistant to technological innovation. And then there is the energy situation.

The Soviet Union has vast deposits of oil and coal, but these lie mostly beneath Siberia and the rough and perpetually icy waters of the Arctic and North Pacific, far from the populous industrial centers of European Russia. Transportation and other bottlenecks will delay full-scale development for many

years. Meanwhile, production in existing oilfields is declining.

The jury is still out on the American CIA's forecast that the Soviet Union will become a net importer of oil by 1982, but it does appear likely that overall production is peaking, and may fall gradually during the 1980s.

A few days ago, Soviet planning officials conceded that 1979 production goals have not been met for a whole list of important items, including oil, coal, fertilizers, plastics, rolled steel and many consumer items. Targets for 1980 are, in many cases, being scaled back to more modest levels.

The CIA now expects the Soviet economy to grow by less than 3% annually for the next few years, and says the growth rate could fall to less than 1% if worst-case analyses of the Soviet energy situation prove true.

The Soviet system has a way of muddling through economic problems without the necessity of fundamental change. And it could happen again. Many experts are convinced, however, that this time is different.

To quote the Columbia study, "The post-Stalin leadership is not used to, nor is the Soviet Union as it exists today prepared to deal with, those kinds of emergencies confronting them in the 1980s."

Some solutions, such as decollectivization of agriculture and adoption of fundamental reforms in industrial planning and management, are likely to remain ideologically out of bounds.

Military spending, which exceeds that of the United States in both relative and absolute terms, could be cut. And that is the option that Western governments, to the best of their abilities, should try to encourage. But a large enough reduction to do much good would require a virtual revolution in the Soviet Union's internal politics, where the military-industrial complex is far more powerful than in democratic societies.

The Kremlin may, in the end, find itself unable to make any of the hard choices and settle into an extended period of debilitating slow growth.

Unfortunately, as current Russian mischief-making in Iran reminds us, there is another, uncomfortable possibility.

If the energy squeeze does worsen and bring economic stagnation in its wake, the Soviet Union might come to see a grab for the Middle Eastern oilfields as the least unattractive of alternatives. Because vital Western interests would be so obviously threatened by such a move, that would be bad news indeed. □

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Miscellaneous

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13 DECEMBER 1979**Jack Anderson**

Brzezinski Tactic on Cuba Irks Vance

For the gentlemanly Cyrus R. Vance, words like "counterproductive" and "inappropriate" are as scathing as he ever allows himself to use. Both words appear in an angry memo, which he has addressed to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security affairs chief.

This is the latest development in a seething, behind-the-scenes controversy that I revealed Oct. 31. I reported that Brzezinski had drafted a top-secret memorandum outlining a three-phase program to put the Soviets and Cubans in their place. It could only be described as a blueprint for reviving the Cold War.

As part of the scheme, Brzezinski ordered a questionnaire sent to all U.S. ambassadors requesting data on Cuban activities in their areas for use in a worldwide propaganda campaign.

The questionnaire, stamped *Top Secret Umbra*, was opposed by Vance. The secretary of state believes that the United States should seek detente, not confrontation, with the Soviets. Two-thirds of the ambassadors also protested the instructions, an unprecedented show of opposition.

But Brzezinski would not be dissuaded. He wouldn't even allow the Iranian crisis to interfere. Nov. 7, three days after the American hostages had been seized in Iran, the ambassadors were reminded not to miss the Nov. 15 deadline for filing their Cuban reports.

This was too much for Vance. He dashed off a sharp memo intended for Brzezinski's eyes only. "The continued U.S. diplomatic emphasis on the Cuban-Soviet relationship is counterproductive and particularly inappropriate at this time," declared the secretary of state.

"The U.S. can best secure the cooperation of Third World countries both in the long run and during this crisis," he suggested pointedly, "by recognizing that they have legitimate national concerns entirely apart from the U.S.-Soviet relationship."

The responses from the ambassadors, meanwhile, flooded into the State Department by secret cable from diplomatic posts all over the world. There was no enthusiasm in the messages. The ambassadors to anti-communist countries reported that a new propaganda campaign would be preaching to the converted. The ambassadors to nonaligned countries warned that they had to keep a low profile.

Ambassador Marilyn Johnson cabled from Togo, for example, that the tiny African nation "doesn't look at the U.S.S.R.-Cuban relationship as nefarious" and "doesn't believe the U.S. is threatened by Cuba."

She concluded tersely: "Economic and social development can keep Togo more moderate; propaganda campaigns against a Third World nation will not . . . The ante for strong anti-Soviet positions is not words, but economic and military support."

From the neighboring nation of Benin, Charge d'Affaires John Davidson reported: "It is not productive to undertake an effort to get out the facts about the extent of Cuban dependence on Soviet aid. . . . Benin has little reason for focusing on the darker side of the affiliation between Cuba and the Russians."

Brzezinski's Cold War campaign has aroused widespread revolt in the foreign policy establishment. Vance has complained privately that the Brze-

zezinski plan would "reverse 15 years of American diplomacy," sources told my reporter Ron McRae. But President Carter is going ahead with it.

Iranian Threats — Incredibly, some Iranians in the United States, far from keeping a low profile during the Tehran hostage situation, have been passing out literature urging acts of violence against Americans.

Among the terrorist suggestions are attacks with knives and razor blades on Jewish women, aimed at preventing the reproduction of Zionists.

The FBI knows who is responsible for these threats, and has them under constant surveillance. But because our laws forbid the arrest of someone who makes general threats without taking action, the police are helpless.

Meanwhile, the Senate's sergeant-at-arms has advised senators to change their personalized license plates and avoid routine routes on their way to work. And additional metal detectors are being installed at entrances to the Senate office buildings.

Under The Dome — Robert Strauss, Carter's reelection campaign chief, expects a bitter fight with Teddy Kennedy for the Democratic nomination, and he's not all that sure that the president will come out on top.

"We may not win," he told a recent meeting of party leaders. "But we're going to fight like hell."

• Susan's confusin' the U.S. Mint as well as the public. A Gainesville, Fla., resident recently ordered a mint set of the new Susan B. Anthony dollars, and received instead a mint set of quarters. The 25-cent piece is close enough in size and shape to be mistaken often for the controversial coin dollar.

DETROIT NEWS
5 DECEMBER 1979

Most embassies provide cover for own spies

By HUGH McCANN
News Staff Writer

The primary purpose of an embassy is to provide an official link between nations. But embassies have traditionally also served to collect information about the host nation.

Some of this information is public or is available on request from the host country; other information is secret and is known as "intelligence." Individuals who gather intelligence, or who recruit others to collect intelligence, have always been known as spies.

Such intelligence gathering usually is taken as a matter of course and discovery of spying attempts by a "diplomat" results in that individual's expulsion. But in the case of Iran, where students have taken Americans hostage in the embassy, a different response has arisen.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini says that the Americans were involved in spying and will be tried on that charge.

BACKING UP their complaints, students besieging the U.S. Embassy in Tehran produced a captured document last Saturday purporting to back up charges that embassy personnel were involved in spying.

The document, dated Aug. 2 and marked "Secret," purports to be a communication from Lowell B. Laingen, the embassy's deputy chief in Tehran, to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Washington. The message discusses a request for "cover" for two men — Malcolm Kalp and William Daugherty — who were on "SRF assignments."

"There is absolutely no way of guaranteeing that the document is genuine," said a spokesman for the Department of State. "There are many ways that fakes can easily be made."

In the intelligence-gathering community, the term "cover" refers to an identity and/or occupation that an intelligence agent adopts so that he may go about his real mission undisturbed by local police or internal-security forces.

ASKED WHAT "SRF" stands for, the state department spokesman said that it is "an internal definition within the State Department."

The second paragraph of the message reads, in part: "... We are starting from a clean slate in SRF coverage at this mission, but with regard also for the great sensitivity locally to any hint of CIA activity, it is of the highest importance that cover be the best we can come up with.

Hence there is no question as to the need for second and third secretary titles for these two officers. We must have it.

"We should, however, hold to the present total of four SRF officer assignments for the foreseeable future, keeping supporting staff as sparse as possible as well, until we see how things go here.

"We are making effort to limit knowledge within (the embassy) of all SRF assignments; that effort applies particularly to Daugherty, pursuant to (the) new program of which he is a product and about which I have been informed ..."

SEVERAL FORMER employees of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency have written of the way in which the agency operates overseas. They say that the top CIA man in a foreign country — he is known as the Chief of Station — often has the "cover" of a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador or of the embassy's second or third secretary.

Under such an arrangement, the CIA station is inside the embassy building but insulated from the workings of the rest of the embassy — except in the matter of operating communication facilities with the U.S.

Ex-CIA man Victor Marchetti, writing in *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, says that the CIA station handles all electronic communication, whether it is between the CIA station and CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.; or between the embassy and State Department headquarters in Washington, D.C.

For certain messages that the ambassador doesn't want the CIA station chief to read, the State Department has its own special codes — called "Roger channels," says Marchetti.

THE MESSAGE produced by the Iran students is identified as a "Roger channel" communication.

In *Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence*, another one-time member of the CIA, Peter de Silva, says: "More often than not, however, 'cover' would be relatively nominal and consist of the agency station being a part of an official American entity, such as an embassy.

"Presidential directives were explicit in describing the subordination of the CIA station chief to the American ambassador, if cover were to be established within the embassy.

"Furthermore, the ambassador had full rights to know anything and everything being done by an agency station in the country of its assignment; it only remained for the ambassador to set limits on what he wanted to know and what he didn't care to hear about."

According to former CIA man John Stockwell, author of *In Search of Enemies*, "85 percent of all CIA field case officers already are well known in their local communities because of their liaison relationships with foreign police, their own open admissions of CIA identities, their free-wheeling, high-profile lifestyles, and the gossip and conspicuous clannishness of their wives.

"In Abidjan (India), my first post, all CIA station personnel were listed in the embassy's unclassified, public telephone book as the 'Political 11 Section.' 'Political 1 Section' was legitimate State Department personnel."

THE NEW YORK TIMES
13 December 1979

Scholars Foresee a New Age of Terrorism

By BLANCHE CORDELIA ALSTON

A group of experts on terrorism suggested yesterday that the taking of American hostages in Iran could be indicative of a new age of terrorism.

Yonah Alexander, the director of the State University of New York's Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, said that the number of "significant acts" of terrorism had risen from 293 in 1970 to 1,511 in 1978. In the first three months of this year alone, he said, there had been 765 such acts.

Of the 6,294 incidents noted between 1970 and 1979, Mr. Alexander said, more than 60 percent had taken place in the past three years.

He said that about 45 percent of all terrorists acts were directed against business. "Future incidents will be much more costly in terms of protecting people and property," he said.

Mr. Alexander spoke at a news conference sponsored jointly by the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism and the City University of New York's Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations.

Seymour M. Finger, president of the Ralph Bunche Institute, said that the taking of hostages in Teheran was "a much more serious threat to international peace and security than we have known."

Diplomats Called Sitting Ducks

"The Government of Iran has endorsed the taking of hostages and has not carried out its obligation of international law to protect foreigners," he said at the news conference at the New York City office of the State University of New York, 60 East 42d Street. "Diplomats are sitting ducks

wherever they go because the host country cannot protect diplomats"

And if a country cannot send diplomats, he said, "the fabric to resolve disputes peacefully" is weakened.

Mr. Finger praised President Carter's cautious approach to the crisis and his decision not to use force to free the captives, but Ray S. Cline, a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, suggested that "selective military action" be used. He also said that the intelligence community "is the key to the terrorist problem."

"We should reactivate, strengthen and increase the use of clandestine agents to find out where in these countries our interests are at stake," he suggested. "Terrorism is infectious if there is no remedy for it. The Iran pattern will be repeated elsewhere unless we find some leverage to use against a hostile regime."

Part of that leverage, he said, might be for United States military forces to seize strategic oil terminals in the Persian Gulf as a bargaining tool.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A15THE WASHINGTON POST
14 December 1979*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

Of the Soviets, Skeptical

The sudden upsurge of formal but unpublicized complaints about Soviet conduct now being conveyed by President Carter's top diplomatic officials to Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin reveals a startling change in Jimmy Carter that was unimaginable a few months ago.

The president is no longer a convinced partisan of the view that Russia, like his own United States, plays politics by a set of loose but roughly definable superpower rules.

The latest evidence of this change is a request for "clarification" of the Kremlin's stunning, still unannounced incursion into Afghanistan by at least one and probably two battalions of organized military units. The use of these troops, belonging to a crack Soviet airborne division, marks the first time since World War II that Moscow has intervened in a Third World country with organized units under Soviet command, and Carter is demanding an explanation.

Carter's growing disillusion with the Russians also expressed itself in a private complaint direct from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Dobrynin on Dec. 6. Vance was angry over evidence of new Soviet nuclear test ban cheating.

Lumped with Carter's dismay over earlier Soviet rule-breaking, such as its outrageous radio campaign to incite violence against Americans in Iran and its interference with food supplies to starving Cambodians, these new signals of presidential anger hint that Carter might actually—and belatedly—be running out of patience.

Carter is reported by White House insiders to have been mightily buoyed up by popular acclaim for his handling of the Iran crisis. These intimates believe the president's new show of relative realism toward Moscow's superpower rule-breaking has a psychological root in his spectacular climb in the polls. This reinforces his disenchantment over growing Soviet truculence in doing what it wants, whatever various treaties and rules of conduct say.

Vance's confrontation with Dobrynin on Dec. 6 was long overdue, considering unambiguous evidence of repeated Soviet violations of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty. This sets a 150-kiloton limit on underground nuclear tests.

The United States has obtained "hard" information that the Soviets exploded two underground tests this year not yet reported by the Carter administration. It was those two tests—each with an explosive force of between 180 and 210 kilotons—that Vance wanted Dobrynin to explain. Dobrynin predictably denied there had been any violation.

That failed to satisfy Vance. He called on Dobrynin to supply U.S. scientists with the full geologic data on rock formations surrounding the test site and with geographic coordinates so they could more precisely measure the size of the two unannounced blasts.

At least one additional 1979 underground test is known to have exceeded the 150-kiloton legal limit (by at least 50 percent). Three 1978 explosions also broke the ceiling. Yet, until Carter ordered Vance to lodge his formal complaint, nothing whatever had been said to the Russians. The American people have never been told.

The TTBT is only one of three treaties that U.S. intelligence agencies have told Carter the Russians have broken. One of these, as we have reported previously, is the 1963 Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty, systematically violated in 1978 and once again this year, on Oct. 19, when an underground test "vented" its fallout into the atmosphere through carelessness.

The third treaty that is now the target of a formal Carter administration charge of violation is the anti-ballistic missile agreement. Despite the specific proviso in Article 6 of that treaty, which forbids antiaircraft radar to be used to track incoming

ballistic missiles (rather than airplanes), the United States charged a possible violation by the Soviets last October, at the height of the crisis over Soviet combat troops in Cuba. The radars used were the most modern model associated with SAM10 antiaircraft missiles.

Yet last July, when U.S. intelligence first reported Soviet testing of SAM10 radars at Sary-Shagan in central Russia to track incoming ballistic missiles, not a word about violations was said to the Russians. That failure infuriated defense-oriented senators who knew about the Soviet maneuver, including Republican Sens. John Tower, Gordon Humphrey and other members of the Armed Services Committee. They are now lobbying Carter to make a diplomatic issue of the violations and let the American people in on this secret: the Russians have been playing fast and loose with vital treaties on which the future security of both countries could depend.

Whether or not Carter takes that advice, his transformation from a believer in Soviet good intentions to a chastened skeptic, while leaving room for further growth, is a healthy sign of political maturity that fits well with his new showing in the polls.

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WASHINGTON STAR
8 DECEMBER 1979

The Nation

Supposed CIA Agents Identified

Covert Action Information Bulletin, a periodical which says it is out to destroy the CIA, yesterday published the names of 14 men and a woman it identified as CIA agents under cover in various U.S. embassies and consulates around the world.

It also gave the name of a 15th said to have been the chief of station in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia who "crossed the street" and was said to be working now as adviser to the Saudi foreign intelligence.

Despite its policy of "naming names," Covert Action said it had declined to reveal the names of any American intelligence agents at the captured U.S. Embassy in Iran.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-19WASHINGTON STAR
9 DECEMBER 1979

Snepp Case Tests Right to Write by Ex-U.S. Employee

By Lyle Denniston
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Supreme Court is having trouble making up its mind on a key case on the rights of a former CIA agent who turned author and sharply criticized U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Frank W. Snepp's appeal and an opposing appeal by the government pose a variety of significant legal and constitutional issues, but the court has spent weeks pondering whether it will even review the case.

After resigning from the CIA, Snepp wrote *Decent Interval*, a book that assails the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam at the end of the war in April 1975.

The government contends that Snepp broke a promise to clear everything he wrote with the agency, and the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the government is right. Snepp argues that he can't be forced to clear in advance any writing that does not include secret material; his book is said to contain none.

The final outcome of the case could have a major impact on the right of government employees, not only those who work for secret agencies, to write about their experiences.

In addition, the case could have an impact on other writers, not themselves federal employees or officials, who write books or articles based on what they have been told by persons in government.

Conceivably, some attorneys are now suggesting, the case's final result might reach books like *The Brethren*, the new book about the Supreme Court by two reporters, Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong of *The Washington Post*.

Since much of that book came from secret court documents apparently supplied by the justices' law clerks, in violation of court policy if not the clerks' own promises, it might fit the theory that the government is using in the Snepp case, legal experts have said.

The Snepp case has been pending at the Supreme Court since last summer. It was ready for the justices' action when they returned to the bench in early October.

The justices have spent more than two months taking up the case for at least brief discussion with their staffs, but then putting off any action on it.

Lawyers following the case have been told that it has been circulated among the justices at least six times without a vote.

Now it appears that the court will take no action until at least early January. The justices have one more session, tomorrow, before taking a four-week recess, and the Snepp case is not likely to be mentioned then.

At least one justice is so uncertain about the case that a lower court has been asked to send up more data on it. Attorneys have learned that Justice John Paul Stevens requested the full case file from the Court of Appeals. Normally, the justices do not get interested in such files until after the court has agreed formally to rule on a case.

Only members of the court and their staffs know what problem any justice is having with the case.

But legal experts have begun to speculate that one significant factor could be the government's potentially sweeping claim that it has a right to collect all the money that Snepp has made or will make from his book.

The government contends that Snepp's promise to the CIA not to write anything without permission amounted to a legal "trust," and he has now violated, or breached, that trust. Thus, the government argues, Snepp has profited from that breach, making the money he has received "ill-gotten gains" that belong to the government.

Justice Department lawyers handling the Snepp case reportedly were put under pressure by CIA Director Stansfield Turner not only to go after Snepp's proceeds, but also to attack his publisher, Random House, and the CBS television network and CBS reporter Mike Wallace for a "60 Minutes" program about the book.

In the Supreme Court appeal by the government, however, only the proceeds to Snepp are sought.

U.S. District Judge Oren R. Lewis of Alexandria, Va., who ruled against Snepp last year, accepted the government's theory. Lewis imposed a "constructive trust for the benefit of the United States" over any money Snepp makes — on the book, reprints of it, movie rights, or any other "distribution for profit."

The Court of Appeals, however, overturned that part of Lewis' decision, and ruled that the government "is not entitled to a constructive trust." It would have been, that court said, if Snepp had written about secret material.

The government's claim to the proceeds is the only issue the Justice Department has taken to the court.

Snepp, with the support of publishers and various news organizations, has asked the court to rule that government officials and employees may not be required to give up their constitutional right of free expression as a condition of their jobs.

The appeal also asks the justices to rule that Snepp should not be required to submit, in advance, any writing that he does about non-classified material. The court order requiring him to get clearance includes not only writings about the CIA, but fiction as well. That order also extends to publishers who would handle Snepp's writing.

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A Scandal Star's Mom Says Judy's Sex, Spy Saga Has Had a Happy Ending

BY RUDY MAXA

What's a mother to do when her 22-year-old daughter appears on national television to admit she is a prostitute? What do you say to your Fairfax County neighbors when she details in a paperback her sexual adventures as a Washington hooker, a career that included a six-month stint as paid escort to a celebrated Russian defector?

The parents of characters in Washington's sex scandals are generally anonymous, and the case of Judy Chavez's kiss-and-tell adventure last year with a Soviet defector, diplomat Arkady Shevchenko, was no exception. Chavez's parents avoided reporters clamoring for details about the mystery woman who claimed the FBI and CIA provided Shevchenko with more than \$40,000 to buy her expensive company.

"What do you do?" Marilyn Taylor, 51, asks today. "You try to keep yourself busy doing something else. You don't think about it and hope everything comes out for the best."

Taylor (Judy Chavez kept the surname of her former husband) is a feisty McLean housewife and mother of two adopted daughters who thinks everything has come out for the best. After 28 years as a civil engineer with the U.S. Forest Service, her husband, Heyward, is looking forward to retirement. The couple have put their home on the market and plan to head for the sun to operate the Gold Mine Saloon they recently bought in Panama City, Fla. But this time last year the Taylors sat in their tastefully decorated living room and watched in horrified fascination as their older daughter's face appeared on network television and the nation's front pages.

At first they were shocked. But by the time their daughter's paperback autobiography appeared last spring, Mrs. Taylor was sending autographed copies to friends.

She collected press clippings and today says, "Judy is grown up, and she's turned her life over to the world now. We talk about once a week . . . she was always very individualistic."

As a young girl, Judy was a Brownie and Girl Scout whose interests included ballet, tap dancing, and the piano. She graduated at age 16 from Fairfax County's Oakton High School after quitting Fairfax Christian School. She married a local boy and the couple moved to California before returning to Washington to find a job. They separated in 1975.

Gradually Mrs. Taylor began to wonder how her daughter supported herself.

"I always had a feeling," she says. "She lived well, drove a new Camaro, had a nice apartment, kept irregular hours. But when I asked her what she was doing, she'd just get up and leave."

Recalls Judy: "I believe they thought I was in real estate—I was evasive."

She gave her parents several hours' notice before NBC-TV broke the story of her vocation and expensive liaison with Shevchenko.

"I asked her why she didn't marry him," Mrs. Taylor recalls, "and she said because he's too old, 48. You know how I feel about him? He got exactly what he deserves, messing around with a 22-year-old. That dirty old man."

Today Chavez lives in New York and works on a book about how to be a femme fatale. She attends classes in French, music and ballet because, she says, it keeps her out of trouble. A romance with a minor rock musician has faded, which makes her mother happy—she didn't much like him the one time they met.

"Judy likes good living," says Marilyn Taylor. "Maybe what got her off on the wrong foot was I never gave it to her. I always told her she had to work for it. But evidently she found an easier way."

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THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
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Defectors

**Spy satellites can't see through metal
or tell us what's inside the Russian mind**

BY RUTH DANLOFF

As darkness settles over the crowded apartment buildings of North Arlington, Mr. X cautiously opens the door to his walk-up flat. There is no nameplate on the door or on the mailbox. His telephone number is not listed.

"I take precautions," says Mr. X, a middle-aged Russian who bears a vague resemblance to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

An orange rug covers the floor of his sparsely furnished apartment and a picture of his wife, mother and two grown sons—all in Moscow—sits on the table beside the sofa.

"I have always been against the system," says Mr. X, who defected from the Soviet Union two years ago for "ideological reasons."

"When I was a student I criticized it, even during the years of terror. Then during Khrushchev's time, I hoped Russia was changing. They released people from camps. The armed forces were reduced 40 percent, then" His voice trails off.

"The reason I didn't defect earlier was because my children were young," he says, pouring a glass of Rhine wine and laying the table with typical Russian fare—pickled cabbage and herring, beets and sour cream. "I miss them, sure; I want to get the Soviet authorities to let them go, but when my son applied for an exit visa, they put him in a psychiatric institution for three week's observation."

In Moscow, Mr. X held a position related to arms control. Here he fills his day by working with right-wing groups concerned about Soviet imperialism and advising members of Congress about the pitfalls of SALT.

Disgruntled Soviets like Mr. X can be more effective watchdogs for the SALT treaties than all the space-age electronic equipment orbiting the earth. A top-level defector could bring news to the West of Russian noncompliance with the treaties.

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"If the Soviets are contemplating cheating; if they think they can gain strategic advantage, they have to think, 'Can I get away with it? Supposing one of my boys doesn't like it and leaves,' " says former CIA director William Colby.

A spy-in-the-sky can count Soviet missiles, but only a spy on the ground could tell the CIA what the Kremlin intends to do with them. He could also say if the Russians secretly equipped their SS-18 and SS-19 missiles with more than 10 warheads—in violation of the treaties—as some senators fear. Are they surreptitiously developing a devastating new weapon — something which takes 12 years to get off the drawing board and onto the launch pad, where it can be spied on by satellites? Electronic gadgetry can discover much about the enemy's capabilities, but it cannot see through steel. It cannot look into men's minds or learn of high-level policy decisions in the Soviet government.

In 1976, a presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, now defunct, warned that the United States was too dependent on electronic surveillance.

"One well-placed human agent in Castro's government could have provided early warnings of the Soviet brigade's presence and described what its true purpose was," says Cord Meyer, former CIA assistant deputy director of plans, and now a columnist.

Recruiting spies, however, is easier said than done, especially in a totalitarian society such as the Soviet Union, with its closed borders and its watchful KGB.

Soviet intelligence has some built-in advantages when it comes to gathering information with people, not satellites, say experts. "It costs us billions of dollars to collect information on the Soviet Union which the Russians can pick up out of Aviation Weekly for nothing," says Colby. In addition to material on the open market, the Russians have had considerable success buying top-secret information from money-hungry U.S. citizens.

Although the Soviets can find agents in the United States, the United States wins hands-down on defectors. They range from artistic defectors such as Mikhail Baryshnikov or Mstislav Rostropovich, who move easily into U.S. society, to important Soviet and East European officials whose whereabouts, intelligence contributions and adaptation to American life remain one of the darkest secrets of the American spy establishment.

However, since 1975, when Congress began to investigate the CIA, some information has been made public about defectors' lives in America.

These "leaks" are causing alarm. "After all the publicity about what happened to Nosenko and Shadrin," says Dr. Ray Cline, former deputy director of the CIA, "we may have trouble encouraging other defectors."

Yuri Nosenko was a watchdog for the KGB at the U.S.-Soviet Disarmament Conference in Geneva when he defected nearly 16 years ago, just three months after the Kennedy assassination. His assertion then that Lee Harvey Oswald was never in the pay of the Soviets remains controver-

sial today. The information smelled to certain CIA factions of "disinformation," part of a mission to distance the Soviet Union from the assassination. Last year's testimony before the House Assassination Committee revealed that in order to "break" him, the CIA subjected Nosenko to imprisonment for four years, including a period of confinement in a specially constructed 10'x10' windowless vault of steel and concrete. There, to keep his sanity, he fashioned a chess set from the threads of his clothes and tried to keep track of time in the dust. Finally, in 1967, a decision was made to clear him.

Nicholas Shadrin was a high-living Soviet naval commander, who, in 1958, stole his ship's long boat and escaped with his Polish fiancé, Ewa, in a 24-hour Baltic crossing to Sweden. In the summer of 1966, while working for U.S. naval intelligence in Washington, he was approached by KGB agents to spy for the Soviet Union. The FBI encouraged him to play along, feeding the Russians carefully selected "soft" information. But three years ago, while in Vienna, Austria, to meet a KGB contact, Shadrin mysteriously disappeared.

"The Swedes warned us not to come to the U.S. They use you and dump you," says Ewa Shadrin, her eyes filling with tears as she sits in the living room of their Arlington house surrounded by mementos of their marriage.

Mrs. Shadrin, who believes her husband could still be alive in the Soviet Union, accuses the CIA and the FBI of using him as bait and of botching his surveillance in Vienna.

CONTINUED

Most intelligence experts agree with Ray Cline that if disaffected Russians and East Europeans are frightened of becoming espionage casualties like Nosenko and Shadrin, then a vital intelligence source is endangered. On the other hand, a few case officers who have experience with defectors wonder if the information they supply justifies the troubles they bring both to their personal lives and to the agency resettling them in the United States. "You never know if a defector is for real," claims one former intelligence officer. "The Russians have flooded the market with phonies."

The U.S. intelligence's first task is to penetrate the lies, to establish the defector's "bona fides." Is he genuine, or is he a "plant"? His name is run through the computers and an urgent meeting is convened of the Interagency Defectors Board, made up of representatives of the CIA, Defense Intelligence, the military services, the State Department and the FBI. Speed is essential. Once the Russians learn someone is missing, they start agitating with the local authorities. If that country is friendly to Moscow, it may mean smuggling the defector "out black"—hiding him in the trunk of a diplomatic car or flying in a plane to pick him up.

In the United States high-ranking defectors tend to settle in the Washington area to be near the CIA. "Wringing out"—debriefing—can take two years, after which a defector may continue as a "consultant" with a stipend.

"The house was always full of people," recalls Ewa Shadrin. "The guards mostly sat in front of the television smoking. A couple came in to do cooking and cleaning."

Indeed, the CIA and the FBI become the defector's surrogate family, giving new identities, providing jobs and houses, fixing up a divorce and in the case of Arkady Shevchenko, the Soviet's No. 2 man at the U.N., who defected last year, they may have underwritten a call girl.

"The business of hand-holding defectors," says one former CIA officer, "is an obligation imposed for life. It does no good to say 'but I left the agency last year' when they call in the middle of the night. They cling to someone who understands their problems and could do something."

Some defectors come with grandiose ideas of their own importance, expecting Washington to create miracles. One particularly troublesome Russian insisted on becoming a professor, though he didn't want to learn English. "In the end the CIA gave him a \$35,000 stipend and found him a special tutor. Then he wanted us to send his kids to private school, then to private college. It was a terrible drag on the agency," says one former CIA agent.

Another who expected special treatment was Anatoly Golitsyn, who defected from the Soviet embassy in Helsinki in 1960. Allegedly the highest KGB defector ever, he was the man who confirmed that Kim Philby, head of the anti-Soviet section of British Counter Intelligence, was the mysterious "third man" who tipped off Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess that MI6 was about to arrest them as Soviet spies. (Anthony Blunt, Queen Elizabeth II's debonair arts curator, was recently identified as the fourth man who likewise warned Philby.) At first, Golitsyn insisted on being debriefed by the U.S. president. The stocky Russian believed a "mole" (a double agent) existed in the CIA. Give him \$10 million, he suggested, and he would agree to become chief of NATO counter intelligence.

Successful adjustment to the American way of life largely depends on a defector's reason for leaving his country in the first place. Motives vary, though a large percentage are middle-aged men with marital or drinking problems. Some are attracted to the consumer society. Other defectors come to revenge their country's political system. This is particularly true of East Europeans who want to get back at the Russians.

"The defector who comes for ideological reasons does best," says Konstantine Boldyrev, a Russian emigré who has helped refugees in the United States. "Their ideology is a crutch. Those who come for material reasons usually break down. The intelligence defectors are pretty pathetic; all they are trained to do is spy."

A secret CIA study in the late 1960s on communist defectors' adjustments to American life concludes that the Soviets have the most difficulty. A sentimental people, they become depressed easily and start drinking as they wrestle with guilt and loneliness in a society where individual initiative, not state planning, is the key to success.

Whatever the motive, whatever the adjustment, one thing defectors share is fear. U.S. intelligence officials have been told that every Soviet embassy has a leather-bound "blue book" containing names of traitors sentenced to death in absentia—the KGB hit-list. Since Stalin's death, the KGB has curtailed its terror tactics, though the Shadrin kidnapping and the Bulgarians' poison umbrella attack in London last year have caused defectors to worry. Today, in an era of partial détente, a tacit agreement has emerged that says, "We won't trouble you if you shut up and don't engage in anti-Soviet activities." Nonetheless, the KGB continues to track down some defectors, trying to "double" them, or pressing them to come home by mailing them copies of *Golos Rodiny* (Voice of the Motherland).

CONTINUE

After a bad start — his wife's suicide in Russia, scandals with a call girl and a bout with the bottle—Arkady Shevchenko is determined to prove that a defector can make it in America without a change of identity. Once he completes his memoirs, for which he received a \$600,000 advance, he plans to come in out of the cold as a public personality, to lecture, teach, write and speak out on issues. "He knows the risk, but he prefers to live in freedom for as long as he can. That's one reason why he left," says Bill Geimer, the Washington lawyer Shevchenko hired to protect his interest and to quash his play-boy image.

Now married to an American, Shevchenko leads a quiet life in a Washington suburb. He has had no contact with the Soviets since three days after his defection, when Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to Washington, and Oleg Troyanovsky, the Soviet ambassador to the U.N., tried to persuade him to return home.

U.S. intelligence experts say the lives of defectors are often fraught with problems and risks. "But that's the business they chose," Cline says. "I can't feel too sorry for them. They knew the name of the game when they got into it."

Unlike reconnaissance satellites, human spies cannot be turned in for more sophisticated models. As long as the United States and the Soviet Union remain political antagonists, defectors will be the sad but vital pawns in the East-West game of "I Spy." ■

Ruth Daniloff, a Washington free-lance writer, first became interested in defectors after encountering Russian spies Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean in Moscow.

VIP

By Maxine Cheshire

Maryland police officials in several jurisdictions are more than normally interested in a boot-encased leg which washed ashore recently from the Chesapeake Bay onto a beach in the community of Herald Harbor. Because the leg had been in the water more than a year, investigators are trying to determine if there might be a connection to the mysterious death of former CIA official John Paisley, whose badly decomposed body was pulled from the bay on Oct. 1, 1978, with a bullet hole behind the left ear.

EXCERPTED

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THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
10 December 1979

CIA's Manhattan 'tests': Experiments on New Yorkers?

By James Coates

WASHINGTON — The CIA did something sinister in New York City in 1953 and early 1956 — possibly exposing unsuspecting Manhattanites to germ warfare agents or drugs such as LSD. Everybody who was involved in the covert operation is long gone, said agency spokesman Dale Peterson. "Nobody here remembers the details," he explained.

But if dead men — or for that matter, retired men — tell no tales, their expense accounts live long after them. And it is a CIA expense account that gives chilling hints that agency operatives did something nasty in New York with germs or hallucinogenic drugs.

A fragmented picture emerges from a pile of yellowing receipts released by the agency under the Freedom of Information Act. Here are some of the things the spy bureaucrats billed the home office for:

"Cigarets, Development Security \$1.30"
"Bottle stoppers — juice, biol. exp. \$2.02"
"Beer, security, exp. devel. \$1.58"
"Ice, 275 lbs. emergency \$1.56"
"Book, The Complete Shepherd \$3.97"

UP TO THAT point the vouchers could be for a slightly weird party involving small amounts of beer and large amounts of ice.

But, the chits soon become more menacing:
"Bug duster, one dozen, dissemination \$2.98"
"N.Y. Times, Subscription-Information \$1"
"Shotgun shells, dissemination study \$10"
"Nasal filters, sampling 3 at \$12.50 each \$37.50"

"Driver license, car rental, proposed field test — area survey — security \$9.70"
"Nasal filter pads — Emergency sampling \$8.15"
"Animal Fresh Food, emergency \$2.89"
"Book — WRITING CODE, security \$2.50"

"Dual Exhaust Dissem — study \$8.50"

THERE ARE 93 separate expense items listed in the receipts and several people have pondered the nature of the program they financed. Here are some highlights of the speculation:

• A team of CIA agents working with Army personnel from the germ warfare labs at Ft. Detrick, Md., equipped a 1953 Mercury with a dummy exhaust system, which may have served as a dispersal system for a germ or drug weapon.

• The automobile was driven many miles on New York streets, bridges, expressways, and tunnels for "tests."

Afterward the automobile was scrubbed at a commercial car wash for "decontamination," the expense vouchers say.

• Scores of bug dusters — the ordinary "flit gun" variety with a pump at one end and a little jar for holding bug killer at the other — were purchased. The agents also bought numerous packs of "nasal filters" as well as suitcases, miniature motors, and soundproofing material.

THE IMPLICATION LURKING in that series of purchases, say some analysts of the documents, is that the agents hooked motors to the bug guns and placed the devices in suitcases converted to conceal the spraying apparatus. Wearing nose plugs, the agents carried the devices in city crowds where bystanders got a dose of whatever was being sprayed.

The vouchers also covered purchases of hundreds of small boxes and vials — apparently to hold specimens taken around town to establish just how well whatever was being sprayed covered surrounding people and objects.

The CIA-Army team also collected a lot of weather data during their experiment, feeding speculation that conditions had to be just right before the spray was effective.

A voucher for \$1.50 to visit the observation tower of the Empire State Building for "weather data" was one major tipoff that Operation Big City — the CIA's code name for the project — occurred in New York. Other data includes numerous — and obvious — references to Manhattan's streets.

The expense accounts, like most other CIA data released under the Freedom of Information Act have been heavily censored. Names of hotels, car washes, restaurants, food suppliers, and the like have been crossed out.

THERE ARE TANTALIZING hints for armchair analysts that the CIA operatives made mistakes during their tests. One voucher, for example, shows they bought a quantity of "nasal filter pads — emergency sampling."

Another cryptic entry reads as follows: "Toy dog, No official Recp. (receipt?). Air contamination test \$0.98/.02 tax /\$1."

Why did the spies need a \$1 toy dog? One observer speculated that the

toy was a wind-up animal that was operated in a corridor filled with the chemical, then tested to see how much had adhered to its fake fur.

Plenty of people "come up with those types of hypotheses," said the CIA's Peterson. But he emphasized that the agency has made no such effort because so much time has passed.

He admitted that the agency knows the identity of the employee who approved the expense accounts and that the man is still living. But the CIA has not "debriefed" him about just what was done at "Big City."

Between May 17, 1955, and Feb. 14, 1956, the agents sought reimbursement for the purchase of 93 items, which they justified to the home office.

Many of the project's expenses were covered elsewhere in the regular CIA budget, the documents show. But attached to the receipts now circulating, there is an agency memo saying these expense accounts were covered by a slush fund because "proper funds for a given activity will require an undesirable amount of written or oral justification."

WHATEVER THE AGENTS were doing in New York, it appears unlikely that people were infected with disease or intoxicated with any hallucinogenic drugs.

One analyst of the documents, a well-financed foe of the CIA, said that checks of newspapers, oath certificates, and other sources during the experiment showed no unusual incidents had occurred. The expense accounts are among 20,000 pages of once-classified material from an agency project code named MKULTRA, a governmentwide effort to develop mind control methods and use LSD and other hallucinogenic chemicals on urban populations.

The project was developed during the Cold War when extensive publicity was focused on how the Soviets had brainwashed Cardinal Jozef Mindszenty and how the Communist Chinese had broken the wills of numerous American POWs in Korea.

Under MKULTRA, the CIA sought to provide a U.S. capability for the same techniques — and it was expanded into studies of mind control drugs and chemical agents, a CIA official explained.

John Marks, a former CIA agent now considered a renegade by his one-time colleagues, documented many of the farfetched MKULTRA schemes in several books and articles, including a recent volume called, "The Search for a Manchurian Candidate."

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Marks has suggested there might not have been a drug culture in the United States during the 1960s if LSD and other chemical cocktails had not been mass produced by pharmaceutical companies with MKULTRA contracts.

PETERSON SAID that two years ago when the mind control project was unearthed, the CIA feared they would find that many people received doses of mind-altering drugs in the program.

"Now we think there was only a handful," Peterson said. In one highly persuasive case, a victim jumped to his death from a New York hotel room window after a dose of psychedelic medicine.

While the CIA was devising plans to develop an LSD weapon, the Army was busy testing several germ warfare agents on unwitting Americans — another well-publicized horror story.

Senate hearings in 1977 disclosed that the Army tested a variety of "biological simulants" on unsuspecting people in the U.S. between 1949 and 1968. The germ warfare simulants do not cause disease, but allow the scientists to test just how effectively they can spread the agent in a population.

The Army tests ranged from Washington's National Airport to Hawaii, San Francisco to Key West, and San Clemente to Alaska.

Although the tests occurred from 1949 to 1968, there is a puzzling gap of eight years between August, 1955, when germ agents were tested in the Pennsylvania Turnpike tunnels and January, 1963, when a test was run off the coast of Hawaii.

2
MKULTRA project there have been indications that the CIA took charge of these tests during the 1955-68 gap. Based on this, the New York project code named "Operation Big City" was simply a continuation of the covert tests.

"Big City" was one of 180 projects that were operated under MKULTRA. Sidney Gottlieb, the official in charge, has testified that he destroyed all memos, reports, and other documents outlining what "Big City" was about. He neglected, however, to destroy the expense vouchers.

These vouchers have prompted a lot of speculation by CIA watchers, notably the Church of Scientology, which has engaged in a dispute with American intelligence agencies.

A group of Scientologists spent four months analyzing the "Big City" expense vouchers and concluded that the CIA took charge of the germ war testing and used the people of Manhattan as human guinea pigs.

The analysis has been delivered to the House and Senate Intelligence and Armed Forces committees as well as the CIA and the Army, the Scientologists said. It also was delivered to journalists, along with mimeographed copies of the CIA expense vouchers that have been available for nearly two years.

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ON PAGE _____

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 December 1979

James M. Gavin

The general who doesn't fade away

By Stephen Webb
writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Cambridge, Massachusetts

Assistants glided in and out with the required deference. Phones flashed and rang. And flashed again. The legendary paratroop general seemed a trifle uneasy. He glanced at his wristwatch as if a second wave had failed to jump on time. "Big crisis here," he grinned.

General James Gavin might have been regrouping the 82nd Airborne Division after its D-Day drop. One expected a wounded trooper to stagger in with the electrifying news that a column of German Tiger tanks was spilling off Route 2 and grinding menacingly toward us. At any moment, I thought, we might have to dive under the desk as a swarm of Messerschmitt 109s strafed the parking lot. Perhaps I should be asking where the front was now, and how any casualties we were taking, and would the boys be home for Christmas.

The former commander of the 82nd Airborne Division had the situation well under control. "The phone calls," he boomed with a wave of the hand. "I'm involved in saving Mar-a-Lago and George Washington. You know, the pictures by Gifford Stuart that the Smithsonian wants to buy from the [Boston] Athenaeum."

The handsome face is a little more rugged these days, but his gray-blue eyes are just as piercing, and the mouth every bit as firm and combative as it ever was. He might not care to spring from the door of a DC-3 on a night jump, but one suspects that beneath the gray suit there still swaggers a green-eyed paratrooper. One recalls his feisty message to the 505th Combat Team prior to its airborne assault on Sicily in 1943. The term American parachutist has become synonymous with courage of a high order. Let us carry the fight to the enemy and make the American parachutist feared and respected," he declared. "Attack violently."

General Gavin is sitting here in his office at Arthur D. Little, Inc., the industrial research and consulting firm, where he's been successively executive vice-president, president and chairman of the board. He's been acting as a consultant to the firm since he retired in 1977. His graduation from Mount Carmel Area Senior High School in Pennsylvania hangs on the wall.

To have reached the general's office is something of an achievement in itself. For several minutes one seemed unable to progress beyond the front desk: Cameras and tape recorders are viewed as suspiciously here as they would be at the supersecret intelligence establishment. A card thrust me demanded to know whether I was a US citizen (which I am not) and whether I was on a classified visit (which I had not). "I wasn't," I confessed.

Early in 1977 General Gavin learned that Jimmy Carter was considering appointing him CIA director. "It was the darndest thing I've ever gotten into," he remembers with amused exasperation. "I didn't want to get into that. I needed it like a hole in the head, the publicity likewise. I really didn't need it."

It seems that a member of Jimmy Carter's transition team called him to let him know he was on a short list. "I talked to Tip O'Neill's office and said, 'Well, what do you think about this? If it comes up, do I have any support or should I even consider it?' And then I went to see my old friend Frank Church. I took him to Russia with me on a trip some years back. So I asked him what he thought about it, and he said, 'Jim, I think it's the greatest idea ever.' I talked to Barry Goldwater. He and I were second lieutenants a long time ago, down in Arizona. He said: 'Jim that'd be great. I'd like to have you down in Washington.' So the next darn thing that I knew, Tip O'Neill announced to the press that I'd be a great candidate, and Church did the same thing. I could have died. And the White House had its mind made up."

General Gavin insists that the US "must have the world's best espionage agency." He's afraid the KGB has been having a field day of late, "with what's been exposed by Congress and others." He says the CIA should never "have gotten involved in Watergate, because it's to be used solely against foreigners. The CIA got a little off-base on that. But we absolutely must have a good CIA. It's imperative."

General Gavin is an avid reader of espionage books. He thoroughly enjoyed "The Wizard War" by R. V. Jones and "The Ultra Secret" by F. W. Winterbotham — not to mention Anthony Cave Brown's "Bodyguard of Lies."

"What the British did during World War II is incredible. Every time we landed in Europe — and I landed in Sicily, Italy and Normandy — the Germans outnumbered us. They could have easily have outnumbered us two to three on divisions, but they were always fooled out of position."

EXCERPTED

opinion

John Crown

Terrorism Calls For The FBI And CIA

It was reassuring to read this week that the Carter administration has directed the U.S. Marine Corps to organize a 50,000-man spearhead for a Rapid Deployment Force.

Such a force would consist of three Marine brigades, and the first is to be ready by 1983.

The concept stems from the unstable world in which we live and with the obvious need for the United States to be able to respond quickly and effectively virtually anywhere in the world. In addition to the Marine participation, there will, of course, be a need for aircraft and ships.

While all of this is encouraging, it can in no way be regarded as the exclusive and entire solution to the complex problem of terrorism and turmoil. What this force does is respond when a crisis reaches a certain point.

What we need in addition to that is some method of finding out in advance that events are covertly moving toward a crisis in a given country or a given area.

In short, what we need is an effective team along the lines of the Central Intelligence Agency



—that is, the CIA that antedated Watergate.

And to combat terrorism at home what we need is an effective team along the lines of the Federal Bureau of Investigation —that is, the FBI that antedated Watergate.

In the caterwauling generated by Watergate this nation's politicians indulged in some sort of frenzied hara-kiri which disemboweled both the FBI and the CIA. Neither has fully recovered. And we are the losers, both nationally and internationally.

A year ago when the troubles in Iran were attracting our attention there were cries both within and without government that the CIA had not kept us fully informed of what was possible—or probable—in that country.

Those who cried out either conveniently forgot or chose to ignore that Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, in his ill-conceived ambition to be the Democratic presidential nominee in 1976, had successfully emasculated the CIA in order to grab headlines for himself.

And as for the FBI, we have the curious—and disgusting— anomaly that the terrorists are either forgiven or made into heroes, while those in the FBI who sought to serve the best interests of the nation are prosecuted—or persecuted.

That came to mind with the

resolution adopted by the Society of Former Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at its recent annual convention in Washington.

That resolution "requests, as justice demands, that the indictments of L. Patrick Gray III, W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller be dismissed upon the action of the attorney general as not being in the best interests of this nation and its citizens."

Further, "the society reaffirms its intention to continue to extend its full facilities and capacities to those present and former FBI agents who have been indicted or threatened with criminal or other action or otherwise harassed as a result of their good-faith official investigation of terrorist activities without personal gain for themselves."

In addition, the society called upon the Justice Department to pay the legal expenses of those who have had to pay out of their own pockets "for private counsel in the defense of employment-related activities." In the name of decency, honor and justice—if those terms apply to the federal government anymore—that is an elementary demand.

In an address to the society, James L. Buckley made one of many telling points:

"The blunt fact is that editorial writers, college presidents, and

CONTINUED

influential churchmen condoned the most appalling acts because those committing them clothed themselves in the most high-minded causes: opposition to the Vietnam war in the case of SDS; to racism in the case of the Black Panthers; and to what they described as the predatory economic and social order in the case of the Weathermen.

"This collapse of the ability to make the most elementary moral distinctions between means and ends had the effect of turning criminals into victims; and this, in turn, prepared the way for as grotesque a miscarriage of justice as we have seen in recent years, one with which you are all too familiar. ..."

Terrorism is on the rise throughout the world. We must have the means of combating it both at home and abroad. The concept of three Marine brigades as a Rapid Deployment Force is a partial answer.

But in addition we need an effective FBI and an effective CIA, as we had before infamous politicians goaded by blind ambition gutted them.

Whether we can recreate such effective organizations is moot. But a good first step would be to dismiss the indictments against L. Patrick Gray III, W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller—and compensate all those who have incurred legal expenses in their defense.

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ON PAGE B-1

TRENTON TIMES (N.J.)
23 NOVEMBER 1979

CIA now just another recruiter on Princeton campus

PRINCETON (AP) — The Central Intelligence Agency has invaded enemy territory looking for converts.

Once the scene of massive anti-war, anti-CIA protests, Princeton University is now the site of a recruiting drive by the intelligence agency.

"You have to recruit people from somewhere, and a university is obviously a good place to get qualified applicants," said Kathy Pherson, public affairs spokeswoman for the CIA.

"It's a normal recruiting situation; it's like any other government agency or large corporation trying to fill their positions," she said.

THERE WERE no protests when a CIA representative spoke to nine potential employees on campus this week.

"We get a number of government agencies coming to campus to recruit, and the CIA is one of them," said Minnie Reed, Princeton's acting director of career services.

"They've been coming here every year since 1967, when we first had business and government recruiting" for seniors.

Nine students of 1,100 Princeton seniors signed up for interviews. The number was about average: Eight had signed up the previous year and 14 in 1977, Ms. Reed said.

James J. Fitzgerald, a CIA personnel representative based in New York, told the students the agency is hardly all trenchcoats and cloaks and daggers. He outlined the four main branches of the agency: Scientific and technological, administrative, intelligence and operational.

"MOST OF our employees work at headquarters in McLean, Va., but we have people overseas, too," he said. "We're looking for people who want a career, not a job."

Most students out of college start at \$14,000 a year, while engineers begin at \$18,000, he said. Vacation is 2½ weeks every year, and a month after three years in the agency.

The application process is grueling. A 17-page employment form requests detailed information about every place the applicant has studied, the places he has lived and worked for the past 15 years and about his entire family.

Eight references are necessary, as well as a security check that includes a lie-detector test.

Approved For Release 2009/04/27 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9

IRA!

Hardly a story this week that does not
use the three magic letters - CIA.

Approved For Release 2009/04/27 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9

CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER
3 December 1979

Diplomat foresaw chaos after shah

By Richard G. Zimmerman
Plain Dealer bureau

WASHINGTON — The State Department was warned 15 years ago that "if a revolutionary change were to occur in Iran, the pent-up grievances are likely to explode into demagoguery, extremism, revenge-seeking, and a search for new enemies."

The author of the classified dispatch, then a junior political counselor who had been posted in Iran only 10 months, was just as pessimistic over the ability of the government of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi to survive.

"The shah's regime is regarded as an unpopular dictatorship not only by its opponents but, far more significantly, by its proponents as well," Martin F. Herz warned his superiors on the basis of his own observations and conversations, CIA reports and other diplomatic sources.

(President Carter obviously was not aware of how unpopular the shah was with his own people until it was too late. In 1977, during a toast delivered in Tehran, the president lauded the shah for "the respect, admiration and love which your people give to you.")

While Herz' observations obviously carried little weight with his superiors, he did rise to become an ambassador and is now director of studies at Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.

"Ambassador Holmes (Julius Holmes, then U.S. ambassador to Iran) let the report go through, although he didn't relish it," Herz recalls today. "He knew it would only be grist for the lower levels at the State Department."

Herz recalled that Holmes "came from the old school, slightly jaded, slightly cynical." He said Holmes felt the shah would be in power for some time and that it was in the best interest of the United States to get along with him.

Herz said he was "quite pleased" when he recently reread the 15-year-old memo in light of current events in Iran.

Herz, a realist, observed in his dispatch that "even an unpopular dictatorship can be defended on the grounds that it is necessary and that no viable alternative exists."

But Herz said that in his 10 months in Iran "we have heard this forthright defense of the regime from only one man — General Hasan Parkravan, the chief of SAVAK, the shah's internal security organization."

Yet even Parkravan, one of the most hated men in Iran at the time, "is known to be periodically in despair about the situation because he feels that repression is not a solution to the principal problem of government in Iran, which is to obtain a broader popular consensus," Herz observed.

The United States was making a possibly fatal mistake by continually defending the shah, by continually touting and overemphasizing his pro-American sentiments, Herz felt.

"By being given credit today for power to influence the situation in Iran that we do not actually possess, we of course incur the blame for deficiencies that we are in no position to prevent or remedy," the dispatch warned.

Herz concluded that "the most distressing aspect of this situation is that concessions made to popular pressure, for instance by way of giving leeway for freedom of expression and assembly, are quite likely to be the very thing that might set off a revolution in Iran."

(Fifteen years later, the shah was in the process of granting concessions when he was driven from his throne.)

"The shah, in other words, is riding a tiger from which he cannot safely dismount," Herz correctly prophesied.

WASHINGTON AFRO-AMERICAN (D. C.)

4 December 1979

Crying for blood

Who can believe the wave of emotional hysteria that we are now experiencing in the midst of the Iranian crisis? Is this the same generation which just a few years ago risked shooting and imprisonment in protesting U.S. militarism in Vietnam?

It hardly seems possible that the American people (including its youths) are now crying for blood. Yet it is true.

All kinds of anti-Khomeini memorabilia from tee-shirts to toys threaten to make mockery of the season honoring the Prince of Peace. The Iranian ayatollah is even the center target on dartboards.

Worse than all of this, however, is the wave of prejudice and outright harassment of persons of Iranian descent in the United States. Crowds hurl cat-calls and other objects at Iranian students, and other persons (some of whom are Iranians who have become naturalized citizens of the U.S.) report that they experience fear just walking down the streets of our cities.

All of this reminds us of horrible parallels in our own past. It all sounds too much like the treatment blacks experienced for years in the

presence of whites in the South. And it reminds us also of the terrible wave of anti-Japanese fever that caused thousands of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent to be hurried into concentration camps during the last world war.

In reality, it seems as if many among us are literally begging for a war. Part of this unjust and unfair situation can be traced to President Carter, whose own action against Iranian students has been criticized as unconstitutional. (Although, we must say that the response of John Connally and some other potential presidential candidates is even worse.)

Part of it just appears to be a part of the American psyche. (Although it is almost unbelievable to see this hysteria directed against another Caucasian people — the Iranians are not Arabs.)

Even the State department and CIA have joined in with such "old hat" accusations such as those which claim that the present uprising is really being directed by Communists or some Marxist group like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. When as, everyone knows, the Muslim world is an antagonist of the Communist world.

MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE

7 December 1979

CIA in Iran

Iranian students here have explained — and many of us have read the same for years in church-mission newsletters and journals — that the U.S. embassy in Iran was used by the CIA for directing "events" in Iran, including which relatives of whom should be tortured how.

The real danger in putting the shah on trial is that U.S. financing and training of torturers would receive official light. This side of America is a side we do not know how to discuss publicly yet, it seems to me.

But we had better learn. Pretend that some foreign country's embassy in Washington began sending agents out among us, leaving our friends' bodies dying on our doorsteps from torch burns. We would not be fooled by claims that the embassy must be given diplomatic immunity. I doubt that that embassy would be standing long. And I wonder whether we would take as few embassy lives as the Iranian "fanatics" have in the process. — Robert Spottswood, Minneapolis.

BLUEFIELD TELEGRAPH (W. VA.)
9 DECEMBER 1979

Will We Never Learn?

In the television coverage of the month-long Iranian crisis, viewers have been treated over and over again to the film clip of President Carter on his visit to Iran, standing beside a confident shah and praising that nation as "an island of stability" in a troubled area.

The inevitable question is why did Carter think the shah was secure on his throne — if he really did — or that Iranian dissension posed no real threat to him or to this nation? Was the President ignoring information our government had, or had he simply been given wrong information?

Whatever the reason for his apparent ignorance of the fact that the shah was about through, it is obvious that he should have known. The taxpayers of this nation have forked over billions of dollars of their money to create a number of intelligence agencies, notably including the CIA, which are supposed to have firm information on the stability, or lack of it, of our important allies.

When we don't have that kind of information, or when our leaders ignore it when we do have it, we inevitably are caught by surprise and end up looking like idiots, as Carter and the rest of his administration did in the case of Iran.

It should be noted that the shah is claiming that U.S. pressure, meaning from the Carter administration, helped force him off his throne. It is perfectly possible that Carter did do that, without a backup plan to avoid the kind of thing now going on in Iran. It can happen when Washington has no reliable information about such situations.

It is of course true that our intelligence agencies, again led by the CIA, have been under a long and sustained attack by incompetent charlatans like Sen. Frank Church of Idaho.

Church, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has seemed bent on destroying the CIA as a functioning organization, and there are indications that he has just about succeeded.

There also is good reason to believe that the folks back home in Idaho have caught on to Church and are going to bounce him out of Washington when they have the opportunity next year. They certainly should do it, but in the meantime the damage he and his cohorts have inflicted on our intelligence apparatus needs to be repaired, if that is possible.

Perhaps it isn't possible. There must still be some good people in the CIA and other intelligence agencies who know what should be done and how to do it, but it may be that in the current climate in Washington it simply isn't possible to operate the kind of intelligence operations we must have if we are to survive in the hardball game our opponents are playing overseas.

It also is quite possible that even in its present stifled and defensive state, the CIA's vast apparatus still is producing the hard information that our leaders need to operate intelligently in the world arena, and those leaders either aren't getting it or aren't paying any attention to it when they do get it. It could be a little of both.

Whatever the problem may be, the vast majority of concerned Americans must be thoroughly fed up with the continuing spectacles which develop as we are caught by surprise again and again by overseas developments inimical to our interests. Iran is merely the latest instance of this, and certainly won't be the last.

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THE BUFFALO EVENING NEWS (N Y)
15 December 1979

CIA Says Soviets Strive to Split Iran Into Small States

12-15-79
By MAX McCARTHY
News Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The Soviet Union is enlisting Iranian citizens for military training in Afghanistan. The Buffalo News has learned.

According to CIA sources, the Iranians are members of the Baluchi tribe in the southeastern part of the oil-rich nation.

Intelligence analysts believe that this latest piece of information about the ambivalent role of the Soviets in the U.S.-Iran crisis suggests that Kremlin policy is geared toward the "fragmentation of Iran into small, independent states."

The Soviets previously have been observed in actions that would tend to foster the breakup of the country into these parts:

Azerbaijan — Soviet broadcasts in Turkish have been aimed at this large, restless province and have fueled aspirations for local autonomy. An estimated 500,000 Turkish-speaking Azerbaijanis this week marched through the provincial capital of Tabriz declaring support for their religious leader: autonomy-minded Ayatollah Kazem Shariat Madari.

CIA agents recall that the Soviet Union in 1946 fostered the creation of a Communist republic in the region and withdrew its troops only after President Harry S. Truman threatened to use atomic weapons, on which the U.S. then had a monopoly, if they did not withdraw.

Baluchistan — Iranian advocates of an independent Baluchistan are receiving political training by the Soviets,

according to CIA sources. The object is said to be the hope for Soviet influence in a possible breakaway state.

Kurdistan — The Kremlin is pouring money into the coffers of the Kurdish Democratic Party which, according to intelligence analysts, is under the influence of the Kremlin.

Khuzistan — Heavily populated with Arabs, many professing Marxist beliefs, Khuzistan in southwest Iran contains most of Iran's rich oil fields.

Experts on Iranian politics are now saying that if Iran were to lose these four areas it would be "emasculated — left only with the ruling Persians with little to rule." The authorities recall that "The only way the former shah and his father kept all these disparate elements together was with a strong central government backed up by a big and effective army."

The analysts also claim that the Kremlin is following the so-called "ripe fruit" policy in Iran. Soviet leaders in recent years have likened Iran to a piece of fruit which, when fully ripe, would simply drop into their hands.

Petroleum executives and CIA analysts explain that the Soviet Union is "rapidly running out of oil in its own wells and will be forced to bring in huge quantities of foreign oil within the next few years."

Some analysts ascribe "extraordinarily devious" motives to the Kremlin in the current crisis. They are claiming that the Soviet hierarchy "actually would like to see the United States intervene militarily in Iran."

Their theory is that an American military strike against Moslem Iran would inflame much of the Islamic world into an anti-American fervor. They note the irony of "the fact that many of the 4,000 Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan today are killing Moslems" in that country, Iran's eastern neighbor.

The same experts are also saying that one reason the Soviet Union may use its veto on the U.N. Security Council to kill possible U.S.-sponsored, U.N. economic sanctions against Iran would be to force the United States into exercising its military option to help secure the release of American hostages.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 9WASHINGTON WEEKLY
18 DECEMBER 1979

UPI Story of Khomeini As KGB Agent Killed By Washington Post-Star And N.Y. Times

The Washington Post has ignored reports of how the Soviets are forging U.S. documents. By contrast, it has given front-page publicity to a claim by terrorists in Iran that an embassy document links the American hostages with the CIA.

On December 2, the Post carried a page one story headlined, "Iranians Say Document Ties 2 Hostages to CIA." The story concerns charges by two of Khomeini's aides that a "purported secret State Department cable" shows that two of the American hostages are CIA officers.

However, in the fourth paragraph of the story, a State Department official is quoted as saying that the Iranians occupying the embassy "have an ample record of forgery, misrepresentation and fabrication." And so have the Soviets. Sen. Gordon Humphrey recently revealed that the Soviets have been forging U.S. documents as part of a worldwide KGB misinformation campaign. This story has been ignored by the Post.

Is this "purported secret State Department cable" a KGB or Iranian forgery? The Post doesn't know. But it went ahead with the story, which linked American hostages to the CIA. The Post

**Published In Miami Herald,
Houston Post and Dallas
Morning News - But Censored
By Big Eastern Media**

even ran a photocopy of this allegedly secret document.

The Post has often publicized charges that the CIA has been involved in Iran. But often it ignores charges of Soviet involvement there.

On November 23, for example, UPI released a story charging that Ayatollah Khomeini was a Soviet agent in the 1950s. According to UPI: "The Soviets penetrated the Shiite Moslem sect as early as the 1950s and the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was a Russian agent at that time, according to a Polish army counter-intelligence chief who defected to the West in 1960."

The former Polish espionage chief, Col. Michael Goleniewski, was debriefed by the CIA and reportedly told the agency that Khomeini was the most important of five top Russian agents in Iran. According to UPI, Goleniewski "reported to a high Iraqi government official, who in turn passed information to the Russian KGB through its agents in Warsaw, where Goleniewski was headquartered."

UPI said that Goleniewski's information has been reliable. It noted that he had exposed Soviet agents operating in Britain, Sweden and Israel.

The story that Khomeini was a Soviet agent was dramatic news. It was carried on page one by a New York Newspaper, the *News World*. We also saw it in the *Miami Herald*, the *Dallas Morning News* and the *Houston Post*.

Big Eastern Media—the *New York Times*, *Washington Star* and *Washington Post*—ignored this UPI story.

Isn't a communist defector—whose information has been proven correct in the past—as reliable as some Iranian terrorists who have a record of forgery and fabrication?

Apparently not for newspapers like the *Washington Post*.

—Cliff Kincaid

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE E12THE WASHINGTON POST
19 December 1979

Jack Anderson

Carter's Logic vs. Iranian Fanaticism

A frustrated President Carter, with his logical engineer's mind, cannot seem to cope with the illogical, if not irrational Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The president has turned, as he usually does, to the textbooks for the answers. He is studying two secret primers on the ayatollah. One is called "Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran: His Personality and Political Behavior." The other is more specific, "A Psychological Perspective: Khomeini's Political Behavior and Decision-Making in the Current Crisis."

Carter's classified reading also includes other related documents analyzing the role that Khomeini's fanaticism has played in the Iranian crisis. The ayatollah emerges from these studies as a dedicated, calculating, rancorous, implacable old man who would sacrifice Iran's oil wealth, his own safety, life itself to pursue his goals.

No threat of reprisal is likely to budge him. Boycott? "If we have to lose our honor in order to fill our stomachs, then we would prefer that our honor is preserved and we will go hungry," he said. Oil cutoff? The Persian people lived with petroleum for 5,000 years, and Khomeini believes they can get along without oil again. Military attack? "Why should we be afraid?" he retorted. "We consider martyrdom an honor."

There is no doubt in the minds of Central Intelligence Agency analysts that the ayatollah means it. During the street fighting that brought down the shah, Khomeini sent instructions from his exile in France for his followers to wear white robes to show up the blood from their wounds.

Khomeini is as reckless as Carter is

cautious, as dogmatic as Carter is reasonable, as militant as Carter is mild, as bloody as Carter is squeamish. The ayatollah apparently views Carter's forbearance as weakness, his restraint as timidity, his concessions as appeasement. The president, jeered Khomeini, "lacks guts."

The secret studies also indicate that the ayatollah's advanced age and brooding bitterness have affected his mind. He dared to defy the shah, risking prison and assassination. He is convinced that the shah's agents murdered his father and one of his sons. For 15 years, the exiled Khomeini has nursed a smoldering, pious hatred for the shah. Now at age 79, he won't be deterred from getting revenge. This hunger for revenge, the analysts suggest, is his dominant passion.

This strange, stubborn, unyielding man has now been united with a populace that for 25 years has been boiling with anger without focus, grievances without unity, revolutionary hopes without a revolutionary leader. He has given that revolutionary role a driving force by his strident religious appeals.

More than 95 percent of Iran's 36 million people are Moslems, and most of them belong to the militant, martyr-minded Shiite sect. Khomeini has fired them up with calls for a more aggressive Islam, for a holy war against the infidels. This is "a struggle between Islam and the infidels," he has declared.

Nothing in the textbooks can instruct the engineer in the White House how to overcome the vulnerability of a mighty, comfortable, cautious nation before the powerless zealot, or how to battle the

tyranny of the aggressively weak over the self-disarmed strong.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES
19 DECEMBER 1979

Ally of Khomeini Is Murdered

By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN

Special to The New York Times

TEHERAN, Iran, Dec. 18 — A prominent Moslem clergyman close to the regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was gunned down today along with his two bodyguards by killers who escaped on a red motorcycle through the congested streets of Teheran.

The murder of Hojatolislam Mohammed Mofateh, a 51-year-old former member of the ruling Revolutionary Council and dean of the Divinity College of Teheran University, followed the style of several assassinations attributed earlier this year to a terrorist group called Forghan, which seems directed against clergymen in politics.

Plotting Is Charged

The Revolutionary Council issued a statement attributing the crime to agents of the Central Intelligence Agency and Savak, the Shah's secret police. By implication, the statement also accused the Carter Administration of complicity. [The allegation of C.I.A. involvement was denied in Washington.]

The Iranian radio and television said: "Once again the criminal hand of the United States emerges to deal a blow against the Moslem people and divert opinion from the crimes of the United States and prepare grounds for plotting against the Islamic revolution."

The murder diverted attention from the 50 hostages who have now been held six weeks in the United States Embassy.

The Revolutionary Council resolved yesterday to set up a 24-member grand jury to investigate United States policy toward Iran. The hostages could appear at such an inquiry, though possibly as witnesses rather than defendants.

The relationship between this panel and any hostage trial was not clear. The regime appears to be waiting for instructions from Ayatollah Khomeini.

As Dr. Mofateh lay dying in a hospital, followers mounting a vigil outside chanted "Blood will triumph over the rifle" and "Carter will be annihilated."

Universities and schools as well as the bazaar in Teheran have been asked to close tomorrow in mourning. A demonstration scheduled at Teheran University is expected to take on anti-American overtones as it proceeds through the city.

The Iranians who are holding the em-

bassy issued a communiqué linking the murder to the United States and Savak.

"Does the United States think that it can change our people's minds in their fight against the United States with these kinds of murders?" the captors said.

In an earlier statement, broadcast today, they accused Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh of sounding too conciliatory toward the United States on the issue of the hostages. The rambling statement did not mention him by name, but it evidently alluded to his interviews with the Western press in saying that the Foreign Ministry was "exceeding the limit in remarks about the spies, their trial, their release or meetings with them."

The statement said such remarks were out of "rhythm" with Ayatollah Khomeini and the revolution. The statement said it was "a disgrace to talk with the enemy, and more important, with an enemy like the evil United States, more than is necessary." It reiterated that the United States must return the Shah even if he had left for Panama.

Ghotbzadeh Seems More Cautious

Mr. Ghotbzadeh has seemed more prudent since the criticism.

Ayatollah Khomeini shed no new light on the fate of the hostages when he spoke today from the window of his home in Qum to followers who had been injured in the revolution. He repeated his contention that the only solution was to send the Shah back to Iran for trial.

The Iranians holding the American Embassy also contended in today's communiqué that Iranian embassies abroad were not revolutionary enough and proposed that they be staffed by militant youths, with "an ambassador raised from the revolution and in service to it."

Kamal Kharazi, deputy director of the Foreign Ministry's Political Department, said 402 out of 800 employees in his department had already been purged.

The attack on Dr. Mofateh took place when he was getting out of his Chevrolet Impala sedan in front of the Divinity College on Mubarezan Street at about 9 A.M.

Two young men, wielding pistols, walked up and shot his two armed bodyguards first and then wounded Dr. Mofateh in his right leg while an accomplice maintained a lookout. The bearded, dark-haired professor managed to limp into the college entrance pursued by one gunman who shot him in the shoulder, the wrist and finally the head, where the fatal bullet entered his left temple.

According to several witnesses, the gunmen scooped up the Israeli-made Uzi submachine guns carried by the bodyguards, climbed onto a Yamaha 125 motorcycle and fled. Dr. Mofateh was taken to Taleghani Hospital for surgery but died about 1 P.M. without regaining consciousness, hospital officials said.

Group Blamed for Some Killings

He was at least the fourth prominent figure in the regime to be slain since last spring. They included Ayatollah Morteza Motahari, like Dr. Mofateh a member of the Revolutionary Council. The terrorist group Forghan has been blamed for some of the killings.

Dr. Mofateh, who was married and had at least two children, was a hojatolislam, which ranks just below ayatollah in the hierarchy of the Shiite branch of Islam. A native of Hamadan, he studied at the Qum seminary. The Iranian press said he was jailed in 1975 under the Shah and later helped organize anti-Shah demonstrations. When Ayatollah Khomeini returned from Paris in February, Dr. Mofateh served as his Arabic interpreter.

He resigned from the Revolutionary Council earlier this year, apparently to devote more time to teaching. But he continued to speak at mosques and rallies. Official reports said he belonged to Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Republic Party. Another account called him a member of the rival Moslem People's Party loyal to Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari, under whom he had studied at Qum.

U.S. Denies C.I.A. Involvement

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 18 — The United States today denied allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency had been involved in the murder of Dr. Mofateh.

"That is absolutely untrue," Jody Powell, the White House spokesman, said. "There is an effort on the part of the Iranian authorities to escape the consequences of their own actions and to divert the attention of the Iranian people from problems in Iran by continually blaming every problem on the United States."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 129

THE WASHINGTON POST
19 December 1979

Khomeini Aide Is Killed; Iranians Blame the CIA

By Michael Weisskopf

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Dec. 18—A leading Islamic scholar and close associate of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was shot to death this morning on a crowded Tehran street, and Iranian leaders immediately blamed the assassination on agents of the CIA.

Iran radio quoted eyewitnesses as saying that Mohammad Mofath was gunned down by two or three men on motorcycles as he and two bodyguards stepped from a car into a Tehran theology college which Mofath directed. The guards also were killed.

Mofath, a senior member of the ruling clergy who strongly supported political rule by Iran's religious hierarchy, was the third influential cleric and Khomeini ally murdered since Khomeini led his Islamic revolution last February.

Although no one claimed responsibility for today's slaying, the assassination is similar in style to two previous murders for which a little-known fundamentalist religious group that called itself Forgan claimed credit.

The organization, which has described itself in leaflets as fiercely opposed to political actions by Iran's spiritual leaders, has been attacked by leftist and religious groups as "an agent of imperialism" linked to the CIA.

Mofath, who was said to be in his 50s, held the clerical rank of hojatolislam, one step below the position of ayatollah. He was exiled and jailed under the shah and was believed to have served on the first secret Revolutionary Council after the shah was overthrown.

A longtime friend of Khomeini who served as the revolutionary leader's Arabic interpreter in the period leading up to the revolution, Mofath fought for the section of the newly approved constitution giving supreme governing power to the ayatollah.

According to eyewitnesses, Mofath was shot first in the legs. He managed to drag himself into the theological

center where gunmen carrying what were said to be .45-caliber revolvers, shot him in the head. He died in a Tehran hospital two hours later.

While the popular cleric underwent surgery, angry crowds gathered outside the hospital. Some of the shouts heard were: "Carter, Carter will be annihilated . . . Blood will win over the rifle . . . assassinating personalities has no effect any more."

Tehran radio interrupted its normal programming after the shooting and played funeral music while Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council declared: "This is the work of the CIA and Savak (the deposed shah's secret police)."

19 December 1979

ARTICLE APPEARED

ON PAGE A1

Ghotbzadeh Says U.S. Probe Of Shah Could Resolve Crisis

By Michael Weisskopf
and Stuart Auerbach

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Dec. 18—Iran's foreign minister today expressed doubts that any of the 50 American hostages here will be freed before Christmas, and said that an official U.S. investigation into alleged crimes of the deposed shah would be a "very positive step" that could end the 45-day crisis.

Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh said in an interview that his scaled-down demands for the release of the hostages carry the "full authority" of Iran's ruling hierarchy and are "already cleared from many angles." He repeated twice that he was using this interview to signal Washington on ways to end the impasse that has dragged on for more than six weeks.

The call for a full probe by the American government into relations with Iran since the 1953 CIA-backed coup that returned the shah to power was a far cry from the original demand that the deposed shah be returned in order to secure the hostages' release.

While the students still maintain that demand, other Iranian leaders have steered further and further away from it as the hostage crisis drags on and as the realization grows that the United States could not and would not return the shah.

The foreign minister does not have the final word on policy decisions in a country whose power is divided among the radical students holding the U. S. embassy, the Revolutionary Council which is nominally in charge, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who is the religious and political leader.

Khomeini, for example, today repeated the demand that the United States return the shah even though he is now in Panama, a country the religious leader said is controlled by America.

Significantly, however, for the first time in 45 days Khomeini's demand for the return of the shah was not linked to the fate of the hostages, who were not mentioned in his talk.

As a gesture to spur the U. S. decision on an investigation, Ghotbzadeh said Khomeini had decided to allow the hostages gifts from their families, Yule trees and Christmas Eve services conducted by Catholic and Protestant ministers, who will also serve as the long-sought independent observers to certify the good health of the 50 Americans.

"That is the gesture that we make to disinflate the public opinion" in America, he said.

As welcome as the holiday services may be, the clergy are not the same as the delegation of independent international observers, including a doctor, that the United States has demanded be allowed to see the hostages. These demands have been brought to the Foreign Ministry by diplomats here who have volunteered to perform service.

Ghotbzadeh said authorities here have not thought about allowing news correspondents or television cameras into the embassy on Christmas Eve so that the American public can see for themselves the condition of the hostages.

Ghotbzadeh indicated that authorities here had been considering a "particular case" for pre-Christmas release, but he declined to reveal any details—including why the release fell through, how many Americans were involved and how this "case" differed from that of the rest of the hostages.

Diplomats here have said they have been trying to arrange for the release of three Americans who are reported to suffer from chronic heart or circulatory ailments.

Ghotbzadeh, though, insisted that none of the hostages—whom he once called "prisoners" in a slip that he immediately corrected—"feel slightly bad in any way."

Ghotbzadeh's retreat from his statement Sunday, which raised the possibility that some of the hostages could be home for Christmas, vividly illustrates his lack of control over the embassy militants. The students have steadfastly maintained that no hostages would be released until they all face spy trials, and said today that the foreign minister has "gone over the limits" in statements about the hostages.

During today's interview, Ghotbzadeh left vague what kind of investigation the United States should conduct, and whether it must get under way

before any of the hostages can be released.

At one point he mentioned a congressional probe, similar to the ones that sparked the national debate on America's involvement in Vietnam. But he emphasized that some assurance of government action is needed by Iran.

If the hostages are released without the promise of a serious investigation, he said, U.S. government officials, "will bury the more general issues"—which he listed as including CIA involvement in Iran, the wealth of the shah, the sale of unneeded military equipment of Iran and the alleged bribery of American officials by Iranian diplomats.

He also said Iranian authorities will supply material to aid the U.S. government probe and suggested that newspapers use the Freedom of Information Act to get documents to show what the CIA has done in Iran.

Ghotbzadeh said word of American investigations into what he considers the real issues separating the United States and Iran—the alleged crimes of the shah—could be used as leverage to persuade the students to give up the hostages.

"These things," he said, "will at least give a certain impression here that the American government is really trying to do something about the real case."

Ghotbzadeh's suggestion, however, presents problems for the United States which must decide how to respond in a positive way without appearing to be giving in to extortion.

The foreign minister, a long-time close aide of Khomeini, visit the 79-year-old religious leader Monday in the holy city of Qom. Ghotbzadeh said they talked about general foreign policy issues, including the outline of policies regarding the hostages.

"I am talking with full authority and I know what I am talking about," said Ghotbzadeh, referring to the charges of the radical students that he is speaking out of turn.

What is important for Iranians, Ghotbzadeh said, is for the United States to realize that "behind the question of the hostages is the question of the shah."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1417

THE WASHINGTON POST
20 December 1979

Jack Anderson

Faulty U.S. Intelligence in Tehran

Top Carter administration officials are privately expressing anger at the third-rate intelligence information they have had to work with in the Iranian hostage crisis, and are trying to put the blame on past administrations.

It's understandable that the president and his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, would try to picture themselves as the innocent reapers of a whirlwind sown by their predecessors. That way, Carter also can harvest the political windfall of the crisis without having to accept any responsibility for causing it.

Unfortunately for Carter, it's a bum rap in many respects. While it's true that previous administrations, in their blind devotion to the shah, effectively handcuffed U.S. intelligence agents, it's also true that Carter and Brzezinski had two years to correct the situation.

Yet the Iranian revolution a year ago caught U.S. leaders by surprise—either because our agents were providing inaccurate information, or their reports were being ignored by our policymakers.

Hardworking spies and analysts tried to regain the ground that had been lost over the years in the Iranian intelligence desert, and by midsummer they had succeeded at least in part. I've already reported how some intelligence and State Department experts warned, months before the event, that U.S. diplomats might be seized as hostages if the former shah were allowed into this country. But

their warnings were ignored by Carter and Brzezinski.

Ever since the preventable disaster occurred and the Tehran embassy was seized, our long intelligence blackout in Iran has caused serious problems for Carter & Co. as they try to figure a way out of the mess they helped to create. The sad fact is, our intelligence agencies know practically nothing about the so-called students who have led the world to the brink of war by their intransigence in the hostage situation.

Intelligence sources told my associate Dale Van Atta that they have been able to identify at least three separate "student" groups among the terrorist-captors of our embassy personnel. But they haven't been able to provide much more than the barest of thumbnail sketches of some of the kidnapers' leaders. Indeed, U.S. intelligence hasn't even determined the names of several of the apparent ringleaders.

Small wonder, then, that our intelligence community is divided on the best way to deal with the fanatical phantoms who are threatening American lives.

Our experts aren't even sure who instigated the embassy takeover. Some put the blame on the mad mullah, Ruhollah Khomeini, pointing out that the ayatollah made inflammatory statements several days before the seizure in which he called the embassy "a nest of spies." They think he may still be calling the shots.

Most intelligence analysts, however,

think Khomeini simply tried to take belated leadership of a situation he didn't foresee, and has no real control over the student radicals.

"We are hoping that dealing with the ayatollah is the way to end the crisis," one source said. "But we know better."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1

THE NEW YORK TIMES
20 December 1979

Iranian Official Held in Teheran As Ally of U.S.

Militants Say Documents of Embassy Show Links

By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN

Special to The New York Times

TEHERAN, Iran, Dec. 19 — The Iranian militants occupying the American Embassy here announced tonight the arrest of Iran's Ambassador to Scandinavia and produced what they said were embassy documents to accuse him of having collaborated with the United States.

Abbas Amir Entezam, who served as Deputy Prime Minister and spokesman for the former revolutionary Government of Mehdi Bazargan, was the first prominent Iranian to be arrested after having been mentioned in American diplomatic correspondence seized by the militants.

Mr. Entezam's arrest, which according to one account took place at the Teheran airport, occurred after he was summoned home from Stockholm, purportedly for consultations. The militants said tonight that they had waited for him to be taken into custody before making excerpts from the documents public.

Excerpts Read on Television

Two of the young militants, appearing unshaven and in rumpled army jackets on a late evening Iranian television program, read extracts of papers said to have been taken from the files of the seized United States Embassy. In them, Mr. Entezam was portrayed as a friendly Iranian official who was eager to mend relations between his country and the United States and who had offered to act as a conduit from his embassy office in Stockholm.

The excerpts read out tonight did not contain anything that clearly demonstrated Mr. Entezam had been an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency or showed that he had done anything to betray his country. But the frequent mention of him in the documents held by the radicals, given the current climate of anti-American feeling, seemed sufficient to bring accusations of disloyalty if not of treason, a crime that is punishable by death under Iran's Islamic law.

'Intelligent Speaker' for Regime

The two militants took turns reading out references to Mr. Entezam in Persian from sheaves of papers piled before them and in interpreting their significance. The dates of the correspondence were not made clear, but they appeared to span a period from last summer, when Mr. Entezam stepped down as Government spokesman, to the seizure of the American Embassy on Nov. 4, while he was serving as Iran's ambassador to Sweden, Denmark and Norway.

One document read in Persian and attributed to the embassy's chargé d'affaires, L. Bruce Laingen, described Mr. Entezam as an "intelligent speaker for the revolutionary Government" and "actively interested in maintaining contacts with the United States and sincerely trying to mend bilateral relations between Iran and the United States." The documents said that the embassy would continue talking with him as much as possible.

A second document, as read out by one of the Iranian radicals, said that the C.I.A. had asked the embassy to inform Mr. Entezam that it was ready to exchange information after Sept. 19. There was no other evidence produced to suggest that Mr. Entezam was knowingly involved in contacts with the intelligence agency.

Other purported documents quoted him as assuring the Americans that it would be "easier to talk in Stockholm" and that he would help when he returned to Teheran every two months for consultations. The militants said that he also hoped to be appointed as Iran's ambassador to the United States.

Mr. Entezam, a former businessman who imported electrical equipment, was an active figure in the first Government that emerged from the February revolution that deposed Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi. However, he made a number of enemies and there were rumors in Teheran that he had profited from arranging exit visas for wealthy Iranians who wanted to escape the new regime.

His arrest seemed likely to lead to a roundup of other Iranian citizens and to heighten the current antagonism against the United States in the wake of the embassy takeover.

Carter Called a 'Frightened Lion'

Earlier today, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini likened President Carter to a "frightened lion" and said that military and economic threats by Washington would have no effect on the Iranian people.

"These are the cries an animal makes to frighten its opponents," said the Iranian religious leader, speaking of American pressures that have included a proposed naval blockade of the Persian Gulf. He made the remarks in an interview in the city of Qum with Mohammed Hassanin Heykal, an Egyptian journalist now in disfavor in Cairo.

"We are not afraid of tough talk from Carter," said Ayatollah Khomeini, who has consistently supported the takeover of the United States Embassy by the radical youths more than six weeks ago. He asserted that the Iranian people were not frightened because they welcomed rather than feared death. "People say, 'We want to be martyrs,'" he asserted.

"Mr. Carter tries to frighten such a people with military intervention," the Iranian leader went on. "Mr. Carter himself is frightened because he does not believe in the afterlife."

While he was meeting with Mr. Heykal, tens of thousands of Iranians surged through the streets of Teheran in a funeral procession mourning a murdered associate of Ayatollah Khomeini. The procession turned into the most impassioned anti-American demonstration for several weeks.

U.S. Blamed for Killing

Hojatolislam Mohammed Mofateh, the dean of the Divinity College of Teheran University, was shot down yesterday along with two bodyguards by unknown assailants. The policy-making Revolutionary Council blamed the United States and the C.I.A. despite the absence of any evidence, and the contention was echoed by the crowds today.

The Ayatollah and his militant supporters occupying the American Embassy have not budged from their insistence that the 50 hostages there will be put on trial for espionage unless the deposed Shah is sent back to Iran. The only signs of a willingness to compromise have come from a few officials within the Iranian Government.

Hashemi Rafsanjani, the acting Minister of Interior and a member of the Revolutionary Council, raised the possibility

in a Teheran newspaper interview today that relatives of the hostages might be allowed into Iran to see them in the Christmas period.

"About the hostages," he said, "I should say that we will be extremely happy if, from the human point of view, we create conditions so that these people can have contact with their relatives and the American nation so that it can be informed about the health of these individuals and understood to some extent that our issue is not the issue of these 50 people who are hostages but the interests of a country." Mr. Rafsanjani also has the title of hojatolislam, of lesser importance than ayatollah, in the Shiite religious hierarchy. The interview appeared in the newspaper Bamdad.

Decision Up to Khomeini

Asked whether his statement meant that the Iranian Government might let the families of the hostages visit them during the Christmas season, Mr. Rafsanjani replied that this decision was up to Ayatollah Khomeini and the militants holding the embassy.

"However, there is a possibility their families will be allowed to visit them and we would like such a thing to take place," he said.

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ON PAGE 4-F

THE NEW YORK TIMES
20 December 1979

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"However, there is a possibility their families will be allowed to visit them and we would like such a thing to take place," he said.

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Militants at the embassy, reached by telephone, played down the idea of such visits while not ruling it out. A spokesman called it only a "suggestion" by Mr. Rafsanjani and said: "We haven't reached any decision about that yet."

The militants have agreed to accept some Christmas cards for the hostages though it is not known whether the Americans have received them, and apparently they are willing to allow Christian clergymen to see the hostages during the holiday time. Most of the hostages have been kept out of sight since their capture on Nov. 4 and assurances from Ayatollah Khomeini and the radicals that they are all in good health have not been confirmed independently.

There were previous hints yesterday that some Government officials were looking for a graceful way to resolve the confrontation over the hostages. The Foreign Minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, suggested in an interview that it might help if the United States undertook its own inquiry into the Shah's alleged misdeeds. Mr. Ghotbzadeh had previously been rebuked by the embassy militants for suggesting that some hostages might be released by Christmas.

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ON PAGE A-1

WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE)
20 DECEMBER 1979

Captors Reject Christmas Visits To Hostages

TEHRAN, Iran (UPI) — Militant students, scuttling another proposal by a member of Iran's government, ruled today that relatives will not be allowed to make Christmas visits to the 50 American hostages being held in the U.S. Embassy.

"No relatives will be allowed to see them at Christmas," a militant spokesman said. "After all, they are hostages."

He refused to say whether the hostages — in their 47th day of captivity — would be allowed to attend Catholic and Protestant church services next week as promised by Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh.

"That's his opinion, not necessarily ours," the spokesman said.

Interior Minister Hashemi Rafsanjani had raised the possibility of Christmas visits yesterday when he said, "There is a possibility their (the hostages') families will be allowed to visit them for Christmas and we would like such a thing to happen."

The students and Ghotbzadeh were locked in a power struggle after Iran's ambassador to Sweden was arrested on charges of being a CIA agent.

A militant spokesman said on state television that Ambassador Abbas Amir-Entezam was taken into

custody after secret U.S. Embassy documents were turned over to the revolutionary prosecutor. The spokesman claimed the captured documents proved the ambassador was a CIA spy.

He read out portions of the American documents, quoting one in which Charge d'Affaires Bruce Laingen wrote that Amir-Entezam had been working to re-establish closer ties with the United States.

The ambassador, a deputy premier in the provisional government of former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, had himself transferred to Sweden to maintain his CIA contacts, the spokesman charged.

He read another document purportedly showing a former embassy political officer identified merely as Mr. Stempel had been a CIA officer in Iran.

The militants' announcements have been a deep embarrassment to Ghotbzadeh and heightened the present struggle with the students for influence in Iran and the ear of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Earlier this week Ghotbzadeh suggested a U.S. inquiry into the ousted shah's rule might improve the climate in the hostage crisis and possibly speed their release. The militants opposed the idea, and Khomeini later said any such proceeding would have to be in Iran.

In the holy city of Qum, Khomeini today said the majority of Americans now oppose any U.S. military intervention in Iran to free the hostages.

"Many of them (Americans) have come to our side. Fifty-five percent of the American public opinion opposes military intervention," he said.

"The American nation is experiencing an awakening and will soon see through these superpowers trying to impose their will," the 79-year-old Iranian leader told several hundred revolutionary guards who marched past his house shouting, "We are your soldiers Khomeini."

The militants at the embassy this week launched a full-fledged public attack on Ghotbzadeh, calling his optimistic statements on the future of the American hostages "irresponsible."

They accused him of "deviating" from Khomeini's wishes and said many Iranian embassies were nests for "counter-revolutionaries" and threatened to occupy them. Ghotbzadeh defended himself by insisting

he spoke with the full authority of Khomeini, but the religious leader remained virtually silent on the power struggle.

Ghotbzadeh's immediate predecessor, Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, also ran afoul of the militants. He was subsequently replaced.

Diplomatic sources said the future of the hostages might rest on the outcome of the struggle. The militants insist the hostages will be placed on trial for spying unless their "minimum" demand that the shah be returned to Iran is met by the United States — even though the former ruler is now in Panama.

Fighting between rival groups in eastern Iran's troubled Baluchistan region, meanwhile, left two persons dead and 36 others wounded, Tehran Radio reported today.

It was the latest outbreak of violence in areas of Iran where ethnic minorities have been agitating for greater autonomy from Khomeini's central government.

THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
21 December 1979



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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
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U.S. Wants Hostages Mute if Tried

The Carter administration at present wants the U.S. hostages in Iran to stand silent if they are put on trial and may not provide them with lawyers.

Official sources say this is the tentative decision on handling a situation that the administration is still trying to head off. Hopes are waning that the release of the 50 hostages can be obtained before some form of trial, despite U.S. warnings of further economic pressure or possibly a naval blockade.

Iranian authorities are talking about convening an international tribunal next month to examine allegations of U.S. crimes in Iran during the rule of deposed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The hostages will be used as witnesses before the tribunal, some authorities have said.

The militants holding the U.S. embassy in Tehran are still talking about having spy trials for the captives. It is not clear whether the tribunal might merge into trials.

American officials have warned that the hostages must not be put on trial. They have implied that military action will be taken if trials are held. And in public statements they have refused to discuss the question of legal defense for the hostages, insisting instead that trials would be illegal.

But in confidential discussions the administration has been considering how to react if a tribunal or trials go ahead.

The official thinking now is that the United States will denounce them as a violation of international law, which prohibits legal action against diplomats, refuse to participate in the trials, and try to get word to the hostages that they should not testify.

"It's sort of like prisoners of war — they shouldn't give anything more than name, rank and serial number," one official said yesterday.

But the administration recognizes that after two months in captivity some of the hostages might be in such a mental condition that they will cooperate in a trial. Responsible officials here hesitate to talk loosely about "brainwashing," but the possibility is in their minds.

One reason for not having the hostages testify, officials said, is that anything they say is likely to be twisted. While some of the material found in the embassy and made public by the militants seems to show a CIA involvement — which the militants say proves spying — the militants have also implied hostile and espionage meaning to routine embassy materials.

As an example of twisted interpretations, one official mentioned the papers cited by the militants to justify the arrest of a former deputy premier, Abbas Amir Entezam. He was called home from his post as ambassador in Sweden and charged with being a CIA spy because he had dealt with the embassy in an effort to improve Iranian-American relations.

A second reason for not letting the hostages testify is that the material implying CIA activity cannot be explained away. Officials here concede that there were CIA personnel in the embassy. They quickly add that none of their activities violated international law on embassy work, and therefore there is no legal basis for a trial.

Since any Iranian jury or international tribunal selected by Iran presumably would already have its mind made up, the United States does not think there is any purpose in providing lawyers for the hostages.

An attempt to argue points of law with a regime that is flouting international law and defying a decision of the International Court of Justice — which said last Saturday that the hostages should be released immediately — would just be appearing to dignify the proceedings without helping the hostages, officials think.

The staff of the legal adviser to Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance prepared a memorandum recently that outlined four possibilities on providing legal defense if the hostages face trial or tribunal.

The options were trying to send lawyers from the United States to defend them, engaging international legal experts who could argue as neutral specialists, hiring Iranian lawyers, and letting the hostages defend themselves. One of them is a lawyer with experience of representing the State Department in legal proceedings.

The memo has been left lying on top officials' desks and the options are not being pursued, one source said, because no defense at all seems the best way to handle the situation.

— Henry S. Bradsher

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21 December 1979

Few Iranian Diplomats Have Left U.S.

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

Despite the widespread public impression that most Iranian diplomats here have been ordered to leave the country, the State Department said yesterday that few, if any, have actually left and it is uncertain whether any will depart in the near future.

The order announced Dec. 12 called on Iran to cut down its representation in this country from 218 accredited diplomatic personnel to only 35, with a deadline of last Monday, Dec. 17. The action was taken "to demonstrate to the government of Iran our continuing concern over the illegal holding of hostages and American property in Iran," it was announced last week.

State Department officials said the Iranian Embassy furnished a list Wednesday of 34 officials who have been designated to remain. At the same time, spokesman Hodding Carter said it is "murky" whether and when the vast majority of the diplomatic personnel will leave.

A substantial number of the Iranians are married to Americans or are long-term residents pressed into service temporarily by the Iranian regime after the downfall of the shah, according to the State Department. These people have a claim to remain here on other grounds, even though they lose their diplomatic status.

Other Iranian diplomatic personnel may wish not to return, on grounds that they may face persecution at home, according to the State Department. However, there is no report that any current Iranian diplomats have sought political asylum.

Those who intend to leave have been granted "a decent interval" to get their affairs in order, Carter said.

He said the slow-moving and murky situation is due to "our courts, our own laws, the procedures of a civilized country and the difficulties of sorting out who is who" in a democratic society.

In his daily briefing for reporters, Carter also said that the possibility of a Soviet veto or an unfavorable vote from other nations in the U.N. Security Council would not deter the

United States from seeking economic sanctions against Iran.

No such decision has been made, he said, but it is among the options under consideration. Some officials believe President Carter will authorize a drive for United Nations sanctions in the next few days.

"The United States intends to seek its goals through every appropriate legal avenue . . . whatever we think of the chances of success," the State Department spokesman said.

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin had been expected to return from Moscow this week with an answer to U.S. feelers about economic sanctions on Iran. But Soviet Embassy officials said Dobrynin is not back, and they have no indications when he will return.

The State Department, reversing last week's strong criticism, praised Japan for cooperating with measures to put pressure on Iran. Spokesman Hodding Carter noted recent statements by Japan's Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, as well as new actions to prohibit influx of Iranian oil in Japan. Carter said the United States has been assured that "Japan will keep step with European countries" in applying economic pressure.

While the administration continues to expound its policy, a former high official of the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations was sharply critical of the U.S. failure to take stronger action in the early days of the crisis.

James R. Schlesinger, who served as CIA director, defense secretary and energy secretary, among other posts, told reporters that the United States should have set a deadline for release of the hostages and threatened Iran with "punishment" if the deadline was not met.

Asked about the risks to the hostages and the U.S. stakes in the Middle East, Schlesinger declared that "the greatest risks are those associated with inaction." He said that a strong U.S. military force should have been dispatched to the region at the same time the initial ultimatum was delivered.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
21 December 1979

Regional Clashes Reflect Unrest of Iran's Minorities

By Michael Weisskopf
Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Dec. 20—An outburst of antigovernment violence in southeast Iran today underlined the growing unrest among the country's minorities and compounded the problems of a regime already preoccupied with the crisis over detention of 50 American hostages at the U.S. Embassy here.

Two persons were killed, and 44 others were injured in a wild shooting and stone-throwing melee with strong antigovernment overtones in the southeast city of Zahedan, provincial capital of Baluchistan. A second demonstration flared in the vital southeast port city of Bandar Abbas.

The latest regional challenge to the central government of this ethnically and religiously divided country could further complicate the release of the Americans held hostage since Nov. 4.

Diplomatic analysts believe the domestic pressures created by disturbances like today's uprisings, together with the pressing demands for autonomy by ethnic minorities in the populous northwest provinces, keep government leaders from fully focusing on the hostages' release.

Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini consistently blames the local uprisings on "agents of the CIA." It is not known, however, if the regional challenges could force him to

seek early release of the hostages so he could concentrate on the economically and politically debilitating provincial rebellions.

Some diplomatic observers believe that Khomeini views the hostage issue and his fierce adversary relationship with the United States as a trump card, a means of limiting local disturbances by calling for national unity to face a foreign threat.

In Tehran, meanwhile, the militant Islamic students holding the American hostages say they are considering a suggestion by a government minister to allow families of the captives to visit them on Christmas Day.

Interior Minister Hashemi Rafsanjani, who also is a member of the nominally ruling Revolutionary Council, said yesterday, "There is a possibility their families will be allowed to visit them and we would like such a thing to take place."

Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh said earlier this week that the government is planning some kind of a Christmas celebration for the hostages, including a possible visit by clergymen and the delivery of gifts from home. No details have officially been announced since then.

In recent weeks, Iran's government leaders at times have shifted attention from the hostages in Tehran to unrest in the provinces. The most serious incident came early this month when a pro-Khomeini mob marched against the home of another ayatollah in the holy city of Qom, touching off a fight there and an anti-Khomeini demonstration a day later in northwest Azerbaijan where Iran's largest ethnic minority lives.

The government also has tried to work out an agreement with the Kurds, a large ethnic minority that demands autonomy. After several weeks of negotiations, the Kurds rejected a Khomeini government proposal for self-rule yesterday.

Today's melee in Zahedan appar-

ently stemmed from tensions between the predominantly Sunni Moslem population of Baluchistan Province and the Shiite Moslem government of Khomeini represented locally by Khomeini-assigned Revolutionary Guards.

The Sunni minority in Baluchistan, a very poor date-farming province near the border with Pakistan, ardently oppose sections of the newly approved constitution that designates Iran's majority Shiite strain of Islam—an Islamic sect formed as a result of a 7th century power struggle with Sunni orthodoxy—as the official religion of Iran.

According to the official Pars news agency, violence broke out after the province's Sunni leader called a rally in a local mosque to hear a speech by Ibrahim Yazdi, a former foreign minister recently assigned by Khomeini as a regional troubleshooter.

According to the news account, shooting began when rival groups began shouting slogans in favor of and against the revolutionary guards trying to keep order. Yazdi escaped without injury during the shooting and rock-throwing, according to the news agency and independent sources.

The fighting is not the first incident of violence in the largely desert province of 660,000 people. In September, 30,000 people demonstrated against the constitution. A month later, ballot boxes were burned and two people were killed in a protest against local elections in which all candidates nominated by the central government were of the Shiite faith.

The other fracas today took place in the Persian Gulf town Bandar Abbas, site of Iran's biggest naval base and a major port for the shipment of natural gas. High school students staged a large rally to protest the jailing of teachers accused of being leftist, the state radio reported.

As many as 19 teachers have been fired by a school administration loyal to the Khomeini government, prompting several days of demonstrations, street fighting and vandalism, according to local sources.

Today, large groups of students marched to the high school and then to the prison of the revolutionary prosecutor outside the city.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-35NEW YORK TIMES
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In an article in The New York Times, Ray Cline, a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, argues both for a revival of American covert operations abroad and for changing the agency's name—hence abolishing "the C.I.A." "Regrettably," Mr. Cline concludes, "the name is a liability abroad."

Well, how does he think that came to be? The C.I.A. is not a bad word around the world because it collects satellite information or reads the Soviet railroad timetables or even because it employs "spies." The C.I.A. is feared and hated because of the covert operations Mr. Cline wants to resume—for example, the overthrow of the Iranian Government in 1953 and the installation of Mohammed Riza Pahlavi as Shah.

It's true that Soviet and other propagandists have made the C.I.A. more of an ogre than it ever actually has been. But that could not have been accomplished had it not been for the C.I.A.'s own loose-cannon energies and heavy-handed escapades—the coup in Guatemala in 1954, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the murderous pursuit of Fidel Castro, the destabilization of Chile, the creation of a "secret army" in Laos (all, to be fair, authorized, to some degree, by one Administration or another).

Unfortunately, Mr. Cline's is not the only voice calling for a return to covert operations; politicians and journalists with short memories also have taken up the cry. Most would insist, of course, that they are not thinking of overthrowing governments or assassinating leaders; but these can only become possibilities, as inevitably they do, if covert action is an accepted and frequent tool of government policy.

Those who claim that it should be such a tool usually do so on the ground that events in Iran prove the need for something "between surrender and sending in the Marines" (Mr. Cline's phrase). Something between those two extremes surely is needed; and the

IN THE NATION

Iran 'Proves' What?

By Tom Wicker

Carter Administration, at least for the moment, is pursuing just such a mid-course. Even if it weren't, covert operations—trying to set up a coup against Ayatollah Khomeini, for example, or backing the anti-Khomeini Azerbaijanis with guns and cash and "advisers"—would be no more useful than either of Mr. Cline's extremes.

If these supposedly (but seldom) secret operations failed, Iranian charges against the United States would be confirmed throughout the world, most particularly in the Islamic oil-producing countries; and the forces supposedly being aided would be ruined instead.

And even if such operations "succeeded," what would success mean? Would an American-installed or supported regime dampen or increase anti-Americanism among Iranians? How would it be viewed elsewhere in the Middle East's oil-producing countries? Would that kind of "success" safeguard or endanger Western oil supplies?

The answers are obvious. In fact, it is not too far-fetched to say that the origins of the trouble in Iran today can be traced directly to the American-engineered coup of 1953, and to the C.I.A.'s later unwillingness to offend the Shah by keeping in touch with, or even abreast of, his political and reli-

gious opposition. The intervening quarter-century of the Shah's regime may have been valuable to the United States, but the price is now being paid; whether in the long run it will appear a high or a low price remains to be seen.

Rather ominously, however, the Iranian crisis seems to "prove" more to American politicians and generals than to the American people—who, by and large, have kept calm, supported the Administration's restraint and muted demands for any sort of "quick fix." But ironically, the Administration's prudence and caution in its non-military handling of the Iranian problem seem to be balanced against plans for a military expansion that Iran "proves" will be necessary to deal with or prevent similar crises.

To the Carter Administration, for instance, Iran "proves" the need for a 150,000-man Rapid Deployment Force, at a cost of \$9 billion in ships and planes alone. Mr. Carter also seems to think that Iran "proves"—or at least supports his case for—a 4.5 percent increase in the military budget, after inflation, in each of the five fiscal years following fiscal 1981.

Now the Administration has disclosed that it is seeking a military base or bases in the Persian Gulf area, apparently because Iran "proves" the need for a stronger American "presence" in the Middle East. Maybe so; but all these let's-get-tough propositions ought to be as carefully scrutinized as the notion of renewing covert operations.

Note, for example, that while moderate governments in the Middle East apparently favor an American base in the area, Drew Middleton, The New York Times military correspondent, reports that not one wants American forces stationed on its territory. That points to what ought to be obvious—the military utility of such a base might well be outweighed by popular resentment in the region of what would be taken as renewed American interventionism and imperialism.

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21 December 1979

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Mullah Slaying Bore Hallmark Of Extremists

By Ian Mather
London Observer

TEHRAN, Iran — Although Iran's leaders blame the assassination of Dr. Mohammed Mofatteh, a close associate of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, on the American CIA and SAVAK, the former Iranian secret police, others say the killing bore the hallmark of an extremist Islamic group called Forghan.

Forghan is a shadowy organization of assassins believed responsible for the murder of four second-ranking mullahs of Khomeini's entourage since the revolution.

Why it should kill clergymen — and why not the most senior ones, around whom security is not good — remains a mystery.

Mofatteh was killed by unidentified gunmen as he entered the theological faculty building at Tehran University on Tuesday morning. The killers escaped on motorcycles.

Two telephone callers, one saying he represents a group called "Cobra Snake" and the other claiming to represent "FM," took responsibility for the killing. Nothing is known of either group, or even if they are groups and not just a caller.

The "Cobra" caller said his group was trying persons and carrying out death sentences according to the 77th verse of the Koran, which concerns the "law of retaliation."

The ruling Revolutionary Council immediately described the assassination as "the work of CIA and SAVAK agents." Khomeini, in a message of "congratulations" on the achievement of martyrdom, said: "America is happy that, by creating terror in the hearts of the nation who are the soldiers of the Koran, they can check the holy *jihad* (war) of the faith of God."

The assassination led to a particularly colorful contribution from the anonymous scribe who writes the communiques issued by the militants holding the American hostages.

He wrote: "Every day a hand comes out from the sleeve of the criminal U.S. and aims at the heart and brain of a child of this revolution . . . ignorant of the fact that any drop of Islamic militants' blood helps the tulips of life and victory to grow."

The killing has scarcely improved the chances of early release for the 50 hostages, who are completing their seventh week of captivity. After a surprisingly muted reaction to the departure of the deposed shah for Panama, the mood on the streets has once again turned ugly and anti-American and, for the first time in weeks, reporters have been collared by groups of mourners and asked if they are Americans.

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Drawing Board



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Iran Is Confident It Can Withstand Economic Sanctions

By Edward Cody

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Dec. 22—Tehran expressed defiant confidence today that it could withstand any hardship imposed by economic sanctions sought by the United States to pressure for release of Americans held hostage in the U.S. Embassy here.

"We have already taken precautionary steps," said Finance Minister Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr. "We are going to buy what we need from other countries," he added, without specifying what countries.

Bani-Sadr's determination was echoed by the militant Islamic students occupying the embassy and holding the 50 Americans there since Nov. 4.

"We are not afraid of economic sanctions," said a spokesman for the students, reached by telephone inside the embassy. "Our nation can cope with them."

The defiance reflected Iran's national mood of confrontation with the United States over the hostages and demonstrated again the eagerness of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's followers to portray themselves as unyielding enemies of Washington. At the same time, it paralleled the assessment of Iranian economists that sanctions would have little immediate effect unless food imports were cut off and oil exports were blockaded.

In addition, members of Khomeini's ruling Revolutionary Council are reported confident that the Soviet Union will exercise its veto in the U.N. Security Council to block the Carter administration's request for sanctions. There have been no public signs here, however, that Moscow has offered such assurances to the Iranian leadership.

In any case, President Carter's announcement yesterday that he is seeking the U.N.-sponsored sanctions

against Iran seemed to have little effect on Iran's resolution to try at least some of the embassy hostages for espionage.

Khomeini, the Islamic revolution's spiritual guide and temporal leader, told a French parliamentary delegation at his headquarters in the holy city of Qom today that a trial before an international court definitely will be held.

"Those hostages who were spies will be tried before an international tribunal for the crimes of the American government," he said, according to the official Iranian news agency Pars. "The CIA and SAVAK also will be exposed so the world may know what kind of crimes America committed through the shah."

SAVAK was the deposed shah's secret police. Its abuses, including torture, underlined much of the popular hatred of the shah. Widespread conviction here that it was trained by and linked to the American Central Intelligence Agency also contributes to resentment against the United States.

The walls of the occupied U.S. Embassy, for example, are papered with photographs of "martyrs" including victims of SAVAK, along with young men shot by the Army during the uprising that led to the shah's overthrow almost a year ago.

One of Khomeini's high aides, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, chief

mullah of Tehran, also expressed determination to carry through with the trial despite the threats of economic sanctions raised by Washington.

"The trial of the hostages is essential and definite," he told a Japanese television interviewer.

The composition of an international tribunal apparently is still under negotiation between the Khomeini government and prospective panel members.

Sean McBride, the former head of Amnesty International and winner of the Nobel and Lenin peace prizes, was reported to be flying to Tehran tonight for talks with the Iranian leadership, with the tribunal idea presumably among the subjects he planned to discuss.

Replying to questions about the U.S. sanctions proposal, Bani-Sadr acknowledged that such measures, "will have some effect on the economy."

"It will make prices go up and it will slow down economic activity," he said. "It will also upset dependent industries which rely on imports. But it also has positive effects. It makes people work harder in every field, especially production."

A respected economist at the University of Tehran said sanctions would have only a small immediate effect on the Iranian economy as long as food imports and oil sales continue, as suggested by Washington.

A food embargo, however, would drive up prices steeply and quickly, adding to an inflation rate already estimated at 40 percent, he said.

Iran depends on imports for 20 percent of its wheat, for more than 30 percent of its rice and sugar and for 80 percent of its vegetable oil, according to Moreza Movahedizadeh, managing director of Government Trading Corporation. The United States supplies between 25 to 30 percent of these vital imports, he said. World-wide refusal to buy Iranian oil would swiftly empty the government coffers, he added, because tax collections have been temporarily halted and oil is the treasury's only current source of income.

But the economist, who asked that his name not be cited, said a lack of heavy machinery or spare parts for Iranian factories would not produce a great effect because most industries have been shut down or run below capacity anyway during more than 15 months of turbulence.

Iranian economists estimate the nation's gross national product has dropped by 50 percent from the 1977 level of \$65 billion because of the turmoil.

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23 December 1979

Anti-Khomeini Violence Flares Anew

Iran Moves on Baluchis

By Michael Weisskopf
Washington Post Foreign Service

ZAHEDAN, Iran, Dec. 22—Iranian troops moved into this provincial capital today in an effort to put down a bloody outburst of minority nationalism that intensified threats to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's control of the country's border regions.

Before troops loyal to Khomeini arrived, masked snipers firing automatic weapons from city rooftops killed a member of Khomeini's Revolutionary Guard and wounded at least three others, bringing the casualty total for the three days of fighting to 12 dead and 70 injured.

The atmosphere remained tense tonight as sporadic shooting and street-fighting persisted in the latest regional outburst aimed at least partly at the Khomeini regime. Soldiers in tanks and armored personnel carriers patrolled the city, trying to enforce a cease-fire signed by warring parties yesterday.

With the third day of unrest in this southeastern province of Baluchistan-Sistan on the Pakistani border, and smoldering tensions in two populous northwest provinces, Khomeini has serious problems distracting him from the situation of the 50 Americans being held in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

Government forces were sent to the capital of the mountainous, desert-skirted province today after Khomeini's regional trouble-shooter, Ibrahim Yazdi, failed to negotiate an end to fighting between the Sistani and Baluchi tribes, who belong to different Islamic sects.

Traditional ethnic rivalry intensified earlier this month when a new constitution approved by a national referendum made Shiite Islam the official religion of Iran. The Baluchis,

Sunni Moslems who greatly outnumber the Sistani Shiites here, largely boycotted the election.

Another irritant was the arrival of Khomeini's force of Shiite Revolutionary Guards, a militia that roams the streets with automatic weapons and presents a constant reminder to the Baluchis of their minority religious status and their dislike for the central government.

Just what sparked the recent violent outbursts is a matter of dispute. The provincial governor, Habib Jariie, said that chronic tension between the economically, socially and religiously disparate groups has been fanned by leftist groups who hope to topple Khomeini.

Yazdi, a kind of ombudsman charged with resolving differences in the provinces, had a different explanation. Emerging from several hours of negotiation with Sistani and Baluchi leaders at a high school today, he told reporters that "foreign elements" were responsible for stirring up longstanding conflicts between the two tribes.

Yazdi said the alleged instigators were arrested today but he refused to identify them or give their number or nationality.

When asked if such secret arrests were reminiscent of SAVAK, the hated secret police of the deposed shah, he replied, "We are governing our own affairs."

Throughout the last several weeks of ethnic unrest in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan—the provinces in the northwest that are seeking autonomy from the central government—Khomeini and his representatives have blamed the problems on "foreign agents," especially the CIA.

The Baluchis, a largely nomadic people surviving on date farming and smuggling, and the Sistanis, a better educated and wealthier class of farmers and businessmen, began fighting Thursday when several hundred residents of Zahedan began walking to a mountain retreat to hear a conciliatory speech from Yazdi.

Proceeding up the mountain path, the Sistanis began chanting slogans supporting Khomeini's selected governor, Jariie and the ever-present Revolutionary Guard, according to Jariie. The Baluchis then began yelling

insults against the governor and the militiamen.

Suddenly, the shouting turned into pushing, stone-throwing and shooting, leaving three dead and 44 wounded. Eight more died and 23 were wounded yesterday as fighting continued in the narrow streets of this poor capital city of 60,000.

After his meeting today, Yazdi said both sides agreed to a cease-fire and approved of military intervention to enforce it. The agreement, he said, was signed by the province's two turbaned religious leaders—Moulavi Abdol Aziz Mollazadeh of the Sunnis and Ayatollah Mohammed Kafami of the Shiites.

Even as he spoke, however, gunshots could be heard a few blocks away and shouting by street mobs continued for several hours amid military loudspeakers blaring, "We are the Army and we are in control of the situation. Go to your homes."

Tensions were running high all day as shopkeepers and residents fled the commercial center of town shortly after noon. Cab drivers refused to go into most sections of the city, and one quickly threw his vehicle into reverse when asked to enter a certain quarter.

Jittery Revolutionary Guards, ensconced in a heavily protected building surrounded by sandbags, contributed to the uneasiness by a prominent display of arms. Fingers were kept near the triggers of their submachine guns, ready for the slightest provocation.

When a car backfired near the guard headquarters, one especially nervous young militiaman dropped his pistol, then his hat and finally his pistol again before recovering and running full speed in the direction of the misfiring vehicle.

Communications from the city were frustrated for most of the day because of telephone line breaks.

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24 December 1979

Shah's Niece Vows to Revive Monarchy

By Ronald Koven

Washington Post Foreign Service

PARIS, Dec. 23 — Taking a note from the people who overthrew her uncle, the shah, Princess Azzadeh Shafik has vowed to mount a counter-revolutionary movement from Paris designed to bring to power a younger generation of the imperial family.

"The countdown starts today" for the restoration of the Iranian monarchy, Azzadeh, 23, said in an intense two-hour interview in the oak-paneled living room of her house in a fashionable cul-de-sac called Villa Dupont.

"I'm starting here just like everyone started. I'm going to do exactly what Khomeini did. The countdown starts today. It's not Neauphle-le-Chateau, it's the Villa Dupont. We're going to take a plane and fly back just like he did. Why not?"

It was from his base in French exile at Neauphle-le-Chateau just outside Paris that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini directed the revolution that overthrew the shah and led to the aged leader's triumphal return to Iran.

After months of keeping a low profile, there has been a spate of activity in recent weeks by members of the shah's family, much of it spurred by the assassination on a Paris street 2½ weeks ago of Princess Azzadeh's brother, Shariar Mustapha Shafik, a 34-year-old officer in the shah's Navy.

Azzadeh's mother—the shah's twin sister—Princess Ashraf, has bitterly condemned the revolutionary government in Tehran for her son's death, but Azzadeh apparently has moved in to pick up his political banner.

Azzadeh made it clear in the interview that she was moving to rally a younger generation of monarchists, bypassing her mother and her uncle.

The princess said she did not think that the shah could be restored to power but that the principle of the monarchy must be restored "at all costs" to provide a symbol for national unity. The regional revolts under the Islamic republic have proved, she said, that "Islam is not enough" to hold the country together.

Once the principle of the monarchy is restored, she said, it will be for the people to decide whom it wants as king. Between the shah's two sons, the 19-year-old crown prince and his 13-year-old brother, the younger one seems to be more popular among the Iranians she has talked to, Azzadeh said.

Azzadeh's uncle, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and Princess Ashraf would not be cast aside but would be important advisers to their politically inexperienced children, she said. "I'm working for a generation that is not his," she said, calling her uncle "the sage of the family."

Wearing little makeup and faded, fitted denim jeans and a crocheted vest, Azzadeh poured herself cup after cup of cold coffee. Her lawyer said she had been working feverishly, night and day, since her brother was shot down outside the house by an assailant whose act was claimed by an Iranian judicial authority.

Asked if she had sought the blessings of the shah and of her mother, Azzadeh's French lawyer and political counselor, Marc Valle, said: "She will not be disavowed. I can only tell you that much. She decided on her own to do this, but she will not be disavowed. She incarnates the hopes of her generation."

"For eight months we were told to keep quiet, to wait until America gives us the green light," said the young princess, pacing furiously. "When we saw my brother dead on the pavement we began to understand."

What she said she understood was that the United States and other Western powers are backing Shahpour Bakhtiar, who was the shah's last prime minister—named in an attempt to appease the revolutionaries—and who also is in Paris exile and proclaiming his readiness to return. Hence the West has abandoned the monarchy, she said.

"Bakhtiar is waiting for the messiah to come and bring him home to Iran on a silver platter," said Azzadeh. "Let him wait. What has he done? Nothing. I think the time has come to move. If you want to return to your

country, you do something."

"My brother was pure," she said. "That made him dangerous. That's why he was killed. He was on none of the lists of wanted people. He was the only credible person to rally both the military and the civilians."

There have been reports that Shafik was planning to go to Iraq to lead fellow naval officers in exile there in a coup attempt on Dec. 9.

Lawyer Valle, the family's representative in the French police investigation of the assassination, said, "He was killed because of what he was about to do. Serious events were about to occur. He was about to rally the Iranian people around his name."

Azzadeh implied that she had tactical differences with her brother about how to oust the Khomeini regime, that her brother, as a military man, naturally thought of using military force. But, she said, "between my brother and me there was never any disagreement about what we wanted to accomplish. I am taking up his struggle to the finish. He went to the finish. Why not me?"

She professes as much bitterness against Bakhtiar, who was rejected by Khomeini, as against the Islamic revolutionary leader himself. "We have compiled a dossier this thick on Bakhtiar," she said, putting her hands about six inches apart.

Azzadeh accused them both of having been in touch with the SAVAK secret police of the shah and the CIA. Bakhtiar was in the pay of her family's Pahlavi Foundation, she said.

She became even more animated when she accused Bakhtiar of having lied by saying after her brother was killed Dec. 7 that he had not met the young naval officer since his own escape from Iran to Paris this summer.

"Let him say that to me to my face, in public, before the TV cameras. He used my brother like he has used everyone else. He told my brother he backed him. No one will try to kill Bakhtiar. He's not important enough."

While she insisted that she wants power through political, not military action, she made it clear that she in-

CONTINUED

tends to stay in touch with the young Iranian officers who were associates of her brother.

Those officers, she said, have told her "a hundred times" that they want a regime that knows its own mind—"rather national communism than a flabby social democracy," she said, referring to Bakhtiar's politics.

Military action, she said, should come only to solidify power after political action has restored the monarchy.

As for Khomeini, she said he would be placed on trial "in a public square" where the people who brought him to power will be asked to cross-examine him about whether he has "betrayed his religion, his people and his country."

Khomeini would be allowed to defend himself fully and freely, she said, and the people would decide what to do with him—whether to send him back into exile or to let him live in Iran as a simple mullah. She would not discuss the option of executing him.

The shah's only weakness, she said, was that he was too loyal to his friends and could not believe that they were corrupt. Now, she said, all the corrupt people are around Bakhtiar, since they are betting on him as their ticket back to power.


She said her mother gives her money occasionally for her weekly newspaper, Free Iran. It has a circulation of 5,000, half in Persian and half in French, she said. Half of the Persian-language copies are distributed in Iran, she added.

Backing her, Azzadeh said, is a committee of 21 university professors, jurists and other prominent intellectuals.

She has a 6-year-old son but is apparently separated from her husband and prefers not to talk about her personal life. But, she says, recalling that she studied literature, "I always wanted to write. I still think I will someday. But this is not the time to think about myself. I must throw myself into the world of reality."



WASHINGTON WEEKLY
25 December 1979



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1

THE WASHINGTON POST
25 December 1979

Ruling Council Weighs Freeing Some Captives

By Michael Weisskopf
and Edward Cody

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Dec. 24—Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council is seriously considering urging the militants at the U.S. Embassy to release American hostages not suspected of espionage, according to several council members.

Despite the growing evidence of high-level support for such a partial release, however, neither Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini nor the hostages' student captors have given any hint that such a move may be imminent.

The students still publicly insist that only the return of the deposed shah will bring about the hostages' release. A spokesman at Khomeini's headquarters in the holy city of Qom today professed to know nothing about immediate plans to free any hostages.

But Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, chief mullah of Tehran and a Revolutionary Council member, said tonight that the council had accepted such a proposal, although it had not received final approval from Khomeini, Iran's spiritual and temporal leader.

Because of the hydra-headed nature of central authority in Iran, it was difficult to assess the likelihood of a partial release of the hostages.

But observers noted that not even the students at the embassy had issued a flat denial of the Revolutionary Council's proposal, even though they insisted that only they had the power to decide when or whether the hostages should be freed.

Besides Montazeri, both Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh and Finance Minister Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr were quoted by Tehran newspapers today as predicting a swift release for some hostages not suspected of spying.

According to the "evidence" cited publicly by the students, fewer than half a dozen of the 50 hostages have been openly accused of being officers of the Central Intelligence Agency.

To outward appearances, this would seem to leave the majority of the hostages eligible for the partial release, with the remaining hostages presumably retained for some sort of political show trial.

It was unclear, however, whether only suspected CIA employees would be ineligible for the proposed early release or whether the definition would be interpreted more broadly to include routine reporting by such embassy officials as political officers and commercial attaches.

Past experience has shown that a final decision probably lies with Khomeini, the only authority figure who appears to command the respect and obedience of the students.

The upbeat statements from Ghotbzadeh and Bani-Sadr seem calculated to create momentum in favor of their own moderate position in the debate within the Revolutionary Council. Council members said they have been discussing a release at recent meetings. But nothing decisive can be accomplished until Khomeini hands down his opinion, they added.

The maneuvering illustrated the three-way diffusion of power that has complicated efforts to arrange for the release of hostages—or even decide whom to deal with.

The Revolutionary Council, in principle, manages the country's affairs. The Islamic militants who occupy the embassy, clearly refuse to recognize its authority. Only by appealing to Khomeini's direct intervention with the students can the Council have its wishes carried out.

It is this diffusion of power that has contributed to delays and disorder in

setting up the international "grand jury" advocated by Iranian officials for hearing the alleged crimes of the United States and the deposed shah against the Iranian people. There also had been suggestions, endorsed by Khomeini, for a separate international tribunal to try the hostages against whom espionage charges are brought. Sean MacBride, former head of Amnesty International, left Tehran yesterday after two days of discussions with Revolutionary Council members on some kind of international jurists' panel. On departure, he expressed qualified optimism that progress had been made, at least at the level of his contacts.

Ghotbzadeh told the Tehran newspaper Ettelaat that the grand jury will begin hearings during the first week of January. He said nothing about any hostage trial, however, and student spokesmen in the embassy insisted that no tribunal has been organized for hearing charges against the hostages.

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ON PAGE 3

THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
25 December 1979

Hostage from another era looks back at loneliness

John Downey thinks the hostages in Iran are in a different situation from the one he was in, when he was held in China for 21 years after being convicted at a show trial of spying for the CIA. But, as Downey recalled yesterday, one thing does not change: the loneliness at the start.

"I was one person and it was a long time ago. In Tehran you have 50 people over there, each one trying to cope in his own way, trying to do their duty. The other side trying to interject fear. Being kept alone is the toughest, however. For me, the first Christmas was the worst."

On that first Christmas, in 1952, they put John Downey into a cell in the basement of a prison building somewhere in Peking. A little less than a month before, while flying a CIA mission, he was shot down over China. Now, for his first Christmas, a guard gave him cake or cookies—Downey today can't remember exactly which. And then Downey remembers being taken upstairs to an interrogation room. When he would not talk, he was taken back to his cell.

He was in solitary confinement. He would try to get a human reaction, a smile, a nod, a raised eyebrow, a hand sign out of the guards, but they had been told to maintain a "correct" attitude, which meant shutting Downey off from as much of life as they could. Once, Downey drew figures on paper to indicate a married couple. He showed it to the guard as a way of asking the guard if he was married. The guard refused to react.

DOWNEY BEGAN TO LIVE on his memory. "You laugh," he was saying yesterday. "It's not that easy to go nuts. You spend a lot of time reminiscing. You remember sports results, schooldays, fun you had. I remembered the 1950 Yale-Fordham game. I played guard for Yale. We won the game 20-14. I kept remembering the kickoff play when Jim Ryan ran 96 yards. I blocked my man and looked up and saw Ryan running. I thought of that play a lot while I was in jail."

Two days of silence and daydreaming went by and then one day a guard opened Downey's cell, let him upstairs, threw a door open and walked him into a courtroom that was ablaze with camera lights. Camera men ran up to Downey and snapped closeups of his face. Three men in military uniform sat at a dais in front of the room. About 100 spectators jammed into the place for the show trial of the American spy.

"I had a lawyer," Downey remembered yesterday. "He was an assistant professor at a law school in Peking. He told me, 'You should make a good showing here.' He meant that I should confess."

Downey remembers a prosecutor getting up and reading something. Then Downey's lawyer said that the court should understand that his client was very young, only 22.

That concluded all testimony. Downey was returned to his cell. Six weeks later, a guard took him out of the cell and led him up to the same courtroom. Again, the lights and cameras of a show trial caused Downey to blink.

ON THE DAISY ONE OF THE MILITARY men said something. Then the lawyer said to Downey, "Life."

Downey was taken back to his cell. The United States government, which said he was a hostage, issued a statement a couple of years later, in 1954, that read:

"The United States today demanded the immediate release by Red China of 13 Americans jailed on spy charges. The imprisonment is an outrage and the United States reserves the right to claim compensation. The United States demands that Red China release those unjustly detained American nationals forthwith in accordance with the provisions of the Korean armistice agreement and in conformity with the elementary precepts of justice and humanity. Communist China should bear in mind that the long list of Red Chinese outrages against American nationals, which the American people have borne with restraint this far, does not mean that Peiping can afford to ignore any longer the demands of the American government."

The use of "Red China" or "Communist China" and the spelling of the nation's capital of Peking as "Peiping" seems to indicate an arrogance used by this country at that time in trying to deal with the Chinese. The answer to the arrogance was that Downey remained in a cell. The hope today is that we are a bit wiser in the ways of addressing strangers, such as the Ayatollah Khomeini, his religion of Islam, and his nation of Iran. If not, 50 people in Tehran might get a bit rusty.

The United States government maintained for years that Downey was a civilian employee of the Army. The Chinese said he was a CIA spy. Finally, in 1973 President Nixon made an agreement with the Chinese. Nixon made a public admission that Downey was indeed a CIA spy. In return for this, the Chinese released Downey on March 10. By now he was 43 and he had served 21 years in a foreign jail as a spy.

FROM A DISTANCE, IT seems interesting that Nixon had to tell the truth—a feat requiring more effort of him than giving back money—to get Downey out. Perhaps our present President could consider applying the same principle and issue a report on his marriage to the Shah of Iran.

Downey came back to Connecticut, where Gov. Ella Grasso named him the chairman of the state's Public Utilities Commission. Which is something the hostages in Tehran might consider: When free, expect your rewards not from the wasp State Department, but rather from a good local ethnic politician.

In talking yesterday, Downey was not so much in love with the idea of an American military attack on Tehran in order to free the hostages. "I don't feel qualified to make the judgment on what the government should do," Downey said, "but I'm very cautious on a thing like this. Heroism is fine if it doesn't get a lot of people killed."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE D 12THE WASHINGTON POST
26 December 1979

Jack Anderson

Rockefeller-Shah-Kissinger Connection

Precisely at the midpoint of this century—and at the midpoint, too, of American involvement in Middle East oil affairs—a series of threats and crises reverberated throughout the Middle East oil region which prefigured the cataclysmic events of the 1970s.

The oil companies had established a corporate world government in oil matters dominated by Exxon, Shell and British Petroleum. They pegged the world price of oil to the high production cost of spot sales on the U.S. Gulf Coast. Consumers never benefited from the incredibly cheap-to-produce Middle East oil, which the oil companies extracted for 10 cents a barrel.

Then in 1950, the eccentric Mohammed Mossadegh began to inflame Iran with attacks on the British-run Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., which he nationalized amid jolting confrontations, great blubbing and fantastic chaos.

The oil companies tried to negotiate with Mossadegh, but he had some of the same traits that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was to display nearly 30 years later. Mossadegh refused to come to terms.

Howard Page, then the Middle East coordinator for Exxon, said in later testimony, "The U.S. government tried several schemes, three or four schemes, and sent people out, high-level people . . . to negotiate with Mossadegh."

"The British advised they would

never get anywhere with Mossadegh. I would have advised the same thing. I couldn't have done it with Mossadegh. I did it with the next government but not with Mossadegh."

Exxon's man did not mention that the company helped bring the "next government" to power. Strings were pulled in Washington by the politically powerful Rockefeller family who, through a complex of crisscrossing corporate wires, controlled Exxon and Chase Manhattan Bank.

The details of a CIA coup are murky. But competent sources attest that the Rockefellers helped arrange the CIA coup that brought down Mossadegh and replaced him with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The grateful shah restored the expropriated oil properties to their British owners but also permitted several American oil companies to muscle in on the British show. The dominant American company in this new consortium was none other than Exxon.

The shah demonstrated his gratitude to the Rockefellers in many other ways. These included heavy deposits of his personal fortune in Chase Manhattan and housing developments in Iran by a Rockefeller family company.

During this lucrative relationship with the shah, the Rockefellers employed Henry A. Kissinger as their foreign policy adviser. It was with the Rockefeller's blessings that Kis-

singer later moved to Washington to guide Richard Nixon's foreign policy.

In 1973, President Nixon was preoccupied with Watergate. This left Kissinger free to call the shots in foreign affairs. He chose not to interfere with the shah's clamor for exorbitant oil prices. By allowing, perhaps even encouraging the shah to quadruple oil prices, Kissinger made possible fabulous profits for the shah and the Rockefellers.

Kissinger, meanwhile, returned to the Rockefeller fold as the chief foreign policy adviser to the Chase Manhattan Bank. When the shah was overthrown, Kissinger and David Rockefeller became his real estate agents. Rockefeller found the shah a plush haven in Nassau. Later Kissinger persuaded Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo to allow the shah to settle temporarily in Mexico.

Then Kissinger and Rockefeller organized a pressure campaign to bring the shah into the United States. They finally succeeded in getting President Carter's approval for the shah to check into a New York hospital. As a result, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was overrun by militants who grabbed diplomats as hostages and held them in knife-edge jeopardy.

The Rockefeller-shah-Kissinger connection has been a disaster for the United States and cries out for congressional investigation.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
26 December 1979

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2

**Bazargan defends colleague
against 'spy contact' charge**

Tehran, Iran

Former Iranian Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan defended his ex-cabinet colleague, Abbas Amir Entezam, who was named last week by students occupying the US Embassy in Tehran as a contact for American spies. Mr. Bazargan, a member of the ruling Revolutionary Council, was quoted as saying that he did not think it "an offense for a prime minister, minister, or ambassador, whose job it is to contact and exchange opinions with foreign officials, . . . to have such contacts."

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ON PAGE A1-15

THE WASHINGTON POST
27 December 1979

Private Lawyers Preparing Defense for Hostages

By Morton Mintz

Washington Post Staff Writer

Attorneys from four of the nation's most prestigious law firms are preparing a defense for the American hostages if Tehran decides to put some of them on trial for crimes against Iran.

The law firms were recruited about a month ago by the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, which is co-chaired by John B. Jones Jr., a partner in Washington's Covington & Burling, and Norm Redlich, dean of New York University Law School.

"The Lawyers Committee has been doing background legal research and contingency planning in the event the hostages are tried," Jones said yesterday. "Our researches to date confirm the position of the U.S. government that there is no basis under any law for the trial of any of the hostages."

In addition to Covington & Burling, the law firms are Hogan & Hartson, in Washington and, in New York City, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison.

The law firms' involvement assures the hostages—if they are tried and are allowed counsel—of free representation by skilled American lawyers. At the same time, the U.S. government would be able to preserve its steadfast refusal to acquiesce in the idea that there is any basis in law for a trial.

It could not be learned whether the Carter administration originated the idea for the project even though there has been quiet cooperation between high-ranking officials and the committee from the start.

White House counsel Lloyd N. Cutler, a former co-chairman of the committee, said that he and legal advisers at the State and Justice departments "have had discussions with the Lawyers Committee." He declined to comment further.

State Department press officer Hodding Carter told a news briefing yesterday that neither the department nor Secretary Cyrus R. Vance had "approached anyone" to prepare a de-

fense for the hostages. State's position is that trials would be "illegal and unacceptable," Carter said.

Privately, department officials said that they are providing the committee with such unclassified materials as it may request, and that they considered preparation of a defense case by non-government lawyers a good idea.

Justice Department spokesman Robert J. Havel, after talking with Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti and the department's Office of Legal Counsel, termed the committee effort "purely private," adding, "We haven't done anything to discourage it."

The position of President Carter, Vance and Civiletti "is that any trial by the captors will be a gross violation of international law, and we haven't devoted any time to really dealing with who might provide counsel," Havel said.

The committee co-chairmen declined to provide details about the project. "Any further comment by the committee would not be in the best interests of the hostages," said Jones.

CBS reporter Fred Graham said Tuesday night that, of nine of the hostages' families who had been reached, none had heard of the project.

At the law firms, spokesmen fended off questions, although it was learned that the number of lawyers assigned at Hogan & Hartson is "several" and at Covington & Burling "more than one."

Because of conflicting and confusing reports from Iran, it is uncertain whether any of the hostages actually will be tried—on "spying" or other charges; whether a trial (or trials) would be held by Iran's revolutionary court system; whether the accused, if allowed counsel, would be represented only by Islamic counsel; whether the hostages would appear before some sort of international body, or, finally, whether volunteer American lawyers would be allowed to go to Iran to advise the hostages, if only about the legitimacy of a proceeding.

At the American Embassy in Tehran, the student militants who have been holding the Americans captive since Nov. 4 have spoken repeatedly of trying them as spies. But Iranian foreign minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh

has raised the possibility of an international "grand jury" to investigate American ties to the regime of the deposed shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

On Nov. 18, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini warned that many of the hostages might be tried for espionage if the shah were not returned by the United States to Iran.

Four days later, however, the captors at the embassy said that hostages will be tried regardless of the fate of the shah.

On Dec. 3, the students said the trials would be conducted by "competent Islamic judges," even though Ghotbzadeh had said that the accused would be judged personally by the captors.

In mid-December, after the shah left the United States for Panama, the students said again that, because he hadn't been returned to Iran, the hostages would be tried "as soon as possible." Khomeini's son Ahmad said that the "spies" will stand trial.

Islamic tradition protects diplomats and foreign envoys. Moreover, according to the Congressional Research Service, it does not include "spying" or "espionage" among the crimes for which there are specific punishments. The CRS adds:

"A contemporary Islamic court might apply 12th century precedents (the period when Islamic criminal law stopped evolving) to declare that 'spies' were similar to captives taken in war who were tried for criminal acts."

"It is more likely that a secular court, perhaps calling itself an Islamic court, would try 'spies' on an *ad hoc* basis, as accessories to other criminal acts...."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-14

THE WASHINGTON POST
27 December 1979

Some Hostages Defying Captors, Cleric Reports

By Edward Cody and Michael Weisskopf
Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Dec. 26—Some of the American hostages in the occupied U.S. Embassy here still display open defiance of their Islamic student captors after more than seven weeks of imprisonment under armed guard, an American minister who visited them said tonight.

The Rev. William M. Howard Jr., one of three American clergymen who conducted Christmas services inside the embassy, said some of the captives showed their refusal to submit by saying "snappy things" to their guards.

His observations, relayed on the eve of his return to the United States along with his two colleagues seemed to indicate that resistance remained firm for at least some of the hostages inside the embassy although they have been under armed guard since Nov. 4.

As an example, Howard said he heard one of the prisoners mutter in the direction of the student guard, "What do you guys know?" Another hostage, advised that he could not discuss political subjects, asked about which football teams are playing in the Rose Bowl this year and added sarcastically, "Or is that too political for you?"

"About 10 were clearly rebellious" among the 21 hostages Howard saw during his overnight stay in the embassy, he said.

Meanwhile, in Washington, the State Department said today it is unable to account for the discrepancy between its contention that 50 Americans are being held in the U.S. compound in Tehran and the reports by the clergymen who visited the hostages that they saw only 43 captives.

Department spokesman Hodding Carter said the U.S. government stands by its contention that "50 Americans are held or should be held in the embassy compound." Whether some of the captives have been removed or were not seen by the clergymen for other reasons is a matter that only can be clarified by the Iranian authorities, since the United States has no way of verifying what the situation is inside the compound, he said.

Howard and his colleagues — the Rev. William Sloane Coffin of New York's Riverside Church and Catholic Auxiliary Bishop Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit—previously had refused to divulge what they saw during their five closely supervised hours in the embassy, presumably for fear of souring further contact with the student occupiers. In recounting tonight some of what they observed, the three continued to avoid description of exactly where the Americans are detained or any detailed account of living conditions inside the compound.

Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who received the three American churchmen this morning, pledged to seek an explanation for the confusion about how many hostages

actually are in the occupied embassy.

After five hours in the building, the ministers, who were accompanied by Cardinal Leon-Etienne Duval, archbishop of Algiers, concluded that they had seen only 43 Americans, despite the higher State Department estimate of 50.

A spokesman for the students told reporters today that the discrepancy of seven was because some hostages refused to attend the services. Another spokesman, also reached by telephone inside the embassy, had suggested yesterday that the missing hostages could have been refused permission to attend if they were suspected of espionage.

The student spokesmen frequently contradict one another and several groups within the embassy compound are said to be competing for authority and attention over the others, which often makes what they say inconclusive. Observers who have watched the students over the weeks raised the possibility of several plausible explanations for the confusion:

- The students, split among themselves to some extent and inexperienced in any case, could have forced some of the most uncooperative hostages to stay away from the services as punishment, without realizing the extent of concern this would arouse.

- The students also could have deliberately kept some hostages out of view in a calculated effort to keep the situation confused and generate as much uncertainty as possible in the United States.

- Some hostages might have been transferred outside the embassy, as reported earlier but never confirmed by the students.

Coffin said the State Department also was contributing to the confusion by its refusal to reveal names of the hostages. He suggested the reluctance could be because some of them are Central Intelligence Agency employees with double identities.

"They know who is in there," he added. "They are afraid some guy has got two names, and they don't know which name he is using."

Coffin said the younger captives, especially the Marine guards, showed the greatest strain, and were having a difficult time adjusting to the inactivity.

"They're certainly not used to reading a lot of books," he said.

Coffin also said he met with Barry Rosen, the embassy's press attache, who was paraded outside the compound during the first week of the student occupation. When Rosen was told that his son, Alexander, had sent his father a gift, "His face lit up like a Christmas tree," according to the minister.

Earlier today, the clergymen visited the embassy charge d'affaires, L. Bruce Laingen, and two other American officials who have been held in

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the Foreign Ministry during the seven weeks of the embassy's occupation.

Laingen jogs up and down the ministry steps to keep fit. Coffin said, adding that all three men were being held in "high-level captivity."

Howard added that the three Americans in the Foreign Ministry "are under certain kinds of strain," especially Laingen who is obsessed with the plight of his compatriots in the embassy.

"Laingen is like the captain of the ship who is separated from his crew," Howard said in a television interview with ABC News.

Following the visit, the three ministers met with Ghotbzadeh. In the session the foreign minister gave "very little indication that there was any movement" toward resolving the hostage problem, Howard said. Coffin said he left the meeting thinking "both sides should try to understand each other . . . morally speaking, we're living in a glass house and people who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones."

"If lives are to be saved," the New York minister added, "we must exercise restraint." Coffin recalled that during the visit on Christmas morning, one of the student captors complained to him that occupying the embassy was forcing him to neglect his studies in electronics.

"I offered him an easy solution," said Coffin.

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ON PAGE A 16

THE WASHINGTON POST
27 December 1979

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The Seizure of the Embassy Continues

When up to your knees in alligators, it's hard to keep in mind the main objective of draining the swamp. President Carter should not be distracted from the main objective of securing the safe return of Americans held hostage in Iran.

To achieve this he should agree to Iranian proposals for an international tribunal to look into the alleged crimes of the shah and the U.S. role in Iran since the 1953 CIA-backed military coup put him in power. Americans as well as Iranians wish to know the truth about the U.S. role in support of the shah's dictatorship.

The shah's testimony would be required. He would find a probe by a fact-finding panel in a neutral country preferable to being returned from Panama to Iran for a criminal trial.

SHELDON D. CLARK
Sandy Spring, Md.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 19

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
31 DECEMBER 1979

Washington Whispers

★ ★ ★

Size-up by top intelligence experts of Soviet penetration of Iran: Russia has no significant religious leader in its pocket, or any military leader or politician with clout. But it has gained influence with younger activists in each of these groups as well as among the Iranian "students."

★ ★ ★

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ON PAGE 12-19TIME
31 December 1979

Nation

The Gruel Stalemate Drags On

Threats, warnings and shifting signals on the hostages

Carter doesn't know how ridiculous he sounds when he threatens us," jeered Iran's tempestuous Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. "The noises he makes are similar to those of a frightened lion, who does three things: he roars in the hope of frightening off his challenger, he makes rude noises because fear causes his muscles to contract, and he sways his tail in hopes of finding a mediator."

It can prove dangerous for anyone confronting a lion to conclude that the animal is frightened. But given the Iranian taste for hyperbolic rhetoric, there was a certain truth in Khomeini's metaphor. Jimmy Carter, frustrated by the failure of his economic pressures to win the release of the 50 American hostages, let it be known that he was seriously considering a naval blockade. Before it comes to that, however, he is formally asking the United Nations Security Council this week to impose some form of economic sanctions on Iran—a step that has been taken only once before, against Rhodesia in 1966. Noting that Tehran has repeatedly ignored U.N. pleas for the hostages' release, Carter declared on nationwide TV: "Iran stands in arrogant defiance of the world community." At stake, said the President, are the "foundations of civilized diplomacy [and] the integrity of international law."

Carter did not disclose just what sanctions the U.S. would request. But aides said they will probably include a partial trade embargo, exempting Iranian imports of food and pharmaceuticals and exports of oil. Carter had no advance word from Moscow, aides said, whether the Soviets would go along with sanctions or block them with a veto.

Thus, in the seventh week of the cruel stalemate over the hostages, tensions mounted again—in Iran, the U.S. and also in Panama, where the deposed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi took up residence on the Pacific resort island of Contadora. In Panama City, several hundred leftists marched through the streets, spray-painting FUERA EL SHAH (Shah get out) on trees and walls and hurling stones at the U.S. embassy. A squad of 30 helmeted officers mounted on motorcycles charged a ragtag band of 100 marchers, led by part-time Radio Commentator Miguel Bernal. The police and National Guard beat the demonstrators to the ground with 18-in.-long red-and-black rubber truncheons and hauled them off to jail.

In the midst of the uproar, while the Shah calmly set up housekeeping at his new haven, U.S. officials in Washington were trying to determine how his abrupt departure from the U.S. would affect the plight of the hostages. An answer soon came from Tehran, and then another and another. First, in their 74th communiqué of the crisis, the militants holding the U.S. embassy bluntly declared that "to reveal the treacherous plots of the criminal United States and for its punishment, the hostage spies will be tried." The same hard line was reflected in a banner headline by the newspaper *Islamic Republic*, which usually serves as the organ for Khomeini's Islamic Republic Party: THE TRIAL OF THE HOSTAGES IS DEFINITE.

Within hours, however, this was denied by Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who, since taking office four weeks ago, has apparently been searching for a way out of the impasse. He promised that "no trial will go on," though the government still intended to convene an "international grand jury" to investigate the "Shah's crimes and American foreign policy here." In the meantime, he said, release of some hostages before Christmas was "possible but not certain." Added Ghotbzadeh: "We will try to do our best to defuse the crisis. I certainly don't want to have this crisis forever."

For those statements Ghotbzadeh was promptly summoned to the holy city of Qum for a refresher course on the Ayatollah's policies. Afterward, Khomeini announced that everyone was in accord. Said he of the students' renewed demand that the hostages be tried unless the Shah is sent back to Iran: "The nation agrees with this. The Foreign Minister and the government also agree with this. Why should the nation not support this?"

The Ayatollah insisted that the hostages were not protected by diplomatic immunity because the U.S. embassy was not a proper embassy. Said he: "It was a den of espionage, and they are spies. We reject all the clamor by various sections abroad that these people should be freed because they are embassy staff and mem-

bers of a mission." Emboldened by the regime's new expressions of support, the student militants turned their fire on Ghotbzadeh. In Communiqué 75, they accused him of "talking too much." Said the militants: "The Iranian nation should be ashamed to speak more than necessary to an enemy, particularly a filthy one like America." To hasten his fall from grace, the state-run radio, which until three weeks ago was directed by Ghotbzadeh, praised the students' criticism of him and declared: "There is no room for diplomatic games in our revolution." It was clear warning that Ghotbzadeh may face the same fate as his predecessor, Abolhassan Bani-sadr, who was fired as Foreign Minister after 18 days of service because he seemed too conciliatory about the hostages. For the rest of the week, the normally loquacious Ghotbzadeh made no more public statements. Said a longtime associate: "It is the first time that Ghotbzadeh has not fought back when attacked." Added a Western diplomat in Tehran: "By all appearances, we are back to Square 1."

Experts assessing the balance of forces in Tehran believed Khomeini and his reactionary mullahs were still very much in command of the divided Revolutionary Council. But the situation took a complicating turn when two gunmen assassinated one of Khomeini's close colleagues, Mohammad Mofatteh, dean of Tehran University's College of Theology, and two of Mofatteh's bodyguards. Although an anonymous caller to the state news agency claimed that the killings were committed by a previously unknown terrorist group called F.M., Khomeini and his followers characteristically blamed the assassinations on the U.S. Said the victim's son, Sadegh Mofatteh, 21, a college student: "No matter who pulled the trigger, it was the CIA that engineered the conspiracy."

Using the student militants as a sort of Muslim Red Guard, Khomeini unleashed a campaign to silence critics of his strict theocracy. The students produced documents, purportedly from embassy files, indicating that Ambassador to Sweden Abbas Amir Entezan had advised the U.S. on ways of mending relations with the revolutionary government. One

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document described him as "actively interested in maintaining contacts with the United States and sincerely trying to mend bilateral relations between Iran and the United States." Summoned to Tehran, supposedly for consultations, Entezam was arrested at the airport on charges of disloyalty. Meanwhile, the Ayatollah Kazem Shari'atmadari, Khomeini's chief religious rival, went into seclusion. As a result, his disappointed followers, the Azerbaijanis, who had been demonstrating for two weeks in Tabriz, suspended their protest against the central government.

The regime moved at the same time to bring to heel the 300-member foreign press corps, much of which it has tried to use for propaganda purposes. Some 2,000 Khomeini supporters marched through the streets of Tehran denouncing "Zionist- and imperialist-affiliated journalists" for sending "false and baseless" reports to the West. Following that, the government expelled TIME's correspondents in Iran, Bruce van Voorst, 47, and Roland Flamini, 45. Abol Ghassam Sadegh, director general for the foreign press in the Ministry of National Guidance, denounced TIME for "one-sided and biased" coverage. Said he: "Since the hostage problem, the magazine has done nothing but help arouse the hatred of the American people toward Iran." One example he cited was TIME's use on its cover of Khomeini's quote: "America is the great Satan." Sadegh admitted that

Khomeini had made the statement but charged that TIME had taken it out of context.

Sadegh announced that the magazine's bureau would be closed indefinitely. Under questioning by a reporter for a Persian-language newspaper, he also said that Van Voorst had worked in the past for the CIA. Van Voorst was in fact a research assistant for the CIA in the mid-1950s but severed all connections with the agency after he became a journalist and made no effort to keep his former CIA affiliation a secret.*

In Washington, the Carter Administration seemed to despair of reconciling the conflicting messages from Tehran about the hostages. Said State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III: "There

are signs that come and signs that go. Interpretation of them is subject to change almost on an hourly basis."

To demonstrate Americans' support for the hostages, Carter asked people across the country to fly U.S. flags on Tuesday, which he designated National Unity Day. The biggest was a 60-ft. by 90-ft. flag that hung on the George Washington Bridge between New York and New Jersey. Americans also mailed the hostages hundreds of thousands of Christmas cards, including one that was 10 ft. by 64 ft. and signed by 22,000 people in Panama City, Fla.

At the same time, the President dispatched a delegation of State and Defense Department officials to sound out Oman, Somalia and Kenya on the possible use of their airfields and ports by U.S. planes and ships. Carter's aides insisted that the talks had nothing to do with the hostage crisis. But almost simultaneously, they disclosed that the President was considering taking "nonviolent" military action against Iran, possibly a naval blockade of the country's ports. This would run the risk of damaging U.S. relations with allies in Europe, who are heavily dependent on Iranian oil, and with Muslim nations that have not taken sides in the dispute. On the other hand, a failure to end the impasse soon might fuel criticism of Carter for focusing too narrowly on the hostages and not paying enough attention to the broader impact of his actions on the U.S. position elsewhere in the region (see WORLD).

Signaling a blockade in advance seemed an odd way to fight a diplomatic conflict, but the Administration hoped that in this war of words, the warning alone might influence Tehran. Said a Carter aide: "You have little to lose by making damn sure they understand." ■

*TIME has strongly protested the expulsion. Said Chief of Correspondents Richard L. Duncan in a cable to Sadegh: "TIME will, of course, continue to report fully on events in Iran from the sources available to it. We regret that you have deprived us of the opportunity to ascertain directly for ourselves the true situation in your country. I can think of no occasion when a country has ever improved the quality of the press coverage it receives by expelling correspondents."

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SALT

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THE WASHINGTON POST
19 December 1979

Lloyd N. Cutler

The Case for SALT II

My model for brevity is a British solicitor who was my colleague on a panel of lawyers in London. When his turn came, he said his topic was to compare the antitrust laws of Britain, Germany and France. He said:

"I shall do it in three sentences:

"In Britain, anything that is not expressly forbidden is allowed.

"In Germany, anything that is not expressly allowed is forbidden.

"In France, everything is forbidden, but almost anything can be arranged."

I cannot present the case for SALT in three topic sentences, but I can do it in four. All of them are related to our national defense.

1) If your principal concern is to maintain U.S. strategic equivalence, we have a better chance of doing so with SALT II than without it.

2) If your principal concern is to maintain the combat efficiency and readiness of our non-nuclear forces, we have a better chance of doing so with SALT II than without it.

3) If your principal concern is strengthening the resolve and the nuclear and conventional capability of the NATO alliance, we have a better chance of doing so with SALT II than without it.

4) If your principal concern is to get on with deeper cuts in the nuclear arsenals of both sides than SALT II itself achieves, we have a better chance of doing so with SALT II than without it.

The secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commander of the Strategic Air Command believe we have a better chance to maintain strategic equivalence with SALT II than without it. They have three main reasons:

- SALT II's limits (and those of the protocol) do not bar the United States from carrying out any strategic weapons program the Joint Chiefs now plan, within the time span they now plan.

- SALT II's limits will restrain the Soviet Union. At their present rate of launcher construction and conversion, the Soviets could readily surpass the various launcher ceilings before 1985. At their present rate of missile development, they could readily deploy more than one new light missile type by 1985, and they could readily deploy MIRVed heavy missiles with more than 10 warheads each by 1985.

- Without SALT II's provisions to assist verification, we would know much less about what the Soviets are actually doing than if SALT II were in effect. Most important, the Soviets could conceal their new developments in ways SALT II forbids—for example, by encrypting all the telemetry on each missile test.

For these three reasons, it will be more difficult to maintain strategic equivalence without SALT II than with it. Without it, the Soviets can add more to the power of their own forces, widen any advantage they may achieve in the early 1980s and conceal from us what they are doing. All this will lengthen the time and increase both the cost to us and the uncertainty of maintaining parity.

The strength and readiness of our non-nuclear forces are primarily a function of the size of the defense budget. Our nuclear forces are only 10 to 15 percent of that budget and, when the budget comes out too low, it is the conventional forces that suffer.

Part of this is due to the budget-balancing imperative that must motivate all presidents, but most of the responsibility lies on the floor of Congress.

The writer is counsel to the president.

Over the past 10 years, Congress has cut defense appropriations some \$40 billion below what presidents have requested.

Ratification of SALT will help upgrade our conventional forces in two ways. First, achieving the required 87 votes depends on forging a new consensus in the Senate between those who will accept SALT II in order to win support for greater defense expenditures and those who will accept greater defense expenditures in order to win support for SALT II. This consensus is likely to shatter in the aftermath of a failure to ratify SALT II. Second, whatever the level of the defense budget, more of it would have to go into strategic nuclear weapons, if SALT II were not ratified, in order to keep up with the additional Soviet nuclear buildup that would then occur. Whatever the level of defense expenditures, approval of SALT II will free up more of the available defense resources for conventional forces.

If there is any issue that commands a consensus

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of the Senate, it is the support and strengthening of the NATO alliance and its military capability—nuclear and conventional. Failure to ratify SALT would have the general impact of weakening America's position of leadership in the alliance. As Helmut Schmidt said in his recent Economist interview, how can NATO depend on the leadership and the commitments of a nation that negotiates a major military treaty over a seven-year period under three administrations of both parties, and then cannot obtain the approval of its own legislature?


Failure to ratify would also have an adverse impact on NATO's actions to deploy in Europe modernized and longer-range U.S. nuclear weapons systems, so as to offset the threat of the Soviet SS20. For the NATO governments in Europe, a decision to deploy under American control nuclear weapons capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union is a political decision of great internal and external consequence. For them, the decision to deploy the new weapons is justifiable on two parallel grounds: military needs, and as the first step in a plan to negotiate theater nuclear weapon limitations. These limitations would be in the context of SALT III, alongside the further intercontinental limitations that will also be part of SALT III. But such a plan depends upon the existence of SALT II. That is one reason the heads of so many European governments have publicly and privately urged the ratification of SALT II.

SALT II does not cut the existing strategic arsenals very deeply. But it does ban completely many systems now on the drawing boards, and it places substantial limits on MIRVing, new types and other avenues of breakout and proliferation.

Above all, it lays the basic groundwork for further cuts in SALT III. I would liken the SALT II treaty to a Wall Street bond indenture. It contains all the critical definitions, all the warranties and covenants, all the events of default, all the procedures for notice and consultation. Once this basic indenture is in place—whether for a \$100 million bond issue or for launcher ceilings and sub-ceilings of 2,400, 1,320 and 1,200—it is a relatively simple matter to negotiate an increase in the size of the bond issue or a decrease in the level of the launcher ceilings.

But if we have no SALT II, no basic bond indenture, then the future negotiation of agreements on lower ceilings will be incomparably more difficult. As in SALT II, agreement on any one point will depend on agreement on all other points. All the definitions, all the counting and non-concealment rules will have to be traded out again.

Without SALT II in place, an agreement on deeper cuts would probably take many more years to achieve.



By Tom Gibson for The New York Times

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THE WASHINGTON POST
21 December 1979

Senate Committee Says SALT Not in America's Best Interest

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Armed Services Committee gave formal approval yesterday to a report on SALT II which concludes that approving SALT "is not in the national security interests of the United States."

After a bitter fight, and over the objections of its chairman, the committee adopted the report by a vote of 10 to 0. Seven senators who opposed issuing the report voted "present," apparently to indicate their disdain for the procedure.

At a press conference given by eight of the 10 supporters of the report, Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), their chief spokesman, said SALT II was "a license for a massive buildup in strategic arms" that "granted unilateral advantages to the Soviet Union."

Adoption of the report with 10 committee votes dramatized the Carter administration's failure to convince members of this most hawkish of Senate panels of the value of the strategic arms limitation treaty. When SALT hearings began last summer, administration lobbyists held out hope of building a 10 to 7 or 9 to 8 majority on the committee for SALT II.

But three senators who had to move toward the treaty to make those hopes come true joined the 10-vote majority that backed yesterday's anti-treaty report. They were Howard W. Cannon (D-Nev.), William S. Cohen (R-Maine) and John W. Warner (R-Va.). The seven others who voted for the report were all counted as SALT opponents months ago.

Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.), a SALT advocate, dismissed yesterday's result as "a plot" contrived by staff aides hostile to the treaty. He said it would have no significant impact on the final Senate vote on SALT II. Hart said that there were only about 15 members of the Senate who had declared their opposition to SALT II, and "nine of them are on the Armed Services

Committee," so that this vote "in no way represents any shift of opinion in the Senate."

Jackson said SALT does not now have the 67 Senate votes it would need for approval. Asked if the treaty was dead, Jackson replied: "It's in a sort of state of repose."

The history of yesterday's report was unusual. It had been written by staff aides to anti-SALT senators, principally by Richard Perle of Jackson's staff, and circulated among like-minded senators before being considered at a committee meeting. Stories were leaked to the media that a majority of 10 or 11 members had approved the report before it was even seen by some members.

This left no real role for Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, who opposed issuing any such document as inappropriate for the committee. But Stennis and the SALT supporters on the committee were outvoted. The committee never did consider all the specific points critical of SALT II contained in the report.

Members of the committee's majority defended their decision to issue a report recommending radical changes in or rejection of SALT II, while admitting that treaties actually fall within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee. For example, Cannon said the Armed Services Committee simply was fulfilling its duty to report to the Senate on a matter relevant to national security.

Senators on the other side of the issue disagreed.

Carl Levin (D-Mich.) said the committee had never before formally recommended against a treaty, and John C. Culver (D-Iowa) said he did not think committees should advise the Senate how to vote "on matters not within their legislative jurisdiction."

The report opens with a statement of concern that the Soviet Union has achieved the theoretical ability to wipe out America's land-based missile force with a sneak attack. The military balance is shifting against the United States, the report says, adding that even the administration's recently expanded defense-spending plans "are not adequate to close the gap."

SALT II allows the Soviets to maintain a land-based missile force far superior to America's, the report says. It

criticizes numerical limits in the treaty that would force the United States to dismantle some of its best land-based or submarine-based missiles if this country wants to deploy large numbers of the new air-launched cruise missile.

The report says that the "new types" rule in the treaty, which limits each country to one entirely new type of missile and permits changes no greater than 5 percent in key characteristics of other missiles, will permit the Soviets to deploy an entire new generation of missiles designed to meet these criteria.

The senators voting for the report, in addition to Jackson, Cannon, Cohen and Warner, were Harry F. Byrd Jr. (Ind.-Va.), John G. Tower (R-Tex.), Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), Barry M. Goldwater (R-Ariz.), Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa) and Gordon J. Humphrey (R-N.Y.).

Those who voted "present," along with Stennis, Hart, Levin and Culver, were Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), Robert B. Morgan (D-N.C.) and J. James Exon (D-Neb.).

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AGEE PASSPORT

Good work!

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THE WASHINGTON POST
24 December 1979

Agee's Passport Revoked

In an action related to the Iranian crisis, the State Department yesterday revoked the U.S. passport of CIA critic Philip Agee on grounds that he might otherwise cause "serious damage to U.S. national security and foreign policy."

The State Department took the unusual action after receiving reports that Agee might be invited by Iranian authorities to participate in an "international tribunal" to judge American actions in Iran and that he might be asked by student militants to help develop their case that American diplomats are acting as spies.

Speaking by telephone from his current home in Hamburg, Germany, Agee said he has been invited to Tehran by the hostage-takers at the U.S. Embassy there. He said, however, that he has refused to become involved in identifying Central Intelligence Agency personnel or analyzing files at the embassy until all the U.S. hostages are released.

Agee also said he has proposed to Iranian authorities and the student militants that complete CIA files on the agency's operations in Iran since 1950 be exchanged for the 50 American hostages. His proposal has not been accepted by any party so far, he added.



PHILIP AGEE

The former CIA official, who has published the names and activities of many of his former colleagues, called the revocation of his passport "illegal" and said he will take legal counteraction. State Department spokesman David Passage said Agee has been informed of his right to a hearing, but that any effort to use the revoked passport now would be a violation of U.S. law.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 11THE NEW YORK TIMES
24 December 1979

Ex-C.I.A. Agent's Passport Blocked After He Makes a Proposal to Iran

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 — Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance has revoked the passport of a former Central Intelligence Agency employee who has proposed resolving the Iranian crisis by exchanging C.I.A. files on Iran for the release of the 50 hostages being held at the United States Embassy in Teheran.

A State Department spokesman, David Passage, said today that Mr. Vance took the extraordinary action last night on the ground that the activities of the former C.I.A. agent, Philip Agee, "were causing or were likely to cause serious damage to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."

Mr. Agee, who is in Hamburg, West Germany, served for many years in Latin America as a agent of the C.I.A. and in 1975 wrote "Inside the Company: A C.I.A. Diary," which purported to reveal the names of covert C.I.A. officers.

Since then, Mr. Agee has actively opposed American policies and has published several articles allegedly revealing classified information about the American intelligence community.

Reportedly Urged to Come to Iran

Mr. Passage would not disclose what touched off Mr. Vance's action against Mr. Agee — the first time in the Carter Administration that an American citizen has been known to lose his passport.

Mr. Agee himself said in a statement that he had been urged by Iranians to come to Iran but that no one had specifically asked him to take part in the international tribunal that the Iranians are creating to investigate alleged American wrongdoing in Iran.

But the former C.I.A. officer, who has been expelled from Britain, France, the Netherlands and Norway said that he would not go to Iran until the hostages were released. He said that just yesterday he had proposed to militants at the embassy that they release the hostages in exchange for C.I.A. documents on the agencies activities in Iran since the 1950's.

Iranian authorities have said that an unspecified number of the 50 American hostages in Teheran would be required to testify before the tribunal. Because of this possibility, the United States strongly objected to the convening of the panel, which Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh has called a "grand jury."

Carter Administration spokesmen have urged American citizens, as well as foreigners, to refuse to take part in this tribunal as long as the Americans remain in captivity.

The United States has warned the Iranians that the "parading" of the hostages before the tribunal would be regarded with the same gravity by this country as

putting them on trial for espionage, which had been threatened earlier.

The State Department spokesman, Mr. Passage, said that Mr. Vance's revocation could be appealed at a hearing within 60 days and Mr. Agee's lawyer, Melvin Wulf, said he would contact the department tomorrow. Mr. Wulf said that Mr. Agee had been living in Hamburg since last year. His wife dances for the Hamburg ballet company, Mr. Wulf said.

The spokesman said that if Mr. Agee tried to travel to another country on his revoked passport, he would be subject to prosecution for violation of American law.

If Mr. Agee wishes to return to the United States, Mr. Passage said, he would be given a one-way identity card, which would be surrendered to American authorities on arrival.

'8-Year Effort to Silence Me'

Mr. Agee, reached by telephone in Hamburg, said that the State Department action is "only the latest part of an eight-year effort to silence me."

"This action comes precisely when I have proposed a solution that might well bring the immediate release of the hostages in Teheran," he said. "In recent weeks I have proposed to the Iranian Government, to the militants occupying the American Embassy in Teheran and to various interested third parties such as Sean MacBride that the quickest solution to the crisis would be an exchange of the C.I.A.'s files on its operations in Iran since 1950 for the captive Americans."

He said that his solution would get "the Americans home and it would provide all the evidence needed for the international investigation wanted by the Iranians and by the people of many other countries. In fact, I told the militants at the embassy by telephone yesterday that they would have a much more conclusive case using the files than they would have from whatever the Shah or the 50 Americans might say."

"I do not know whether my idea will be accepted by any of the sides involved," he said.

The former C.I.A. agent said, "I do not know why Mr. Vance is now so afraid that I might go to Iran, although the militants at the embassy asked me to go, because I will not become involved in identifying C.I.A. personnel or in analyzing documents until after all hostages are released. This I am sure is known by Mr. Vance because my proposals have not been secret."

He said that he would use "all legal means to retain my passport and right to travel. I will not let this arbitrary action by Mr. Vance stop me from proposing concrete solutions that could bring home the American hostages immediately."

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ON PAGE 14-4

THE NEW YORK TIMES
25 December 1979

West Germany Acts to Bar Agee

Special to The New York Times

BONN, Dec. 24 — West German authorities initiated efforts today to revoke the residency permit of a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, Philip Agee, following the United States State Department's cancellation of his passport.

L. R. Osterling, an official with the state Interior Ministry in Hamburg, said his department had received a message today from the federal Interior Ministry informing him of the American action.

Mr. Agee recently proposed to the Iranian Government that the American hostages be exchanged for the C.I.A. files on its operations in Iran since 1950. Mr. Agee said he had declined an Iranian request to identify C.I.A. operatives in Iran or to help in examining embassy documents until the hostages were released.

Mr. Osterling said that the notification of the American action was the first step in the procedure to revoke the residency permit for Mr. Agee, who lives in Hamburg. Although the case will most likely be reviewed by the Office for Resident Aliens, Mr. Osterling said, the law stipulates that a residency permit is only good in conjunction with a valid passport.

If the permit is revoked, Mr. Osterling

said, Mr. Agee's status becomes problematic. Without his passport he cannot remain in the country. Nor can he legally leave Germany unless he reverses his earlier refusal to accept a United States State Department offer of an identity card, which would enable him to fly back to the United States.

Mr. Agee said today that West German authorities had not yet gotten in touch with him regarding his status. He said his residency permit was valid until next September and that he would be meeting with his lawyers to discuss his choices.

The State Department announced yesterday that Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance had revoked Mr. Agee's passport on Saturday. The State Department said Mr. Agee's actions "were causing or were likely to cause serious damage to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."

David Passage, a State Department spokesman, said the efforts to revoke Mr. Agee's passport had been under way for several years. "Only recently were we persuaded that there was enough of a case that it was likely to hold up in court," he said.

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ON PAGE 2

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
25 December 1979

Ex-agent's passport lifted

WASHINGTON [UPI]—The State Department has revoked the passport of former CIA official Philip Agee, who proposed an exchange of CIA files on Iran for release of the 50 American hostages in Tehran.

A department representative visited Agee at his home in Hamburg, West Germany, Sunday and "asked him to surrender his passport," State Department spokesman David Passage said.

He said Secretary of State Cyrus Vance ordered the revocation on grounds that "Mr. Agee's continued use of the passport was injurious to U.S. national security."

Agee is the author of a book, "Inside the Company—A CIA Diary," which identified intelligence agents and gave detailed descriptions of CIA operations.

IN HAMBURG, Agee said Monday he had been in contact with militants occupying the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, with the Iranian government, and with "interested third parties," such as Irish Nobel Peace Prize winner Sean Macbribe, who flew to Teh-

ran last weekend in an effort to win release of the 50 hostages.

"The quickest solution would be an exchange of the CIA's files on their operations in Iran since 1950," Agee said.

"If such a solution were agreed to, the hostages would be home quickly and both Americans and Iranians would have almost complete knowledge of the relations between their governments over the last three decades," he said.

Agee also said the students holding the embassy had asked him to go to Iran and take part in an "international tribunal" to judge American actions in the nation.

HE SAID he refused to take part in identifying CIA agents or analyzing documents seized by the Iranians until the hostages are released.

The former CIA official said he could not understand why his passport had been revoked, since his proposals "have not been secret."

"This astonishing measure is just part of an eight-year effort to silence me," Agee said.

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ON PAGE A-19

THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
26 December 1979

CIA Agents Cheer Action On Agee

WASHINGTON (UPI) — In the "community," when you are out, you are really out.

So it was in the world of intelligence that present and former agents Tuesday welcomed the withdrawal of the passport of former CIA agent Philip Agee, now living in West Germany.

One veteran intelligence officer said with conviction, "If I can get him with my bare hands. . . I'll kill him. I'll kill him."

Other comments were more restrained but conveyed the message that Agee is a man intensely hated by the twilight organization that Agee says is out to "get me."

The State Department Sunday revoked the passport of Agee, 49-year-old former Central Intelligence Agency agent in Latin America and author of a book published abroad which, among other things, named some 900 CIA agents serving in various foreign missions under diplomatic cover.

Current and former members of the intelligence community in Washington welcomed as "long overdue" word of the revocation of Agee's passport.

"I think it's overdue for the U.S. government to take a formal position indicating that Agee is in fact a defector from the United States," said Ray Cline, a former deputy director of CIA and former head of the State Department's Intelligence Bureau.

"He has been consciously lending himself to

anti-American propaganda intelligence," Cline said. "There is little doubt in my mind that he is receiving instructions from either the Soviet or Cuban intelligence services as to ways to damage the international reputation and effectiveness of the United States."

David Philips, former chief of CIA's Latin American operations, characterized Agee as a "primitive who forfeited his right to call himself an American."

"The news that he has been stripped of his last pretense of citizenship is the best news CIA people have heard in a long time," Philips said.

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COVERT ACTION

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DES MOINES REGISTER
4 DECEMBER 1979

Don't repeat this folly

The situation in Iran is giving a new lease on life to "covert action." U.S. intelligence officials say that the Carter administration and members of Congress now see the need to build a covert-action capability, which is described as "almost non-existent."

Never mind that covert action cannot free the hostages in Tehran. Never mind that covert action is largely responsible for

Covert action was a flop, which is why the CIA wisely has de-emphasized it.

the fix the United States is in in Iran. The myth dies hard that derring-do and clock-and-dagger work can fix everything.

Covert action was a flop, which is why the Central Intelligence Agency wisely has de-emphasized it. The stress on coups and assassination plots was at the expense of intelligence-gathering. That must be the top priority of an intelligence agency if a country is to be forwarned.

When CIA-inspired coups did succeed, they often backfired. The hatred the Iranian people

have for the United States is an outgrowth of the CIA's responsibility for installing the shah in 1953.

Congress investigated the intelligence agencies in 1976 and found serious deficiencies. Tightened congressional oversight was one consequence of the probes. Now a move is under way to cut down on oversight.

Perhaps there is too much duplication in the work of the oversight committees. But the disclosures of secret wars and other hidden U.S. efforts to dictate events abroad made it essential to rein in the intelligence agencies.

The plight of the hostages in Iran does not prove the need for covert action. On the contrary, it illustrates the shortcomings of covert action and the need for hard information. This country was surprised by the revolution in Iran because it was so infatuated with the CIA-installed shah that it refused to believe there was a significant opposition.

Surely memories are not so short that the findings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence are being forgotten. Surely Americans are not ready to go back to the "good old days" of unrestrained covert action.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE _____NEWSDAY (L. I. N. Y.)
7 December 1979

U.S. Moves to Improve Covert-Action Ability

By Jim Klurfeld

Newsday Washington Bureau

Washington—When President Carter begins "to turn the screws" on Iran, as he said Tuesday night that he would, he will be doing it without two major threats—covert action and quickly deployed forces.

But because of the Iran situation, the United States is already moving to develop major capability in both areas for any future crisis, according to administration and congressional sources. The reluctance to intervene in far-off lands—born of the Vietnam War and the dismantling of the CIA's covert operations branch after congressional investigations of the 1970s—is being reversed by the seizure of American hostages in Tehran.

"There is no doubt that the attitude has changed as a result of this crisis," one Carter foreign-policy official said. "We were moving in this direction anyway, but Khomeini has galvanized opinion here like nothing else could. Now there is once again a realization that whether we like it or not we have to play a major role in the world and we ought to have the tools to do that to the best of our ability."

In the last two weeks the Senate Intelligence Committee has delayed issuing its long-awaited CIA charter because of a strong push to reduce the number of committees to which the CIA must report covert actions. Under current law seven committees must be notified, a situation intelligence officials say makes it virtually impossible to keep covert operations secret. The administration would like to reduce the number to two. Now, in the wake of Iran, there is new-found support for that position, according to committee sources.

Also in the last two weeks the Pentagon has taken the first concrete moves to establish the long-planned quick-deployment force. Tuesday the Marines announced plans to organize a 50,000-man unit that could be flown to any part of the world at a moment's notice and have equipment and artillery quickly available.

Neither of these programs will help in the current crisis. Indeed, both will take years to organize, especially the quick-deployment force. But officials point out that there is now a large gap between the diplomatic and economic moves available to the President and outright military action. Having the ability to run a covert operation or quickly deploy a military force in the Persian Gulf would give the President more flexibility.

Covert operations can range from placing articles in local newspapers to creating small and even large armies to fight an undeclared war. They can include helping organize political forces that might be friendly to the United States or aiding groups that are opposed to an unfriendly regime.

"There is no doubt but that the problems we face in the Persian Gulf could be dealt with, at least to some degree, through covert operations," a former CIA director said. "The very purpose of a covert operation is to give the President an option between diplomacy and outright military force."

The problem is that with all the investigations, we have just about given up on that option. It is just not possible to report to seven different congressional committees and expect the mission to remain secret. There are very, very few covert operations active today.

In fact, it was a CIA covert operation that put the shah of Iran back in power in 1953 after he was chased from the country. The counter-coup was organized by Kermit Roosevelt, Theodore's grandson, who was then the CIA's Mideast chief.

But the move to give a President these options is not unanimously endorsed. One Senate source, who did not want to talk on the record because of the current crisis, said that a major problem will be that once these capabilities are available there will be a tendency to use them—whether they are needed or not.

"The problem we found in Vietnam was that since we had the resources to intervene we intervened without giving adequate thought to whether it was really in our interest to intervene," the source said. "And the same

was true of covert actions. The investigations showed they were out of control, that many of them could not really be justified."

The Senate investigation of the CIA did uncover widespread abuse of covert actions, with many never approved by the executive and congressional committees that had responsibility to oversee such actions. There were the schemes to assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro, a small undeclared war in Laos and an attempt to sabotage democratic elections in Chile. The Senate committee, chaired by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), who is now chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, discovered that many of the covert operations were unsuccessful and some downright ridiculous. (There was a plot to assassinate Castro with a fungus-infested diving suit and to place chemicals on his shoes to make his beard fall off.)

The committee concluded "that the recklessness of an action is substantially increased when policy makers believe their decisions will never be revealed." And the committee said that the secret nature of covert actions is a "perversion of democratic government."

The notification of seven committees—the House and Senate intelligence committees, foreign-affairs committees, armed services committees and Senate Appropriations Committee—has been an attempt to bring the activities under control. Now the proposal is for only the two intelligence committees to be notified.

The idea of having a quick-deployment force has been proposed by the Carter administration for two years but has not been funded. Now Pentagon officials say that in the next 10 years the military is prepared to spend as much as \$8 billion on such a force. Much of the money would go for 50 new transport planes and for new ships that would be pre-positioned carrying Marine gear.

Gen. Paul X. Kelley, Marine planning chief, said the Iran crisis is providing a sense of urgency about moving ahead with this force. "Looking toward the 1980s it becomes obvious that we need a sharper focus for the Third World," Kelley said. The quick-action force would not be targeted on any one part of the world, but Pentagon officials say that it is designed for areas such as the Persian Gulf where there are major U.S. interests involved and the need to respond quickly to a crisis.

But there is also criticism of this plan as unrealistic. John C. Collins, a military analyst with the Library of Congress, said that the U.S. forces cannot adequately staff such an operation without creating serious shortages in other parts of the world vital to U.S. interests. And he said that without a return to the draft, those force levels could not be reached.

"Having such a capability would make a difference militarily, especially as a deterrent. If other nations know that we have the ability to move quickly into an area they would be less likely to challenge us," Collins said. "But it is going to take a lot more money than we have now."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-27

THE NEW YORK TIMES
20 December 1979

Rebuilding American Intelligence

By Ray S. Cline

WASHINGTON — The Iranian crisis illuminates tragically the low state to which the United States central-intelligence system has been reduced. In the last five years, savage news-media and Congressional criticism as well as Carter-Mondale punitive restrictions on the Central Intelligence Agency have disastrously weakened our capability for conducting clandestine intelligence operations abroad.

While violence, anarchy, war and anti-Americanism have been spreading, the Government has retired or dismissed nearly all of the experienced intelligence officers tempered in the conflicts of the 1950's and 60's. It has dampened C.I.A. morale, chilled energetic efforts to collect hard-to-get information, and cut Americans off from many valuable foreign intelligence sources. This incredible conduct has amounted to unilateral disarmament.

Now in the Iran confrontation, Washington has few options between surrender and sending in the Marines. There is no quick fix. We must begin to get our intelligence house in order before the next crisis and the one after that strike. What should we do?

We must rebuild what we have nearly destroyed. Four measures would help.

First, the name "C.I.A." has to go. The semi-fictional "C.I.A." of world headlines is an international whipping boy in which the K.G.B. and every tin-horn dictator or ayatollah blame their difficulties. Regrettably, the name is a liability abroad.

Second, we must raise to new levels of excellence the analytical and information-processing elements of the several intelligence agencies in the C.I.A. and the State and Defense Department. They should be gathered under one budgetary and administrative roof and designated the United States Intelligence Community (U.S.I.C.). The Community would be an association of agencies in different Government departments responsible for the quality and relevance of their work to a single managerial chief, the Director of National Intelligence. The director ought to be selected for a term of five years on the basis of character and intellect plus bona fide experience in both research scholarship and high-level policy management of intelligence operations. The Community's aim should be totally objective, depoliticized intelligence reporting. The U.S.I.C. would be responsible for assigning tasks to intelligence collectors as well as for coordinating intelligence reporting, but it would be decentralized into competing centers of research and intelligence estimates. Nothing illegal or operational would ever be done by the analytical intelligence service.

Third, the intelligence-collection agencies, which often must break foreign laws to get crucially needed information, should be set up as independent commands in the State and Defense Departments or in other Cabinet departments that have overseas responsibility such as the Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture Departments. Clandestine-agent operations overseas, signal interception, and overhead and underwater technical reconnaissance should be carried out by strictly professional staffs who respond directly to requirements from the U.S.I.C. Their overseas personnel must have solid diplomatic cover.

Fourth, the major effort would be to create a new clandestine-operations command responsible for establishing secret contacts abroad. The chief should be an experienced C.I.A. officer whose identity must remain hidden except from Congressional intelligence committees. He and his staff would be assigned authentic State, Defense or other official cover — not the transparent "reserve-officer" status that in the past has exposed many C.I.A. employees abroad with the pitiful results we see in Iran.

The main clandestine-information-collection target ought to be early evidence of violent changes or fundamental shifts in political power in consequential countries. In menacing situations, we should use our undercover assets in covert actions to help friendly individuals and groups abroad with the hope that they might prevent seizures of political power by hostile or anarchic forces. Covert operations have bolstered American policy in the past; after skillful rebuilding of overseas nets, they would be capable of doing so in the future.

Advance notification of covert-action plans should be restricted to the Senate and House intelligence committees, where tight security controls exist. The foolish law now requiring advance notification of 150 Congressmen in eight committees, almost guaranteeing leaks, should be repealed. Then the President in consultation with a small group of responsible Congressmen could use our potential capacities for meeting Soviet, Cuban and other underground warriors on equal terms rather than letting Americans abroad be sitting ducks as they were in Teheran.

Ray S. Cline, former Deputy Director for Intelligence in the Central Intelligence Agency, is executive director of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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LIECHTY/BODROGIY

Korea

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ON PAGE A 14

THE NEW YORK TIMES

20 December 1979

Ex-C.I.A. Officer Charges Agency Withheld Data on Korean Bribery

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 — A former Central Intelligence Agency officer who was stationed in South Korea has charged in court documents that the agency intentionally concealed from the Justice Department its knowledge of South Korean efforts to bribe members of Congress.

The agency succeeded in gaining the suppression of certain written statements submitted to the court by the former agent, C. Philip Liechty.

In response to a request from the C.I.A. and the Justice Department, Judge Oren R. Lewis of the Federal District Court in Alexandria, Va., ordered that Mr. Liechty's statements be kept secret. At a hearing last Friday, the judge forbade Mr. Liechty and his attorneys to disseminate the text or the substance of the statements, which had been public for at least a few days before Judge Lewis's order.

Mr. Liechty previously filed formal complaints inside the C.I.A. alleging that agency officials in Korea from 1969 to June 1973 manipulated intelligence reports to support "predetermined foreign policy objectives" of President Nixon and his adviser Henry A. Kissinger. Mr. Liechty indicated that intelligence officials also did not want to antagonize Congress for fear that it would cut the agency's budget if it publicized information about the bribes.

Complaints to Superiors

Mr. Liechty expressed similar concerns in the written statements filed with the court. The statements were public for a few days before Judge Lewis ordered them sealed. Mr. Liechty's attorneys, Thomas F. Fay and Sol Z. Rosen, said today that they intended to challenge the secrecy order issued by Judge Lewis at the request of the Government.

C.I.A. officials say that the sealed documents contain information about "the nature and character" of covert operations and that disclosure would re-

sult in "identifiable damage to the national security."

Justice Department lawyers have now asked Judge Lewis to go a step further and order that no one giving a deposition provide information "over the objection and instruction" of the Federal Government.

Judge Lewis is scheduled to hold a hearing Friday on the request. Such protective orders are unusual, but the Government has successfully requested them in several recent cases, including its attempt to stop The Progressive magazine from publishing information about the hydrogen bomb.

Suing Former Colleague

Mr. Liechty, now 39 years old, served in the C.I.A. from 1963 to 1978. In his civil suit, he seeks damages from Robert F. Bodroghy, now a branch chief at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va., who served with Mr. Liechty in Seoul. Mr. Liechty contends that Mr. Bodroghy made untrue, defamatory statements to the effect that Mr. Liechty had been discharged because he failed to finish assignments and disobeyed orders. Mr. Bodroghy denies having defamed Mr. Liechty.

The Government is not directly involved in the litigation but intervened to protect what it says are national secrets — information that is "classified or properly classifiable." A C.I.A. spokesman, Kathy Pherson, said she could not comment on the case because it was pending in court.

Mr. Liechty and Mr. Bodroghy served together in Seoul in the early 1970's. Mr. Liechty has told colleagues that he refused to go along with C.I.A. officials in a "cover-up" of bribes paid by Korean agents to members of Congress as part of a lobbying and influence-buying campaign.

Mr. Liechty says he learned in 1971 and 1972 that Park Chung Hee, then President of South Korea, had secretly authorized

the influence-buying activities. Mr. Liechty's statements were made, according to sources familiar with the case, in the court documents now sealed and in the statements he filed with the C.I.A.

Mr. Liechty said in his statements that he had accused the agency of withholding from the Justice Department information about bribery of American officials.

Intelligence information collected in the early 1970's was apparently not given to prosecutors until 1976. It was reported then that President Park had personally instructed a South Korean businessman, Tongsun Park, to give cash, jewelry, campaign contributions and other gifts to Congressmen.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-4WASHINGTON STAR
22 DECEMBER 1979

Koreans Halted Murder, Ex-CIA Officer Says

By Allan Frank
Washington Star Staff Writer

The head of the South Korean CIA intervened during his agency's 1973 kidnapping of an opposition politician to prevent the victim from being murdered at sea between Toyko to Seoul, a former U.S. CIA officer said yesterday.

Christian Philip Liechty, who was a CIA operations officer in Seoul from 1969 to 1974, asserted U.S. and Japanese government protests about the kidnapping prompted the then-KCIA chief, Lee Hu Rak, to send a radio message halting the murder.

Liechty contended the kidnap victim, New Democratic Party leader Kim Dae Jung, apparently was scheduled to be tossed overboard from a ship that was transporting him secretly in chains to Seoul. Lee directed the operation, Liechty said.

The former CIA officer talked with reporters after a federal judge

in Alexandria suggested to Justice Department attorneys that they "act like big boys" and seek an injunction to prevent Liechty from talking to the press about his CIA experiences.

In making the suggestion, Senior U.S. District Judge Oren R. Lewis said he would be likely to grant such an injunction.

The former U.S. intelligence officer also maintained the CIA gave "hundreds of thousands of dollars" to Lee for bogus KCIA-CIA covert operations that actually were paper operations to funnel American pay-offs to Lee.

Liechty said the U.S. government told the late Park Chung Hee, then president of South Korea, it knew Park had approved the kidnapping of his political opponent, and that the United States would hold Park personally responsible if Kim were murdered.

The Japanese government was outraged that South Korean officials had violated Japanese sovereignty by kidnapping Kim from a Tokyo hotel, drugging him and transporting him out of the country on Aug. 3, 1973.

Kim was dumped by his captors in front of his home in Seoul six days later.

Judge Lewis rejected Justice Department attorney Stanley D. Wright's request that CIA officials be given 10 days to examine in secret Liechty's responses to questions in a private civil suit.

Lewis frequently scolded Wright, who was seeking indirectly to prevent Liechty from revealing "national security" secrets during questioning in a private lawsuit filed by Liechty against a CIA officer, Robert F. Bodroghy.

On Dec. 14, Lewis ordered Liechty and his attorneys not to disclose the contents of a written answer to questions put to Liechty by attorneys for Bodroghy, who was a superior of Liechty's in South Korea.

Liechty, who is involved in a Montgomery County custody case with his estranged wife, claims in his suit that Bodroghy made defamatory statements about Liechty to a Montgomery court investigator.

The former CIA officer, who left the agency last year, has filed a series of complaints with the agency that intelligence officers in South Korea systematically misreported events in South Korea to further the Nixon administration's support of President Park.

Among the information the CIA station in Korea concealed from the Justice Department and some officials at CIA headquarters here, Liechty has claimed, was extensive evidence of KCIA operations to bribe U.S. congressmen from 1970 through late 1973.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A8THE WASHINGTON POST
22 December 1979

Ex-Agent Claims CIA Knew of Korean Bribery Campaign

By Robert Meyers
and Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writers

A former CIA agent in South Korea yesterday accused the agency of "deliberately" suppressing information in the early 1970s that U.S. congressmen were talking sexual and financial bribes from South Korean officials in exchange for favorable trade arrangements.

"It was a cover-up," the former agent, C. Philip Liechty, charged in an interview. "Internal CIA reports in late 1971 and 1972 had the details, but they were never sent to Washington. The information came into our hands accidentally. [But] it confirmed what we had been hearing all along."

Liechty, 39, was in the CIA's Seoul office at the time.

Liechty said the unidentified CIA officials who allegedly suppressed the

information did so in an attempt "to avoid political embarrassment" with congressional officials. One source close to Liechty said that the CIA feared its budget would be curtailed by vindictive congressmen if the information became known.

"The name of the game was sex and booze and all the good things Asia has to offer," including money, Liechty said.

The former agent, who was fired by the CIA last year during its economy-oriented reduction in personnel, declined to identify congressmen who reportedly took the favors, whose identities were known to CIA officials.

Agents allegedly were told by their superiors in 1971 and 1972 not to ask their Korean sources about wealthy Korean businessman Tongsun Park,

who was at the center of the South Korean influence-peddling scandal, the source close to Liechty said.

However a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee has reported that some information on Park's lobbying efforts was reported back to Washington in the early 1970s, but it was not turned over to the Justice Department for possible prosecution until late 1975.

Additionally, the Senate Intelligence Committee, in a 1978 report on the CIA role in the Korean bribery affair, concluded that there was no evidence of an intentional cover-up. The report criticized the agency, however for what it described as sloppy reporting techniques.

Liechty was interviewed by the committee staff shortly before the report was issued a spokesman for the committee said.

Liechty spoke with reporters yesterday after appearing in federal court in Alexandria in connection with a \$2 million civil defamation and invasion-of-privacy suit he has filed against a former CIA colleague, Robert F. Bodroghy. A deposition Liechty made in the case purportedly contains information about national security matters, and the Justice Department last week had that material placed under seal so it would not be made public.

Yesterday, U.S. District Court Judge Oren R. Lewis declined to rule in advance that any other national security matters revealed in the case be placed under seal. He indicated however, that he probably would do so to protect "national security," if the government filed the proper forms.

Outside the court Liechty, who joined the CIA in 1963, claimed that

the agency used a bureaucratic device in the mid-1970s to conceal from the Senate committee the agency's alleged involvement in foreign assassinations, which the intelligence panel then was investigating.

According to Liechty, CIA personnel were ordered to sign a form stating their "direct knowledge" of assassinations. Such language prohibited them from "revealing the detailed but indirect knowledge we had" of CIA involvement, he said. Liechty also insisted that he possesses such "indirect" knowledge, but he would not elaborate.

A CIA spokesman refused to comment yesterday on Liechty's charges.

The former agent said that the "massive bureaucracy that stifled accurate reporting" was what most angered him about the agency.

For example, the source close to Liechty said the ex-agent's reports of alleged torture of South Korean students by Korean government officials were watered down by CIA officials in Seoul before being sent to Washington.

The source added that although Liechty admittedly has no documents to back up his various allegations, he has offered to take lie-detector tests.

The civil suit against Bodroghy stems from a bitter child-custody battle involving Liechty and his wife. Bodroghy allegedly told officials in the custody dispute that Liechty had been fired from the CIA for failure to obey orders and finish reports, and for once threatening with a gun a CIA official who interfered with him, according to court papers.

Bodroghy has declined comment.

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CARLUCCI AT PRINCETON

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CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN
10 December 1979

International Scene

CIA's Frank Carlucci: 'Don't talk of your successes'



This is the first part of a three-part interview with Frank Carlucci, who became deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in early 1978. After serving in the Navy and graduating from Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, he served with the Foreign Service in South Africa; Kinshasa, Congo; Zanzibar and Brazil. He also has been director of the Office of Economic Opportunity; deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget; undersecretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; and ambassador to Portugal.

By MICHAEL SHAW

Q. Mr. Carlucci, what are the challenges the United States will encounter in world affairs in the 1980s?

A. That's a rather broad question. Let me divide my answer into a number of categories. First there would be the national security challenges: our defense posture vis-a-vis the Soviets and a whole series of treaties that are under negotiation, like disarmament and mutual and balanced force reductions. What posture will the United States and the Soviet Union take in these negotiations? Certainly we will continue to face the problem of nuclear proliferation. The energy problem will remain with us and, indeed, it could become even more critical in the '80s. If consumption continues to go up as it has and production remains constant as predicted, additional measures will have to be taken on the energy front.

There is also the question of relationships with the Third World; the issue of equitable distribution of wealth between the have and have-not nations. Connected with this are the difficult issues posed by Soviet and Cuban expansion activity, particularly in Africa. There will also be questions of how the United States can strengthen her relationships with her

allies; how our relationship with the People's Republic of China will evolve; and what role the continuing problem of Vietnam and Cambodia may play in that relationship.

Q. What is the Central Intelligence Agency's role, as you view it, in meeting these challenges?

A. Fundamentally, our role is to provide the policymaker with the best possible information on which he can base policy decisions. This means efficient and good collection, high-quality analysis, and links with the policymaker that permit us to respond to his high-priority needs.

Q. What effect, if any, have recent revelations and books about the agency had on its ability to perform these functions, particularly with respect to its relations with foreign intelligence agencies and sources of information?

A. Obviously, no intelligence organization can function at peak efficiency in the constant glare of the public spotlight. But, we accept some of this as a fact of life. Books always cause a problem. Particularly damaging are the ones that reveal our sources and methods. Consequently, we have established a procedure

CONTINUE

to try to deal with this problem. Employees sign a contract when they come to work for us authorizing us to review their manuscripts for sensitive intelligence information. We have had generally good results with this practice, with one or two notable exceptions. In the case of Frank Snepp, we took the issue to court and so far the position of the agency has been upheld. There is also a group in Washington, D.C., that publishes a bulletin entitled "Covert Action," whose purpose is to expose the names of CIA personnel and agents overseas. This is particularly harmful, and so we are consulting with the Congress and the attorney general on measures that might be taken to curtail it. It is very difficult in an intelligence organization to ever know how much information you might have received if these kinds of activities were not going on. People who co-operate with us express concern about these books, and the activities of people like Phillip Agee. We have reason to believe that this has impacted adversely on the flow of information to us. Nonetheless, we continue to be an effective organization.

Q. Recently, there have been articles in the press which have criticized the agency with respect to developments in Iran and other articles which suggest that the limitations that have been placed on the agency and criticism of the agency have hobbled its effectiveness. Would you care to comment of these statements?

A. It is hard to generalize on these matters. Generally, when people talk about intelligence failures, they tend to think in absolute terms. But, intelligence does not operate in absolute terms. It is always possible to have more information about a given situation. How much information is enough? In cases such as Iran, the press accounts prior to the departure of the shah were generally exaggerated. This is not to say that our predictions were perfect. But it is certainly inaccurate to say that the intelligence community did not forecast the difficulties in Iran. We have tried recently to sharpen our reporting and analysis on broad social movements.

One of the problems in the intelligence business is that you can never talk about your successes. Generally, a successful operation is only successful as long as it can be kept secret. If we talk about our successes, we com-

promise our sources and our methods. Usually, it is only the so-called failures that come to light. That's just one of the facts of life that we have to live with in the intelligence business. I assure you there have been successes and that they have been important successes.

As far as constraints are concerned, this is essentially a matter of establishing the proper checks and balances without impeding intelligence effectiveness. We think that Executive Order 12036, issued by President Carter at the outset of his administration, is an important step in this direction. We also think it is possible to develop charter legislation which will set out broad guidelines for intelligence activities which will reassure the Congress and the American people that intelligence organizations are under control, yet will not impede their effectiveness.

In connection with the charter legislation, there are some areas of concern to us. For example, we are required to report plans to carry out covert actions to seven committees of Congress. That obviously imposes constraints on the president's ability to carry on covert action activities. Mind you, we think we ought to report to Congress, but to a reasonable number of committees, not seven. The Freedom of Information Act has caused us a number of problems. We find that the practice of using the disclosure process in trials to push for the revelation of more classified material than the Intelligence Community can conscientiously accept, and thereby stymie the prosecution—a practice referred to as "gray mail"—has impeded our efforts to deal with serious security breaches. We also think that the antiquated 1917 Espionage Act is not a good instrument for solving the kinds of problems such as the "Covert Action" bulletin problem that I described earlier.

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Next: Covert operations.

(As Received)

CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN

11 December 1979

CIA's Frank Carlucci: 'Covert action is a policy tool'

This is the second part of a three-part interview with Frank Carlucci, who became deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in early 1978.



/ By MICHAEL SHAW

Q. If you had a free hand to write not only the charter by the operations book for the agency in the 1980s, how would you structure things and what would you do?

A. Well, I think the first concept that has to be understood, and understood fully, is that confidentiality is the heart of an intelligence operation. There are certain things that we can make available to the public. We try to do that by declassifying up to 150 finished intelligence products per year on a wide variety of subjects. But we have to restore an environment where we can distinguish between that information which can be made public and information which must be kept confidential in the interest of the nation. It is very difficult to establish a set of written proscriptions in statute. Some proscriptions on intelligence activities already exist. But if you try to make a comprehensive list, you inevitably imply that something nobody thought to put on the list is therefore authorized.

I think that you need to establish a surrogate process through congressional oversight and something like the present Intelligence Oversight Board, which would see that intelligence activities are within the acceptable limits of U.S. public opinion. These oversight mechanisms exist in one form or another today and are still evolving. All and all, I think we are moving in a healthy direction and, aside from correcting some of the problems I mentioned earlier, I do not think I would try to reverse course in any way at this point.

Q. What would you do to sharpen the intelligence community's ability to discern and prioritize signals from different parts of the world?

A. We have given a lot of thought to this problem and have taken certain steps to deal with it. The most important was to establish a focal point in the intelligence community for "warning." We have put one of our most senior and able officers in charge of that function. He in turn reports to an intelligence committee which I chair. This has worked very well and I think will continue to serve us in excellent fashion.

Q. Covert operations, particularly during the Vietnam/Watergate period, took on some negative connotations that may not necessarily fit in their historical perspective. Can you give our readership a view of covert operations within its long-term historical perspective that can enlighten us on what a nation must do or be able to do in the world in order to meet the challenges that we face today?

A. First of all, both the president and the Congress have recognized that covert action is a legitimate foreign policy tool. That is exactly what it should be, a foreign policy tool, and not an independent capability. Covert action is attempting to influence events in other parts of the world without the source of that influence becoming known. Most people do not have any problem with trying to influence events in other parts of the world. Indeed, that is what much of our foreign policy is about. Most people also recognize that most things that an intelligence organization does have to be done clandestinely.

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Somehow, it is just when you put the two together that people have problems with it. Yet one can conceive of many circumstances where a friendly, democratic government needs help. It cannot accept that help overtly without incurring political difficulties. Let us say, for example, that they have to deal with a terrorist problem and ask the United States for that help. If the statemen are politically vulnerable, they may well ask that that help be given clandestinely.

I find that when most people take issue with covert action they are really quarreling with the policy and not the instrument. Just because I disagree with giving economic aid to country X, that does not mean that I believe economic aid should not continue to be a foreign policy tool. Covert action has become associated with one or two highly controversial foreign policies.

Once again, the successes cannot be mentioned because the credit for those successes must go to the foreign government, not to us. The important point is to ensure that a mechanism for policy control is set up and that we not do away with the policy instrument itself. Such a control mechanism has now been established, although, as I mentioned earlier, it would be appropriate to cut down on the number of congressional committees which have to be informed when a covert action operation is undertaken.

Q. Following the definition of a successful covert action as being in fact covert, I would assume that one reason we do not read too much in the press about the activity of KGB or covert operations of terrorist groups or of perhaps Cuba and other countries, is that by that definition, if they are not discovered, they have been successful. Can you outline, for example, in the Mideast, what are the operative forces beneath the surface there? To what extent is there the unreported and unseen challenge of the opposition, if one wants to put it that way?

A. Well, I cannot go into any detail without revealing sources of information. Incidentally, most people do not appreciate how easy it is for another country's counterintelligence operation to trace a seemingly harmless factual statement about a situation back to a particular agent or a particular method. So, we can't be too careful.

One thing that is important to recognize is

that, in most cases where our adversaries have been successful, they have been willing to undertake either covert actions or overt military actions. We now see a substantial Cuban military presence in Africa, for example. There are various parts of the world where you see a substantial Soviet presence. They do not really operate under the same set of constraints that we, as a society, do. In most cases you find them exploiting existing unrest.

That is why it is so important for our country to work to resolve problems which create unrest and conflicts between and within nations. It is also why it is important for our country to help countries friendly to us to resolve their underlying economic and social problems. Certainly the KGB is at work and they put substantial resources into their operations. But, our country, despite the constraints our intelligence organizations face, has superior intelligence service.

Q. At the risk of doing some crystal-ball gazing, do you believe that the world energy crisis can be dealt with in the next few years?

A. I think it can be dealt with but not without the exercise of a great deal of willpower by Americans and by the people of other countries in the free world. The problem is essentially one of restraining increasing consumption while stimulating sources of production. Unfortunately the rate of consumption has so far outstripped the rate of increase of sources of production that over the next few years only consumption restraint will solve the problem. But, given the will, I think we can solve it.

Next: Oil and the Middle East
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CIA's Carlucci: The agency's morale is 'high'

This is the last part of a three-part interview with Frank Carlucci, who became deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in early 1978.



By MICHAEL SHAW

Q. In light of what has happened in Iran, do you believe the other Mideast oil-producing countries represent an ongoing, stable supply of oil?

A. It would not be appropriate for me to comment on individual countries, but the line between production and demand is now so thin that any disruption such as has occurred in Iran is bound to have an immediate impact on consumers. Obviously, there are sources of instability in the oil-producing areas of the world, and these are things that we have to monitor very closely.

Q. Has the Central Intelligence Agency provided the president with a worse-case scenario in the event that there are further disruptions of the oil supply from the Mid East?

A. We supply the president with a continuing analysis including both optimistic and worse-case assumptions.

Q. How pessimistic is your worse-case assumption?

A. It is the kind of assumption that would entail some hardship on the part of Americans.

Q. One book written about the beginning of World War II suggested that Japan's timing of its attack on Pearl Harbor was related to an approximately 90-day-or-so supply of oil. Does history repeat itself?

A. I don't know about history repeating itself, but we can certainly learn lessons from history and one of the great lessons of Pearl Harbor was that our nation needs effective intelligence. It was precisely as a result of Pearl Harbor that the predecessor agency of the CIA, the Office of Strategic Services — the OSS — was created.

Q. Many assertions have appeared in the press to the effect that the American people have lost the will to assert themselves in world affairs. In analyzing world developments, and in sketching scenarios for different questions that present themselves, is the willingness of the American people to react to particular situations plugged into the equation?

A. We deal with foreign intelligence only, and do not analyze domestic reaction to foreign events. Our job is simply to tell the policymaker what those foreign events are and what the likely intentions of foreign leaders might be. It is then up to the policymaker to assess the domestic ramifications of their decisions.

Q. Is it fair to say that the Central Intelligence Agency will gather the facts, analyze them, sketch the scenarios, and pose the alternatives, but it is the ultimate responsibility of the president to decide what the country shall do and he is the one who must make that decision in light of American public opinion?

A. That is a fair assessment.

Q. There has been considerable discussion that the morale of personnel in the Central Intelligence Agency has fallen off in recent years.

Would you attribute that development to the environment and attitudes within the United States toward the intelligence business generally, or would you say that there have been some organizational problems within the agency that are being met at the current time?

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A. Morale is a nebulous thing. Obviously there are a number of factors that impact on morale. The barrage of criticism to which the agency has been subjected has had its impact on our employees. This is particularly true because of the facts have been distorted or inaccurate and, given the nature of our business, we are unable to put them in perspective. Like any organization, we have our internal problems. We like to think that we are dealing with them effectively.

From my own experience, in a number of government agencies, I would characterize the morale of the CIA as high. Certainly we have some of the most competent and dedicated people in government working in the CIA. Many of them work extremely long hours and cannot even tell their families what they are doing. Perhaps a measure of the state of our health is the fact that we have no trouble recruiting people. In fact, the number of applications for employment with the agency has been going up and the quality of people that are coming into the agency today is as good as, if not better than, it ever has been.

Q. Which is more important, the quality of the people that you bring into the Central Intelligence Agency, or the development of the new technologies that are making the spy business very different than it used to be?

A. Both are important. Without quality people, you do not develop quality technology. If the question is what is more important, technical collection or human collection, the answer once again is that both are important. The technical systems can accomplish a great deal but they have their limitations. They can only tell you what is happening right now or what happened yesterday. It really takes human intelligence to know what people's intentions are.

Q. You are privy to probably the most stark view of the world of just about anybody. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future

of the United States?

A. Basically, I am an optimist. I think our country has the resources, both human and natural, and the will to deal with the problems it faces.

Q. Do you place your guarded optimism within a certain time frame in which we must do certain things?

A. Certainly. And some of those things have already been discussed in this interview. We need to deal with the question of our defense capability, vis-a-vis the growing defense capability of the Soviets. We need to deal with problems such as nuclear proliferation and we need to deal with the problems of energy and the Third World.

Q. Is time running out on any of these issues?

A. In foreign affairs, time does not usually run out. The problems become more difficult to deal with if you do not face up to them. In most of the areas I have mentioned, I believe our country is moving to face up to the problems.

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HELMS IN LONDON OBSERVER

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DID THE CIA FAIL AMERICA?

Richard Helms was head of the CIA for seven years and American Ambassador in Iran from 1973 to 1976. Here, in the first part of an exclusive conversation with KENNETH HARRIS, he blames Congress for damaging confidence in the Agency and argues that covert action is necessary in a brutal world.

KENNETH HARRIS: What with the present Iran crisis and the row about Cuba earlier this year, it seems to a foreigner like me that the American people are not getting the Intelligence Service they ought to have. I wonder if that's anything to do with the fact—if true—that the power of the CIA has been much curtailed as a result of public investigation by Congress?

RICHARD HELMS: I know it's the conventional wisdom to blame Intelligence for not warning us of the Shah's downfall and what has happened since, but I can't for the life of me see why. Everybody could read in the newspapers what was happening in Iran. The question was, what did governments do about it? What was the Shah doing? Did the US support the Shah? Did Britain support the Shah? Where was the support from Western Europe? This went on for 14 months before the Revolution in February.

So what was the role of Intelligence? The American Embassy reported that there were demonstrations, that there were going to be more demonstrations, that Khomeini was in Paris. These were things manifest to everyone. And yet people keep saying: 'If we'd had better Intelligence, we would have done something.' But what better Intelligence did you need than that the country was rising, in increasing intensity, against the Shah?

As for Cuba, the Carter Administration stopped intelligence-gathering flights over the island in January 1977, and did not resume them for almost two years, as I understand it. Carter wanted to make friendly overtures and warm up to the Cubans. I'm inclined to think there was more politics than Intelligence—or lack of Intelligence—in the row about Cuba.

There is a case to be made that American Intelligence was adversely affected by the 1975

Congressional investigation. There is no doubt that a lot of secret material was put in the public domain which, in my opinion, should never have been allowed out. Other material was presented in a needlessly biased and sensational form. All these things tend to reduce morale and the quality of Intelligence work.

I'd like to come back to that later. Meanwhile, how did the CIA get started?

The Central Intelligence Agency was originally established as an overt part of the US Government in 1947. It was to be answerable only to the National Security Council, which in effect means the President. It was to see all information coming in, of whatever source, from foreign lands. It would analyse it, appraise it, correlate it, evaluate it, and make reports to the President, and other important officials.

Why was this new agency needed? It was felt necessary because the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 clearly demonstrated that if the relevant Intelligence available in Washington had been pulled together in a central place and examined, we could have foreseen the attack. And so the CIA was set up to perform this function.

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Was it a good idea that it should have been an overt function?

Yes, because there was nothing about this organisation that had to do with clandestine work such as espionage, counter-espionage, or covert action. But there was one sentence put in the law stating that the Agency was to perform certain 'functions of common concern.' Now, under this particular dispensation, the National Security Council issued a series of highly classified directives which pushed the Agency into secret activities such as espionage, counter-espionage and, later, 'covert action' and para-military operations. This was done over a time, it wasn't done all at once.

It was intended that these activities would be relatively small, that they would be decently 'covered' in the CIA. Along came the Korean war, however, and the expansion of the covert apparatus of the CIA. From that time on, the covert part of the Agency began to be the tail that wagged the dog. People forgot that the Agency had been set up for an analytic purpose, and began to see it as an activist Agency. It was involved in various kinds of clandestine manipulation, cloak-and-dagger if you like, dirty tricks if you like—whatever terminology you prefer.

It is this that has become associated with the initials 'CIA' and I feel, frankly, that in 1979, it is high time the name of the Agency was changed. CIA: those three initials have become what we in the US refer to as a buzz word. It isn't a word, but they're buzz initials. You say 'CIA' and that immediately triggers mental images of the Bay of Pigs or the demise of Allende in Chile.

This is particularly true in foreign countries, and constitutes a problem that is only dimly perceived by the American public. There is a flood of propaganda all over the world, every day, from Russian sources, from Eastern European sources, from outlets in Africa and Asia accusing the CIA of various heinous crimes, none of which it has committed. There's a constant *ratatatat* about what the CIA is allegedly doing to the poor countries in the Third World, what it's doing to overturn Governments in other parts of the globe. None of this is happening these days, but the propaganda goes on, and effectively so.

If you're going to change the name, wouldn't it also be a good idea to make it clear that whatever covert action is necessary will no longer be carried on by the CIA?

This is one of the problems that comes up in connection with the legislation currently being discussed in Congress. If one is going to start legislating specific prohibitions for Intelligence Agencies, one must draw up specific guide-lines for what one can do and what one can't do. There is nobody in journalism who doesn't know that you can play with words, interpret them narrowly or widely and so forth. I think the legislative route is the wrong route to go. I think the correct route is to have confidence in the President and his advisers, and in his ability to direct an Intelligence organisation to do what it should be doing, and to help it as it needs to be helped or criticise it as it needs to be criticised. But leave the President some latitude.

Laws have a way of restricting one at a time and in a way one never anticipates. The unexpected in the world is the one thing that is surely going to happen. Why do we have to harness CIA operators? Because we don't trust our President, because we don't trust the Director? Because power corrupts? These things sound so nice when they're said in the old halls of academia.

People like to feel proud of what a clean, decent and righteous country we have. But the fundamental fact remains that you've got to trust somebody in your Government. If you don't, what kind of a Government have you got? Are we a governable people? If we're a governable people we have got to have some trust in the people we pick to govern. And if we can't do this, then I think there are a lot of other things we aren't going to be able to do, including the whole running of the country. And therefore, I think that building in all these inhibitions is quite unnecessary. And these so-called abuses that the Agency has been charged with in the past, really, when you examine them, weren't all that bad or all that serious, and to set up an entire legal structure in an effort to prevent some little abuse in the future, seems to me the wrong way to approach this problem.

Members of Congress did not seem very critical of the CIA up to the early 1970s. Why have they been so critical in the past three or four years?

It rather seems, as one sits here in Washington, that almost every Senator feels he could do a better job as President than the incumbent, and it doesn't make any difference whether the incumbent is Republican or Democrat, Carter, Ford, Nixon, Johnson, or Kennedy. Many of today's Congressmen, unlike some of their predecessors, show a definite assertiveness as to their rights, entitlements and so forth. And they take advantage of a piece of legislation which I deplore — the so-called Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. This amendment mandated that the Director of Central Intelligence was to report to four Committees in the House and four Committees in the Senate on anything the CIA did in the covert action field. Well, that effectively kills covert action, because one simply cannot assume that literally scores of Congressmen and Senators and their staffs are all going to keep the secrets.

Couldn't the men who drafted the amendment see that?

One would have thought so, but I found out to my surprise, and I must say, great disappointment, that neither President Ford nor Mr Colby — Director of Central Intelligence at the time — made any remonstrance about it. The President could have. He might well have stopped the amendment while the bill was being put in final form during the House-Senate conference. But there was no remonstrance from the Ford Administration. That was the time to knock it out. Now it's been on the books all these years. Why it can't be changed now, I don't know. Something should be done to correct this situation.

Do you see any conflict between public concern over 'dirty tricks' and the operation of an effective Intelligence network?

There is a strange attitude that pervades American public opinion. Americans want a strong Intelligence organisation, they feel their Government should know what's going on in the world. On the other hand, they don't much like hearing about dirty tricks or the connivance that is involved in espionage. They'd be delighted to have the operation run and not hear too much about it.

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Many Americans — and I don't know whether this is a majority view — have the peculiar idea that the US is so rich and so powerful and so wise that we don't need to demean ourselves with such things as espionage and covert action because, after all, we're a righteous, upstanding people and nothing's going to happen to us. We hold our banner high and set a good example, or so we believe. Well,

that's all very nice, and in many respects, it's kind of sweet, but is it very intelligent?

The approach of the Carter/Mondale Administration has been to bend over backwards on all these issues of human rights and civil rights, as if a sovereign people didn't have an obligation to protect itself against foreigners who are spying on it; against its own citizens who engage in treasonable acts of one sort or another.

It seems to me that we've become in the past few years wonderfully sort of airy-fairy about the world in which we live, failing to recognise that it's a brutal world. This business of being righteous and upstanding I espouse, and it would be fine if the other fellow were equally righteous and upstanding. But if he's going to take advantage of you and you still don't want to demean yourself to meet him on his own terms, then you have to take the consequences.

There are all kinds of things going on in the world that are important for Governments to know in the fast-moving communications of our time. A hundred years ago, it was different. The important thing then was to know if some foreign Power was about to build a new weapon or make an advance in technology that would threaten the existence of your country.

We're an interlocked world these days; what we do affects the other fellow, and what he does affects us, and even small countries in the Third World with their one-crop economies have an effect on the commodity markets in our own country. In short, there's a whole range of things that Governments ought to be informed about. With Britain's current economic problems, I would have thought that it would be more important to have a good Secret Service today than it was in the days of Queen Victoria when the world was your oyster, and a gunboat solved your problems.

Have American attitudes been influenced by what people have read in the newspapers about, for instance, the CIA conditioning people with drugs?

Well, I don't think there is any question but that the way this issue of drugs was played up in the newspapers, it did indeed make a bad impression on the American public. Mistakes were made in some of the liberties the Agency took in the drug programme, but the programme as such seemed to be perfectly legitimate.

When the Agency was established in 1947, we had the difficult problem of settling it into American society and the American bureaucracy. The CIA was a brand new organisation set up to do functions which had not been performed in the US before.

As we looked at the world, what were some of the problems we were going to have to face? What were the Russians doing in the field of drugs, for example? This query was triggered by the fact that a Swiss chemist named Hoffman suddenly came up one day with a drug, now known as LSD, which was odourless, tasteless and colourless. In other words pour it into a glass of water and you didn't even know it was there, and yet it had the power to turn a normal individual into a case of walking schizophrenia. Well, suppose, we said to ourselves, the Russians were to use something like this against us. Shouldn't we be prepared to know what the reactions are? How to diagnose it? What to look for?

There was the episode of George Kennan, our Ambassador to the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, who made a speech in Berlin that got him declared *persona non grata* by the Russians. There was a feeling at the time that perhaps the Russians had contrived this and maybe they'd given him something like LSD and he was just disoriented. Ambassador Kennan has his own explanation these days as to why he gave the speech, but the fact remains it was one of the triggers that set off an examination of LSD.

Now, I recognise the widespread belief that the CIA administered it to unwitting people, including a man who jumped out of a window to his death. But Mr Olson was a member of a military group working on these things. He was part of a group that the Agency was consulting with. He had well understood that he was going to be administered a drug, he didn't know what drug, he didn't know when it was going to be administered, but he understood the ground rules and so he was a willing participant in the experiment. I believe it is said that we didn't examine Olson's background sufficiently and that he had suicidal tendencies. His family, which was given a big sum of money by President Ford as a result of this episode, denies that he was suicidal, but I believe there is evidence to suggest he was. In any event, this experiment wasn't handled with sufficient safeguard, and everyone is genuinely sorry about it. But the fact that we were investigating what different kinds of drugs do to people, seemed to me to be a perfectly rational thing for us to be doing in a world where such drugs might be used against innocent Americans.

The same thing applies to brainwashing. We did a lot of work to try to ascertain how brainwashing was accomplished, why it was accomplished, what its reaction on prisoners was and so forth. The point I want to make is that we felt these were fields we ought to investigate in order to protect ourselves if such methods were used against us.

You seem to be implying that in the interests of a national security, a loyal Intelligence man will stop at nothing: drugging, assassination—anything. Many people would claim to be horrified

by that. I'm not sure they would all be sincere in doing so, but they would make public noises to that effect.

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I recognise that and I'm not contending for one minute that Intelligence officers should be devoid of morality. I don't think John le Carré has done any particular service by suggesting that some Intelligence operatives are worked-over psychotic cases who don't understand the borders or limits of human conduct. But where do you draw the line?

How far should a man go in the dim twilight of some types of Intelligence work, some types of covert action? I submit that the British public might feel differently about these matters in a different context. If there were a war on, they might feel one way, whereas if there were not, they might feel another.

It becomes even more complicated in our country where we've had two wars, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, that were undeclared wars. Were they, or were they not, wars in the legalistic sense of the term? Certainly people were fighting one another, and certainly people were killing one another. In these circumstances, trying to draw the moral profile of an Intelligence officer is a difficult thing to do. Certainly the men with whom I was associated in the CIA had no interest in going around killing people, and they didn't kill. Assassination is no part of an Intelligence Officer's duty.

I believe there are certain other types of activity in which American Intelligence Officers should not participate. The American public won't sit still for drug trafficking, torture or physical brutality. These are things that most of us know very clearly the American people won't tolerate.

But the public should be fair enough to recognise that, in war, things might be different. In the Second World War, for example, there was a lot at stake. The British Commandos who were trained by Col. Fairbairn weren't taught to fight fair, they were trained to survive, to kill with stealth, and if they couldn't kill the enemy, to maim him. This was, I think, quite proper in the circumstances. But if it were to be done today — if the whole lexicon of dirty tricks were to be applied — people would be quite shaken by it.

Next Sunday: Richard Helms on Russian Intelligence methods.

Richard Helms, ex-CIA chief, talks to KENNETH HARRIS about **THE SECRETS OF RUSSIAN ESPIONAGE**

KENNETH HARRIS: The Russians have the reputation of being better at Intelligence work than anybody else. Why should this be so?

RICHARD HELMS: The Russians have had at their disposal a lot of manpower, that's point one; and point two, Intelligence has been part of the Soviet governmental machinery for generations, and they understand how to do it with great skill. It involves not getting caught, it involves handling yourself in such a way that you don't attract attention, it involves a lot of things.

The KGB differs substantially from the CIA in that it has both domestic and foreign responsibilities. It not only has the internal security functions in the Soviet Union, but also it operates the Border Guards, which is a very large organisation in Russia. This is in addition to performing, along with the GRU [the Russian equivalent of MI6], foreign espionage activity. The KGB is very active; they're active in Western Europe certainly, and they're active in the US.

Occasionally I'm asked: why should the Russians bother to put a lot of first-class Intelligence officers in the US; we make almost all our secrets public, one way or the other? And this is certainly true. I know that one magazine writer set himself the task of examining all the testimony printed from our Congress, in both the House of Representa-

tives and the Senate, in one year to see what he could find out about our military programme. He was horrified to discover how much information he could acquire just by this type of analysis.

Are Russian Intelligence-gathering methods different from those of the West?

Russians tend to go at espionage a bit differently from the British or the Americans. The Soviets are very interested in obtaining documents. They want pieces of paper. We have often wondered about this because the Americans and British are likely to have an agent—sitting in a Foreign Office, we'll say—and he comes out and reports orally and his words are taken down, and this makes an Intelligence report. The Soviets distrust that kind of thing. They want the actual document.

The KGB matches up documents that it steals from inside the Government or inside contractors for the Government, with material from trade or technical journals and newspapers. They're very skilful at it. In the field of analysis, the CIA is supposed to take all the information coming in from foreign countries and to analyse it, collate it, correlate it, write current Intelligence documents, write estimates for the future, and so forth. As nearly as one's been able to determine, the

Soviets don't seem to have that kind of analytic function.

It is my impression that one of the reasons that Soviets like documents is that they can be sent right to the top, right to their leadership, and these men can make a determination about the political sense or military value of the material. The preoccupation with Intelligence is right at the very top of the Soviet Government and on a continuing basis, and it doesn't go through many filters before it gets there.

To an onlooker, it seems that the CIA is no longer under fierce attack from within America. Does this mean that the Agency has been rendered so ineffective it can no longer do a good job?

Two things have happened. First, there is a slowly changing mood in the US about these matters. Many Americans are realising that we went a little bit far after the Vietnam War in criticising ourselves and our role in the world.

Second, public opinion is swinging back in favour of an increased defence budget. People are becoming aware of the powerful military machine the Soviets have been building in the past 10 or 15 years. This is causing a shift in sentiment toward better Intelligence, better defence, in other words getting our guard up.

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Take the Soviet military machine the way it is today and imagine a replay of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. How would the Russians react now? I once heard Mr John McCloy, who was appointed by President Kennedy to negotiate the withdrawal of Russian weapons from Cuba in 1962, tell the following story to President Johnson. McCloy described how he was sitting on a fence at his farm up in Connecticut with Kuznetsov, the Soviet negotiator, settling the arrangements for taking out the Ilyushin bombers from Cuba. They were sitting on the fence so there couldn't possibly be any technical intrusion into their conversation. Kuznetsov, according to McCloy, said, "All right, Mr McCloy, we withdraw the bombers, just as we've withdrawn the missiles, but I want to tell you something—this is the last time the US is going to be able to act like this towards the Soviet Union."

That was at the end of 1962. So whatever Mr Kuznetsov had in mind at the time, if you look at it in the perspective of 1979, the Soviets have done a very good job of increasing their military forces to a point where I don't know how the US could really oblige them to do what they did not want to do.

President Truman got the Russians out of Iran in 1946 simply by indicating that they'd better get out. We had the atomic bomb, and they didn't in those days. We got them to turn around at the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 because they were heading into a difficult situation in which it was clear to them, I believe, that the US was far more powerful in strategic weapons, and probably in conventional weapons as well.

But now that the Russians have this very large strategic force, the shoe may be on the other foot. Democracies have a difficult problem making decisions in this kind of context. The Soviets don't have that problem. The leadership decides what they're going to do, and they go ahead and do it.

At the time of the Cuba Missile Crisis, as we lined up our naval vessels and said to the Russians: 'Don't send your ships any fur-

ther,' suppose the Russians had replied, 'All right, that's what you told us, but there's freedom of the seas, we're going right on through to Cuba.' What is the decision an American President makes in that situation? It's going to be a very tough decision indeed. And I leave it at that. I'm not going to develop it — there's no sense in our playing war games here.

It seems to me that what many Americans want is for their Government to eschew all 'covert' action.

Any country that gets itself into such a position that it can't accomplish its ends by diplomacy, or by overt economic action, and has to send in troops or marines, turns its back entirely on the fact that there are situations in which defence can be manipulated covertly.

It seems to me that it is just plain silly to deny oneself this possibility, this kind of a utensil, this kind of equipment. But one does run into the difficulty that people tend to react in an exaggerated way: 'Oh, you're going into covert action; you're going to blow up things, upset governments, you're going to do all these terrible things. We shouldn't do these things.'

I don't think one ought to prejudge these situations and possibilities. I think these are questions and decisions which should be left to our governing authorities. Do you want to influence an election in such and such a country? Do you want to intrude yourself in another country? How do you want to help our para-military forces here? Such questions have to be answered, and the necessary decisions taken by the Government. We should not contrive legally, statutorily and in other ways, to put ourselves in a strait-jacket, tie our hands behind our back.

As for the morality of so-called meddling in the affairs of another country, I would agree that in a perfect world, like the Garden of Eden, one should not and need not do these things. But in our world—in which other countries are constantly undermining our security and strength—it's a different matter.

Would there be less criticism of 'covert' action if we hadn't heard so much about the failures?

I recognise that it is the failures that get in the newspapers. Of course, what is a failure to some is a success to others. Those who believe that it's immoral to do these things will tell you, even when we have had a success, that it was wrong. Looked at in that perspective, almost everything done in a foreign field is wrong because it's influencing events which theoretically should be influenced by other people. But history shows that world Powers adopting that attitude have not survived very long.

When I said last week that people prefer not to hear about some of the necessary measures to they don't have them on their consciences, I'm prepared to believe that's true also. But then, this is not a new phenomenon in human life. We're all touched with a bit of hypocrisy.

But there have been failures?

Let's face it; if the record wasn't good in the past, what is wrong with making it better in the future? In other words, what is wrong with proceeding with these operations now that we've gained experience, expertise, and have developed a cadre of officers who know how to do these things?

How do you feel about the general situation, Mr Helms? Are we moving nearer to a Third World War?

That is an extraordinarily difficult question for me to answer, Mr Harris. But if the Soviets become so powerful militarily that we are not able to compete effectively in the world, then we do come to a point of considerable danger. The reason I say this is that the Soviets might be tempted to call our bluff.

One really dramatic change that has not yet impressed itself on the American people is that for the last five years the US has been dependent for its energy on foreign countries. Historically, the US has been independent of foreign sources for all the necessities of life — private, economic, industrial, and so on. We went into the Second World War and built tanks, aeroplanes, anything you like, all without any by-your-leave from anyone else. Now this has changed. Our economic life is tied to the Persian Gulf region. Suddenly, we have a vital interest in that oil supply continuing to flow.

The Persian Gulf is very near the Soviet Union on the map. If the Soviets for some reason were to challenge us in this area, I don't believe that we could retreat. If we did, we would, effectively, be in their hands.

When you say, 'retreat'...

By retreat I mean retreat to the point where they took control of the countries that had the oil, and could give it to us or deny it to us as they happened to feel on any given day. This would create unquestionably a crisis of the first magnitude. Whether it would lead to a Third World War would depend on a whole lot of factors which have not yet eventuated. I don't think the Soviets will be tempted to start a Third World War. Certainly we are not going to start a Third World War unless really challenged. But I don't regard this question casually. I note that as in a checkers game the Soviets are quietly moving pieces on the board. In Cuba one day, in Afghanistan the next. Their behaviour in Afghanistan will, I think, tell us a lot about their aims toward the Persian Gulf area and the Indian Ocean.

I don't believe myself to be a so-called hardliner, but we've got to stand up for ourselves and not read into Soviet intentions something that is not there and was never intended. Americans are constantly saying that the Soviets won't do this or won't do that, when they don't have any solid evidence to support their contention. One should read earlier Soviet statements about their position in the world, and what their aims are in the long run. They're patient, they're prudent, they move slowly and carefully, but they move. Almost like a glacier if you like. And I have yet to have anybody put in my hand a responsible Soviet statement from a high Soviet official or political body like the Politburo or the Presidium that takes back any of those aims or objectives which the Soviets have consistently set for themselves over the years. And that includes the export of their system to other countries.

As in the case of Hitler's 'Mein Kampf,' we ought to pay attention to what the Soviets write and say, and not what we think they might be writing and saying.

You've described your fears about the general situation. Is there any 'specific' problem to which you think those concerned about the role of Intelligence in

a democratic society should be giving more thought?

Yes. Terrorism. The subject of terrorism is not well understood. The word is unfortunate—it is descriptive of almost nothing—and it tends to strike fear into the hearts of people who hear it. But it is an area of activity where Intelligence can play a very important role. And this applies to any country's Intelligence.

One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Israel's Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, used to be a terrorist, and it was regarded as a highly respectable profession when he was giving the mischief to the British, back in the days after World War II. But that doesn't alter the fact that terrorist organisations should be, if possible, followed very closely by Intelligence, particularly Secret Intelligence.

If a terrorist attack is going to take place, and one's able to anticipate it, one can save all kinds of sadness and grief, not to mention lives. Certainly this has been clear from the difficulties the Israelis have had with the PLO. There's a compiled history over the last 10 to 15 years of terrorist activities all over the world. And it's a particularly vicious form of operation, because unless you have the ability to penetrate the particular terrorist group, it is hard to anticipate what they're

likely to do next. Often they do unpredictable, quixotic things. Silly things. Many times the actions are vicious and cruel. And yet, in the US, it's my understanding that the FBI has guidelines now to the effect that they're not permitted to penetrate certain groups and investigate the activities of certain people until there's clear evidence they've done something wrong, or committed a criminal act. Well, if you are not allowed to penetrate them, and anticipate the problem you're likely to get, then you invite serious trouble.

We had, you recall, several years ago, an organisation in Washington called the Hanafi Muslims. They took hostages in the City Hall and in the Mosque and in the B'rai Brith headquarters. There were a couple of deaths as a result of this. Had the Hanafi Muslims been penetrated, or their activities followed, the action might have been anticipated and aborted in some way or other. As it was, it had to run its course.

I leave that as my last comment here. Because terrorism hasn't hit the US very much, that is not to say that one day it may not, and it could cause an awful lot of grief. If you look at the city of New York, just consider what a terrorist action could do to that city.

(As Received)

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MISCELLANEOUS

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THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
25 December 1979

Experts Clash Over Reliance On Sky Spies To Watch Reds

By Malcolm W. Brown
The New York Times

WASHINGTON — Can the United States make good the shortfall in intelligence about the Soviet Union that has resulted from the loss of listening posts in Iran and other neighbors of the Soviets?

A crash program to develop substitutes for the lost listening posts is in progress — a program that depends heavily on improving the capability of reconnaissance and communications satellites. But scientists, technologists and intelligence experts disagree about the prospects of success.

Satellite intelligence programs are among the most strictly held secrets in this country. Development of such programs is directed by such government organizations as the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Department of Defense and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Among the major builders of the secret equipment are the TRW Co. and Lockheed Corp.

Despite the vast development of America's spy satellite program in the past two decades, and despite the leaks that have acquainted the public with many of its achievements, it has been publicly and officially acknowledged only once. The occasion was a speech Oct. 1, 1978 by President Carter, in which he spoke of this country's "photo reconnaissance satellites."

The president's acknowledgment did not loosen the secrecy surrounding the subject, however, and neither government officials nor others involved in satellite development were willing to speak for direct quotation or indirect identification in interviews conducted by The New York Times. Nevertheless, a number of knowledgeable people consented to background interviews on this country's intelligence war with the Soviets.

Satellite enthusiasts privy to government secrets often regale outsiders with accounts of satellites whose sensors can read auto license plate numbers in Red Square, or pick out the warm outline of footprints left on a jungle trail by a hidden soldier, or listen to a terrestrial telephone conversation.

But skeptics inside and outside the official "intelligence community"

warned in interviews that even the best satellites can miss vital information unless detecting conditions are perfect. Overreliance on satellite intelligence has become more dangerous than ever with the loss of bases in Iran and other countries, they contend, since the Soviets are becoming increasingly expert in techniques for destroying, blinding or disabling reconnaissance satellites.

On one point, senior Defense Department, intelligence and other government experts expressed unanimity: The loss of listening posts in Iran has set back America's ability to penetrate certain kinds of Soviet secrets by two to three years.

In the meantime, the United States will face some difficulties in monitoring Soviet missile tests launched from the Turaytom range in Central Asia. The self-diagnostic signals that a flying missile sends back to its base betray many of its characteristics and capabilities to a knowledgeable eavesdropper manning a listening post, and loss of this information would affect America's ability to check Soviet compliance with any Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

Officials say much of the missile information that formerly came from listening posts in Iran is temporarily being collected from improved antennas at listening posts in Norway from modifications made in an existing satellite named Chalet.

Nevertheless, some recent debate has raised questions about the limitations and reliability of satellite intelligence in general.

The ability of American intelligence officials to say for certain, based on satellite information, whether what appeared to be a recent atomic detonation off South Africa was in fact one has increased doubts as to whether the United States can be sure of knowing when some nation has secretly joined the ranks of nuclear powers, thus altering the world balance of force.

Another example of the uncertainty and ambiguity sometimes produced by

satellite intelligence is the dispute caused by observations that American satellites have made of a Soviet high-energy research facility near Semipalatinsk.

According to Maj. Gen. George Keegan, who retired in 1977 as chief of Air Force intelligence, the satellite evidence shows the Soviets are using Semipalatinsk to develop and test a particle beam

weapon of such power and precision as to be able to destroy flights of intercontinental missiles. The existence of such a weapon would nullify America's deterrent defense posture, which is based on the capacity for swift retaliation.

But most other intelligence and scientific experts assert that the Soviets are not developing a particle beam weapon, and that the Semipalatinsk facility is for basic research, particularly in controlled hydrogen fusion.

Is it possible to eliminate uncertainties from the assessment of satellite intelligence?

Government experts roughly divide intelligence into two classes: that which warns of an imminent enemy attack, and all the rest.

In general, the experts, including most members of congressional intelligence committees, are confident that the United States would be duly warned at least 15 minutes before attacking Soviet missiles could reach us. Missile launches are detected mainly from the intense infrared light emitted by their exhaust trails, which become visible to orbiting satellites as soon as they rise above the cloud level.

Since the bulk of America's retaliatory power is carried in submerged, and presumably invulnerable, missile submarines, early satellite warning of enemy attack is not regarded as vital to retaliation in any case. America's underground command headquarters are supposedly immune even to direct hits by hydrogen bombs.

Officials concede that Soviet satellite-killer technology is advancing rapidly, however, and the Soviets might well precede an all-out attack with an attack disabling all our reconnaissance satellites.

The United States, naturally, is developing satellite-killer systems, too.

CONTINUE

"One system," a military informant said, "is a missile carried by an F-14 fighter. The fighter launches the missile at an altitude of about 50,000 feet, and a high-thrust Shrike motor boosts the missile up to the target satellite. When it's in range, the missile fires a warhead of explosive about the size of a Number-10 tomato can, which knocks out the target."

"Both we and the Soviets regard high-powered lasers as likely weapons by which satellites will fight each other," a Defense Department expert said.

But even against high-powered laser weapons, satellites can be armored. Technical experts told The New York Times that vital satellites can be encased in heat-shielding armor of the kind developed for the Space Shuttle.

The complicated communications systems of satellites can be attacked by enemy radio signals in the same way that radar and other forms of military communication and detection can be jammed. An endless war of jamming and counterjamming has been fought in the shadows ever since World War II.

Assuming that a satellite is capable of surviving enemy interference or attack, just how much can it hear, see or detect, within the limits of scientific principles?

"No frequency in the electromagnetic spectrum is denied to a satellite, although some, especially those at frequencies below 30 megahertz, are harder to receive than others," a senior director of spy satellite research said.

This means that a satellite can theoretically see any object on the ground, however faint the illumination may be, or can see images formed by invisible infrared light and radar, even of things hidden underground. Satellites could also receive any kind of radio transmission, presumably including the microwave signals that carry most of the world's telephone conversations.

But how much do actual satellite capabilities differ from theory?

A satellite looking through earth's atmosphere at things at or near the ground confronts some of the same problems as an astronomical telescope looking out. Moving air at different temperatures can spoil a view through the atmosphere in the same way that turbulent waves in a swimming pool prevent a clear view of the bottom. No telescope, however powerful, can ever overcome this problem.

While the characteristics of satellite camera systems are among the nation's most closely guarded secrets, some deductions about them can be made from general principles.

Dr. Halton C. Arp, an astronomer who works with America's largest telescope, the 200-inch telescope on Mt. Palomar, said in an interview that a satellite could undoubtedly see things on mountains and high elevations better than in valleys, where rising currents of warm air are likely to obscure vision.

"One would expect that the longer the wavelength the better would be the resolution," he said. Photographs taken in infrared light use wavelengths longer than those of visible light and therefore must show finer detail.

Another telescope expert, Dr. Jerry E. Nelson of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, said that the most powerful satellite telescopes must be combinations of parabolically shaped mirrors and lenses rather than lenses alone.

"For astronomical telescopes, the practical limit of resolution (the angular distance at which a telescope can discern two objects as separate from each other) is about one arc second," he said.

"Since most atmospheric perturbations are relatively close to the ground, the satellite looking in would have less trouble with distorted views than would an astronomical telescope looking out. So let's say the resolving limit of a satellite might be about one-tenth of an arc second.

"That would mean that from an altitude of 100 kilometers or so, a satellite could theoretically see two points a half meter apart as separate points. With that resolution, you should be able to count people standing around. 'I would be very much surprised if you could see their faces, however, or discern the numbers on an automobile license plate,' Nelson said.

Similar difficulties complicate the reception of various kinds of radio signals, which may be both faint and distorted.

The main avenues for improvement appear to be in better, more sensitive antenna systems and signal processing arrays. While active radar scanning from satellites poses huge problems, the

Soviets are known to be experimenting with radar. Their Cosmos 954, which crashed in Canada last year, was radar-equipped, an American official disclosed. The land contours of cloud-shrouded Venus have been mapped by radar, and similar techniques are presumably applicable to earth satellites.

Infrared cameras, which are constantly undergoing improvement, can discern heat patterns on the ground that may betray the existence of underground factories or testing laboratories. But satellite intelligence depends heavily on the skill of photo interpreters, for whom such details as shadows cast by chimneys, vehicle tread marks and discolored foliage may reveal important secrets.

The Soviets cannot conceal the condition of their wheat fields, pictures of which permit the Central Intelligence Agency to estimate crop yields (and national economic prospects) with considerable precision. But by burying research facilities or weapons far underground and by concealing above-ground clues with obstacles, special paints and other devices, even the best satellites can be foiled.

American experts conceded in interviews that they cannot rely on information from every satellite picture. But over a period of time, they said, enough pictures of a target may be accumulated to show changes that produce military intelligence.

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ON PAGE A13

THE WASHINGTON POST
27 December 1979

Soviet Lag in Offshore Oil Technology Has Impact on Prices

By Kevin Klose

Washington Post Foreign Service

BARAZUKA STATION, U.S.S.R.—

From this sturdy wellhead platform three miles by causeway from the western shore of the world's largest inland sea, Soviet oilmen are steadily pumping energy from one of their nation's most historic and reliable petroleum fields.

Along the shoreline of the Caspian Sea, north of the Azerbaijani capital of Baku, the land and sea are thick with derricks and bobbing donkey pumps providing oil for the industries and homes of European Russia. The work began in the early part of the century and made Baku the traditional oil capital of the Soviet Union.

Its products powered the Red Army offensives that hurled back the Germans in World War II and, together with other major fields west of the Urals, helped fuel rapid postwar growth in the Soviet economy.

Workers here make up to 400 rubles (\$520) a month, well over the Soviet industrial average of 175, according to Musaev Feredun, the site chief, and they compete hard for bonuses available to teams that drill faster and deeper.

The men and women of this station commute over the concrete one-lane causeway that connects 238 separate wellheads—part of a vast shallow-water oil production complex built above the Caspian Sea's sandy bottom. The complex includes a unique oil community on stilts called Peschanoye More, where 1,500 technicians, roustabouts, repairmen, drillers and construction workers spend eight- or nine-day shifts at work.

This technical feat brings proud grins to the faces of Feredun and his colleagues. The causeway operations also serve as an ironic symbol of the shortcomings of the local oil industry, a small but important piece in the puzzle of the troubled Soviet petroleum economy.

What happens here and in other remote areas of the Soviet Union may

affect American oil prices in the next decade.

This is because the Soviet Union also is in the throes of an energy crisis. As in the United States, there is no easy solution. A danger, from the West's point of view, was predicted in a now famous CIA study in 1977. It said the Soviets will be net importers, not exporters, of oil in the mid-1980s.

Should that happen, skyrocketing world oil prices could head for the next galaxy.

Although officials estimate they have many decades more before the easily accessible Baku reserves run dry, Caspian offshore production has fallen short of its targets in recent years, static at about 70 million barrels per year, or roughly two percent of the Soviet Union's 1979 record production of 4.1 billion barrels.

While officials predict they will make the overall five-year plan goals, the search for new areas is limited by the severe technical limitations of this oil center. According to the area's chief oil and gas geologist, Knochbacht Usufzade, the Soviets do not have the know-how or hardware to explore in water deeper than about 300 feet. By his estimate, this means that about 40 percent of the offshore Caspian basin reserved for oil prospecting is beyond reach.

The same limitations apply to other Soviet offshore areas in the White Sea, Black Sea, Barents Sea and off Sakhalin island in the Pacific. In U.S. and other offshore areas, exploration and production proceeds at twice that depth. Some wells have been drilled from 1,000 feet above the sea floor.

The Soviets' lag in offshore exploration coincides with a general drop in production in most of the relatively shallow and easily accessible oilfields in European Russia. Although the Soviet Union is by far the world's largest oil producer, half of its total comes from enormous Siberian fields in the basin of the north-flowing Ob River.

Western analysts say they have found increasing evidence that the remarkable production pace in the severe Siberian climate has been achieved at considerable cost to the older areas, which have sent technicians and equipment to the northeast.

Meanwhile, the massive Siberian effort also is encountering problems. Recent Soviet press accounts show that drilling in the key Tyumen Oblast is 200 wells behind schedule, amid complaints that efficiency has declined because new workers are not prepared for the rigorous climate.

The 1980 target for this vast oilfield is 2.1 billion barrels, an increase of 70 million from the 1979 output. Some Western analysts think the Soviets will be hard pressed to achieve the goal.

Like Soviet planners elsewhere who are looking for help, Baku officials say a long-awaited infusion of Western know-how will solve their immediate problems and lead to greater output. They are counting for great help from a \$50 million semisubmersible oil prospecting rig bought from Armco Steel Corp. now being assembled up the seacoast in Astrakhan. This rig can operate far below the 300-foot limit to find new reservoirs and help the Soviets perfect the deep-water techniques they now lack. Geologist Usufzade said there are plans for building similar rigs, with Western help, to explore other offshore areas.

But the Soviets are notorious for slow results in applying new technology. The gap between target and real output may well widen in the coming years.

President Leonid Brezhnev, confronted by grim figures showing a slowdown in economic growth, has made clear that Soviet economic well-being is tied directly to increased exploitation of petroleum reserves. Controversy surrounds both the amount of oil reserves and probable production rates.

The Soviet Union has the world's second largest known oil reserves, generally said in the West to be about 71 billion barrels. But a Swedish firm, Petrostudies, specialists in Soviet petroleum, in a recent report more than doubled that to 150 billion barrels. The Soviets themselves will not say; oil reserves are a state secret.

CONTINUED

The 1977 CIA report, somewhat revised but still accepted by many, as plausible worst-case projections, predicted production problems soon, caused chiefly by improper extraction methods. The Soviets angrily reject this and the Swedish analysts reached a far different conclusion: that the Soviets have effectively reorganized their oil, gas, and geology ministries with an eye to becoming a major seller of refined petroleum products in the world—and soon.

In any case, while the Soviets extract far more than the next largest producer, Saudi Arabia, (with about 9.5 million barrels), they are lagging below their own goals.

For 1980, Soviet oil production is set at 4.2 billion barrels, 148 million more than in 1979, but 238 million below the original peak production targets set by the state in the five-year plan adopted in 1976. Western analysts doubt whether even the current goal can be met, despite Brezhnev's anger and criticism.

Soviet oil production is not only crucial in the national economy but also in earning hard currency abroad. The Soviet Union is the third largest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia and Iran: about 3 million barrels exported daily, with slightly less than half going to Western, hard-currency markets. Hard-currency earnings from oil total about \$6 billion annually, about half of the Soviet overall total.

Most of this money is used to buy Western technology, such as the Armo offshore oil rig or the \$150 million Dresser Industries oil drill plant, the sale of which was held up by President Carter in 1978 in retaliation for Soviet trials of dissidents.


Thus oil trade is crucial to modernizing Soviet industry; whose manufactured goods are not up to world standards.

Lower-than-expected oil output could affect this trade, since the Soviet economy is making larger demands for petroleum yearly and the Soviets have promised to increase by 20 percent their oil exports to the Eastern bloc, according to a Radio Moscow report last July.

If the Soviets cannot meet these promises, the East Europeans, with rising energy needs, will be forced to buy more in Western markets.

If Moscow cuts oil shipments to Western countries, such as Finland and West Germany, they likewise will be forced into greater reliance on Western markets—adding pressure on prices.

Such considerations affected White House thinking when Carter reversed himself at the end of 1978 and cleared the sale of the Dresser drill bit plant. One of the grounds for that decision was that the West has a direct economic interest in aiding the Soviets to raise their oil production.



By Richard Purno—The Washington Post

Soviet oil production relies on areas stretching from Caspian Sea to Sakhalin.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 24

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 DECEMBER 1979

Soviet shift on aid to others

The Soviet Union has some evidently self-serving reasons for switching the weight of its foreign aid from military to economic assistance. But, in view of the needs of the developing world, any such emphasis must be welcomed — and seen as a more productive challenge to the West than the race to see who can supply the most arms far and wide. As the United States Agency for International Development (AID) underscores, Moscow's 1978 commitment of \$3.7 billion in economic aid "brought its annual program *close to US levels* (\$4.5 billion) for the first time." Meanwhile, according to a CIA report cited by AID, the whole Soviet-dominated communist bloc of states reduced military assistance from a 1977 peak of \$5.7 billion to \$2.3 billion in 1978.

Most of the Soviet economic aid went to Turkey, a NATO member seen as worth wooing along Russia's border, and to Morocco for exploiting its phosphates, which Moscow itself needs. But 13 other countries were also recipients.

The turn from the military-aid lever may be only a respite, as some observers say. And Moscow continued to push large industrial projects in preference to the kind of food and development aid given by the US. The CIA report says the Russians ignored calls for an approach favored within the international aid community — to provide assistance for rural development to meet basic human needs.

But who would expect the Soviet leopard to change all its spots at once? Maybe it is not shifting from guns to rice. But from guns to phosphates is something.

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ON PAGE 40

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
31 DECEMBER 1979

Congress Walks on Eggs In an Election Year

Energy conservation, defense spending, tax relief, SALT—tough decisions are piling up for a politically skittish House and Senate.

National security. Congress can be counted on to give Carter what he wants in increased defense spending. The sentiment for additional military outlays has been stimulated by debate over the national-security implications of SALT and by the Iranian crisis.

Although the entire federal budget for 1980 will not be revealed until late January, Carter in December disclosed his intention to ask Congress for 157 billion dollars for military programs, a 5.6 percent increase from the previous year. The budget includes funds for long-range cargo planes and ships that could swiftly deploy a military force to protect Middle Eastern oil fields if their security should be threatened. Also proposed are outlays for new ships to patrol the sea-lanes through which oil is shipped to the U.S. and its allies.

More money could be in store for the Central Intelligence Agency as well. A growing number of lawmakers contend that the CIA must quickly improve its ability to gather intelligence in Iran and other political trouble spots around the world. Result: A push for more money for intelligence-gathering and analytical personnel and equipment, as well as to ease restrictions on covert operations.

EXCERPTED

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ON PAGE 42-43

NEWSWEEK
31 December 1979

A MISUSED BRAIN?

A year ago, the U.S. Commerce Department approved the sale of a Sperry Rand Univac 1100/10C computer to the Soviet Union. Two months later, COCOM, the Western Alliance committee that reviews exports of sensitive technology to Communist nations, added its OK. The \$3.1 million computer was delivered last September to the State Institute for Design and Research in Synthetic Rubbers outside Moscow. But the institute turns out to be close to a Tupolev facility for the manufacture of both military and civilian aircraft, including the controversial Backfire bomber. And a source in Moscow has now suggested that the Univac is being warmed up for use in aircraft design.

Has Sperry's computer been diverted to military work at Tupolev? If so, it could conceivably help to upgrade the Backfire to the status of an intercontinental bomber—which would violate an agreement reached between the U.S. and the Soviets as part of the SALT II process. President Carter's national-security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has ordered an investigation, and any suspicions aroused by the inquiry may be a further blow to SALT's uphill battle for ratification. They also may tend to underscore recent criticism of the whole system of security for advanced technology that is sold to the Soviet Union and other Communist nations. An in-house Sperry memo candidly described the controls as "too dispersed to be effective."

SUSPICIONS: The seeds of the investigation were planted on the Moscow cocktail circuit where the original source was heard voicing his suspicions about the kind of test the computer was undergoing before it went "on line." According to one Washington official, a Western diplomat passed this information on to the U.S. Embassy, which relayed it. It is unclear what the intelligence community has been able to turn up as confirmation, but the subsequent circula-

tion of at least one CIA report referring to the alleged diversion suggests that it is considered more than gossip.

The U.S. Embassy cable, dated Nov. 20, warned: "Source indicates computer now undergoing start-up tests, but that output is cross sections of aircraft." The cable went on to say that the computer "was approved for use in chemical plant but has been installed in facility near chemical plant but also near Tupolev aircraft plant." And it added the source's claim that "some officials of Sperry know of but wink at this diversion."

On the basis of the locations involved, the Univac may have been made available to Tupolev's Special Design Bureau. But Sperry officials said they could find no evidence that the computer had been diverted to any improper military use. "We are distressed by the unconfirmed allegation . . . and will cooperate fully with any investigation conducted by the U.S. Government," said company chairman J. Paul Lyet, who also heads a White House panel that is examining the use of export controls to restrict the transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet bloc. "Anyone who would wink at something like that should be subject to immediate dismissal."

'LOBOTOMIZED': The Univac 1100/10C is a modest computer. The "10C" is a company code denoting a version of limited capability intended for sale to Soviet bloc nations; Lyet calls it a "lobotomized" computer. Originally, the Soviets wanted to buy a more advanced Univac 1106, but Washington insisted on the less potent model.

By some accounts, the Soviets were really less interested in the Univac than in "software" called ASKA, a program designed for use with the Univac. H. Glen Haney, Univac's vice president for worldwide marketing, said the ASKA program can be used for "any kind of stress analysis"—from chemical plants to bridges to

airplanes. ASKA is marketed by a Swedish firm, and Sweden does not belong to COCOM. Thus the Swedes are under no obligation to help prevent the flow of sensitive technology to the U.S.S.R.

FAY WILLEY with DAVID C. MARTIN in Washington
and WILLIAM E. SCHMIDT in Moscow

THE NEW YORK TIMES
23 December 1979

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Central Intelligence Agency

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
26 December 1979

Could We Mobilize Industry?

By FRED CHARLES IKLE

Recently, the Carter administration announced that it will ask Congress for a larger defense budget—a 3.5% real increase in next year's spending, a 4.5% projected increase in the plan for the next five years.

It is too early to say whether this increase will be sustained by Congress (the Senate now seems to favor more, the House less). In any event, since the Soviets, according to CIA estimates, are now investing about twice as much as we each year in new armaments and will continue to increase their military buildup by some 1% annually, it is clear that we are not about to close the gap in military investment.

That the body politic in the United States is now unwilling to prevent a continuing deterioration in the global military trends is an interesting historical phenomenon—to choose a bland expression. Yet, few would contend that the United States is incapable of doing more. Indeed, comparisons with the past would scarcely support such a contention: Our present defense outlays, in constant buying power, absorb the lowest percentage of our gross national product as well as of all public spending since 1940.

At the outbreak of the Korean war, we spent about the same percentage of GNP on defense as today, but within two years we tripled our defense effort. Between 1940 and 1944, our military budget grew from 2% of GNP to 42%. With today's GNP, this World War II peak would correspond to a trillion dollar defense budget.

Could the United States today achieve a similar feat of industrial defense mobilization if a politically effective consensus demanded it? Should a dramatically threatening crisis crystallize our political will, would we have the tools to do the job? And if we possess this capability, what is its importance for our security—not only when actually used but also as latent strength?

Our capability to expand defense production in a compelling crisis has been neglected in recent years. The need to improve it is lost today between two extreme assumptions. Either it is assumed that the greater strength of our economy could unquestionably be marshaled should the need arise. Or, it is assumed that any major war would start so suddenly and end so quickly—resulting either in our total destruction or a new era of peace and stability—that the mobilization of our industrial strength would come too late.

'Short War' Thinking

The assumption that industrial mobilization is irrelevant because it would come too late stems from a peculiar habit of thought common among our defense planners—"short war" thinking. Because of budget stringencies over many years, our military stockpiles today could support a major conventional war for only a couple of months or so. This puts our planners in a quandary: either they have to assume a short war, or envisage fighting a war without supplies. Understandably, they choose to "plan for a short war."

In a short war, lo and behold, the mobilization of American industry would come too late; the war would have ended before Detroit could produce the new tanks. What would we think of an engineer whose bridge fails to span the river, but who says he could not use additional timbers to complete the job—because he is "planning for a short bridge"?

The other line of thinking contributes to the current neglect of our capacity for industrial mobilization by taking it for granted. In this view, it is simply assumed that the economy of the United States could somehow make up for any possible military weakness. As President Carter put it last year in talking about U.S. and Soviet military strength, "We are by far the stronger nation economically. Our productive capacity is superior, and I think will always be." Yet, despite the importance of this view, it is rarely elaborated. The potential translation of our economic strength into military strength—a complicated process with many uncertainties of scope and timing—is seen as the more reassuring the less carefully it is analyzed.

In fact it is an open question, today, whether our economy could accomplish an industrial mobilization comparable to that after Pearl Harbor—a smooth, fivefold increase of defense production within only two years. Looking back at those years, it almost seems we were ten feet tall.

In many ways, the difficulties would be greater in a future crisis than either in 1941 or in 1950. Unused plant capacity would be smaller, modern armaments take a longer time to produce, automation can reduce quick flexibility and our economy has become less autarkic (in particular, there might be a severe oil shortage).

But many of these difficulties could be mitigated with prior preparation. Rather inexpensive measures could greatly shorten the time needed to expand defense production and help reduce hardships inflicted on the civilian economy. These might range from standby legislation (going well beyond the present Defense Production Act) to ready prototypes of arms specially suitable for mass production. More expensive measures, that might

absorb one or two percent of the defense budget, include larger raw material stockpiles, standby plant facilities and selective advance production of long-lead components of weapons systems.

These preparations—as well as the actual expansion if ever needed—would have to be guided by an overarching national strategy. The tasks for this strategy must be to repel the aggression and recover the lost ground, to deter escalation to nuclear war and to lay the foundations for a more stable peace.

If our economy and industry have the potential for a rapid and massive military buildup, this asset could be of enormous importance. As a quiet threat it could strengthen deterrence of aggression; when actually used it could, over time, eliminate our inferiority in conventional arms. The tripling of our defense effort after the North Korean attack must have been a bitter lesson for the Soviets. Undoubtedly, fear of again stirring up the sleeping giant has contributed an element of caution to Soviet initiatives. It is greatly to our interest to keep this fear alive.

Given the continuing disparity in military spending between us and the Russians, in the 1950s our ready conventional forces could be outnumbered and outgunned in almost every conflict where we might confront Soviet forces. In the 1950s and 1960s, not only was the gap in conventional strength less severe than it will be in the 1980s (in particular, our Navy enjoyed superiority) but also the nuclear balance was then in our favor.

What would we do, for instance, in the event of a conflict in the Middle East, in which our friends are being attacked by a country backed by the Soviet Union? If we stayed out, pro-Soviet forces might come to control all the Persian Gulf oil fields, or Israel might face destruction.

Conventional Forces

If, on the other hand, we helped our friends, Soviet conventional forces could outmatch us at every level of violence. As our forces were pushed into retreat, surely we would neither initiate nuclear Armageddon nor capitulate. While we could pray and hope that our nuclear forces were adequate to deter nuclear attack, we could not lean on them—as we did in the past—to make up for our inferior conventional forces.

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Instead, the President would ask Congress to increase the defense budget, perhaps by 200% or more, just as Harry Truman did in the summer of 1950 when our forces in Korea were pushed back to a narrow foothold around the port of Pusan. And Congress would almost certainly go along. In the spring of 1950, many members of Congress argued that economic instability constituted a much greater threat to us than the military strength of Communism; but a few months later when the time came to vote for a tripling in defense spending there was no dissent on Capitol Hill.

Our capacity sharply to expand defense production is also the bedrock for sound arms control agreements—the principal, if not the only, deterrent to a major treaty violation or abrogation. For example, we are not building defenses against ballistic missiles because of our reliance on the 1972 treaty prohibiting their deployment. Our only real leverage to deter a sudden Soviet abrogation of this treaty is our latent capacity to respond by a swift and many fold increase in our strategic arms programs.

Democracies must rely on their capacity to mobilize and expand military strength in an emergency, since they cannot sustain over many years the same exertion for military preparedness that totalitarian regimes impose on their people. The basic nuclear deterrent, clearly, has to be sufficient and in place all the time: Industrial mobilization is impossible after a massive nuclear attack.

But over three-fourths of our defense budget is devoted to conventional forces. A tiny fraction of these resources allocated to plans and preparations for industrial mobilization could vastly increase our ability rapidly to expand our military strength—to improve both our nuclear deterrent and our conventional forces. The better prepared this capacity for expansion, the more convincing it will be to a possible enemy and the less likely that it will have to be used.

Mr. Ikle, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Ford administration, is active in business and a consultant on national security.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
24 December 1979

Two Men Charged With Illegal Sale Of 10,000 Guns

NEW YORK, Dec. 23 (AP) — Two reputed top international arms traffickers have been arrested on a variety of charges stemming from the alleged sale of 10,000 machine guns to police posing as revolutionaries, the Manhattan district attorney announced today.

Frank Terpil, 40, of McLean, Va., and George Korkala, 38, of Nutley, N.J., were arrested yesterday at the New York Hilton Hotel by city police after the pair negotiated a \$2 million sale with two undercover police, District Attorney Robert Morgenthau said.

Also being held as a material witness, but not charged with any crime, was ex-Marine John Dutcher, 40, a self-described assassin and soldier of fortune who allegedly agreed to train an army in the use of weapons sold by the pair, Morgenthau said at a news conference.

The district attorney described Terpil and Korkala as freelance military specialists who harbor fugitives, sell illegal weapons and train terrorists and military activists through a series of front companies throughout the world.

He said Terpil sold \$3.2 million in weapons, explosives and surveillance equipment to Uganda during the rule of exiled President Idi Amin, and operated various front businesses in Washington, Paris and Panama.

Terpil, fired by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1971, joined Korkala as a partner three years ago, the district attorney said.

Morgenthau said Korkala, who drives a car with diplomatic plates registered to the Ugandan mission to the United Nations, has been known to supply arms to Libya and countries in the Middle East.

FBI agents, armed with a search warrant, raided one of the pair's companies, Amstech Co. in Nutley, after the arrests and found a cache of sophisticated "sample weaponry."

Terpil and Korkala were arrested after undercover agents gave them a \$56,000 down payment on the sale of 10,000 used MK2 and MK3 machine guns, to be delivered in 45 days, Morgenthau said the confiscated guns are being held in England.

The two men were charged in connection with the sale or supply of a Browning automatic pistol and the machine guns Saturday, and the sale or supply of a silenced sniper rifle, automatic pistol and other explosives on other dates.

THE NEW YORK TIMES
24 December 1979

2 Seized in City In Sale to Agents Of 10,000 Guns

By CHARLES KAISER

Briefcase bombs, letter bombs, grenades, poison darts, dozens of firearms and scores of documents were seized over the weekend in simultaneous raids in New York City, Nutley, N.J., and Crewe, England, and criminal charges were filed against two men described by the Manhattan District Attorney as major international gunrunners.

Two undercover detectives convinced the alleged gunrunners that they were actually Latin American revolutionaries, paid the men \$36,000 as a deposit for a \$2 million sale of 10,000 machine guns, and then arrested them Saturday at the New York Hilton Hotel, according to the District Attorney, Robert M. Morgenthau, who conducted the investigation.

Electronics Concern Raided

As the arrests were made, agents of New Scotland Yard raided a building in Crewe — owned by one of the suspects arrested at the Hilton — seized documents and took several persons into custody.

At the same time, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and officers of the New York City Police Department's bomb section — whose aid was sought by the F.B.I. — raided the Nutley offices of an electronics concern on a Federal warrant and recovered bombs, booby traps and firearms.

Frank Edward Terpil, one of the men arrested Saturday morning at the Hilton, was described at his arraignment yesterday as a former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency who had provided

arms to Libya, had trained terrorists, had acted as an adviser to Idi Amin, the deposed Uganda dictator, and had sold at least \$3.2 million in weapons to the Ugandans.

Mr. Terpil's alleged co-conspirator, George Gregory Korkala, drives an automobile with diplomatic plates registered to the Ugandan Mission to the United Nations. He was identified as the owner of the Amstech Corporation, the Nutley electronics concern raided by the F.B.I.

A third man, John Dutcher, whom Mr. Morgenthau called "a self-proclaimed assassin," was also arrested at the Hilton and held as a material witness.

Judge Robert M. Haft of Criminal Court remanded all three men without bail. Mathew Crosson, an assistant district attorney who conducted the investigation with James Kindler and Seth Rosenberg, refused to say, for "security reasons," where the suspects were being held. Mr. Terpil and Mr. Korkala face a maximum of 25 years in prison if they are convicted of all the charges against them.

Mr. Terpil is 40 years old and lives in McLean, Va. Mr. Morgenthau said he was "unfavorably discharged" from the C.I.A. in 1971. A spokesman for the C.I.A. in Washington declined to comment on whether Mr. Terpil was a former agency employee.

A spokesman for the Uganda Mission in New York confirmed that Mr. Terpil had been "very close" to Mr. Amin.

The car seized by the police from Mr. Korkala, bearing license plate number DPL 580, belonged to Abdul Murbe, a former second secretary in the mission here who was close to Mr. Amin and who fled the mission last May. The spokesman said he was unaware of Mr. Murbe's whereabouts.

The undercover agents posed as terrorists representing an unspecified Caribbean movement. One of them pretended he spoke no English, and both of them traveled to England to convince the alleged gunrunners of their sincerity.

First, the gunrunners allegedly sold the undercover men a Browning automatic pistol, a Luger automatic pistol, and a .22-caliber long rifle detectives described as "especially designed" for assassinations.

On Saturday, they signed a contract promising delivery of 10,000 machine guns for a total of \$2 million in return for the \$36,000 down payment. Then they were arrested.

Investigators from Scotland Yard determined that Mr. Terpil purchased the Hunters Lodge Hotel in Crewe in 1973 for slightly more than \$500,000 and used it as a lodge for his confederates.

It was the Hunters Lodge Hotel that was raided by Scotland Yard investigators Saturday. Reached at the Crewe police station last night, a man who would identify himself only as Sergeant Jackson said, "I don't know anything about the job — except that there was one."

ANN ARBOR NEWS (MICH.)
5 DECEMBER 1979

OK spook, go back in cold



BY DON FABER

Editorial Page Editor

IT'S OK, spies, you can go back out in the cold now. Espionage is getting respectable again.

A large majority of Americans, according to pollster Lou Harris, favors "overhauling and stepping up CIA intelligence activities around the world."

That surely comes as good news to the super-secret spook house in Langley, Va. just outside Washington, where staffers have to get security clearance just to go to the sandbox.

And there will be renewed interest in writers Len Deighton and John Le Carre, now that Americans apparently have gotten over their squeamishness about spying.

IRAN IS RESPONSIBLE for the turnabout in attitudes. Before the Ayatollah came along to galvanize public opinion, the CIA was in bad repute.

And deservedly so, in some respects. Disclosures about domestic spying during the Vietnam war and questions about agency activities that had strong political overtones soured Americans on the CIA.

And of course, the CIA is still suffering from the colossal bungle job that was the Bay of Pigs.

Meanwhile, Israeli intelligence was pulling off an Entebbe and snatching a mysterious-cargoed freighter from Cherbourg harbor under the noses of the French, who may have been paid off to look the other way.

WHY WERE we caught short by events in Iran? Why are we embarrassed by the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba? Why are we failing to anticipate developments in other countries where the U.S. has suffered strategic setbacks lately?

The answer in part, I think, is the tight leash on which intelligence operations have been kept. That and the fact we've pulled in our horns all over the globe in response to the drumbeat of criticism over Vietnam and involvement elsewhere.

A responsible world power does not, and should not, neglect its spy apparatus. That would be foolish in the extreme.

* * *

I DON'T APPROVE of "hit squads" and assassination attempts on Castro, but I'm not so naive as to think dirty tricks are off limits just because we're the moral and ethical pillar of the West.

In an imperfect world, spying has a place. The more we know about foe and potential foe alike, the better off we'll be.

And then we'll have less of this anguish and breast-beating at home over why we were surprised so badly by events in Iran.

So it's back out into the cold, you spooks. If the Russians can routinely "staff" their embassies with KGB gumshoes, let's not pretend they're clerks on a cultural exchange program, writing home about Niagara Falls.

U. N. Reconnaissance Satellite Study Extended

United Nations last week extended the charter of a group appointed by Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to study formation of an international reconnaissance satellite agency run by the U. N.

The action will allow the multinational panel to continue analysis of a French proposal for such an agency, with findings due in June, 1981, in time for use during the General Assembly's second session devoted to disarmament. French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing proposed such an organization in 1978.

The concept generally has been opposed by the U. S. and Soviet Union, the only two nations currently operating photo reconnaissance spacecraft on a routine basis. Considerable data and technology transfer and costs would have to be provided by the U. S. and Soviet Union under the French plan, which envisions three steps toward implementation of the U. N. agency:

- U. S. and USSR or any other country possessing reconnaissance spacecraft would provide data products for analysis to the U. N. agency as the initial phase of the program.

- U. N. ground stations would be able to acquire directly and process data from existing reconnaissance satellites in Phase 2, preventing prior censorship by the countries operating the satellites.

- U. N. photo reconnaissance spacecraft would be developed under Phase 3, completing a system the U. N. organization could operate autonomously to monitor arms control agreements and crisis situations.

The international panel examining the concept has been assessing existing technology capabilities and concluded that an 0.5-meter (1.6-ft.) resolution for detailed imaging of military systems would be possible and desirable, along with 3-5-meter (9.8-16.4-ft.) resolutions for observing installations or large military maneuvers. The group, headed by Hubert Bortzmeyer, technical adviser for the French national space research center in Paris, acknowledged hesitancy of some nations to participate in such an activity, but said, "In the future, when many nations [are] able to obtain data from their own satellites, the perception of sensitive and non-sensitive data might change."

A significant question in the group's future discussions will be the role of civilian remote sensing in an overall U. N. reconnaissance satellite agency. Specific topics that will be addressed during meetings in Geneva, Switzerland, over the next 18 months are:

- Assessment of the state-of-the-art and future perspectives of capability of military and civilian satellites.

- Remote sensing centers.

- Types of arms control agreement and crisis situations that could be monitored by U. N. reconnaissance spacecraft.

- Legal implications of such an agency.

- Costs.

- Various structures such an agency might take.

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AFGHANISTAN

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NEWSWEEK
7 January 1980

CARTER'S WIDENING CRISIS

BUFFER: The Soviet push was bound to alter the geopolitical balance in the region. Ever since the days of the czars, the Russians have eyed Afghanistan as an avenue toward the Indian Ocean and its warm-water ports. But until 21 months ago, the country managed to survive as a natural buffer state between India and the Soviet Union. Then a Soviet-sponsored coup installed Nur Muhammed Taraki, Amin's predecessor. Last week's Soviet goal was to replace Amin, who had failed to keep the Afghan Army together and hold the Islamic rebels in the mountains and countryside at bay. "They literally had no choice except to take over the country or let go of it," said former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Robert G. Neumann. "There was no middle way."

The longer-range Russian calculations could be more ominous. Since Vietnam, Americans have shown little inclination to intervene militarily in the Third World, leaving the field increasingly open to Soviet adventures. With the U.S. on the defensive

in Iran—and with no real military options open to it on the ground in Afghanistan—the Russians may have concluded that the risks were small enough to experiment with their growing military power beyond their own borders. The onset of a Presidential campaign in the U.S. may also have led them to conclude that the prospects for a SALT treaty were tenuous in 1980 and the risks of a Soviet provocation in Afghanistan accordingly low. Their broadest objective was to expand their influence in the Middle East. "The CIA estimates that the Russians will be oil importers by the mid-1980s," says Neumann. "That by itself would make the area important to them."

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World

AFGHANISTAN

Steel Fist in Kabul

A Soviet coup overthrows Amin and sets a fearsome precedent

It was the most brutal blow from the Soviet Union's steel fist since the Red Army's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In a lightning series of events last week, Afghanistan's President Hafizullah Amin was overthrown, and subsequently executed, in a ruthless coup mounted by the Soviet Union and carried out with the firepower of Soviet combat troops. In Amin's place, Moscow installed Babrak Karmal, a former Deputy Prime Minister long considered to be a Soviet protégé, but not before Russian troops were forced to fight a sporadic series of gun battles in the streets of Kabul, Afghanistan's capital.

At week's end the Carter Administration charged that Moscow was launching an outright invasion of its neighbor, with two mechanized Soviet divisions crossing the border and heading for Kabul. U.S. intelligence estimates indicated that at least 20,000 troops were in Afghanistan. Said White House spokesman Jody Powell: "The magnitude of the Soviet invasion continues to grow."

The Soviets obviously hoped that their brazen, perhaps desperate, action could help their puppet regime bring a stubborn Islamic insurgency in Afghanistan under control and thus stabilize a dangerous flash point on their southern border. But the coup, in fact, added a new dimension of uncertainty to an area of the world already deeply disturbed by the crisis in Iran. Moreover, the deployment of Soviet troops on foreign soil in Central Asia set a fearsome precedent that cast new shadows over international détente and Moscow-Washington relations. The SALT II accord, already in difficulty in the U.S. Senate, seemed even further jeopardized by the Soviet action.

Outraged reaction came swiftly from the White House. In the strongest language he has ever directed against Moscow, President Carter, in a televised message, said: "Such gross interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is in blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior." He conveyed the same harsh message to Leonid Brezhnev personally on the rarely used White House-Kremlin hot line. At the same time, the President got in touch directly with Western European leaders and President Mohammed Zia Ul-Haq of Pakistan, among others, in an attempt to obtain a collective condemnation of Moscow. All shared his concern. As a result, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher was dispatched to London over

the weekend to discuss the situation with U.S. allies.

Other countries obviously were just as concerned about the Soviet military intervention. Peking fumed that "Afghanistan's independence and sovereignty have become toys in Moscow's hands." Iran's Revolutionary Council declared that the intervention in a neighboring country was "a hostile action" against "Muslims throughout the world." Interestingly, however, there were no attacks on Russian embassies.

The first dramatic signs of the Soviet action appeared on Christmas morning. Moscow suddenly began a massive airlift of combat soldiers to Afghanistan. The suspected motive at the time: to help the Afghan regime put down the rebellion of conservative Muslim tribesmen. In full sight of arriving and departing passengers, wave after wave of Soviet An-12 and An-22 transports landed at Kabul's international airport and unloaded not only combat troops but equipment ranging from field kitchens to armored vehicles.

By Thursday the real motive of the intervention was clear: Radio Kabul suddenly announced that President Amin, a tough, repressive Communist who had seized power only last September from former President Noor Mohammed Taraki, had been deposed. The new President, the broadcast said, was former Deputy Prime Minister Karmal. A later announcement specified that Amin had been convicted of "crimes against the people" and executed, along with members of his family. Radio Kabul failed to mention that in the upheaval, Soviet military units had entered combat for the first time since their border clashes against China in 1969.

The fighting began at 7:30 in the evening, according to the U.S. State Department, with Soviet troops and weapons deployed in key locations of Kabul. In a 3½-hour battle for the radio station, Soviet troops using armored personnel carriers knocked out two Afghan tanks and took a number of prisoners. At one point a U.S. official reported with some relish, "The Soviets are getting shot up pretty well." Soviet-built MiG-21 jets flew overhead in repeated passes. By midnight the city was reported quiet.

The next day, however, diehard supporters of Amin resumed the fighting in Kabul. The coup, scoffed the rebel command, represented nothing more than "a change in pawns." The Japanese embassy said that gunfire could still be heard along the road leading from the Soviet embassy to the old royal palace. Nonetheless, as soon as word reached Moscow that the coup was successful, the Soviets quickly broadcast Karmal's denunciation of the Amin dictatorship as an agent of "American imperialism."

The move against Afghanistan was the first time since World War II that Moscow had used significant numbers of its own armed forces in a state outside the Warsaw Pact. It seemed an ominous extension into Asia of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserts that Moscow has the right to assist any socialist state in trouble. Moscow, of course, claimed that it intervened only at the request of the Karmal government under the terms of a 20-year friendship treaty signed in December 1978. The Russians made no attempt to disguise the fact that the airlift began two days before the coup that brought Karmal to power, thus making a mockery of their rationale.

The military buildup had, in fact, begun several weeks before the airlift. The best analysis of U.S. intelligence at that time was that the Soviets were matching Washington's naval and air buildup in the Middle East. It later seemed, however, that apart from any U.S. buildup, Moscow acted primarily to meet a situation in Afghanistan it could no longer effectively control. The Russians apparently decided to make their show of force in the shadow of the Iranian problem, much as they had intervened in Hungary in 1956 while the West was preoccupied with the Suez crisis. Moscow

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made a *Realpolitik* decision: Amin would have to go.

The Soviet choice to replace him was a Marxist intellectual little known in the West (see box). Karmal thus became the third Afghan leader to seize control of the government in the 20 months since the Communists first came to power in April 1978. As the new strongman, following the April coup, Taraki at first denied there had been a Communist takeover. But in the months that followed, internal struggles dangerously narrowed the government's base. As he attempted to keep the revolution on course, Taraki turned increasingly to Russian advisers to fill a shortage of trained manpower. The number of Soviets soon grew to more than 3,000.

Ominously for Taraki and the Soviets, however, there were already rumblings of revolt among conservative Muslim tribesmen unhappy at the prospect of radical social and economic reforms. As the Marxists in Kabul pressed their case, the opposition gradually developed into a full-scale religious insurgency. In March, thousands of Afghans in Herat (pop. 150,000), a provincial capital 400 miles west of Kabul, rose in a revolt that lasted for several days. An estimated 20,000 civilians lost their lives; so did at least 20 Soviet advisers and their families in a series of brutal rebel attacks.

By last fall, some 22 of the country's 28 provinces were said to be in rebel hands. Amin, by now Taraki's Prime Minister, cracked down with repressive measures, including the execution of some 2,000 political detainees and the imprisonment of some 30,000 others. By the time Amin toppled Taraki and took over completely, the Afghan armed forces themselves were demoralized by purges and defections to the rebels, and clearly were hard put to contain the rebellion.

After General Ivan Pavlovsky, head of Soviet ground forces, toured Afghanistan last fall and assessed the Afghan government's predicament as close to hopeless, the Soviets became convinced of the need for drastic steps. According to former Ambassador to Kabul Robert Neumann, the Russians had three choices: 1) "To let Afghanistan go, in which case the government would have fallen within a week." That would have cost the Russians credibility in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. 2) A "massive Russian military infusion," in which the Soviets would try to squelch the rebellion. Commented Neumann: "This option opens up the real possibility of a Soviet Viet Nam." 3) A coup to install a puppet at the head of the govern-

ment in the hope that he could bring things under control.

According to Neumann, the Soviets decided on a combination of the last two options. In the event of a failure by Karmal, Neumann has no doubt that the Soviets will be prepared to deploy their own forces. Indeed, the large Soviet buildup of perhaps 50,000 troops on Afghanistan's borders was a clear indication of

the Soviets' own uncertainty about Karmal's chances.

U.S. officials are concerned that the Soviet move will further destabilize the region. The most direct impact will probably fall on Pakistan, whose territory has provided refuge for an estimated 350,000 Afghan rebels. There was the prospect that in the wake of the coup, another 150,000 might cross the border. State Department analysts fear that the Soviets might

even go so far as to make military forays into Pakistan. Says one expert: "The border between these two countries has never really been agreed upon, and the potential for increased conflict has dramatically heightened since the Soviet actions." U.S. officials hesitate to speculate about the effect on Iran, though there is some hope that the Soviets' intervention will lessen the Ayatullah Khomeini's strident anti-Americanism. Saudi Arabia and Iraq, meanwhile, both see the coup as an indirect threat to themselves.

Operating from within their own borders and with no domestic public opinion to consider, the Soviets seem almost impervious to criticism. Moscow, after all, knows there is not much the U.S. can actually do. Says Richard Helms, a former Ambassador to Iran and former director of the CIA: "It's no gamble at all. What are we going to do about it? We have no forces there, no bases. What can we do for the time being but remonstrate?"

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 17-22NEWSWEEK
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RUSSIA'S AFGHAN COUP

The fighting broke out early in the evening. Armored personnel carriers and light artillery rumbled through the streets of the capital. Flares and tracer bullets lit up the night around the royal palace and the radio station. As dawn broke, jet fighters swooped low over the city in a show of force. By then it was over. Afghanistan had undergone yet another coup d'état—its fourth in six years—but this time with a difference. Last week's take-over was engineered by Afghanistan's patron to the north, the Soviet Union. In a decisive strike that alarmed governments nearby and faraway, the Kremlin had airlifted more than 4,000 combat troops into Kabul and forcibly installed its own man at the top. It was, as a startled diplomat in New Delhi put it, "more an invasion than a coup."

By any name, the take-over in Kabul was a Soviet attempt to impose order on a chaotic neighbor. Two successive Marxist regimes had failed to put down a rebellion by fundamentalist Muslims who control a large part of Afghanistan's rugged countryside (map). Seeking to break the deadlock, the Soviet Union toppled the regime of President Hafizullah Amin last week and replaced him with the more malleable Babrak Karmal, who had been in exile under Soviet protection before the coup (box, page 22). But instead of bringing peace, last week's events may simply draw the Soviets deeper into an Afghan quagmire. "They have taken the ultimate step," said one diplomat in New Delhi. "They've finally grasped the tar baby."

It was premature to describe Afghanistan as Moscow's Vietnam. But the pattern was familiar: a step-by-step escalation of the Soviet role in Afghanistan, with each failure to end the civil war leading to deeper Russian involvement. Moscow had been unhappy with Amin ever since he overthrew President Nur Muhammed Taraki, who was deposed and killed immediately after he visited Moscow for a public blessing from Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev. Subsequently, Amin charted a

remarkably independent course. He rejected Soviet advice to seek a negotiated end to the war. He demanded and got a change of Soviet ambassadors in Kabul. At one point, he even refused an invitation to come to Moscow for talks. His greatest sin in Soviet eyes may simply have been failure: with his army depleted by desertions, Amin had no hope of winning a military victory.

SUMMARY EXECUTION: The Soviet airlift began on Christmas Day. More than 200 An-22 and An-12 transports landed at Kabul Airport during the next few days, discharging 4,000 to 5,000 combat troops, together with their artillery and armored vehicles. Witnesses said that some bitter Afghans at the airport wept as the Soviet troops disembarked. The shooting began two days later, with the heaviest fighting at the Darulaman Palace and at Radio Kabul, next door to the U.S. Embassy. The embassy was hit by stray small-arms fire, but the 35 American diplomats were unharmed. According to some reports, the Russians, aided by Afghan troops, attacked the radio station with artillery, knocking out two Soviet-made T-62 tanks manned by Afghan soldiers loyal to Amin. By morning, the coup was complete. Russian troops patrolled the streets of Kabul, and MiG fighters circled over the major cities. Radio Kabul announced that Amin, his younger brother and a nephew had been executed summarily for "crimes against the people and the Afghan nation."

Once in office, Karmal moved quickly to broaden his political base and seek a negotiated end to the civil war with the Muslim rebels. His Cabinet, announced the day after the coup, included members of his own, pro-Moscow Parcham (Banner) Party, plus three popular military figures and two holdovers from Amin's Khalq (People's) Party. In a separate announcement, the Karmal government said that Moscow had agreed to provide "urgent political, moral and economic aid, including military aid." Such assistance is provided for by a year-old friendship and cooperation treaty between the two countries. Analysts speculated that the announcement was either an attempt to spread a cloak of *ex post facto* legality over the Soviet buildup—or a hint of still greater Soviet involvement to come.

SOVIET BUILDUP: In fact, the giant airlift to Kabul had barely ended when Moscow began sending ground troops across the Soviet-Afghan border. According to U.S. intelligence reports, two mechanized rifle divisions were entering Afghanistan at the weekend, bringing the total number of Soviet combat troops in the country to perhaps 25,000. Three more divisions remained behind in Soviet territory near the border. In recent months, Moscow has also poured substantial amounts of military hardware into Afghanistan—including more than 100 sophisticated Mi-24 helicopter gunships, which have been particularly effective against the rebels. U.S. analysts could only guess at Moscow's intentions beyond the coup. "Putting in 5,000 men looks like one kind of strategy," noted one official. "Putting in five divisions looks like quite another." Still, the Soviets were clearly ready for any contingency—even, as one diplomat put it, to "replace the entire Afghan Army."

The buildup has paralleled a serious weakening of the Afghan Army—and it has inexorably drawn the Soviets deeper into the guerrilla war. Because of desertions, casualties and a lack of new recruits, the Afghan Army can muster little more than half of its original 100,000 men. Many of its troops are conscripts who resent being ordered to kill their countrymen. Russian forces have had to fill the vacuum. Western analysts doubt that Soviet units have engaged the rebels in any significant direct combat to date. But Soviet advisers now accompany Afghan troops down to the company level, and the MiG fighters and helicopter gunships used in the war probably have Russian pilots at the controls.

As a result, Afghanistan's deeply religious common folk have singled out the Soviets for special loathing. A few weeks ago, two Russians were killed as they wandered unescorted through the Kabul bazaar. Earlier in the year, more than 100 Soviets died in uprisings in the cities of Herat and Jalalabad and in an attack on a tourist bus at Kandahar. Muslim insurgents responded to last week's coup by

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dismissing Karmal as a "Soviet puppet" and rejecting any thought of reconciliation. "Karmal is more pro-Moscow than any of his predecessors," said one rebel leader based in Peshawar. "We shall have to stiffen our resistance."

SATURATION BOMBING: The bloody stalemate between the guerrillas and the government will almost certainly continue. Before his overthrow, Hafizullah Amin had launched a major offensive against the rebels. His only victory came last November in a massive attack on Paktia Province. His troops used saturation bombing, helicopter gunships and more than 300 tanks (some of them reportedly crewed by Soviet troops) to clear the region of the guerrillas. But if the Muslim rebels took a beating in Paktia, they have reportedly held their own in the Logar Valley south of Kabul, around Bamiyan, north of the capital and even on the Badakhshan Plains near the Soviet Union's

Afghan border. Consequently, the situation remains essentially where it was last spring: the government holds the main cities and the chief highway links, while the guerrillas control most of the rugged countryside.

The war has sent a tide of Afghan refugees flowing into Pakistan. So far, about 380,000 of them have made the grueling, seven-day trip through the mountain passes, and they are still coming at a rate of more than 1,000 a day. Many refugees scattered in remote camps along the rugged border have contracted measles, gastroenteritis and skin diseases, and thousands of children suffer from marasmus, a form of malnutrition common among the Cambodian refugees. A limited

United Nations aid program currently under way will probably not prevent thousands of deaths from exposure, disease and starvation. "What we need is a massive international relief effort," says Dr. Ghulam Hazrad, a refugee Afghan physician. "We need antibiotics, vitamins and serums. We are fighting a superpower, yet the world will not help us."

The coup in Kabul raised fears of Soviet raids into Pakistan, which has provided the Afghan rebels a haven in the war. Under a twenty-year-old executive agreement, the U.S. is obliged to consult with Pakistan in the event of a military threat from a Communist country. So far, such a threat from the Soviets in Afghanistan remains hypothetical. But last week, President Carter ordered a speed-up of military hardware shipments to Pakistan that were "already in the pipeline," according to Administration sources.

U.S. officials see a familiar pattern to Moscow's role in Afghanistan. "The Vietnam analogy is almost too trite," says one White House aide. "But you've got Afghan units defecting, and they're trying to put Russians in to stiffen their backbones. Sometimes it works, sometimes the advisers get their heads and hands chopped off. It's a very mean fight."

The Vietnam parallel can be carried too far. Moscow's troops are fighting in a neighboring country, not halfway around the world, and Soviet leaders need not concern themselves with domestic public opinion. Moreover, the guerrillas are a disorganized collection of tribes and religious groups with no central authority and no superpower visibly behind them. Few analysts doubt that the Soviets could win the guerrilla war with an all-out push. "If they got a concerted government effort, they could defeat the guerrilla groups one at a time," says a U.S. official. "It would be a very hard fight, but they could do it."

The Soviets would probably prefer to have Karmal negotiate a settlement so that they can bring their own troops home. That seems unlikely. "The Russians obviously can't stop here," says an analyst in Washington. "If they did, it would take ten minutes for somebody to throw Karmal out." Like the U.S. in Vietnam, the Soviets may find that it is difficult to extricate themselves from Afghanistan's civil war. If they make the operation succeed, however, they will secure their southern flank, acquire a new satellite and secure a base of operations from which they can extend their influence farther toward the Persian Gulf.

JOHN NIELSEN with THOMAS M. DeFRANK and DAVID C. MARTIN in Washington, JAMES PRINGLE in Peshawar, Pakistan, WILLIAM E. SCHMIDT in Moscow and bureau reports

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-18BALTIMORE SUN
3 JANUARY 1980

End of a Second Honeymoon

My opinion of the Russians has changed most drastically in the last week than even the previous two and a half years before that.

President Carter.

If the Republicans needed justification for a broad assault on the president's foreign policy record, the grammatically mangled sentence quoted above should fill the bill. As an admission of naivete, it is reminiscent of George Romney's confession that he was "brainwashed" in Vietnam. Mr. Carter may yet deflect the GOP attack somewhat, but it will require an effective response to the Soviet rape of Afghanistan.

Of one thing we can be sure: The president's second honeymoon—his immunization from criticism lest the U.S. hostages in Tehran be harmed—is coming to an end. Republicans can censure Mr. Carter for his reliance on sweet reason in dealing with Moscow and still skirt the hostage issue. Indeed, with Afghanistan just across its border, the Islamic regime in Iran would probably welcome tough U.S. reactions to a Soviet thrust that threatens its own security.

It is fair enough to ask Republican challengers what they would do about Afghanistan if they were president. But they need not solve a specific problem not of their own making. With the president riding high in the

polls, the predictable GOP tactic will be to seize on Mr. Carter's ill-advised expressions of surprise at Soviet behavior to raise a broader question: Is the president too trusting, too gullible, too soft intellectually to handle a rogue nuclear superpower like the Soviet Union?

For two and a half years, Mr. Carter has been privy to the most secret U.S. intelligence data on the menacing Soviet arms buildup. For two and a half years he has watched Moscow's masters send their surrogate Cuban forces marauding through Africa, aim their missiles at Western Europe, slip their own troops into Cuba, spur Vietnamese aggression and tighten their grip on Afghanistan. Yet Mr. Carter is surprised when Leonid Brezhnev lies or when Soviet tanks rumble across international borders as they did in 1968 and 1956 and 1953 and in the late 1940s. One has to ask why.

The president has deservedly won public support for his controlled handling of the dispute with Iran. His patience may be rewarded, paradoxically, if the Khomeini regime draws rational conclusions from the Afghanistan outrage. But in many world capitals there has been a feeling that Mr. Carter's foreign policy is plagued by uncertainty and irresolution, even amateurishness. This is clearly a matter for political debate during the 1980 presidential campaign.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A19THE WASHINGTON POST
3 January 1979*Joseph Kraft*

The Kremlin Papers

Cynics may mock the view articulated in a New York Times editorial last Friday and widespread in the administration that the Russians, like the Americans in Vietnam, entered a "quagmire" when they sent troops into Afghanistan. But this column has acquired, courtesy of that marvelously cooperative Soviet diplomat, Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, secret documents that prove the "quagmire" theory.

These confidential papers—The Kremlin Papers, as history may well call them—show that the Afghanistan decision was made covertly by a self-appointed elite—Russia's Best and Brightest. Despite a show of assurance, agonizing doubts permeated the debate that took place behind closed doors in the fastnesses of the Kremlin.

Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov opened the argument. Conscious of the need to see matters from the viewpoint of the Pentagon as well as the Red Army, he had doffed his uniform and medals. He not only wore civilian dress; he also parted his hair down the middle.

He pointed out that it would be easier to send the forces into Afghanistan than to take them out. Russia, he said, might be stuck in Afghanistan with the same kind of occupation that had proved so harmful to its strategic purposes in Poland and Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

Moreover, he continued, the Soviet show of force in Afghanistan would probably hearten revolutionaries in Iran. Their efforts would evoke some kind of response in Pakistan to the east and Iraq to the west and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to the south. Eventually all those countries might turn to Russia, and Moscow would be obliged to show support, maybe even to the point of sending troops. "In short, gentlemen," the defense minister said, pronouncing the fatal word itself, "in Afghanistan, we may be stepping into a quagmire."

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko spoke next. He too understood the need to view the problem from the other side. So he had exchanged his dour expression for a benign smile and put on a pair of granny glasses.

The foreign minister asserted that the days of the Cold War were over. What counted now was not relations between the United States and Russia. Much more important was standing with the underdeveloped countries of the Third World. But the Americans had recently been campaigning very actively in the Third World. They had even put before

the United Nations Security Council a resolution asking for sanctions against Iran. The sanctions would be next to useless when it came to prying loose hostages from the embassy. But as a device for lining up Third World support, the appeal to the United Nations was diabolically brilliant.

President Carter himself had been active on the telephone in the effort to win votes. It seemed likely the Americans might get the support of Bangladesh and Jamaica and even Gabon. "So just remember, gentlemen," Gromyko concluded, looking over his glasses and smiling, "if we go into Afghanistan, we may be throwing away a vote from Gabon."

At that point the chief party ideologist entered the discussion. For the occasion he had taken the first name of his American opposite number. "Call me Hamilton Suslov," he told his colleagues.

Sending troops into Afghanistan, he pointed out, was not merely a matter of foreign policy. Grave domestic questions were also at stake. It was well known that the KGB leaked like a sieve. The secret intelligence operators would undoubtedly lead investigative reporters from Pravda and Izvestia to the most trivial improprieties committed by Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Before you knew it, the stories would be appearing, blown way out of proportion of course, on the television news. Actresses, intellectuals and students would parade through Red Square in protest. The Supreme Soviet would grow sticky about budget matters. Indeed, the Brezhnev administration might lose the hearts and minds of the Soviet people.

At that point President Brezhnev himself spoke up. He thanked his colleagues for their candid expressions of opinion. But he felt they had discussed the problems too much in narrow terms of self-interest. What mattered was not strategy but morality. He himself had been mulling over a famous phrase from the old religion—do unto others, etc.

The main reciprocal business between Moscow and Washington was the new arms control treaty—SALT II. The Soviet Union had embraced the accord and was ready to put it into effect at any time. The Americans, on the other hand, were hanging back, postponing ratification in the Senate and using controversy as an excuse for building new missiles and raising defense expenditures. "We are practicing restraint," he said, "but we find no mutual restraint." And so saying, he sent the troops once more into the quagmire.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1A

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
3 JANUARY 1980

Analysis

Afghan coup opens Soviet drive for oil

By George Gedda
Associated Press

WASHINGTON — The Soviet-sponsored coup in Afghanistan is being viewed by some analysts here as the opening salvo in what may become an East-West struggle for control of Persian Gulf oil.

Afghanistan does not border the gulf, but the installation of a staunchly pro-Soviet regime in Kabul puts the Soviets almost within striking distance.

Officials note that the southwestern corner of Afghanistan is just a few hundred miles from the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow channel between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula

through which a substantial part of the Western world's oil is transported. The strait is closer to Afghanistan than it is to Tehran.

The bold Soviet intervention is expected to accelerate a long-awaited administration decision to bolster the American military presence in the Persian Gulf area.

Even before the Soviet move, the Carter administration had felt the tumultuous political situation in Iran and elsewhere in the region required a stronger U.S. military presence.

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance has on his desk a report prepared by a high-level U.S. delegation that was on a four-country visit to that region when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan last week.

The U.S. objective is to obtain access to military facilities in friendly countries in the area.

The recent mission by the senior U.S. delegation included visits to Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Kenya and Oman. It followed a speech by President Carter in which he discussed the possibility of establishing a rapid deployment force, numbering more than 100,000 men, which could be used in military conflicts in the region.

The Russian quest for an outlet to the warm-water seas to the south dates back at least three centuries, and some observers believe that that ambition may have been reawakened by the prospect that the Soviets apparently will face an oil shortage in the 1980s.

Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov offered an unusually candid assessment of Soviet desires 40 years ago at the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact. He said then that the "focal point of Soviet aspirations" was not Europe but "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf."

As Carter noted in his statement Friday on the Afghanistan situation, the Soviets had occupied Iranian Azerbaijan until the spring of 1946, despite a promise to withdraw their troops a year earlier, at the conclusion of World War II. The troops were withdrawn following intense diplomatic pressure from the United States and other countries.

The Soviets currently are the world's largest producer of oil, but a two-year-old CIA analysis predicts that the Soviets and their East European allies may have to import 3.5 million to 4.5 million barrels a day by the mid-1980s.

With the price of oil rapidly escalating on the world market, officials doubt the Soviets could afford oil imports of that magnitude.

In addition, CIA Director Stansfield Turner noted in a recent speech that there is relatively little private automobile travel in the Soviet Union, making it unrealistic to assume the Soviets could cut their consumption much through an energy-conservation program.

The Soviets' best hope for solving the energy-supply problem thus appears to be an expansion of political influence in the Persian Gulf region. Some observers believe the prospective Soviet oil shortages go a long way toward explaining why the Soviets decided to invade Afghanistan, even at the risk of alienating the rest of the Muslim world.

In what must now be viewed as a prescient comment made two weeks before the Soviet intervention, James Akins, a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, summed up his view of the Soviets' attitude this way:

"The Russians don't like to engage in adventures, but this time they might be tempted into an action that they probably would not take if they were really self-sufficient in petroleum for the foreseeable future."

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ON PAGE A1-15

THE WASHINGTON POST
3 January 1980

Afghans Continue Fierce Fighting

By Robert H. Reid
Associated Press

KABUL, Afghanistan, Jan. 2—Soviet troops were reported today to have thrown tanks and sophisticated attack helicopters against Moslem rebels in fierce fighting about 100 miles northwest of Kabul, the capital city.

Western diplomatic sources said the Soviets were believed to be encountering sharp resistance in rugged Bamian Province, a stronghold of anti-Marxist tribesmen. Information about the battles came from four different Western embassies.

"There are said to be many casualties on both sides," one diplomat said of the Bamian fighting.

[The new Soviet-installed Afghan president, Babrak Karmal, ignoring violent protests abroad against Moscow's role in the strategic country, said he would request more defense aid from Moscow, Vietnam and Cuba to root out "all enemies" of his government, Radio Afghanistan reported, according to United Press International.]

Soviet troops, who invaded Afghanistan last Thursday, also were in the western Afghan city of Herat, about 60 miles from the western border with Iran, and in Jalalabad, about 50 miles from the eastern border with Pakistan, Afghan and Western sources said.

Throughout the country, the task facing Soviet troops was complicated by snowy conditions and rocky terrain. There are no roads through many of the mountains. A foot of snow is on the ground here, and some mountains are covered by several feet of snow.

It has been impossible for journalists to confirm the reports of fighting outside Kabul. Afghan officials have been turning most Western reporters away upon arrival at the airport and the few who have entered Afghanistan have been barred from going beyond the capital city. Officials deported 13 journalists today, including many.

Despite reports of sharp fighting in the countryside, Kabul itself was quiet today. The last major disturbance was late Sunday near the offices of Radio Afghanistan, but several people who left Afghanistan reported hearing sporadic gunfire yesterday.

Windows at the West German Embassy were shot out during the fighting Sunday, which is believed to have involved Soviet and dissident Afghan Army units, according to Western diplomats.

Last weekend, reporters here watched vast columns of light tanks, personnel carriers and trucks loaded with Soviet troops streaming out of the capital for the provinces.

Two Soviet tanks remained parked in front of the offices of Radio Afghanistan. Soviet soldiers dressed in bulky brown jackets and thick fur caps stand guard at the post office, Interior Ministry and other important buildings.

Kabul International Airport was ringed by Soviet troops and tanks.

Afghan police control traffic, and unarmed Afghan troops are manning the roadblock near the airport, but there are few signs that the Afghan Army is functioning as an important fighting force alongside the Soviet troops.

An estimated 35,000 to 45,000 Soviet troops are believed to be in Afghanistan, and several thousand more are reportedly poised near the Soviet-Afghan border in case they are needed.

In Kabul, Afghan soldiers were seen wandering around the streets—mostly without weapons—or standing guard at military garrisons or government buildings. Soviet officers could be seen inside the walls of two military garrisons near the airport.

Although new Cabinet ministers have been named, the government ministries are not functioning, reportedly because bureaucrats fear purges. Soviets were said to be filling key slots in the Interior Ministry and other important posts, diplomats said.

No mail has been delivered since the coup, Afghan sources said, and two of the city's three telephone exchanges do not work. There are no telephone or telex links to foreign countries.

The city phone system was destroyed in the opening minutes of the coup by a satchel charge, evidently set by a Soviet soldier to signal the start of the offensive. The explosion blew an enormous hole in the street at the post and telegraph building, and Soviet soldiers were repairing the damage New Year's Day.

Karmal unveiled his new government today and promised to "abolish all antidemocratic and antihuman regulations," release political prisoners and "respect the sacred principles of Islam."

As the Soviets consolidated their hold on the country, Karmal publicly attacked his predecessor, Hafizullah Amin, as "a CIA agent" and "scheming spy." Amin was executed during the takeover.

Kabul newspapers, which appeared today for the first time since the

coup, published the text of Karmal's speech last night on Afghan television. It was his first television appearance since the takeover and he still has not appeared in public, according to diplomats here.

Diplomatic sources said Karmal had evidently not returned to Afghanistan, reportedly from Czechoslovakia, until last weekend.

During the speech, Karmal pledged to restore human rights, release political prisoners jailed under Amin and respect Islam, to which 99 percent of Afghans ascribe.

He also said the government welcomes "the national, Islamic, anti-imperialist" revolution in neighboring Iran, whose government has condemned the Soviet incursion.

News services reported these developments:

Karmal was quoted on the official Radio Afghanistan as saying he would request even more defense aid from Moscow and Soviet allies until opposition to his rule is completely put down.

"We announce to the world that as long as the enemies of Afghanistan do not refrain from interfering with our sovereign territory, we . . . shall ask for further assistance from the U.S.S.R. and other peace-loving countries," Karmal said.

"We shall ask for help from . . . Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, the Palestinian Arab people and others," he was quoted as saying. "We shall not back down."

A Radio Afghanistan broadcast also urged the 400,000 Afghan refugees who fled the country during the rule of Amin to return home. Most are living in Pakistan or Iran.

Travelers crossing the Afghan border into Pakistan reported seeing Soviet tanks with guns trained on Afghan garrisons, according to the Manchester Guardian.

Other travelers said the Durulaman Palace, where Amin reportedly was killed, appeared to be completely destroyed. The palace, on the southern edge of Kabul, reportedly was the scene of a major battle at the time of the coup.

Diplomatic sources in New Delhi said Soviet armored forces were moving from Kabul to Paktia Province, where a large anticommunist Moslem rebel force was dug in.

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ON PAGE A12

THE WASHINGTON POST
3 January 1980

Soviet Afghanistan Role Creates Difficult Choices For Advocates of SALT

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Carter administration is struggling with painful calculations about the potential impact of a further delay in Senate consideration of SALT II, a prospect that now appears unavoidable.

President Carter has refused to "link" SALT II to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and continues to say that the treaty was not signed as a favor to the Soviets, and remains in the American national interest. But a senior White House official acknowledged yesterday that the events in Afghanistan have affected the timing of the strategic arms limitation treaty debate, and that can only mean further delay.

Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) has said nothing about the SALT debate since the coup in Afghanistan, and he has avoided press inquiries on the subject. But knowledgeable sources said yesterday that Byrd feels it is now impossible to hold a SALT debate in February, as he previously planned.

Some administration officials and some pro-SALT sources in the Senate continue to express hope that a SALT debate could occur later in the year, and that the treaty could still be approved by a two-thirds vote. But other sources dismissed such speculation as pipe-dreaming.

The problems raised by further delay for the Carter administration are numerous. Among them:

- American plans for new strategic weapons programs will likely have to be altered. The administration has

been assuming that its principal new strategic weapons system can be the MX mobile missile, but MX only makes sense in the context of a strategic arms competition governed by SALT II.

This is true because the Soviets could relatively easily neutralize the MX system by adding new warheads to their existing or new land-based missiles beyond the limits on warheads imposed by the treaty. Without the SALT II limits, the Soviets could move relatively easily in this direction.

"Without a SALT treaty, we will have to explore alternatives to MX," one senior official said yesterday. Such alternatives could prove both complicated and costly.

- Continued delay of SALT II gives the Soviets, in effect, the option to unilaterally kill the SALT process at any time. They could do this in several ways.

One would be to cease respecting the voluntary extension of the SALT I agreements on offensive arms that theoretically lapsed at the time SALT II was signed. As recently as last month the Soviets reported on their continuing dismantling of outdated Yankee-class submarines as required by those SALT I agreements, but the Soviets could decide at any moment to stop adhering to a pact that now has no formal status. Such a Soviet decision would likely unravel the strategic situation.

Another Soviet option would be to violate some provision of the unratified SALT II. For example, they could encode the radio signals from missile tests that the treaty would bind them not to encode. Or they could test new missiles or additional warheads for existing missiles that violate SALT II limits.

Theoretically the Soviets have always had these options while the Senate was considering the treaty. But now that serious new tensions in the Soviet-American relationship seem inevitable, the chances that they might be exercised becomes much greater.

Carter administration officials express grave alarm at the prospect of a new strategic arms competition ungoverned by SALT constraints. They have argued for months that the best argument for SALT II is the dangers that would follow its rejection, and now those dangers look palpable to these officials.

"This [crisis brought on by the intervention in Afghanistan] will open peoples' eyes a little bit" to the dangers of a world without SALT, one senior official said yesterday.

The administration has continued to plan and operate on the theory that somehow SALT II would win Senate approval in 1980. Despite the political troubles the treaty has had in the Senate, the White House retained its optimism until last week.

Still yesterday some officials argued that President Carter could save the treaty by making a forceful statement that the crisis provoked by Afghanistan actually emphasizes the need for a treaty to stabilize the most dangerous arena of Soviet-American competition.

Others inside the administration and on Capitol Hill disagreed. Several officials involved noted the extreme pressure now on senators who support SALT, particularly those running for reelection this year, and predicted that one or more of them could easily jump the SALT ship, leaving it to founder. "Our friends are really exposed," one administration official said, acknowledging the political difficulty of defending a pro-SALT position after the intervention in Afghanistan.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

3 January 1980

CARTER SEEKS TREATY DELAY; RECALLS ENVOY FROM SOVIET OVER MOSCOW'S AFGHAN ROLE

U.N. PLAN IS SHIFTED

Move in Council Likely — Powell Cites Decisions on Other Actions

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 2 — President Carter decided today to ask the Senate to delay consideration of the treaty limiting nuclear arms and he made other moves, including the recall of the American Ambassador from Moscow, in response to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

Administration officials, who disclosed the decision to delay action on the arms treaty, also said that the United States had dropped its plan to take the Afghan issue to the United Nations General Assembly and instead was backing a proposal by European and third-world nations to put the matter before the Security Council, where it faces a certain Soviet veto.

The Security Council is expected to hold an urgent meeting, possibly as early as Friday, to consider a demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. A draft letter calling for the meeting was expected to be signed by at least 20 nations, including Moslem and other third-world countries as well as Western Europeans. [Page A12.]

Diplomatic Rejoinder to Moscow

In a day of meetings at the White House with his key foreign policy and military advisers, Mr. Carter summoned home Ambassador Thomas J. Watson Jr. in a diplomatic rejoinder to Moscow and "made a number of decisions this afternoon on actions to be taken in response to the Soviet invasion," Jody Powell, the White House spokesman, said.

Earlier, Administration officials had said that the United States was seeking China's cooperation in bolstering Pakistan's defenses against Soviet military pressure. [Page A9.]

Mr. Powell said that the decisions made during the day "involved unilateral actions and actions to be taken in conjunction with other nations." He refused to be explicit on the moves, thus leaving a mystery about what actually had been worked out at the National Security Council session and other less formal meetings during the day.

The decision to hold up the Senate debate on the arms treaty was made at the same time as the White House affirmed that Mr. Carter still supported its eventual passage.

Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said that he interpreted the President's action as meaning that he "does not intend to withdraw the treaty, but to leave it on the Senate calendar pending a more propitious time." The treaty's passage, however, had been in doubt even in a more favorable international atmosphere.

A White House official said that Mr. Carter remained convinced that the accord was in the American national interest and that it had not been signed by Mr. Carter just as "a favor to the Russians."

But he said that because of both the hostage crisis with Iran and the "recent developments in Afghanistan," the question of the timing of the Senate debate was now being discussed with the Senate leadership.

Not 'a Propitious Time'

White House officials were understood to be telling Senators by telephone this evening that the President did not consider this "a propitious time" to take up the treaty. The Senate had been scheduled to deal with the treaty as the first order of business when it returns from recess on Jan. 22.

But Senate leaders had told the White House privately that passage of the treaty was impossible in the current atmosphere, and Administration officials agreed.

Mr. Carter had the option of pulling back the accord or concurring in a delay and he chose to do the latter, thereby leaving open the possibility, however remote, that the agreement might be approved later in the year.

The recall of Mr. Watson, who has been the Ambassador in Moscow only since last fall, was officially described as a return "for consultations."

'Serious Threat to Peace' Cited

But White House officials stressed that the move was a diplomatic act of retaliation for the Soviet actions, which Mr. Powell called "a serious threat to peace posed by the invasion of Afghanistan by armed forces of the Soviet Union."

The recall of the former International Business Machines executive was unusual because in past crises with the Russians the American envoys have usually been instructed to remain at their post to provide their views of the situation from Moscow.

This is what occurred during the Soviet actions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. But Mr. Watson has no special background in Soviet affairs and no particular access to the Soviet leadership, State Department officials said.

George F. Kennan, a former Ambassador, said he could not remember any similar recall.

Mr. Carter also has under consideration some curbing of American trade with the Soviet Union, including some limits on Soviet imports of grain, but Administration officials said that no decisions were taken in the trade field today.

They added that it was likely that there would be some tightening in regulations on sale of oil technology to the Soviet Union.

Officials did rule out the possibility that the United States might intervene militarily as a response to the Soviet actions.

They also said that the possibility of efforts to boycott the summer Olympic Games in Moscow was not a priority matter. The issue was suggested by a senior West German diplomat but is not being considered actively, they said.

In the last few days, both Israel and Egypt have issued statements offering the United States the use of their military facilities to heighten American power in the region.

Until now, the Carter Administration has politely ignored those offers, but today Hoddging Carter 3d, the State Department spokesman, said that the proposals were being considered in connection with the current study on increasing the American military presence in the area.

State Department officials acknowledged that this amounted to a change in approach, but they said this did not mean the offers would be accepted.

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Izvestia Article Denounced

Hodding Carter also lashed out at the Soviet Union over an article that appeared in the Soviet Government newspaper, Izvestia, yesterday, charging that the Central Intelligence Agency had attempted to turn Afghanistan into an American base.

The State Department spokesman said that the "allegations are so ridiculous that it is an affront to the intelligence of people."

"The accusations are a crude ruse to cover up Soviet imperialism, to disguise the reality of Soviet intervention," he said. He also remarked that the Afghan insurgents were independent and had not been helped by outside powers, as alleged by the Soviet Union.

Other officials said that the only assistance provided to the Afghan insurgents who are in revolt against the Kabul Government had been small arms smuggled to them from Pakistanis of the same Pathan ethnic group, who were in constant touch with them.

The Pakistanis obtained the arms from the Pakistani Government but there is no evidence, they said, that the Government in Islamabad was behind the assistance.

Dobrynin in Moscow for a Month

The decision to recall Mr. Watson comes at a time when the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, has been in Moscow for nearly a month. State Department officials said they believed that he had been recalled for a review of relations with the United States, in advance of the action in Afghanistan.

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, who briefed other officials on the diplomatic developments, had planned to seek action in the United Nations General Assembly condemning the intervention in Afghanistan.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1980

Fred Charles Ikle

'Normalization' in Afghanistan

Now that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is an accomplished fact, the process of "normalization" can begin. The dust is about to settle behind the tank columns that rolled across the border, and soon someone in Washington will note "hopeful signs" in the fact that a few tanks are moving back into Russia. The hectic Soviet airlift into Kabul will quiet down and our intelligence will report that air traffic is back to normal.

Perhaps, if continued nagging from the West seems to demand it, Moscow might even offer a formal promise that all its troops will be withdrawn "as the situation in Afghanistan normalizes." This would be in the tradition of the Soviet promise to the president of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, which assured the world that the entry of the Soviet troops would be "temporary" and that they would be withdrawn from Czech territory "as the situation in Czechoslovakia normalizes." (Today, more than 11 years later, the Soviet divisions are still there.)

The Soviet Union will see to it that the "normalization" of Afghanistan continues apace. News about armed resistance that may persist in the rugged mountains will be skillfully suppressed or drowned out by fabricated misinformation. No outside observer will be granted access to any area where Moslem freedom-fighters might still resist. If refugees manage to cross the border into Pakistan, their reports will be balanced off by news stories from other "refugees," reporting that CIA agents are fomenting assassinations and economic sabotage among hapless Afghan tribesmen.

To cheer us up, we will be reading about the genuine increase in the standard of living in Afghan cities and of the freedom of religion enjoyed by Moslems. Now and then our newspapers may carry a photograph of a cherubic Soviet agronomist teaching backward Afghan peasants how to increase their crop yields.

Back in 1979, some American commentators predicted that by invading Afghanistan, the Soviets could only sink deeper into the quagmire of their own "Vietnam." These "quagmire" forecasts will be displaced by admonitions that we should come to terms with the new "reality," should cease encouraging any Moslem resistance in Afghanistan and, instead, should, through a program of economic aid, offer an alternative to exclusive reliance on Moscow for the Karmal government—if Babrek Karmal is then still the name of the Afghan Gauleiter.

Those who will continue to object to the "normalization" of Afghanistan will be asked what alternative policy they propose. Should the United States invade Afghanistan? Or do they propose that we launch a nuclear war? Some will reason

that the whole Afghan "episode" was nothing new, but simply reflected the old Russian quest to get closer to the Indian Ocean.

However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as Zbigniew Brzezinski stressed, is a qualitatively new step. Indeed, if the total Soviet control of Afghanistan resulting from this step becomes an accepted "normal" situation, the invasion will turn into a historic watershed. It will have extended the writ of the Brezhnev Doctrine beyond Eastern Europe.

That is to say, the "normalization" of Afghanistan will signify worldwide acceptance of the rule that the Soviet Union can use its massive military power, outside Eastern Europe as it has done inside, to maintain Marxist regimes against popular opposition or to replace the leaders of these regimes should they be insufficiently compliant with the Kremlin's wishes. In particular, the Third World, by accepting the "normalization" of Afghanistan, will have accepted that Moscow—the Rome of the "socialist" empire—is the sole and final arbiter of the internal affairs of any "socialist" country. The sundry Marxist, "socialist" and Soviet-supported regimes in the Third World will thus give their consent to the "common laws governing socialist construction" that Brezhnev laid down when he announced his doctrine in August 1968:

"It is known, comrades, that there also are common laws governing socialist construction, a deviation from which might lead to a deviation from socialism as such. And when the internal and external forces hostile to socialism seek to revert the development of any socialist country toward the restoration of the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism in that country, a threat to the security of the socialist community as a whole, emerges, this is no longer only a problem of the people of that country but also a common problem, concern for all socialist states."

By "normalizing" the invasion of Afghanistan, the West—and the Third World—will make other invasions of "socialist" Third World countries a normal event, opposition to which would not be expected. Brezhnev's "common law" will thus have been extended to cover a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Cuba (if the Soviets can marshal sufficient military power) and, of course, Iran, once "socialist construction" has begun there.

CONTINUED

The writer is former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

In 1948, after the first Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia, the leaders of Western Europe put their ancient quarrels aside and joined with the United States in creating the North Atlantic Alliance. That alliance preserved the western limits to Soviet invasions up to this day. Now the threat has turned to the south. It is hence in the common interests of the United States and the Islamic world to prevent Brezhnev's "socialist construction" from becoming the vanguard of an attack by Soviet tanks and gunships. We in the United States must marshal the strength to back up the self-defense of all independent nations in the Middle East. And the leaders of these nations must rise above the destructive fanaticism of a Khomeini. In the life of nations, a mortal threat can call forth the greatest acts of statesmanship—provided the threat is recognized.

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ON PAGE 3

WALL STREET JOURNAL
2 JANUARY 1980

West Appears Unlikely to Prevent Soviets From Setting Up Satellite in Afghanistan

By KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Despite President Carter's tough rhetoric, the West appears unlikely to block the establishment of a Soviet satellite in Afghanistan.

President Carter accused Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev of lying to him when Mr. Brezhnev said Soviet soldiers were invited to Afghanistan to protect that nation from an outside threat. In a televised interview Monday night, Mr. Carter called that explanation "completely inadequate and completely misleading."

And the President warned that the U.S. and its allies will make clear to the Soviets that they can't violate world peace "without paying severe political consequences."

But U.S. officials say there is little the U.S. or its allies can do to force Moscow to withdraw its estimated 50,000 troops, who are fighting both the Afghan army and Moslem insurgents in Afghanistan.

"All we can do now is try to make it costly for the Soviets to stay there," says one top U.S. policymaker.

Toward that end, the U.S. and its allies agreed to a meeting in London to ask the United Nations to condemn the Soviet invasion as "naked aggression." U.S. officials concede UN condemnation probably won't persuade Moscow to remove its troops until the Kremlin is confident a pro-Soviet regime can maintain control in Afghanistan. Still, a UN resolution condemning Soviet aggression would provide an opportunity to marshal opposition to Moscow from third-world countries traditionally aligned with the Soviets.

More Concrete Measures

More concrete measures are up to the U.S. So far, President Carter has ruled out withdrawing the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty even though Capitol Hill observers say the chances for Senate ratification are almost nonexistent while Soviet soldiers remain in Afghanistan. Other U.S. officials say Mr. Carter doesn't intend to interrupt massive U.S. grain sales to Moscow either. Halting grain sales, these officials say, would upset farmers and could hurt Mr. Carter's chances in the Iowa caucuses later this month.

"We can't commit political suicide to get back at the Russians for Afghanistan," says one administration official.

Other moves, such as military sales to Pakistan, which shares a long border with Afghanistan, are under debate. Military equipment sold to Pakistan could find its way into the hands of an estimated 300,000 Afghan rebels currently inside Pakistan. But so far, Pakistan's President Mohammad Zia ul Haq has been cautious about appearing to

align his nation with the U.S. against Moscow.

The Soviet newspaper Izvestia yesterday accused the U.S. of training Afghan rebels in Pakistan. "The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is directly involved in training Afghan rebels in camps in Pakistan and maintains contacts with counterrevolutionaries and reactionaries in Afghanistan itself," Izvestia asserted.

U.S. officials decline to say what if any help the U.S. is providing the Afghan rebels. "Either we are and I can't talk about it or we aren't," said one U.S. official.

Effect on Iran

What effect all this will have on Iran, which is strategically and economically more important to both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, is unclear. Iranian officials have denounced Soviet aggression but haven't shown any sign of increased willingness to improve ties with the U.S. to protect themselves against Moscow.

Iran's several power centers—Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the revolutionary council and the militants holding 50 American hostages—all appear preoccupied with efforts to humiliate the U.S.

The militants holding the hostages say they will meet UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, currently in Tehran, but won't release the captives.

Nobody really expects Mr. Waldheim's mission to succeed. He went at U.S. insistence after it became clear the U.S. couldn't muster the required nine votes in the 15-member UN security council to impose immediate economic sanctions against Iran. Once Mr. Waldheim agreed to go to Tehran to seek release of the American hostages, in their ninth week of captivity, the U.S. won 11 votes for a resolution calling for UN economic sanctions at some unspecified date if Mr. Waldheim's mission fails. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Kuwait and Bangladesh abstained.

But the hard part lies ahead. Once Mr. Waldheim reports to the UN next Monday, the U.S. still must find nine votes for imposing economic sanctions on a set date. Securing agreement on a date won't be easy. U.S. officials concede. And even if the U.S. can find nine votes, the Soviet Union may veto a resolution that actually imposes sanctions.

But President Carter indicated in the television interview that his patience hasn't yet run out. Though he is both "angry and impatient," he said setting a deadline is impossible. For the U.S. to start a war in Iran, he said, "just to show that I am brave or courageous or forceful or powerful would be exactly the wrong thing to do for the hostages and for our long-range interests."

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Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Will the Doves Ever Learn?

More than two years after the Soviet campaign to make a satellite out of Afghanistan became clear even to detentists in the State Department, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at long last has agreed—tentatively—to shore up U.S. ties to other key states lying in Moscow's bloody path.

Objective No. 1: terminate the self-defeating ban on economic and military aid invoked against Pakistan as punishment for that traditional American ally's refusal to forswear nuclear weapons.

Objective No. 2: feed light weapons to the tough, resilient Afghan Moslem guerrillas in their continuing struggle against dominion from Moscow, getting the weapons in through the porous Afghan-Pakistani border.

But the debate churns between Cyrus Vance's fearful detentists at State and less dovish officials in the Defense Department, in the CIA and on the National Security Council staff. As late as Dec. 20, when the handwriting of Moscow's imminent military takeover of Kabul was writ large on the wall, high officials at State were telling White House national security operatives: "Don't worry. It's not all that important."

In the real world, there would be only one outcome of the debate over such a switch of policy: switch immediately. That means finding a way to equip the Pakistani air force with something better than the venerable F86, the 1947 plane that still is its backbone; release the \$45 million in economic aid frozen last April in a dispute over nuclear weapons; reestablish Pakistan, now all but naked to Soviet bullying, as a strong ally; remove the tether from the Central Intelligence Agency.

But Jimmy Carter's foreign policy has been strangely immune to dictates of the real world. In his Oct. 16 annual

report to a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, Marshall Shulman, Vance's Soviet adviser, said that "the single most significant development in U.S.-Soviet relations during the past year" was the new strategic arms limitation agreement.

As for ever-widening Soviet control over the government of Afghanistan, Shulman said the Soviet Union "evidently feels committed to defending what it terms the Afghan revolution. . . . We are consulting widely with other countries in the region and have found they share our concern about this situation."

Some officials dispute Shulman's priorities. They think that the "most significant" development of 1979 was not SALT II but the Soviet worldwide offensive far beyond its own communist empire of Eastern Europe. The outright Soviet invasion of Afghanistan followed Shulman's testimony by two months, but authoritative sources in the Carter administration insist that previous Soviet moves there anticipated it.

"When you find an armed, masked man with a large bag and a glass cutter at your back door at midnight, you should make the obvious assumption," one such official told us.

Refusal to make obvious assumptions has marked many steps along the State Department's path in the Afghan tragedy since shortly before Moscow arranged the Marxist takeover in Kabul in April 1978. As we reported a few months later, one of the shrewdest foreign diplomats here warned the administration that its apparent acceptance of Moscow's seizure of the government "can have serious consequences" for Pakistan and Iran.

Yet Pakistan's nuclear sins—though mild compared with Israel's, which has paid no price at all in reduced aid—

were used to bar all economic and military aid, despite waiver provisos in the law.

What has now forced Vance and his top policy advisers to change their tune is this Soviet message to the Western world: after 150 years of Afghanistan's playing the role of buffer state between czarist (now communist) Russia and the West, Moscow has become confident enough to use its own military power to take it over.

Detentists in the Carter administration, led by the president himself and most of the policy-making seventh floor of the State Department, put the value of SALT II above Soviet power plays in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and the early stages of Afghanistan. If there is to be belated change now, it will first be seen in Pakistan—the next soft target in Moscow's inexorable bid for world domination.

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Brzezinski Increases U.S. Estimate Of Soviet Soldiers in Afghanistan

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

'Not a Good Position for Iran'

As a result of the 57-day crisis over the hostages, he said: "Iran finds itself isolated internationally, surrounded either by foes or by countries in the deepest of turbulence. This is not a good position for Iran to be in."

"That is why it is very much in Iran's interest and in the region's own interest that the hostages be promptly released," he said, "and that Iran's security be promoted by stable relationships with those who are prepared to be Iran's friends." He was interviewed on ABC's "Issues and Answers."

Mr. Brzezinski said that the current Soviet troop movements into Afghanistan involved "several tens of thousands" of men. Last week, the United States reported that five Soviet divisions had moved close to the Afghan border, involving as many as 50,000 troops, in addition to about 6,000 airlifted to the Kabul area.

Yesterday, Mr. Carter noted that two of those divisions were now moving into Afghanistan. Today, Mr. Brzezinski said the "numbers are now larger."

Soviet Troops in 2 Formations

He said that they were basically moving in two formations. One is crossing the border from Kushka and moving into the Afghan city of Herat, and it includes armored formations, many tanks, including their most modern ones, armored personnel carriers and troops on trucks. The other moved from Termez on the Soviet side of the border and was heading for Tashkurghan and Kabul.

Mr. Carter indicated yesterday that he was particularly concerned about the possibility of the Soviet troops continuing onto Pakistan, and Mr. Brzezinski went out of his way to affirm the American security agreement with Pakistan that dates from the 1950's.

Mr. Carter also indicated to reporters that the United States was going to increase military aid to Pakistan. Except for minor training programs, the United States has supplied no military assistance to Pakistan since the 1971 war with India. In 1975, the United States lifted an embargo imposed on military sales to Pakistan and India and said it would sell limited supplies on a case by case basis. These amounted to about \$40 million to Pakistan in 1978, the last year with accurate figures.

In April, because of concern that Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons, the United States, as mandated under law, cut off all existing aid, which was only economic assistance and the small training mission.

Question on Kind of Aid

When asked what kind of military aid was possible, given the situation and the legal barriers, Mr. Brzezinski said, "Cash sales would be one formula." But he refused to be more precise.

Other officials said Pakistan had indicated recently that it was not interested in highly visible American assistance because of concern that this would give the Soviet Union cause to cross the border. Rather, the Pakistanis seemed to want just an affirmation of American security pledges, officials said.

In the past two days, both Moscow and President have gone out of their way to assure Afghanistan's neighbors that the developments in Afghanistan were not meant to threaten them.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 30 — President Carter's national security adviser said today that the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan had grown beyond the 25,000 to 30,000 estimated yesterday and he urged Iran to settle the hostage crisis with the United States because "Teheran could be next" to face a Soviet threat.

As Zbigniew Brzezinski renewed the Administration's concern over what he called "large-scale aggression" in Afghanistan, other officials said that Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, had responded sharply to President Carter's demand that he withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan immediately. The officials said that Mr. Brezhnev, however, repeated what Moscow had said in diplomatic notes around the world, that the military forces involved were limited and that they would be withdrawn when their mission was over.

Yesterday, Mr. Carter, told reporters that he had warned Mr. Brezhnev in a hot line message that the Soviet Union would suffer "serious consequences" if it did not pull back its forces. Today, Mr. Brzezinski indicated that the United States, consulting with other countries, had not decided what to do. Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher is flying to London for talks with allies.

Other officials said the United States was not thinking of a military response unless Soviet troops invaded Pakistan, with which the United States has a security pact. Rather, officials said, the American intention was to focus world attention, particularly in the Moslem world, on the Soviet actions. In this sense, they said, Moscow had to realize that it would face "serious consequences" in its political and economic relations with other countries, including the United States.

Link to Arms Treaty

Although Mr. Brzezinski said the future of the nuclear arms treaty should not hinge on Afghanistan, officials said privately that there could be no serious thought of seeking its approval in the current atmosphere.

Mr. Brzezinski, in linking the Afghan crisis to the current problems with Iran, was in a sense foreshadowing efforts to involve the Moslem world in an anti-Soviet drive.

"I should think every sober-headed Iranian, even the most anti-American ones, ought to ask themselves, what do the events in Kabul portend for Teheran," Mr. Brzezinski said.

Referring to the close ties of the deposed Shah to the the United States, Mr. Brzezinski said, "I think every Iranian should remember that the independence of Iran, its national integrity, its territorial integrity, were assured over the last 35 years by friendship with the United States."

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New Soviet Motives Emerge

2 Divisions Deployed in Afghanistan Appear to Be First Phase of Operation to Eliminate Rebellion

By DREW MIDDLETON

The movement of two Soviet motor rifle divisions into Afghanistan appears to change the character of the intervention from an effort to support the Russian-sponsored regime in Kabul to the first phase of a serious and potentially costly operation to eliminate rebellion.

Military Analysts Militarily, the deployment of the two divisions may be compared to President Lyndon B. Johnson's announcement on July 23, 1965, that he would reinforce American forces in South Vietnam with an additional 50,000 men.

The war strength of a Soviet motor rifle division is 13,000 men. The unit reorganization programs of 1975 to 1977 have raised the armor strength of these divisions to 265 tanks plus about 300 armored personnel carriers armed with both guns and missiles. The division is supported in the field by a wide range of artillery weapons, a three-battery battalion of Frog rockets and a helicopter group.

Divisions Likely to Be Effective

Intelligence analysts emphasize that even if the two divisions are below war strength, they should be effective against any opposition the rebels can offer.

American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization analysts believe the military side of the Soviet operation is being directed by the Turkestan Military District, which comprises the Turkmen and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics and has its headquarters at Tashkent.

Another five divisions assigned to the military district are reported to be on alert status north of the Russian-Afghan frontier. The consensus among analysts

is that these divisions would not be brought into the operation until they had been brought to something approaching war strength by the addition of reservists and the military situation demanded reinforcements.

Reports from Pakistan that the divisions were to "march on Kabul" had an old-fashioned character. Analysts pointed out that in view of the mountains and glaciers that separate the capital from the frontier areas, the two divisions' objectives were likely to be more immediate and practical. One obvious mission, it was pointed out, would be to seize and secure the main airfields in northern and northwestern Afghanistan close to the Soviet frontier.

The easternmost of these airfields is at Kunduz in the province of the same name about 30 miles from the frontier. To the west lie other airfields at Mazar-i-Sharif in Balkh province, Maimana in Farah province and Herat in Herat province.

Three weeks before the present Soviet operation began, reports reached European intelligence agencies that Soviet engineering teams had begun improving the runways and facilities at Herat, which is about 75 miles from Iran's eastern frontier.

Secure bases in these airfields would give the Russians the ability to fly reinforcements anywhere in Afghanistan. Apparently there are sufficient Russian troops in Kabul to maintain order, and there is no need at the moment to send the newly arrived divisions down the long road through the mountains that leads from Kunduz and Mazar-i-Sharif to the capital.

Many Rebel Motives

The insurgents say they are resisting the regular Afghan army, stiffened by small Soviet units, in six of the country's provinces. Rebel sources have reported the destruction of one power station and the defeat with heavy losses of a brigade of 2,000 men. Analysts warn against acceptance of such claims at face value.

British sources familiar with the people and the country believe there is a relatively small core of insurgents fighting to rid the country of the Soviet-backed re-

gime. They also suggest that a far larger number of the rebels are tribesmen more interested in loot than politics, and guerrillas who are eager for weapons, jealous of their tribal rights and hostile to the imposition of a unified command. The question, one source said, is whether they will use their captured weapons against the Afghan Army and the Russians or against neighboring tribes.

The strength of the rebellion will be tested, the sources said, if the Russians deploy into the provinces where the rebels contend they are making progress: Kandahar, Nangarhar, Jalalabad, Kunar, Badakhshan and Takhar. Russian expeditions into these areas, it is agreed, will put far greater pressure on their logistical arrangements than the relatively simple movements of airborne troops into Kabul and of the motorized troops across the uncontested frontier.

The character of the Soviet command system could be a serious disadvantage in waging war against guerrillas. This type of combat demands quick decisions by company and battalion commanders.

The Soviet command system, as it was demonstrated by their Egyptian and Syrian pupils in the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and as it is documented by Russian military writings, requires that command decisions, involving the movement of units as small as a company, must be taken by senior officers at division, corps or even army level. This insures high-level control of all operations. But it also may rob maneuver units of the flexibility necessary to fight an illusive, lightly-armed enemy.

The Russian forces that have moved into Afghanistan have been trained and organized to fight a major war against NATO, the Chinese or both. These troops may now be involved in a war in which crushing aerial bombardment and vast tank forces are less important than infantrymen skilled in imitating and improving on the tactics of their foes.

The Soviet intervention, military and political sources agreed, has increased the threat to neighboring states, primarily Iran and Pakistan.

The gloomy conclusion of most analysts is that if the Russians win control of Afghanistan — and they say this is a big "if" — the Soviet Union will have obtained a dominant position in an unstable part of Asia. The long term losers in Asia, they added, may well be the Chinese.

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BALTIMORE SUN
31 DECEMBER 1979

Soviets reject U.S. call for Afghan withdrawal

By ANTHONY BARBIERI, JR.
Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—The Soviet Union claimed last night that it sent troops to Afghanistan to help fend off an American-backed insurgency and flatly rejected Washington's demands that it withdraw its forces.

"The Soviet contingent will be withdrawn from Afghanistan when the reasons which brought the need for [the troops] have been eliminated," an authoritative article in today's issues of the Communist Party daily *Pravda* declares.

In the article, the Kremlin denies that it engineered the coup Thursday that toppled the regime of Hafizullah Amin and installed a new government under the strongly pro-Soviet Babrak Karmal.

But the Soviets charge that a Muslim guerrilla insurgency that has been plaguing a series of Moscow-backed regimes since April, 1978, has been receiving "unlimited backing" from the United States and China.

The United States has denied supporting the rebellion, and President Carter, in what he described as the strongest statement of his presidency, used the Moscow-Washington "hot line" to demand a withdrawal of the 25,000 to 30,000 Soviet troops he said were in Afghanistan.

In their first public statement on the issue since the coup, the Soviets not only reject the U.S. demand, but charge that American intelligence agents were arming and training Afghan rebels based in Pakistan. They claim that Pakistan was being pressured by the United States to harbor such rebels.

The Kremlin said that the new Afghan regime had urgently requested military aid.

"The Soviet Union decided to grant this request and to send to Afghanistan a limited Soviet military contingent that will be used exclusively for assistance in rebuffing the armed interference from the outside," the *Pravda* article said.

The article was signed by "Alexei Petrov," which is widely believed to be a pseudonym used by the Kremlin when it wants to attach particular importance to a policy statement.

It is the first official admission to the

Soviet people that Soviet forces are indeed in Afghanistan, although Soviet diplomats abroad admitted as much shortly after the coup.

The Kremlin statement is a clear effort to counter criticism from Muslim nations bordering Afghanistan that the Soviet invasion was aimed at crushing the Islamic movement in Afghanistan.

Instead, Moscow is pushing its newest client to a far more conciliatory attitude toward the rebels—Mr. Karmal has offered to negotiate a settlement to the conflict—while pouring in a sufficient number of troops to help crush the revolt if diplomacy fails.

Meanwhile, the alleged outside threat from the United States—already unpopular in the Muslim world—will be used as the pretext for keeping the Soviet troops where they are.

In a long speech, carried in its entirety by the Soviet news agency Tass, Mr. Karmal appealed for acceptance by both Iran and Pakistan.

He said he welcomes the Iranian revolution—a revolution Moscow has so far been unsuccessful in befriending—and told Pakistan he wanted to patch up strained relations.

On the other hand, the Soviet troops reportedly being moved to the Pakistani border obviously are intended to warn Pakistan that it must stop giving a safe haven to Afghan rebels.

As part of the more conciliatory strategy in Afghanistan, Moscow has joined Mr. Karmal in mounting a bitter attack on Mr. Amin, the executed Afghan leader whose ruthlessness in attempting to crush the Muslim revolt made him highly unpopular.

The Kremlin neglects to mention that it supported Mr. Amin lavishly until the time he was toppled by Mr. Karmal.

The *Pravda* article says Mr. Amin, Moscow's former ally, was a brutal murderer on whose hands "is the blood of many Afghan people."

But the Soviets are sending a clear message to the Muslims that things will be different under the Karmal regime.

First, Mr. Karmal gave a speech yesterday saying he would not push the coun-

try headlong into socialism. Muslim rebels had claimed that it was the forced socialization of Afghanistan under the previous pro-Soviet regimes that was tearing apart the ancient social fabric of the country.

Later, *Pravda* indicates that it understands that Afghanistan's ancient customs cannot be crushed overnight.

But the newspaper also makes the point that the disruptions in traditional Afghan life were needed to fulfill the aims of the regimes the Soviet Union has been supporting.

"Life demanded profound transformations in rural and urban areas, the restructuring of class and tribal relations, of the very socioeconomic base of Afghan society," *Pravda* says in justifying the actions of the previous pro-Moscow regimes.

The Kremlin's strategy in identifying Mr. Amin as a ruthless tyrant and then claiming to have helped those who ousted him is starkly similar to the strategy employed last year when a Moscow-backed Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia and overthrew the pro-Chinese regime of Pol Pot.

No Soviet troops assumed a combat role in the Vietnamese invasion, but in the aftermath, Moscow attempted to portray nations that objected to the Vietnamese invasion as supporters of the Pol Pot regime and all its brutality.

It is clear now that the Soviets will use the same public relations strategy as they try to identify their former ally Mr. Amin with the United States, China and the Western powers.

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Bear Hug

In Kabul Coup And Teheran, Soviets Pursue Old Ambitions

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

WASHINGTON — The Soviet Union's traditional interest in Afghanistan, Iran and other states to its south was stated bluntly by Vyacheslav M. Molotov in negotiations with the Nazis during their "honeymoon" prior to Hitler's invasion of Russia. Agreement on a Nazi-Soviet protocol was possible, Mr. Molotov said, "provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union."

Much has changed in 40 years, but Kremlin leaders are still trying to maintain what used to be called "spheres of influence" on their borders. Last week, they dispatched more than 8,000 combat troops to Kabul, moved five divisions to the Afghan border, apparently plotted and carried out the swift coup and execution of Afghan's ruthless but pro-Soviet President, replacing him with a more compliant Kremlin client. In an epoch when big powers generally pay homage to the political sensibilities of developing countries by avoiding direct military intervention, such actions seemed crudely out-of-date.

Comparing Afghanistan's independence to other Soviet neighbors, one expert assessed it as "more than Mongolia but less than Finland." Something of a Russian protectorate for most of its independent existence, the mountainous, landlocked nation was a partner in what amounted to the first international love affair with the young Soviet state. In 1919, pausing in the midst of a bloody civil war and simultaneous defense against invading big powers, Lenin responded promptly to a request for arms from the Afghan King, Amanullah.

"The Workers' and Peasants' Government is inclined to grant such assistance on the widest scale to the Afghan nation, and, what is more, to repair the injustice done by the former Government of the Russian czars by adjusting the Soviet-Afghan frontier so as to add to the territory of Afghanistan at the expense of Russia," Lenin announced.

Current history also prompts questions. Why were the Russians willing last week to act in a style that risked repetition of the world criticism in 1968, when Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia to oust a liberal Communist regime seen as threatening Moscow's ideological domination?

Sensitive to the disorder in neighboring Iran, where Moscow has often intervened in the past, and troubled by the inability of their Afghan supporters to quell a Moslem uprising, the Russians may have decided that further instability in Afghanistan could damage their national interests. Some experts theorize that Moscow, no less than Washington, has been concerned by increasing Islamic militancy. In Afghanistan, the insurrection was motivated, in part, by a perception by local tribal leaders that officials in Kabul were atheistic Communists.

With Iran, bordering both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, also swept by Moslem fundamentalism, and its ethnic minorities agitating for autonomy, Moscow had to be worried about the impact on the large Moslem populations on the Soviet side of the frontier.

While the United States has been preoccupied with the fate of American hostages held by a radical group at its embassy in Teheran, Soviet concerns have been more sweeping. In Kabul, the Russians are aware that if the Soviet-backed leaders were toppled, there would be strong tendencies toward anarchy; anti-Communist Islam probably would be predominant. In Iran, where the Soviet Union in two separate periods tried to set up puppet states, Moscow probably sees opportunities as well as risks.

Lenin's Bolsheviks set up a "Soviet republic" in Gilan Province along Iran's Caspian coast that lasted one year. Later, Britain and the Soviet Union divided Iran into security zones during World War II. After the war, the Russians, instead of withdrawing their troops, set up autonomous governments in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, two areas where ethnic minorities are again chafing against the central authority of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Under United States pressure in the Security Council, the Russians were forced out of the areas in 1946.

By 1960, Moscow had learned to live with Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi, despite his close ties with the United States. The Shah, while permitting United States intelligence stations inside Iran, promised the Russians he would forbid American missiles. He also made mutually advantageous trade deals with the Russians.

Although Moscow did allow Iranian exiles to broadcast anti-Shah programs from Baku, in Soviet Azerbaijan, the content was sharply toned down until late last year when anti-Shah demonstrations became threatening. Then, the Russians began supporting the Ayatollah, apparently hoping the United States would be evicted from Iran.

As it turned out, the Ayatollah has been his own man, and the Russians had not fared particularly well under the new order. However, during the eight weeks of the hostage crisis, Iranian authorities have stopped criticizing the Russians, clearly hoping for their support against economic and military reprisals by Washington.

Responding, the Soviet Union has been playing a deliberately ambiguous role. At the United Nations, Moscow has gone along with resolutions demanding release of the hostages. But its propaganda has stressed military actions the United States might take, and has continued, through the Baku broadcasts, to attack the Central Intelligence Agency and "imperialistic" subversion in Iran.

Last week, as the United States sought a Security Council vote on economic sanctions, the Russians were in a difficult position, caught between their hopes for United States ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and their longstanding geopolitical interests in the oil-laden Gulf. The Soviet Ambassador, Vladimir Vinogradov, a former deputy foreign minister and ambassador to Cairo, has been able to see the Ayatollah Khomeini only rarely, but last week at a possibly pivotal moment in Soviet-Iranian relations, Mr. Vinogradov received an audience with the Ayatollah in the Holy City of Qum.

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30 December 1979

Kabul Coup Seen Advancing Historic Moscow Objectives

By Kevin Klose

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Dec. 29—By placing its troops in direct combat and garrison roles to install a tractable new regime in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has come closer to achieving an objective that eluded the czars for more than a century: control of a landlocked central Asian area that eventually could yield to Moscow direct access to warm-water ports. This is a strategic goal of immense importance.

In a broad sense, the Soviet military thrust is a shrewd move on the world geopolitical chess board of the sort the Brezhnev leadership has made in various forms in recent years in Angola, Ethiopia and Cambodia. Moscow's intervention seems to guarantee the swift conversion of an innocuous buffer state into a Kremlin puppet and potential staging area for direct leverage deep inside Central Asia.

Iran, Pakistan and India woke up to a changed world Friday after the coup Thursday in Kabul. The intervention also is significant for China, the U.S.S.R.'s most bitter adversary, which has expansionist aims of its own in the area.

The angry and worried Washington reaction, which President Carter made plain in his luncheon talk with reporters today at the White House, underscored the fundamental strategic change Moscow's move implies and the strength of Soviet military power. At a time when the distant United States is grappling with ways to reinforce its influence throughout the Persian Gulf and South Asia, the Soviets simply marched in against virtually no organized opposition and took control. The operation reflects continued Kremlin calculations that it can seek detente with the West while also seizing any opportunity to expand its power. Whether it can consolidate this gain and make more from its new salient depends on various internal and external factors, but the historic goal is clear.

The Arabian Sea port towns of Chah Bahar in Iran and Gwadar in Pakistan lie about 300 miles south of the Afghan border, in a region dominated by Baluchi tribesmen disaffected from both Tehran and Islamabad. Baluchistan, convulsed by a breakaway rebellion from 1973 to 1977, has always been a tempting target for a Soviet gateway to the sea.

Strategic international oil sea lanes to the Persian Gulf lie south of the Baluchistan coast. But Moscow first must deal with complex tactical and strategic problems within Afghanistan, which could take years to solve and could themselves damage Soviet relations with Moslem governments and peoples from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea.

The success of the Soviet gamble, which began with the relatively easy coup against President Hafizullah Amin, depends on the ability of new leader Babrak Karmal — to quell the Moslem insurrection that has ripped Afghanistan since pro-Marxists came to power in a 1978 coup.

The fact that Moscow mounted the military overthrow underscores the consensus among foreign observers here that the Soviets are intent upon finding a political settlement allowing peace between the pro-Marxists and the tribal Moslem insurgents. Babrak, sheltered and tutored by Moscow or its East Block allies this year going underground to escape a purge by Amin, has called for peace with the Moslem tribesmen. However, Moscow is in the awkward position of using its troops to quell rebellious Afghan Moslems while proclaiming it supports Moslem nationalist aspirations elsewhere in the region.

To minimize the impact of this, the Soviets are certain to clamp tight restrictions on outside access to Afghanistan to lessen internal awareness of what is going on. But if Moscow expands its combat role, much will be learned abroad from foreign diplomats, Western intelligence listening devices and from thousands of new refugees streaming into Pakistan to join the estimated 350,000 Afghans already there.

Official Soviet media have offered only terse confirmation of Russian combat troops in Kabul. Today, the official Tass news agency reported a Kabul radio address by Babrak and highlighted his assurances to "the worthy Moslems of Afghanistan, Sunni and Shiite, ulemas and clergy."

But Moslem countries elsewhere have already reacted with alarm to the intervention, providing a foretaste of longer-term reaction to the Middle East and South Asia. The Kuwaiti government has officially protested and newspapers in Saudi Arabia and Iraq have denounced the Soviet role.

Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini also has responded negatively, and it is here that the Soviets may stand to lose the most ground in the immediate future. Khomeini earlier had attacked Kabul for warring on Moslems. Tehran has always been particularly sensitive to its problems with the Baluchi separatists. Khomeini, who has sought to solve his severe internal problems by uniting Iranians behind his handling of the U.S. Embassy crisis, is unlikely to soften his view. Indeed, the Soviet intervention calls up memories of the Stalin-era seizure of northwest Iran during the World War II Anglo-Soviet operation to secure its

oil fields from the Germans. The Kremlin later unsuccessfully attempted to carve out an "independent" Azerbaijani state there.

Elsewhere in South Asia, the Soviet move will further strain relations with Pakistan, which already stands accused by the Communist Party paper Pravda of supporting the Afghan Moslems. The coup came just before Islamabad was to send a diplomatic mission to Kabul to seek ways of easing mounting ill-will over the presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan's border areas. The camps have been centers of some insurgent activity, despite strict Pakistani measures to suppress inflammatory public pronouncements by anti-Marxist leaders there.

While it has exacerbated relations with many Third World countries, Moscow's presence brings with it in the long run enormous new pressures for accommodation with the Soviets by those capitals. In addition, some veteran Asian diplomats here believe that the Kremlin's action also has perversely—given it a significant and potentially long-term psychological gain over the United States.

CONTINUED

These sources argue that Asian and Moslem leaders, accustomed to wielding power to govern societies prone to mass violence and turmoil, have gained new respect for Moscow's naked use of force to stake out its vital interests. Although they back Washington's use of restraint in handling its Tehran embassy crisis, these diplomats say the United States is the loser in any comparison by some Asian capitals with Moscow's Afghan intervention.

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IRAN

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NEWSWEEK
7 January 1980

IRAN'S 'WATERGATE II'

By Arnaud de Borchgrave

Abolhassan Bani Sadr developed the idea when he was Iran's Foreign Minister, and Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, his successor, refined it. Third World revolutionaries have dubbed it "Watergate II." As outlined to me by informed sources in Arab capitals, Iran's plan for an international tribunal on the alleged crimes of the U.S. and the deposed Shah amounts to an "exposé" of U.S. policy in the Third World. "If we wanted, we could blackmail dozens of high officials all over the Western world," Ghotbzadeh bragged in one conversation that was reported to me. "But we will confine our revelations to the activities of American and Zionist imperialism."

Ghotbzadeh warned last week that if the U.S. imposes economic sanctions on Iran, the tribunal will be abandoned, and the American hostages will be tried as spies. But spy trials

san, Jordan's King Hussein and the governments of Egypt, Somalia, Zaire and Oman.

None of this is particularly startling—or even new. In a recent discussion with me, King Hussein admitted that the Shah had given him military aid. "We wish Iranians well toward a restoration of stability," he told me, "but at the same time we don't just forget our friends. Iran under the Shah supported Jordan. This we will never forget."

The fact that some of Iran's allegations are true will give all of them a certain credibility. It is well known that the Shah kept Iranian oil flowing to Israel during the 1973 Arab oil embargo. What is new, however, is evidence that the Shah sent some of his military intelligence and security officers to take secret training courses in Israel—a connection that eventually grew into worldwide collaboration among the intelligence agencies of Israel, Iran and the U.S. Other Secret Service arrangements with France, Britain, South Africa, Rhodesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Morocco also will be made public.

HOLES: Pro-Western Arab intelligence officers told me that Russian, Cuban and Palestinian agents have supplied other documents that will conveniently plug a few holes in Iran's case against "American imperialism and its Third World lackeys." Ghotbzadeh claims he has proof that the Shah contributed money to the political campaigns of Presidents Nixon and Ford and that he lavished expensive gifts on dozens of prominent American and European political figures. The Watergate II extravaganza also will be sprinkled with disclosures about the Shah's torturers, currency transfers by his family during the past 25 years (estimates of the amount are down to \$6 billion, from the \$22 billion claimed when the Shah left a year ago) and tidbits on the "nefarious" role



Ghotbzadeh and MacBride: Talk of blackmail and 'the Iran syndrome'

also would be heavy with propaganda, and they would employ many of the techniques developed for the tribunal. In any forum, Ghotbzadeh and his associates hope to keep America paralyzed for months in an orgy of recriminations. "We read that the Vietnam and Watergate syndromes are over," he said recently. "Now you are about to see the Iran syndrome."

The tribunal would be composed of prominent international figures; among others, Ghotbzadeh has approached Irish human-rights activist Sean MacBride, a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. My sources have been told that the hostages would be used as witnesses to certify the authenticity of documents presented to the panel. Ghotbzadeh has said that the evidence accumulated after months of digging in government ministries, royal residences, banks and the U.S. Embassy in Teheran would prove that the CIA was running a vast network of spies inside Iran's principal military bases.

The documents will show that the Shah spent millions of dollars in secret funds to help anti-Marxist governments and movements around the world—with the quiet blessing of several U.S. administrations. Among the recipients of the Shah's munificence: Jonas Savimbi's anti-Communist guerrillas in Angola, Bishop Abel Muzorewa in Rhodesia, Morocco's King Has-

san, Jordan's King Hussein and the governments of Egypt, Somalia, Zaire and Oman.

played by Henry Kissinger and David Rockefeller. Pro-Western Arab leaders are worried that the coming trial of U.S. "imperialism" is part of a Soviet-engineered plan to paralyze the U.S. during a huge geopolitical power play in the Middle East. As many Arab moderates see it, Iran's so-called Islamic Revolution is becoming increasingly Marxist. "As a Muslim and Arab, I am deeply disturbed when I see actions in the Muslim world that are totally alien to its teachings," says Hussein. "I cannot help but conclude that we have been penetrated by forces acting under the guise of Islam that seek to destroy Islam."

Hussein: Disturbed

Zohrab



President Carter is trying to speed up the creation of a rapid deployment force to respond to such geopolitical challenges, but moderate Arabs are against such a force in the region. "Are we talking about a U.S. that claims to be Israel's staunchest ally deploying its power in our area?" says Hussein. "It is high time people realized that the lack of an over-all Mideast settlement is the root cause of instability . . . Deployment and contingency plans that bypass such a settlement are bound to be counterproductive." To some extent, Iran's anti-American propaganda already may be producing results.

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SPECIAL REPORT

**'WE WEPT
TOGETHER'**

'NUMBERS GAME': The question of how many Americans are being held hostage in Teheran contributed to that lack of understanding. After the clergymen reported counting 43 Americans at the embassy, the U.S. State Department accused Iran of playing "a very cruel numbers game" and demanded that the "missing seven" be accounted for. The students holding the embassy countered that there were 49 hostages, but that six of them had not wanted to attend religious services.

The explanation convinced no one. "Even if you were a committed atheist," said one diplomat in Teheran, "you would want to see visiting Americans and pass on messages to your families." One well-informed source in Teheran maintained that the Americans who did not show up for the Christmas services included those accused by the students of being CIA agents—among them, Thomas Leo Ahern, William Daugherty and Malcolm Kalp—and that it was possible that they were being held incommunicado. There was some plausibility to that line of speculation; Ahern is a devout Catholic and would hardly have refused to meet with a priest.

Some U.S. officials believed that the missing seven had been removed from the embassy weeks ago as "a bargaining re-

serve" and that they were the prisoners most likely to be paraded before a revolutionary court as "spies." With the Carter Administration mustering international support for a trade embargo against Iran, Teheran buzzed with talk last week that spy trials were virtually inevitable.

One straw in the wind was the hard-line attitude adopted by Ghotbzadeh, who earlier had proposed holding an international tribunal on the "crimes" of the U.S. and the deposed Shah, instead of trying the hostages themselves (page 27). Emerging last week from a meeting of the council, Ghotbzadeh told newsmen angrily: "The Americans keep interpreting every reasonable gesture we make as a sign of weakness. We offer a tribunal instead of a trial, we allow the Christian priests in to visit the embassy, and the Americans reply with talk of sanctions. If they keep trying to put this sort of pressure on us, then let's forget the tribunal. Let's have an ordinary trial and try them all for being spies." Most foreign observers in Teheran agreed that imposing sanctions on Iran would give strong impetus to a full-scale espionage trial.

By late last week, it was unclear whether the U.N. would—or could—impose meaningful sanctions. After his televised statement on Iran and Afghanistan, President Carter was asked whether he had the votes the U.S. needed in the Security Council to obtain an embargo on Iran. Hedging, he replied: "I expect we will have adequate support . . . for our position." At the U.N., however, many diplomats frankly doubted that the necessary nine Council members would vote for firm sanctions, even if the Soviet Union did not veto such a measure.

With Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on hand at the United Nations late last week, a compromise was under consideration: Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim would be asked to make one more attempt to negotiate with the Iranians for the release of the American hostages, and the Security Council would promise to take action of some sort if Waldheim failed. A decision on the issue appeared possible by early this week.

EXCERPTED

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THE WASHINGTON POST
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Jack Anderson

Enigmatic Role of the PLO in Iran

One of the murkier mysteries of the Tehran situation is the involvement of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its crafty leader, Yasser Arafat, in the embassy takeover and the negotiations for the hostages' release.

The pistol-packing Arafat's role is so enigmatic, in fact, that our intelligence agencies disagree sharply in their assessment of his actions. Some of my sources say they believe Arafat honestly tried to mediate the crisis, as he claimed. Others are convinced the PLO leader's ballyhooed mediation effort was a sham.

The one thing about which both schools of thought agree is that Arafat saw the hostage situation as an opportunity to gain favorable publicity for the PLO in the United States. Whether his mediation attempt was sincere, or whether it was simply a cover for a more sinister mission—assuring the Iranians of Soviet support in the event of U.S. military action—the PLO would still look like a friend in need to the United States.

There is an even more Byzantine possibility, my sources tell me: Arafat may have had a hand in the planning and execution of the embassy takeover from the start. Intelligence experts note that in the past—for example, the seizure of the Egyptian Embassy in Turkey in July—the PLO assumed a spurious mediator role in a situation it had instigated.

In support of this theory, it should be pointed out that some of the so-called students had almost certainly been trained by the PLO, and may have been accompanied in the embassy takeover by young Palestinian guerrillas with PLO connections.

It is also known that, after the shah's overthrow, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini asked the PLO for help in training a security force because he doubted the reliability of the Iranian army.

The PLO sent Abu Sharad, who is now the equivalent of the head of the secret service in the Iranian revolutionary regime, and Hasin Hassam, who is now Khomeini's minister of defense. Intelligence analysts who lean to the view that Khomeini personally engineered the embassy seizure say that he would have used his PLO-trained security force for the job.

The PLO connection with the Iranian revolutionaries goes back a number of years. The Palestinian guerrillas provided training, arms and money to the antishah rebels. And the PLO made no secret of its delight at Khomeini's victory.

The PLO's public posture in the crisis might best be called contradictory. While Arafat's representatives were supposedly trying to negotiate the hostages' release, the PLO's man on the scene in Tehran, Hani Al-Hasan, was stating flatly that "we are not mediators."

He also issued a ringing message of support for the Iranians against the United States. "The PLO puts all its forces, armed and unarmed, at the disposal of Khomeini, to fight against any American intervention, inside and outside Iran," he said.

There was also a report, which I have confirmed independently, that Palestinian guerrillas were the ones who mined the Tehran embassy after the United States hinted it might use

force to free the hostages. Those Palestinians may not have been acting for Arafat, however.

Among intelligence sources who say they believe Arafat's mediation attempt was sincere, there is a report that PLO officials are still secretly negotiating in Tehran for the release of the hostages.

These sources say the negotiations have been kept quiet to prevent a public outcry from radical Palestinians and to protect the PLO mediators from possible violence.

JANUARY 1980

For America: The Lessons of the Crisis

By George W. Ball

Former undersecretary of state for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, George Ball is a lawyer, investment banker and authority on foreign affairs.

The agonizing ordeal of our captives in the Tehran embassy could mark a critical point in our national experience. It has—for the moment at least—renewed our unity of purpose; it may well have cured us of hang-ups left over from Vietnam and Watergate.

We can be proud that Americans have, almost without exception, supported a position based on the most elemental of humane principles—concern for the individual as against the compulsions of world politics. To be sure, the few who sedulously nourish the thesis of America's vanishing power and authority have asked derisively, "Can you imagine the Russians ever letting their embassies be held hostage?" They imply, of course, that the Soviets would react with military force, but what of it? Since the Kremlin's ideological values differ fundamentally from our own, no doubt Moscow would put the tactical interests of an abstraction—the state—above the lives of individuals, coolly sacrificing Soviet citizens to demonstrate the state's effective power.

That we have rejected such a course shows that we have got our priorities right. There is nothing more invigorating to a nation than to be true to itself. That is, it seems to me, why the American people have seemed so impressive during these recent painful days; only a few fringe voices called for us to send home the Shah or for military action that might endanger the hostages. Though some feared that our constraint might be interpreted as impotence, it is, instead, a brilliant demonstration of strength.

In many ways, the whole trying period has been a therapeutic experience that has taught us Americans a great deal about ourselves. Probably a crisis of some kind was necessary to sweep up the last leftover breakage from Vietnam and Watergate. After years of wran-

gling and self-doubt, we have learned, to our astonishment, that we as a people can unite when the issues are unambiguous and our national position accords with our national traditions. We know now that when the country is sufficiently aroused, Americans—almost to a man or woman—will be prepared to use their military power. Contrary to the mourners and lamenters, our national will is firm and intact.

Though our sustained policy of restraint may have puzzled other countries, Americans themselves have well understood it. We have found no contradiction in the fact that the strongest nation in the world is still willing to put the lives of its citizens ahead of the desire to indulge its anger or the urge to express its manhood. We have, in other words, behaved as a mature people and should not be too concerned about how others perceive us.

Let us hope that out of our current unifying experience America will emerge as a stronger, more confident country, better aware of its strengths and purpose than in recent dreary years. Let us also hope that we now have the wisdom to solve complex problems where the issues of right and wrong are not so clearly drawn as in the case of the hostages. Finally, let us hope that, rather than wringing our hands, as many were doing, we will take the actions necessary to assure our strength.

These are lessons we should now have learned:

First, we must improve our military capability to respond quickly to threatening situations any place in the world that could seriously jeopardize vital national interests. Our experience in Iran has demonstrated definitively that the Nixon Doctrine does not work. If, as that doctrine teaches, we try to secure our interests by anointing a developing country in a strategic region as the protector of our interests and then overload it with sophisticated arms, we shall only encourage the disintegration of a political structure too fragile to sustain such a burden. We must, therefore, face the unpleasant reality that regional surrogates offer no easy solution, and proceed promptly to expand our own airlift capabilities, extend our naval reach and earmark and train adequate units for emergency deployment. Such a capability is essential to enable us to help strategically important, friendly nations resist aggression from foreign enemies. The visible evidence of that capability is required to give those nations confidence that they can count on our protection and at the same time to deter others from attacking them.

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We must be able to react largely from American bases since, with the pervasive spread of nationalism, American installations on foreign soil are a vanishing species.

Second, we must stop talking about the need to reduce our dependence for energy on unstable producers in OPEC and act promptly to make that talk reality. We are living in a fool's world and we no longer dare temporize. At the same time, if we are not to face even more serious crises in the Middle East, we must concentrate on an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. We have spent 12 years living with the debris of the 1967 war and it is time we finally cleaned it up—a goal we can achieve only by reconciling a Palestinian national home with adequate arrangements for the security of Israel. In spite of obstructionism from both sides, such a reconciliation should not be impossible, if we only show enough resolution and stop being immobilized by frozen patterns of thought.

Third, we must frankly face the realities of today's world, where power is subject to increasing constraints. The crisis of the hostages shows how restricted are the options in dealing with cowardly regimes that sanctify kidnapping; the toppling of the Shah exposed the limits of our power to keep a hated ruler in place against the will of his people. Yet even though we equip ourselves to help friendly nations resist outside aggression, we will still be relatively powerless to deal with the internal revolutions that may now be set in motion not only by the crumbling of old cakes of custom but also by social and economic dislocations created as high oil prices make nations either too poor or too rich.

Some critics of current policy, notably Mr. Kissinger, have refused to acknowledge the practical limits of our power to restrain or manage great internal convulsions, darkly implying that the Carter administration let Iran slide into chaos by not giving greater support to the Shah—though just what form that greater support might have taken is not clear. That is dangerous talk. The last thing we need is an argument over who lost Iran that adopts the same keening theme song as the old who lost China argument. Our last awkward and brutal effort to interfere with internal political change, in Chile, is an episode few regard as a shining example of America's wisdom or skill.

Yet, though we cannot stop an aroused people from overthrowing a hated ruler, we dare not be the only major nation without an effective intelligence service. We must have the resources to gather information and, at the same time, the operational personnel to follow political trends in strategic coun-

tries, quietly keep in touch with opposition leaders, advise those leaders of American views and policies, and provide some continuity of contacts in sensitive areas where governments tend to change frequently. To avoid such indecencies as the Chilean adventure, we must obviously hold such operations under tight and responsible restraint; but we should promptly dismantle the present absurd requirements of scrutiny by multiple congressional committees that make a mockery of secrecy. Meanwhile, our vituperative post-mortem has left us with the worst of both worlds. It has reinforced the fantasy prevailing throughout the Third World that the CIA is cunning, pervasive and capable of unimaginable feats of interference, while almost totally destroying our intelligence instrument.

Fourth, we shall have to develop a thicker skin and lower our expectations of world sympathy. Though the United States has been the preeminent world power ever since the Second World War, we are still surprised and somewhat hurt when other nations, particularly our Western allies, do not always support our policies—or support them only halfheartedly. Sometimes our reaction reflects a failure of imagination; we are too self-centered to comprehend how a particular situation may appear from a foreign perspective. Although the powers of Europe have greatly enlarged their wealth and improved their standards of living, they still remain regional—indeed, parochial—in their outlook. Or, put another way, though there has been a vast redistribution of wealth and economic power since the Second World War, there has been no commensurate redistribution of political and military responsibility outside the European theater.

To be sure, European leaders clearly stated that the violation of our embassy in Tehran menaced the whole structure of world diplomacy, but they indicated little eagerness to participate in any economic measures against Iran or take or approve any action that might—to their detriment—reduce Iran's oil production. Indeed, several have seemed

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primarily concerned with the financial consequences of America's action in freezing Iranian bank accounts, even though that action was taken to forestall a wholesale Iranian withdrawal that would have deprived American banks of any security for their Iranian loans.

To justify their semidetached position toward America's predicament, the French sought to distinguish between the hostage problem, which they recognize as having universal implications, and our quarrel with Iran over the Shah's return, which they treat as a bilateral Iranian-American problem. But it is not clear what practical implications are to be drawn from such Cartesian logic-chopping.

Finally, history cannot be left out of the footnote that explains why Europeans regard Iran as primarily an American responsibility. The United States greatly expanded its relations with Iran in 1953, when we helped the Shah return to his throne after Prime Minister Mossadegh had nationalized British oil interests. In sorting out that problem, American oil companies were given a substantial share in Iranian production. We greatly increased our involvement with the Shah after 1968, when Britain began to withdraw from east of Suez. As a result, the British have tended to think of Iran as within an American sphere of interest, and, indeed, our identification with that country has been extraordinarily close. France, Italy and Germany have had little financial participation in Iranian oil production, even though they have depended on Iranian output for a significant part of their consumption needs. Such an imbalance was bound to produce quiet resentments, and

those resentments explain to some extent what has seemed a lackadaisical response on the part of Europe. Iran, they tell us, is America's problem.

Though we may feel let down by Europe's lack of vigorous assistance, the reluctant support of Third World countries is easier to understand. Since disparities in wealth and power breed resentment, it is not surprising that many Third World leaders automatically attribute their relative poverty to imperialism or colonial exploitation. That explanation is no doubt comforting: it need concern us only when it serves as an all-purpose excuse for obstructive action.

In essence, we should not be too sensitive to the opinions of other nations, nor should we judge the reactions of others solely in terms of good or evil. We can never be sure how we would behave if we viewed the world from the vantage point of any particular foreign government. The most we can do is try to understand why a government reacts as it does and factor that political datum into our calculations, recognizing that no matter how wisely or generously we may behave according to our own lights, we cannot please all peoples everywhere and we should never try. Once we have enlisted the help and counsel of friendly powers, we must at the end make our own decisions.

Only we Americans can take the final responsibility for our future, and we are now sufficiently grown-up to recognize that that future will never be free of dangers and disasters. The world's dark woods are filled not merely with elves and fairies but also with wolves and dragons and fanatical ayatullahs. ♣

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B15THE WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1980**Jack Anderson**

Key Officials Were on Shah's Gift List

Out of the Iranian cesspool, an ugly question has bubbled to the surface: Did the shah of Iran use his oil billions to manipulate American policy?

Sources close to the deposed shah tell me he used to operate a subterranean system of graft, kickbacks and payoffs that extended from his palace guard to some of the mullahs who now oppose him. The same sources claim his foreign policy, too, was based on bribery, graft and manipulation.

A startling array of prominent Americans were on his gift list. His man in Washington, Ardeshir Zahedi, dispensed envelopes stuffed with cash, Persian rugs, expensive jewelry, watches, cans of caviar, bottles of champagne and services of prostitutes. For top officials, there were even juicier enticements. Consider these conflicts of interest:

Case No. 1—The shah, seeking money to finance his dreams of empire, became the driving force behind the astronomical leap in oil prices. Saudi Arabia, however, offered to block the ruinous 1974 price rise if the Nixon administration would intervene with the shah.

Top secret documents show that the administration's foreign policy star, Henry Kissinger, was responsible for blocking any interference with the shah. So with Kissinger's connivance, the great oil gouge began.

Soon the oil billions began pouring into the shah's coffers, much of it by way of the Rockefeller-run Chase Manhattan Bank. The shah also bestowed other multibillion-dollar benefits on the Rockefeller interests, ranging from oil deals to real estate ventures.

It's no big secret that Kissinger came to prominence through the Rockefeller route. His biographers, Marvin and Bernard Kalb, describe him as "one of the crown jewels in the Rockefeller diadem." After guiding U.S. foreign policy for eight years, Kissinger returned to the Rockefeller fold where he is now advising Chase Manhattan on foreign investments.

Case No. 2—William Rogers was secretary of state when the decision was reached to build up the shah as protector of American interests in the Persian Gulf area, rather than face the difficulties of having the United States look after these interests more directly.

Rogers joined in the process of arming the shah to the teeth, flattering him to the ears and commiserating with him over his revenue problems in bankrolling the vast responsibilities Washington had encouraged him to undertake.

Within three months after Roger left the State Department in late 1973, he turned up as a director of the shah's Pahlavi Foundation. Rogers' law firm was also retained by the shah.

Case No. 3—No American ambassador could have been more solicitous toward the shah than was Richard Helms. As ambassador to Iran during the crucial 1973-77 period, Helms behaved as if he were representing the shah, rather than the American people.

In one classified cable, he urged the State Department to "tidy up as much as possible anti-shah elements in U.S." before a visit from the shah. Helms also asked whether an anti-shah news-

paper in Washington could be closed down. The department's lawyers replied that the paper was protected by the First Amendment.

When Helms finally resigned as ambassador, he told colleagues at the embassy that he was leaving "to make some money." Not long afterward, he opened a consulting firm in Washington for the ostensible purpose of serving as a "go between" for foreign interests seeking to do business in the United States. He called his firms "Sareer," the Iranian word for "ambassador."

His biggest spending client—you guessed it—was Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Case No. 4—Sen. Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.), a power on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, became one of the Senate's most stalwart champions of the shah. After the shah was ousted and condemned to death by the new revolutionary government, Javits helped push through a Senate resolution assailing the shah's death sentence.

This Senate resolution, according to Iranian sources, helped to persuade Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini that the United States was unalterably committed to the shah, thus heightening the distrust and hostility that precipitated the Iranian crisis.

In 1974, the senator's wife Marion Javits, quietly signed on as a \$67,500 public relations consultant to Iran Air. Confidential papers show that the shah's aides considered this a cover for a pro-shah lobbying effort. The papers note, among other political observations, her husband's "great influence" in the Senate.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A21THE WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1980David S. Broder

After the Cinema Is Over

The chief of a European intelligence service who was visiting Washington last winter used a curious phrase to describe the negotiations, then in their final stage, between the Soviet Union and the United States on the strategic arms limitation treaty.

"That is cinema," he said. "That is what they give you to interest and distract you, while they do their serious work elsewhere."

He had brought with him to our meeting a map of the world. He pointed to Ethiopia, where the Russians had established a foothold at the outlet of the Red Sea into the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. He pointed across the strait to North and South Yemen, on the base of the Arabian peninsula, where Russian arms were being used by warring tribesmen.

He swung his hand upward, across Saudi Arabia and Iraq to Turkey—where there was growing unrest, in part the aftermath of the arms embargo the United States had applied

"One wonders, uncomfortably, how much else in our foreign policy is also cinema and illusion."

and then lifted in the Cyprus dispute. He moved southeast to Iran, where the shah had but recently been overthrown and the U.S. government was making efforts to ingratiate itself with what it took to be a moderate government.

Then east again to Afghanistan, where he said the American administration had declined to supply clandestine arms to Moslem rebels opposing the pro-Soviet puppet government.

That country, he said, would surely be annexed to the Soviet empire unless the West signaled it would strongly resist such a move. And then he drew a line from Afghanistan's southern border through Pakistan—cut off from additional American weapons, because of a nuclear-proliferation dispute—to what he said was the ultimate Russian objective: a warm-water port on the Arabian Sea.

At the center of this circle, he showed me, was the Persian Gulf and the narrow Strait of Hormuz, where sinking a single ship could cut the oil lifeline on which Japan and Europe and the United States depend.

"That," he said, "is what is real to them. SALT and the rest—it is cinema to distract you."

It seemed rather melodramatic at the time, but it is not the sort of speech one can put out of mind. And now that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has quashed the hopes of SALT's ratification—in the minds of everyone except President Carter and his spokesmen—one wonders, uncomfortably, how much else in our foreign policy is also cinema and illusion.

Is there—to ask an uncomfortable question—any reality to the administration strategy for securing the release of the hostages in Tehran? Or is it cinema? At home, we have lit lights, sung songs, sent letters and prayers. Congress, the United Nations and the World Court have affirmed the illegality of the embassy seizure. Now there is another U.N. mission to Iran, to be followed by another set of toothless sanctions.

Are we not concealing from ourselves, with this cinema, the fact that the terrorists have paid no price for their action and have been given no real incentive to release the prisoners—and release the United States from this psychological bondage?

And an even harder question to face: is there a sense in which the hostages themselves are a cinema—a preoccupation that lets us avoid the larger issues in what has occurred? Their lives are precious, but their lives have been subject to the will of others from the moment the embassy was seized without a shot.

Does a policy of patience improve their chances? It is not clear that it does. Each day in Iran brings fresh dangers of religious and tribal wars that could topple Khomeini and unleash fearful vengeance on those in the reach of his followers. He himself can be driven to extreme action by the weakness of his internal position.

It has been my belief from the first week of this crisis that when the cinema is finished, when all the resolutions have been passed—and ignored—the government of the United States will have to act, of its own will, to change the equation. For the sake of the prisoners and, equally, for the first step in salvaging a deteriorating situation in a vital part of the world, our government will have to set a deadline for retaliation. Such a deadline would force the captors and their leader to decide what price they are prepared to pay for their persistence in what is, in fact, an act of war.

That is a chilling prospect with which to begin the new year. But the cinema is about over.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 8

THE BOSTON GLOBE
30 December 1979

Coffin and US — love-hate relationship

By William A. Henry 3d
Globe Staff

He was arrested in civil rights marches in the South and called President John F. Kennedy "a very reluctant emancipator." He went to Hanoi in 1963, and in 1968 he was convicted with Dr. Benjamin Spock of organizing illegal draft resistance. In calling for disarmament, he said the United States should "abandon the philosophy that we must be No. 1."

So it was no surprise last week that, when Rev. William Sloane Coffin Jr. was chosen to meet American hostages in Tehran, his first substantive words were about the "just grievances" of their captors and the wickedness of the deposed shah.

He may be the pastor of Riverside Church, built in 1927 with \$26 million of pre-inflation Rockefeller money.

He may be the son of a president of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the nephew of a president of the Union Theological Seminary, a former son-in-law of pianist Arthur Rubinstein.

He may have been chaplain of Yale University and a Cold War covert-action specialist for the CIA.

But Rev. Coffin also is a lifelong radical who has had a love-hate relationship with America.

"The vision of a successful American," he once said, "is not one who has given his goods to feed the poor, but one who has plundered the poor to have his goods."

When Watergate was over, he saw no purgation and no proof that the system had worked.

"People think Nixon is a crock and Henry Kissinger is honest. To me, both of them shared an evil vision whereby the world would be ruled by American power and a few other powerful nations, plus some multinational corporations — none of which is concerned with the suffering of the Third World.

"To me, that's the immorality that needs to be attacked: an immorality of social vision."

He preached that view for 17 years as Yale chaplain. He arrived in 1958 and said the students were a privileged elite with no sense of the injustice in the world. He became a campus hero in the 1960s, first for his civil rights activities, then for opposing the Vietnam war.

He was a leader of marches on Washington, a codefendant in the most celebrated antiwar trial (his conviction was reversed on appeal), a leading figure in Norman Mailer's nonfiction account of Vietnam protest, "Armies of the Night." With the possible exception of Yale President Kingman Brewster Jr., now Ambassador to the Court of St. James's in Britain, Coffin was the man Yale men most admired.

Unlike Brewster, an aloof and majestic figure, Coffin mingled. On the opening day of school in 1957, freshmen wearing coats and ties trooped in to watch a procession led by Brewster wearing formal academic robes. After dinner that day, Coffin appeared in corduroys, a sweater, no coat or tie, and sat on the edge of the stage to "rap."

He invariably recognized students, even recent graduates, as they passed him on the street, called out to them, made them feel like valued friends.

But by the early 1970s, with the war over and a recession making getting jobs difficult, the next generation of students had turned generally conservative. They came to regard Coffin as a benign irrelevancy. The media stopped asking for comment, the activist organizations disintegrated, Coffin turned 50, and in 1975 he retired to write an autobiography.

He was something like the bearded would-be-hip coffeehouse reverend in Garry Trudeau's "Doonesbury," a 1960s activist who ran out of time and causes.

When he took a job, he returned to the establishment, at Riverside, the Rockefeller family church in New York. To his embarrassment, his only public opponents on the church board ignored his decades of activism and condemned his two divorces as unseemly for a man of God.

Occasionally he made headlines — blessing a 10-ton food shipment to North Vietnam, the first since the end of the war, or organizing a defense fund for an accused North Vietnamese spy. But he also presided over the funerals of Nelson and John D. Rockefeller, who epitomized the American Imperium he had so often denounced.

It seemed that at 55 he had made his private peace with America.

Until he was invited to go to Iran.

One of his first comments after the invitation came to him and two other US clergymen was that President Jimmy Carter's call for economic sanctions "was highly reminiscent of Lyndon Johnson's bombing of North Vietnam."

He said: "Patriotism is a wonderful thing, but it must be based on morality." He said: "We must never cease asking what is the virtue of unity if it is unity in folly."

To his assembled parishioners at Riverside, the man who has made a religion of politics and a politics of his religion said: "Let us gather around the Holy Child rather than rally around the flag."

Then the former CIA specialist on Russia flew off to Tehran to tend to the men and women accused by Iran of working for the CIA.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 42

THE WASHINGTON POST
1 January 1980

***Two Plots to Assassinate
Khomeini Allegedly Foiled***

By Ronald Koven

Washington Post Foreign Service

PARIS, Dec. 31—Twice during the past month, hired killers from Europe were frustrated in plans to assassinate Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, according to a reliable Western source.

The source speculated that the assassination plots were most probably ordered by Iranian political exiles who are centered in Paris, the focus of the exile community's efforts to return to power in Iran.

On both occasions, the source said, a foreign intelligence service learned of the assassination plans, and arranged to warn the Iranian government through diplomatic channels.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE _____THE NEW YORK TIMES
1 January 1980

The Wrong Iran Lesson on American Intelligence

To The Editor:

It might be hard to get consensus on what is the most depressing aspect of our difficulties in Iran, but surely Ray S. Cline's Op-Ed piece of Dec. 20 must be a prime candidate. Mr. Cline thinks that the major lesson for us in that tragedy is that we must restore the old C.I.A. methods and philosophy, but with a better cover.

Could it be clearer that that is exactly what we do not need; that it was precisely what Mr. Cline is calling for that got us into the mess we're in?

The intelligence we need in such places as Iran is information about the injustices people are suffering, injustices that, if not corrected, are certain to lead to festering resentments against the regime imposing them and against the United States if it condones them.

If there was a failure of intelligence in China long ago, in Cuba, in Vietnam, in Iran and in many other places, it was plainly a failure to discern the intensity of grievances that masses of people were feeling, and the inevitable attractiveness to them of extremist solutions in the absence of any reasonable alternative.

Although the radicals' seizure of the American hostages cannot be tolerated, the outrages that pushed them to that outrage cannot be ignored. It is important to keep those two issues clearly separated — for the sake of the hostages as well as for future relations with Iran.

I cannot know, of course, whether there was a failure of our intelligence operations to obtain the kind of information we needed. It is conceivable that, despite Mr. Cline's orientation,

those who were supposed to know such things did know them, even reported them, and were ignored. That would represent an intelligence failure of another sort: either the concealment of vital information from the American public or the stupidity of leaders the public had ignorantly elected.

In any case, the lessons about intelligence that we should be learning from our recent international debacles are two: (1) If we fail to appreciate the degree to which our actions and inactions cause people to resent us, we shall forever be unpleasantly surprised; (2) if we appreciate how much we are resented and choose to accept the resentment, then we must also accept the enormous costs of being totally ruthless — and in the long run probably failing. Ask the Shah.

My best guess is that such reactions as Mr. Cline's stem from the assumption that the major objective is to maximize American power, and that all means directed to that end are justified. That is a fatal mistake. The major objective is to make sure that American power is, and is always seen to be, a means to the protection of freedom and furtherance of justice. The

two conceptions are worlds apart; they lead to radically different kinds of actions, including "intelligence" gathering, and they will have radically different kinds of consequences.

Mr. Cline thinks that the best way to prevent "Americans abroad [from being] sitting ducks such as they were in Iran" is to develop better covert operations. I think that the best way to prevent Americans from being seen as enemies of the people is for the United States not to support enemies of the people.

HARRY C. BREDEMEIER,
Professor of Sociology,
Rutgers University

New Brunswick, N.J., Dec. 21, 1979

To the Editor:

Ray S. Cline cannot really mean that the C.I.A. replacement should be called U.S.I.C. "You sick(?)" is no name for an intelligence-gathering group. Mr. Cline has no understanding of the power of a strong acronym. What he wants is Intelligence Gathering Operations ("I go!") or United States Intelligence Receiver ("You Sir!") Never, never "You sick."

DONALD M. KIRSCHENBAUM
Brooklyn, Dec. 21, 1979

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THE WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1979

Jack Anderson

Double-Dealing on Iran Laid to Soviets

While deploring the Iranian threat to world peace and orderly diplomacy, the Soviet Union has been moving quietly to exploit the situation to its own advantage.

By keeping a low profile and engaging in its usual cynical double-dealing, the Kremlin hopes to emerge as the dominant power in a weak, disunited Iran. To this end, the Soviets proclaim their support for the Iranian revolutionaries, while simultaneously working to undercut the new regime behind the scenes.

The Russians obviously welcomed the ouster of the pro-Western shah — indeed, may have helped to foment the revolution that ended his rule. And the near-anarchy that has followed in Iran has been tailor-made for Soviet mischief-making.

But working both sides of the street can be a tricky business, even for such experienced dealers in duplicity as the Kremlin bosses. Intelligence sources tell me that the Soviets are probably no more in control of events in Iran than we are.

Thus, the Kremlin is clearly delighted at the United States' discomfiture in the hostage situation, and its ambassador has been spotted inside the captured embassy compound, either as coach, cheerleader or privileged guest perusing secret documents.

In Moscow, meanwhile, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko assured Iranian Ambassador Moham-

mad Mokri that the Soviets "would not remain neutral" if the United States should attempt "armed aggression" against Iran.

But at the same time, the Soviets are believed to be counseling restraint out of concern that the situation might get completely out of hand. Soviet interests are best served by keeping the fuse burning without igniting the powderkeg.

Gromyko, therefore, encouraged the Iranian ambassador to continue detaining the hostages — for another year if necessary — without harming them or provoking the United States to resort to military action.

The Soviets would like their oil-rich neighbor to be continually beset by turmoil, to remain militarily weak, economically drained and politically threatened.

Moving into the power vacuum in southwest Iran, the Soviet-backed Tudeh Party has quietly organized workers in the oil fields, which are the backbone of the country's economy. The Sovietized workers are resisting attempts by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to solidify control of the vital region.

Clearly, the Soviets are torn between support for the ayatollah's revolution and a desire to undermine it. They are cautious, therefore, about encouraging autonomy among the Azerbaijanis, Kurds and other ethnic minorities.

An unpublished report, prepared

for the congressional Joint Economic Committee, also makes this point: "Soviet leaders probably fear that the evangelism of the Iranian revolution will cause . . . [Soviet] Muslims to demand more autonomy from the central government in Moscow."

On the other hand, the unpublished report notes, the Kremlin might "seek to take advantage of the discontent among the various Iranian nationalities by attempting to establish pro-Soviet states among these people."

Interestingly, Iran's petroleum reserves figure as importantly in Kremlin strategic planning as they do at the White House. The Central Intelligence Agency, in widely disputed findings, reported that before 1985 the Soviet Union will be unable to fill its own domestic oil and natural gas needs.

Under a 1975 agreement with the shah, the Russians were to build a pipeline for export of Iranian natural gas to Western Europe through the Soviet Union. The transit fee was to be paid in natural gas — 13 billion cubic meters a year. But since the revolution, work on the pipeline has stopped, and Khomeini is considering dropping the project altogether.

So for what cold comfort it may bring U.S. leaders, their opponents in the Kremlin are also faced with difficult decisions regarding the present and future course of Iran and its troublesome revolution.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE D7THE WASHINGTON POST
30 December 1979*Jack Anderson*

'Incurable Fondness for Dictators'

The Iranian crisis won't disappear when the fate of the hostages is finally settled. Recriminations will start bubbling to the surface of the American political landscape.

The question to be answered goes deeper than our humiliation in Tehran, serious as that has been. It goes to the heart of U.S. foreign policy: what is to blame for the hatred and ridicule that have been heaped on this country in recent years, and what can be done to reverse the situation? In a way, it's unfortunate that this issue will be discussed in the overblown rhetoric of an election year, because it is one that deserves more dispassionate consideration.

The Iranian crisis is only the latest, and most dramatic, evidence of the enmity the United States has aroused by its support of repressive dictators in the name of anti-communism. In Nicaragua, a Tehran-style backlash was prevented only because the revolutionaries who ousted the U.S.-backed Anastasio Somoza were less fanatical than the mullah in Iran. In Cambodia, revenge for our support of the corrupt Lon Nol was avoided because there were no Americans left to terrorize. In South America and Africa, we continue to prop up the regimes of generals who beat their countrymen with one hand and rob them with the other.

If it is not already too late, a change in U.S. policy toward these repressive regimes might spare us future Tehrans—and Islamabads and Tripolis—when the inevitable revolutionaries throw the rascals out.

As a basically decent man who inherited years of locked-in-concrete alliances, Jimmy Carter has reaped the whirlwind sown by his predecessors. After two years of kowtowing to Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, for example, he was finally persuaded that the shah's fate was sealed, and played a crucial role in his final exit.

But it was too little and too late. The revolutionaries who ousted the shah remembered only the decades of U.S. support for the tyrant, not Carter's pressure on him to moderate his rule. And to our client dictators, who have been trading on their anti-communism for billions in U.S. aid over the years, Carter's abandonment of the shah was seen as simple treachery to an old ally.

The intelligence community's role in America's current no-win predicament is certainly worth looking into. Did our intelligence-gathering agencies send honest, accurate information to Washington, where it was distorted at the top levels to conform to political policies already established? Or did the experts at the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department censor their own reports to tell the policymakers what they wanted to hear?

For years I had reported that the shah was unpopular with the Iranian masses and quite likely to be deposed by popular revolution. This information was reported by U.S. intelligence, which considered the shah an unstable megalomaniac. But it was apparently ignored in favor of more optimistic assessments.

Only two months before the shah's collapse, Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, telephoned the Iranian dictator and assured him that the United States was behind him 100 percent. In a matter of weeks, the reality of the shah's collapsing situation finally sank in, and Carter withdrew his pledge of support, after the shah had refused to liberalize his rule.

In Cambodia, knee-jerk anti-communism saddled the United States with another corrupt, unpopular dictator, Lon Nol. When this pathetic bumbler was thrown out by the savage Pol Pot regime, which was in turn overthrown by Vietnamese-backed communists, the United States had no place to go. The result was the shameful U.S. vote in the United Nations to recognize the government of Pol Pot, although he had butchered half the population of Cambodia.

In Nicaragua, only when it became obvious that Anastasio Somoza—whose

corrupt 40 years of family rule was made possible by U.S. backing—was losing out to a popular revolt, did the United States give up—after an attempt to rob the rebels of victory by back-door maneuvering.

Our apparently incurable fondness for dictators—who need only to spout a convincing anti-communist line and assure us of their stability—may get us in more trouble before too long. In Argentina and Chile, we continue to back repressive military regimes to protect U.S. business interests. And in Zaire, another enjoys American support. President Mobutu Sese Seko, is reportedly heading toward a Somoza-style debacle. He has enriched himself while his people starved and imprisoned any who dared criticize his dictatorship. But he jovially wines and dines U.S. officials and businessmen.

Robert Remole, former head of the U.S. embassy's political section in Kinshasa, told me Mobutu's days may be numbered. Remole's summary of the situation puts the U.S. predicament in a nutshell.

"Mobutu's an s.o.b.," he explained, "but the powers-that-be say, as always, that he's our s.o.b. I'm sure he's not going to be around much longer.... the people of Zaire will blame the United States for supporting him."

Those who will not learn from history are doomed to relive it. It's time U.S. policymakers read a little of our recent history so we won't be doomed to repeat it endlessly.

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30 December 1979Carter 'Crisis Team'
Gets Its Act Together

By STEVEN R. WEISMAN

WASHINGTON — Carter Administration conduct of foreign policy has sometimes tended to be disorderly, as in the case of former Ambassador Andrew Young's unauthorized meetings at the United Nations with Palestine Liberation Organization officials. By contrast, in dealing with Iran, the President's advisers have displayed an unusual degree of unity. There have been almost no signs of internal discord, and secrecy has been tightly maintained on sensitive actions such as unannounced messages to the Teheran authorities and undisclosed military moves bolstering the announced buildup.

Mr. Carter tells White House visitors that he has never seen his foreign policy machinery function so smoothly. Despite differing approaches to world politics, participants are unanimous in assigning priority to the plight of the hostages, White House officials say. But they also suggest that with Iran, the Administration's "crisis management" operation has come into its own.

From the moment the United States Embassy was seized in Teheran on Nov. 4, the President issued orders to avoid the disarray — and appearance of disarray — that characterized Iran policy a year ago. Then, the Administration shifted fitfully from unswerving support of the Shah to conciliation of "moderate" forces struggling to bring him down, followed by a period of recrimination over the inadequacy of American intelligence and foresight in Iran.

The primary vehicle for crisis management is the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council — a working group of top aides presided over by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Adviser. Their discussions in the windowless, woodpaneled Situation Room in the White House basement open with the domestic, legal, economic and energy-related aspects of the crisis. Then, they turn to security and diplomatic issues — secret maneuvers and the channels of communication, however tenuous, with the Iranian revolutionary Government. Those present without a direct interest — the President's domestic advisers — leave the room at this point, underlining the insistence on secrecy.

Mr. Carter set up the Special Coordination Committee early in 1977 as a subgroup of the National Security Council. During the eight-week Iran crisis, the parent N.S.C. — Mr. Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Gen. David C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of Central Intelligence — has met fewer than a half dozen times. The S.C.C. meets almost every morning, briskly hurrying through a fixed agenda. The members include security aides, and Hamilton Jordan, White House chief of staff; Jody Powell, the press secretary; Treasury Secretary G. William Miller; Charles W. Duncan Jr., Secretary of Energy; White House counsel Lloyd Cutler; domestic affairs adviser Stuart E. Eizenstat, and Hedley W. Donovan, senior adviser to the President.

Mr. Brzezinski's staff types up the minutes for President Carter every day, allowing space for him to write notes in the margin and to ratify decisions by checking a box marked "agree" or "disagree." By Mr. Brzezinski's order, S.C.C. members do not re-

ceive copies of the minutes, even at the next day's meeting when they are read aloud with the President's comments. They are kept in a fat gray loose-leaf notebook on Mr. Brzezinski's desk.

"The President wanted more discipline, and he wanted Brzezinski to exercise it on his behalf," said a senior official. "When he approved the compartmentalization of the meetings, he made it possible to enforce that discipline. He was determined that this

crisis be run by him directly, and he laid down the rules that everybody has accepted."

"When you think about it, it's absolutely amazing that there have been so few leaks," another official said. Last Nov. 20, for example, when the White House issued its strong warning against putting the hostages on trial — implying a threat of military retaliation — a private message in much stronger terms was conveyed at the same time through diplomatic channels. It warned the Iranians of "grave consequences" if trials took place. "They understood that doesn't mean economic consequences," an aide said. Existence of this note did not become known until recently, and officials say there are several other such communications, still secret. The United States is also understood to have taken several, undisclosed military maneuvers beyond those announced "so that if we had to take military action, we'd be in a position to do it," the aide added.

The White House precautions seem to have found a counterpart American news organizations' restraint. Several have compiled lists of the hostages in Teheran, but few have publicized them, at least in full. The State Department has refused to confirm names, contending that "would not be in the best interests" of the hostages and their families.

Replying to suggestions that S.C.C. secrecy policy may deprive them of fresh viewpoints, White House officials point to task forces under the committee's jurisdiction designed to explore alternatives, bringing to the President the thinking of outsiders, including academic experts and others with thoughts about the psychology of the Iranian revolutionary leaders.

The liveliest debates, one participant said, have not concerned particular tactics, but rather "basic assumptions." These, he said, go beyond the geopolitical ramifications of United States actions in the Middle East, to such questions as the rationality of the Iranian authorities. "Our basic operating assumption all along is that the Iranian leaders are rational, that the holding of the hostages is not the most important thing in the world to them — that there is a cost beyond which they wouldn't go in order to keep the hostages," this official said. "But how can you be sure that assumption is correct?"

Secrecy has had its drawbacks, however, in making the Administration's case to the American public. For one, American officials disagree with a public perception that virtually none of their efforts have produced tangible results. One top official said the President was convinced, from information provided by diplomatic intermediaries, that the Iranians had in fact responded to American threats of military action and, as a result, had deferred action on trials of the hostages. Whatever evidence there may be for this assertion has been withheld, however.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
29 December 1979

Ayatollah Paperback Out — With Help From CIA

By Warren Brown
Washington Post Staff Writer

Some enterprising Americans have found a way to turn the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's sayings into money.

They have published a Central Intelligence Agency translation of Khomeini's theories and put them into a slick paperback entitled: "Ayatollah Khomeini's Mein Kampf: Islamic Government."

The asking price is \$2.50.

The act of publication by Manor House Books in New York City is legal. Anyone could do it.

"It's done fairly frequently," said Kathy Pherson, CIA public affairs officer. "It's no fancy deal."

It works like this. The CIA, using the services of its Joint Publications Research Service in Arlington, frequently translates foreign language documents for agency analysts.

Just as frequently, especially if they are adjudged to be of "public interest," the typewritten translations are turned over to the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) in the Department of Commerce.

The NTIS documents are unclassified

and can be had by anyone—for a price, but not for profit, since the government is not a profit-making organization.

However, private entrepreneurs can reprint the documents for a profit.

Ironically, in the case of the Khomeini book, the sayings of the ayatollah apparently are cheaper from the private publisher than from the federal government.

Pherson's "unofficial" cost estimate of the NTIS copy of Khomeini's words was \$8.25, compared to the \$2.50 asked by Manor Books.

Translations of other Khomeini speeches and position statements also are at NTIS, Pherson said. She said the document published by Manor originally was published by the CIA's Joint Publications Research Service on Jan. 19. There is no copyright on U.S. government publications.

Manor officials were unavailable for comment last night. However, the first page of the paperback carries this statement:

"Understanding the intentions and tactics of an enemy is the first defense against him. In that spirit we offer this volume.—The Publishers."



CIA translated Khomeini's thoughts, but Manor Books marketed them.

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WASHINGTON STAR
29 DECEMBER 1979

Clerics See No Speedy Solution After Their Visit to Tehran

By Lance Gay

Washington Star Staff Writer

The clergymen who visited the American hostages in Tehran say they could see no speedy way of resolving the crisis in Iran now that the positions on both sides have hardened.

But the three, the first Americans allowed to visit the hostages since they were captured eight weeks ago, said yesterday the hostages are safe, in good condition and guarded by "deeply convicted" young Iranians who do not want to harm them.

"I don't see an easy way out," said Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton, Roman Catholic auxiliary bishop of Detroit.

The students, he said, continue to demand the return of the shah and "they seem to be absolutely adamant on it. They are not going to be relenting easily. So it is going to continue to require great patience on our part, on the part of the hostages and the part of the people here."

Gumbleton said he cannot suggest any quick way out.

"I'm not able to imagine what steps could be taken, that's not my role," he said.

The Rev. William Sloan Coffin of New York's Riverside Presbyterian Church said he sees no way out of the present crisis unless the United States offers some sort of small gesture to express the gratitude of the United States for allowing the clergymen to visit the hostages.

Threatening Iran with economic sanctions only serves to stiffen the resistance of the captors, he maintained.

"It may be hard to get out of, but it was the easiest thing to get into. The dumbest thing we did was to admit the shah, particularly with those telegrams coming over from the embassy saying don't do it. But now we're in it and I think some reciprocal gestures is the business of diplomacy," Coffin said.

He said the administration could make gestures such as promising not to deport Iranian students, taking out full page ads for the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in newspapers showing the Iranian side of the dispute, or turning over CIA papers concerning U.S. policy in Iran for the last quarter of a century.

"I think the same arrogance, as admitting the shah against the advice of our own embassy, is still operating when we think we can get our hostages out without paying any price for it," Coffin said.

"The more we exert conventional pressure, the more hardened the response will be," said the Rev. M. William Howard, president of the National Council of Churches.

The three clergics came here yesterday to meet with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, State Department officials and the families of the 43 hostages they saw in Iran. Shortly after the meeting with Vance, Carter reiterated U.S. policy warning that Iran faces increasing pressure if the hostages are not released.

In an two-hour meeting at the U.S. Catholic Conference headquarters here, the three clergics also met with 50 relatives of hostages and gave them messages that had been scribbled out or memorized.

Gumbleton said the clergics have decided not to release the names of the 43 hostages they met with "at the request of the families."

The group carried back no diplomatic message from the students or the Iranian authorities, Gumbleton said. "We were not there to do the work of the government. That was not our mission," he said.

The group conveyed "impressions" of what they found on their two-day trip. Gumbleton said the main impression he got was that the "students are in charge, they're the ones who are running the compound."

The other impression he got was that the captors were firm in their position on the return of the shah.

Gumbleton said he discussed the hostage-taking with Moslem religious leaders in Iran and, said they indicated belief the so-called students were wrong.

"They agree that this is wrong, but they say, 'You have to understand the wrongs we have had to endure for 26 years.' We talked to clergy who were themselves in jail (under the shah) and they say, 'What about that wrong?'" he said.

Gumbleton told the families of hostages that "the foreign minister in Tehran told us that the Ayatollah Khomeini has instructed the students not to let anything happen to any hostage."

The trio said they were instructed before they saw the hostages not to discuss current events with the group, and Coffin said it was stressed to the clergics not to tell the hostages that the shah had left the United States for Panama.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1980

Soviets Say CIA Trained Afghan Rebels in Pakistan

By Kevin Klose

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Jan. 1—The Soviet Union expanded its allegations of American subversion in Afghanistan today in a continuing effort to blunt world criticism of the Soviet military intervention there.

An authoritative article in the government newspaper Izvestia said, "The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is directly involved in training Afghan rebels in camps in Pakistan and maintaining contacts with counterrevolutionaries and reactionaries in Afghanistan itself."

The paper claimed that CIA agents under cover of "the antidrug board and the American 'Asia Fund' operate in the area of the Afghan-Pakistan frontier."

Izvestia apparently meant the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which has investigators in the South Asia region as part of the federal government's worldwide narcotics traffic suppression efforts. The "Asia Fund" could not be specifically identified but may be a Soviet refer-

ence to the Asia Foundation, a private American assistance organization.

The State Department refused to comment on the Soviet charges, but one official said a DEA agent is permanently assigned to the embassy in Afghanistan. The agent, however, was out of the country on vacation at the time of the Soviet incursion, according to the official.

Under the authorship of Mikhail Mikhailov, regarded here as an authoritative voice, reflecting leadership views, Izvestia expanded earlier official accusations to include Britain and Pakistan, along with China and Egypt, in the alleged subversion effort undertaken by Washington in Afghanistan.

"Pakistan's anti-Afghan course had the support of the U.S. and Britain," the paper said, "and was decisively the result of instigations on the part of these countries, China, Egypt, and some others."

Two days ago, the Communist Party paper Pravda hinted strongly that Pakistan was involved directly in the alleged subversion plot. By naming Islamabad in today's account, the Soviets appear to have written off any early easing of their already strained relations with the Pakistanis, who have strongly backed China in a series of Soviet-Chinese confrontations. Islamabad, like Tehran and other Moslem capitals, has sharply denounced the Soviet military incursion, which Washington estimates at between 30,000 and 40,000 with another 12,000 or so ready to cross the border.

Meanwhile, the official Soviet Tass agency reported a telegram of thanks to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev from Babrak Karmal, who came to power in Kabul Thursday in the Soviet-backed coup.

Babrak, a staunchy pro-Moscow communist who was purged from Kabul leadership last year by the man he overthrew, Hafizullah Amin, told Brezhnev he is "convinced that with the fraternal assistance and undiminished cooperation" of the Soviets, "we shall win and overcome all difficulties we inherited from the past."

Soviet media have avoided describing the insurgents opposed to Kabul's Marxist government as Moslems in an apparent attempt to improve relations with other Moslem countries. In describing the angry rally by Afghan exiles at the Soviet Embassy in Tehran today, Tass simply called them "hooligans who refused to disclose their names" and said they were "hostile to the Afghan revolution."

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
31 December 1979

U.S. Restates Pledge to Pakistan

Brzezinski Says U.S. Force Possible to Counter Soviets

By Walter Taylor
Washington Star Staff Writer

In an unusually blunt warning, presidential adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski says that the United States would be prepared to react with military force if the Soviet Union carries its Afghanistan incursion into neighboring Pakistan.

Brzezinski, appearing yesterday on ABC's "Issues and Answers," referred pointedly to a 1959 agreement with Pakistan, which lies to the south and east of Afghanistan and

which reportedly has been aiding rebel Afghan factions. He said he had been authorized, presumably by President Carter, to publicly reaffirm the agreement.

"In case of aggression against Pakistan," he said, reading from a text of the document, "the United States, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed force . . . in order to assist the government of Pakistan at its request."

"We want it to be understood," added Brzezinski, Carter's chief national security adviser, "that the United States stands by its commitments, and its friends should be sure of that and any potential adversaries should have no illusions about that."

Brzezinski's remarks were the strongest public statement by a White House official to date following Russia's acknowledged participation last week in a coup that saw one pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan liquidated and supplanted by one even more closely identified with Moscow.

The president last week formally protested the Soviet action and the continuing movement of Russian troops into Afghanistan, saying it could have "serious consequences" for relations between the two super-powers.

In addition, Carter dispatched Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to meet with U.S. allies to discuss possible joint countersteps to the Soviet move. Christopher flew to London yesterday for consultations with Western European allies and representatives from nations in the Afghan region, notably Pakistan.

The protest and Christopher's trip have not deterred the Soviets from continuing the deployment of combat troops into Afghanistan, however. Brzezinski acknowledged that since Carter's protest, conveyed directly to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev via the Washington-Moscow "hotline," the Soviets actually have increased the concentration of troops in Afghanistan.

He said there was "increasing evidence" apparently from U.S. spy satellites, that Russian troops deployed to the Afghan-Soviet border had begun to cross the frontier by land and occupy key urban areas.

He cited movements by Soviet armored columns into areas of the northwest and additional northeastern areas of Afghanistan yesterday.

"Several tens of thousands of men" were involved in these maneuvers and the total number of Russian troops in Afghanistan now is estimated at between 20,000 and 25,000, he said.

Brzezinski dodged questions about possible direct response by the United States to what he characterized as the Soviet's "naked use of military force." For example, he would neither rule out nor embrace the suggestion that the United States might provide military aid to guerrilla units battling the Kabul government.

But he stressed repeatedly that the United States has "certain interests" in that part of the world "by which it will stand" and said specifically that Carter had reaffirmed to Pakistan the U.S. defense commitment.

"It is an important commitment

and the United States will stand by it," Brzezinski said.

The United States this year cut off most economic and military aid to Pakistan in a dispute over Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. The attack on and destruction of the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan's capital several weeks ago further strained relations between the two nations. Brzezinski implied, however, that the aid cutoff decision could be quickly reversed if Soviet military activity spread south or east across Pakistan's borders.

"The security of the independent countries in the region is not a matter of indifference to us, not is it a matter of indifference to the international community," he said.

"The only way to preserve peace is for all concerned to understand that there are certain explicit limits to unilateral action and that these limits must be respected."

Noting Afghanistan's border with Iran to the west, Brzezinski also said that Iran, locked in a dispute with the United States over its detention of American hostages in Tehran, ought to be particularly alarmed over the latest Soviet moves.

"Every sober-headed Iranian" ought to ask himself, said Brzezinski, "what do the events in Kabul portend for Tehran? There have been Soviet troops before in Tehran. Tehran could be next."

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ON PAGE A1-8

THE WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1979

U.S. Affirms Commitment To Pakistan

New Soviet Moves Into Neighboring Afghanistan Noted

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States publicly and pointedly reaffirmed its 20-year-old commitment to the security of Pakistan yesterday, as its next door neighbor, Afghanistan, was reported invaded by new, heavily armed military units of the Soviet Union.

Presidential national security affairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, speaking on "Issues and Answers" (ABC, WJLA), read portions of the 1959 U.S.-Pakistan agreement, as a public message to Pakistan and the world that "it is an important commitment and the United States will stand by it."

Brzezinski said he had been specifically authorized to reaffirm the U.S. commitment, presumably by President Carter.

There is no indication that the continuing flow of Soviet forces into Afghanistan, described by Brzezinski as "direct invasion" and "large-scale aggression," is likely to move on to Pakistan in the short run. However, a Soviet-dominated Afghanistan manned with Soviet combat forces would be an ominous new fact of life for already unstable Pakistan to deal with, and would present a long-range military threat of major dimensions.

The 1959 commitment read by Brzezinski calls for the United States, in case of communist aggression against Pakistan, to take "appropriate action, including the use of armed force, as agreed by the two nations and in accordance with U.S. constitutional procedures."

Official sources said the commitment has been reaffirmed privately on at least three previous occasions in the last year, as Pakistan worried about conditions in Afghanistan and about repeated charges and warnings from Moscow concerning alleged Pakistani aid to Moslem insurgents battling pro-Soviet governments in Afghanistan.

After a telephone conversation Friday between Carter and Gen. Mohammed Zia ul Haq, Pakistan's president, U.S. Ambassador Arthur Hummel began intensive discussions with Pakistani officials about new measures to assist that country and assure its security.

These discussions, which are reported here to be still in an early stage, are complicated by the application of U.S. nonproliferation laws barring economic and military assistance to countries seeking to produce or acquire nuclear weapons for the first time. Early this year the United States cut off aid to Pakistan, except for food assistance, under these laws because of Pakistan's secret drive to build an atomic weapons capability.

Official sources said it is unlikely that Pakistan will stop its nuclear development. In this circumstance, direct U.S. help will be limited by law to food aid and cash sales of military equipment and supplies.

Carter, in a White House luncheon with reporters Saturday, made known his resolve to speed up delivery to Pakistan of purchased weapons and spare parts, estimated to be about \$150 million worth of armored personnel carriers, tactical missiles, ammunition and spare parts.

Pakistan has made no new weapons request to Washington since the open Soviet moves in Afghanistan began a week ago, according to officials, nor is it clear what role the Pakistanis envision for the United States in view of the still growing Soviet presence across the border.

Islamic fundamentalism and anti-American sentiments in Pakistan have been stirred by the strident appeals of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and other figures in Iran, another important Pakistani neighbor. On Nov. 21, a Pakistani mob attacked and burned the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, leading to the departure of many Americans.

New signs of Pakistan's sensitivity to its Iranian neighbor were official

statements over the weekend that Pakistan opposes the use of U.S. force against Iran, where 50 Americans have been held hostage since Nov. 4, and that it takes exception to the U.S. freeze of Iranian financial assets. This suggests that despite an enhanced Soviet military threat, Pakistan may choose to continue a low profile relationship with Washington while the U.S.-Iranian conflict continues.

Brzezinski, in his television interview, said there is increasing evidence of large-scale Soviet troop movements into Afghanistan at two points along the border: from Soviet Kushka into the Afghan city of Herat and from Soviet Termez toward the Afghan capi-

tal of Kabul and the nearby airport at Bagram.

The national security adviser said the Soviet forces include "armored formations, a large number of heavy tanks, the most modern Soviet tanks, Soviet armored personnel carriers, motorized infantry and so forth." He said that Saturday's official estimate of 20,000 to 25,000 Soviet combat troops, plus about 5,000 other Soviet military personnel, probably has been exceeded, but officials did not release a higher total yesterday.

Of greater potential significance than the continuing movement across the Afghan border are intelligence reports that large numbers of additional combat units are being moved within the Soviet Union in ways that suggest they may be headed to the border area for assignment to the Afghan front.

The Soviet forces that have entered Afghanistan so far may be adequate to secure key cities, airports and important roads, according to U.S. officials. Movement of additional units on a large scale to Afghanistan in days to come would be taken here as a sign that the Soviets intend all-out military operations against rebellious Islamic tribesmen.

Brzezinski declined to say whether the United States is considering military aid to the rebel forces in Afghanistan. However, informed sources indicated that this is among the subjects to be discussed in London today by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher with senior officials of Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and Canada in a meeting on possible responses to the situation in Afghanistan.

Christopher, boarding a Concorde flight to London, called the Soviet intervention "a grave threat to international stability." He added, "I think the world community is so outraged that the Soviets will find in the long run that it will be most costly to them."

Following the London meeting, Christopher is scheduled to go to Brussels, where a special meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization council has been scheduled Tuesday to discuss Afghanistan.

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AGEE

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
3 January 1980

WASHINGTON, Jan. 2 (AP) — Lawyers for Philip Agee, a former officer of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department will meet with Federal District Judge Gerhard Gesell tomorrow to discuss steps in Mr. Agee's fight to regain his revoked passport.

On Monday, Federal District Judge Barrington D. Parker rejected a request by Mr. Agee's lawyer, Melvin Wulf, to issue a temporary restraining order barring Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance from stripping Mr. Agee of his passport. Mr. Vance ordered Mr. Agee's passport revoked after the former intelligence officer, who lives in Hamburg, West Germany, spoke of involving himself in the Iranian hostage situation.

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ON PAGE 3A

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
2 JANUARY 1980

National



Philip Agee

A former CIA agent will get a new hearing.

Philip Agee, who was turned down in an initial legal bid to regain his U.S. passport, was granted the hearing after a U.S. district judge agreed that the case presented "substantial issues" that merited a further hearing. Agee, who had written books and articles on the CIA since quitting the agency several years ago, was stripped of his passport Dec. 23 by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance. The action was taken after Agee, who now lives in West Germany, had spoken of involving himself in the Iranian hostage situation.

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ON PAGE A 7

THE WASHINGTON POST
1 January 1980

Agee Is Rebuffed In Court Fight to Regain Passport

United Press International

Former CIA agent Philip Agee lost his first court battle yesterday to overturn a State Department order revoking his passport.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied a request for an order temporarily restraining the department's action.

The department revoked Agee's passport Dec. 22 on grounds of national security. Agee had suggested to the militants occupying the U.S. Embassy in Tehran that they release their captives in exchange for the complete Central Intelligence Agency files on operations in Iran.

The request for a temporary restraining order was filed with the federal court yesterday by Agee's New York attorney, Melvin Wulf, and a representative of the American Civil Liberties Union, Charles Simms.

The petition asked that Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance withdraw the order revoking Agee's passport. By noon, the petition was denied.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
1 January 1980

Plea by Ex-C.I.A. Agent to Restore Passport Is Denied

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 31 — Attorneys for Philip Agee, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, filed suit in Federal District Court here today in an effort to force the State Department to restore his passport, which was revoked nine days ago on national security grounds.

Judge Barrington D. Parker said after a court hearing that the case raised "very important and fundamental issues" involving Mr. Agee's First Amendment rights, his right to travel and the authority of the Secretary of State. But he denied Mr. Agee's request for immediate relief — a temporary restraining order against the State Department — saying that his attorneys had not shown that their client would suffer immediate, irreparable injury. Another judge will probably hear further arguments later this week on the request for an injunction.

Mr. Agee, who lives in Hamburg, West Germany, has been an outspoken critic of the Central Intelligence Agency and its clandestine activities. He has written a book and several articles that, the Government says, disclosed classified information, including the names of covert C.I.A. agents.

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance took the extraordinary step of revoking his passport after finding that his activities "are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States."

Never Tested in Court

State Department lawyers said that the 1967 regulation used in the move had been employed in only a few other cases and had never been fully tested in court.

Mr. Agee's lawyers asserted that his passport had been revoked "without due



Philip Agee

process of law in order to penalize and suppress his criticism of the United States Government's policies and practices."

The case was described by lawyers on both sides as an important test of the Government's power to cancel a passport. Mr. Agee's principal attorney, Melvin L. Wulf, argued that a Federal regulation specifically authorizing the Secre-

tary of State to revoke a passport for national security or foreign policy reasons was invalid because it went beyond any statute enacted by Congress.

Mr. Agee has proposed exchanging the intelligence agency's files on Iran for the hostages at the United States Embassy in Teheran.

Glenn V. Whitaker, a Justice Department lawyer defending the State Department's action, said Mr. Agee should not be allowed to have his passport, especially during the Iranian crisis, because "it is his stated intention to go about disrupting the intelligence activities of the United States."

Finds Hostile Feeling Intensified

In an affidavit submitted to the court, David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said that Mr. Agee's statements about C.I.A. activities abroad intensified anti-American feelings and increased the likelihood of attacks such as those on the American Embassies in Iran, Libya and Pakistan.

Mr. Whitaker and Mr. Newsom said that one factor in the decision to revoke the passport was a newspaper article that said Mr. Agee had been invited to Iran to participate in a tribunal involving the hostages. Mr. Wulf said that the report was false and that his client would not participate in such a tribunal if invited.

The lawyers said that without a valid passport, Mr. Agee, who has already been expelled from several countries in Western Europe, was in "imminent danger" of deportation from West Germany.

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ON PAGE A-3

WASHINGTON STAR
1 JANUARY 1980

Ex-CIA Agent Loses Round in Passport Fight

By Allan Frank
Washington Star Staff Writer

Former CIA officer Philip Agee has lost his immediate bid to regain his U.S. passport that was revoked last week by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

U.S. District Judge Barrington Parker yesterday declined to issue a temporary restraining order that would have prevented — for at least 10 days — the revocation of Agee's passport, which had been valid until 1983.

Parker said that Agee's attorney, Melvin Wulf, could not prove that the former CIA agent, now living in Hamburg, Germany, would suffer irreparable harm if the restraining order were not granted.

The judge added, however, that the case presented "substantial issues" concerning the First Amendment and the right to free travel that merit a further hearing tomorrow before U.S. District Judge Gerhard Gesell.

Vance revoked Agee's passport on Dec. 23 because he feared the agent would further complicate the situation in Iran, possibly by identifying agency operatives there. The State Department said Agee's actions "were causing or were likely to cause serious damage to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."

In an affidavit filed with the court yesterday, David Newsom, undersecretary of state for political affairs, said Agee's visiting countries to identify officials engaged in CIA work is dangerous to the United States.

Newsom said, "It is clear to me that if Mr. Agee continues to travel at will . . . to make public allegations against United States officials in foreign countries, such activities are likely to cause serious damage to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."

"Among the adverse consequences which could result from such activities would be that United States diplomatic facilities, including embassies and consulates would be taken over by force," Newsom continued, "and that United States diplomats and other nationals would be physically harmed."


Agee could become a man without a country if the passport revocation is upheld. Without a valid passport, he may not be permitted to remain in West Germany, where his wife is a dancer with the Hamburg Staatsoper Ballet, or to travel to other countries.

Wulf, attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union, argued that the lifting of Agee's passport unconstitutionally violated the former agent's First Amendment right to free speech and to travel freely as a journalist.

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ON PAGE 4

NORTHERN VIRGINIA SUN
29 DECEMBER 1979

LURIE'S OPINION



'THERE IS A DISGUISED CIA AGENT AMONG YOU!'

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4A

ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
28 DECEMBER 1979

Adieu To Agee

Were we still operating in the days of James Bond, the matter would've been settled differently.

But, well, Mr. Bond was employed in His Majesty's service and, well, he was fictional anyway. He did, however, have a way of handling matters in a rather permanent manner. But, these days at least, our government is more polite in how we handle "defectors."

The State Department Sunday revoked the passport of Philip Agee, a former CIA agent in Latin America now living in Germany. It was Agee, you will recall, who authored a book published abroad which, among other things, named some 900 CIA agents serving in various nations under

cover.

The publication of the names placed the agents still active in peril — and perhaps resulted in the killing of at least one agent — to say nothing about crippling American espionage activities.

Agee, while living in Germany, has been "lending himself to anti-American propaganda intelligence." The news that Agee had been stripped of his passport — "his last pretense of citizenship" was applauded by CIA members, many of whom harbor strong hatred for Agee. It was, indeed, an action long overdue. Agee probably should rejoice that the "old days" are over — or something other than his passport would have been revoked.

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SALT II

Approved For Release 2009/04/27 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 24NATIONAL REVIEW
January 4, 1980~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
THE CIA & THE KGB

Taking nothing away from the Soviet Union, it is herein claimed that most of America's wounds are self-inflicted, largely by three categories of people: 1) "the dropouts"; 2) "the philanthropoids"; and 3) "the intellectualoids"

Why the Soviets Aren't Worried

MILES COPELAND

THE WORLD of the President and his security planners bears little resemblance to the world of the President and his SALT II negotiators, and of the bureaucrats, politicians, and editorialists who continually fuss over detente, the difficulties with NATO, "improving Soviet-American relations," and all the other spurious questions which presuppose the possibility that the Soviets may abandon their objectives. The former world is concerned with our "foreign foreign policy," with the strategies guiding our moves in the game that is played for keeps on the international gameboard; the latter is concerned with our "domestic foreign policy" which—fortunately or unfortunately—dictates many of the moves which are passed off as foreign foreign policy. In fact, *most* moves on the international gameboard are not genuine moves on that board at all, but mere reflections of moves in the domestic games of the various players.

Consider the picture of Soviet-American relations that the general public gets from the sources available to it. Our media, a goodly proportion of our politicians, and a majority of what we so loosely call "intellectuals" have, first, adopted the language of the Soviets to describe the various conflicts taking place around the world (e.g., calling terrorists "freedom fighters" and "movements of national liberation," and lumping black African minorities together as "the black majority"—what Pat Moynihan calls "semantic infiltration").

Second, they have all but ignored what the Soviets themselves say about detente, the SALT II talks, and (in the phrase used by some State Department people) "improving Soviet-American relations." After President Nixon returned from Moscow to make what our jittery friends abroad saw as a Chamberlain-like peace-in-our-time sort of speech, the Soviets turned loose their entire propaganda machinery to assure Eastern Europe and "people's republics" everywhere that nothing that had been said in Moscow was to be taken as indicating any intention of relaxing one whit the Soviet Union's "revolutionary determination." Not one word of all this was mentioned on any of the three major U.S. television networks, currently the principal source of news for the American people, and the *New York Times* gave it only the briefest mention on the back pages.

In that other world, however, those who plan our na-

tional security *do* ponder what the Soviets are thinking and doing. When they retire to their garrets to plan strategies for safeguarding our national security, they take with them a view of the world that is more in line with objective fact. Here are the conclusions, established at least to the extent of their being acceptable as "planning assumptions," to which this view has led them:

1. There is not the slightest chance that the Soviets will abandon "Communism" as we know it, or the "struggle against imperialism and capitalism" that it necessarily entails. There is not one sentence, not one word, either in literature the Soviet government disseminates to its own people or in communications that Soviet officials circulate among themselves, to indicate a softening of intentions. Nor is there any indication that the obvious failures of the Communist system—failure to develop the country's vast mineral resources, to motivate the working population to work at top efficiency, to remedy the appalling administrative chaos that causes machinery to wind up in one place as spare parts wind up in another—will bring about its collapse. On the contrary, the Soviet leaders blame their troubles on the continuing presence in the world of "exploitative and corrupting capitalist systems" which distract them from problems which would otherwise be soluble, and they argue that what is needed is more Communism, not less. Moreover, the argument advanced by some of our academics that the Soviet Union's aging leaders must inevitably be replaced by younger men of moderate disposition is confuted by the youngsters themselves—who are, if anything, more fanatically opposed to accommodation than are their elders.

2. SALT or no SALT, the Soviets are developing their military power not merely to achieve parity but to achieve superiority—*clear* superiority, superiority the whole world will recognize. They believe that SALT will assist them in achieving this objective or they would not favor it. Nor are the Soviets neglecting their conventional-warfare capabilities in order to concentrate on nuclear superiority. Military intelligence people now believe that the Soviets have

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so improved their conventional capabilities that they can sweep through Western Europe any time they wish—or, for that matter, through any one of those parts of the world which, according to recent polls, our citizenry would not be willing to go to war to defend.

In addition, the Soviets are pouring time and money into proxy forces—the Cubans, the North Koreans, the Palestinians, and others who are involved in military operations against Western interests. Although it is not the policy of post-Stalin Soviet strategists to wield out-and-out control of proxy forces, the extent to which Moscow now trains and supplies them enables it to conduct precisely the kind of warfare we are least able to resist. Furthermore, proxies make higher “capability levels”—conventional Soviet forces, Soviet nuclear power—seem all the more intimidating. Successful intimidation is an essential feature of any campaign designed, in part, to win over fence-straddlers of the Third World in whom a desire to wind up on the winning side is a key motivation.

3. The Soviets do not envision a hot-war confrontation. They will not attack us head-on—for example, by an assault on NATO—but will go for our means of sustenance, specifically the raw materials and energy supplies of Africa and the Middle East. As numerous Soviet experts on the United States have said repeatedly, they do not have to *smite* us when it is so easy to *choke* us. They are proceeding to do just that, through a carefully chosen, orderly succession of scenarios in which we seem to be backing the Bad Guys of the Third World (and it is in the Third World that the raw materials and energy supplies are located), and the Soviets seem to be backing the Good Guys—and, through their manipulation of our semantics, the Soviets have seen to it that *this seems to be the case even in the eyes of our own people*. Concretely, the Soviets are achieving their aims through the construction of an “Iron Chain” from Angola to Pakistan which will, in chronological order: 1) scare the Saudi royal family and the Gulf sheikdoms into adopting a so-called “positive neutrality”—a position which, experience to date has taught us, causes an adherent to cooperate most with whichever major power it is most afraid of, or whichever power seems to be winning; 2) enable Western Europeans to see which side their bread is buttered on, and to alter their policies accordingly; 3) induce attitudes in the American public of which Andrew Young’s remark that “The Cubans have brought stability to Africa” would be truly representative.

This is the Soviets’ World War III. When these three objectives have been reached they will have won it—in the sense that they will have gained everything they might conceivably go to war for, including the power to dictate the economic terms on which we will be allowed to exist on this earth. To put it another way, they will have gained as much for their purposes as Hitler would have gained for his had Nazi Germany won World War II, either through actually fighting it or by default.

4. Present-day Soviet strategy, like Soviet strategy when Lenin was alive, is based less on Soviet strengths than on American weaknesses. Thus, it depends more on anti-

American forces than on pro-Soviet forces—in fact, the Soviets will happily give aid and encouragement to forces that are anti-Soviet so long as they are sufficiently anti-American as well.

This is by way of saying that, for all their emphasis on military preparations (and our experts tell us that the military forces are the only segment of the Soviet system that operates efficiently), the Soviets’ strategy is based fundamentally on subversion. To our intelligence community it is perfectly obvious that the Soviets would prefer to anaesthetize our powers of resistance by subversion, rather than enter upon the dangerous and costly business of bombing us into submission—especially now that we have dismantled our anti-subversive capacities, and have adopted moral preoccupations which would hamper any attempts our government might make to reconstruct them. (There is, of course, a possibility that Iran will change all this.) “It’s very nice to have a winning philosophy,” said top Soviet ideologist Mikhail Suslov, “but victory is so much easier if the enemy has a losing one.”

With its professional penchant for cause-and-effect analysis, our intelligence community has understandably begun to see the hand of the KGB in our national affairs. In fact, an inter-agency intelligence task force has recently worked out a detailed rationale to support the thesis that, while the KGB is “not actually in control” of any significant segment of our molders of public opinion, it may very well be on its way to building a “network of influence” made up of individuals who are unaware of who is backing them but who are effectively nudging our native effusions into channels which benefit the Soviets. To use an idiom of the intelligence community, the “current situation” in our country is precisely what it *would be* had the Soviets been able to create whatever climate of opinion they wished for simply by waving a magic wand.

The notion is worth examining. The following items, according to Soviet operational specialists, are standard ingredients in the emasculation of a country and the breaking down of its ability to resist the Kremlin’s particular kind of onslaught. They are features of modern American society which have been described in Soviet strategy papers and explicitly labeled as propitious from the Soviet point of view:

- A public which so distrusts its government that it views all official utterances with suspicion, and which can be counted on to react negatively to appeals of the government in the face of national emergencies even in the rare cases when it sees no reason to doubt the government’s veracity;

- A pervasive philosophy of “anti-social individuality,” as Suslov has called it (or “situational ethics,” as we call it), by which an individual citizen finds it easy to rationalize his refusal to join in a common effort for the common good—such as, for example, a military draft;

- The replacement of democratic electoral processes by a channeling of popular enthusiasms through “special interest” groupings which are capable of inordinate influence in behalf of “single issues,” whatever their complexion;

- Epidemic abhorrence of the military, of industry, and of all institutions which smack of power and a capacity for organized effort;

- Unilateral disarmament—or, at least, a public which is strongly resistant to military expenditures, either *per se* or because of a preference for alternative expenditures, real or imagined;

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►General acceptance of language by which our friends, our allies, and ourselves can only be designated by words with unfavorable connotations while the Soviets and their allies are designated by the opposite (cf. the "Newspeak" of George Orwell's 1984);

►In general, a popular tendency to see our enemies abroad as "freedom fighters," "movements of national liberation," etc.—or, at least, as reasonable people, fighting for just rights, who could be won over to our side by a bit of sympathy and understanding—and to regard governments, groups, and leaders on our own side with hostility and suspicion;

►Castration of our intelligence and security agencies, and of all means whereby we might discover an alien hand in these elements of the "current situation," accompanied by legal safeguards to protect those among us who work against the national interest and by campaigns to discredit those who oppose the safeguards;

►As a consequence, a popular ignorance of—or, rather, an insurmountable emotional opposition to factual information about—the "current situations" in (for example) Iran, southern Africa, and Central America, where proxy forces under various umbrellas stimulate and direct popular uprisings and channel them toward outcomes suiting Soviet purposes.

Our security agencies, in response, spend their time searching for "moles" in our government and in quasi-governmental organizations. Lists similar to the one I have just given have been matched against names of persons, organizations, and informal groups responsible for the various items, and investigations have been made, and are now continuing, in an effort to detect Soviet connections.

But, according to evidence to date, Soviet successes in this country—by which I mean developments in this country favoring the Soviets which result directly from KGB operations—have occurred *only* in the field of intelligence acquisition. True Soviet "subversion," as our security officials use this term, has yet to be proved. The KGB may be subsidizing some of our own citizens' efforts, but it doesn't have to direct them—it's just sitting back and watching it happen.

Anthropologists under contract to the CIA, looking hard for ways to explain disaffection in various societies, have bracketed three categories which they believe apply to our own: 1) people who can't make the grade in an increasingly competitive economic order, and who blame it on the order rather than themselves, and who might be called, for want of a better word, "the dropouts"; 2) those who can, and do, compete successfully enough, but who for some reason, usually unconscious and irrational, feel guilty and uncomfortable with their success, and whom we might call "philanthropoids," since they often give large amounts of material aid and moral support to their "less fortunate" co-belligerents; 3) the "verbalists" in our society—the "intellectualoids"—who do not grow corn, manufacture clothing, build houses, or cure diseases but are engaged in professions which escape the disciplines of "results orientation" (e.g., newspaper editorialists, college professors, etc.) and who are therefore free to adopt any crackpot theory that catches their fancy.

Aside from any specific faults persons in these categories may find in the producers of our society, they simply *do not like them*. This elementary fact alone is enough to put them in opposition to those persons and institutions which provide most of our economic well-being and physical security—bankers, multinational corporations, small businessmen ("Babbitts"), and that hated, half-legendary institution known as the "military-industrial complex."

Only a minuscule percentage of those who belong to one of the three categories and whose words and behavior contribute to the "suicide package" described above might conceivably be KGB agents. So far as I can be certain, only the martyred Orlando Letelier, the Chilean who was associated with the intellectualoid Institute for Policy Studies and who received a salary from the KGB-associated Cuban intelligence service while so doing, has been definitely proved to have been an agent of a foreign government. There are others who are being subsidized by either the KGB or some associate (Cuban, East German, or North Korean), but not with their certain knowledge; foreign contributions to individuals and organizations engaged in activities which contribute to paralyzing our nation in the face of Soviet aggressions are almost all channeled through intermediaries in such a way that the recipients are unaware—or may plausibly claim unawareness—of the source.

Practically all of the recipients, moreover, believe their motivations to be entirely patriotic. Even the Institute for Policy Studies, the organization which members of our intelligence community believe to be the rallying-ground for destructive dissidence in our country, has survived the most painstaking investigations: with the exception of Letelier, not one member or associate of that organization can be proved to have taken direction or financial support from a foreign power—not, anyhow, with evidence that could stand up in court.

The dropouts, philanthropoids, and verbalists aren't the main problem in any case. As recent Soviet studies of our society show, Moscow sees even more advantage in a fourth contributor to the suicide package. I refer to the special interest group. The neo-Leninists now concocting Soviet strategies look to any segments of our society, whatever their aims and motivations, that contribute to the centrifugal force which weakens our ability to take united action. Abortionists and anti-abortionists are equally valuable, so long as they exert their energies each against the other and put their "single issues" above the general national interest. Ethnic minorities are even more valuable—Greek-Americans for effectively opposing any defense plan the Pentagon may devise which involves cooperation with the Turks; Jewish-Americans for effectively opposing Arab-American relations or anything we might do to accommodate the Palestinians; Arab-Americans for effectively opposing any plan for the security of our Middle Eastern oil supply which might involve cooperation with Israel.

CONTINUED

pended by this category of special interest groups, our security planners are blocked from creating any workable plan for protecting our overall national interests. There is no recommendation, no plan, no project which the President of the United States can advance as being good for the nation as a whole, whether in the field of economics, energy, or national defense, that will not have against it some powerful group strongly motivated to kill it, and entirely capable of doing so---and doing so not by proving that it is damaging to its *own* well-being but by proving that it is against the interests of the country as a whole. A wealthy and highly concentrated 2 per cent of our population can almost always have its way over a diffuse, unorganized, and largely apathetic 98 per cent.

And this, it happens, is the key to the success of the 2 per cent which shapes up as a special interest group: the skill of its spokesmen in arguing variations of "What's good for General Motors is good for America." These spokesmen are among the smartest, highest-paid, most persuasive people in America. They are the elite of the verbalists. Compared to them, those who argue honestly for the general national interest are a lot of country-schoolteacher amateurs.

Soviet defectors, although anxious to ingratiate themselves with their FBI and CIA interrogators by furnishing them masses of juicy revelations, invariably insist that "what you are doing to yourselves" is so effectively destructive that it robs KGB stations in New York and Washington of arguments to use on their Moscow headquarters for bigger budgets. The sad truth is that the KGB doesn't need agents and Fifth Column operations to achieve its aims. Indigenous individuals, groups, and organizations---and even parts of our own government agencies---are saving it the trouble. □

Mr. Copeland is the author of The Game of Nations. His next book, The Supergame, will be published in May by Simon & Schuster.

ARTICLE
ON PAGE 42

THE WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1980

Warner Urges President To Pull Back SALT II

Associated Press

Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.) called on President Carter yesterday to pull back the SALT II treaty from the Senate.

"In view of the president's statement that [Soviet President Leonid] Brezhnev lied to him about Afghanistan, it might well be that Brezhnev lied during the SALT II negotiations," Warner said.

Carter said in an ABC News interview Monday night that Brezhnev gave him a false account of Soviet actions in last week's overthrow of the government of Afghanistan.

Warner noted that he has previously urged delay of Senate debate on the arms limitation treaty because of Soviet troops in Cuba, the absence of any Russian assistance in freeing

American hostages in Iran "and now this blatant invasion of Afghanistan."

"How can we possibly enter into a contract with a nation which is behaving so illegally all over the world and against the interests of freedom?" he asked.

"I call on the president to pull back the treaty, to make a complete reassessment of our foreign policy with respect to the Soviet Union and to shape a five-year defense program which can meet these new and menacing threats of the Soviet Union," Warner said.

He said the treaty should not be considered until after the presidential election next November.

"Whoever is elected president would have a strong mandate of the people as to how to deal with the Soviet Union and could negotiate a strong and more balanced SALT II agreement if, in his judgment, it will lead to improving freedom and global stability," Warner said.

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MOBUTU

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THE WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1979

U.S. Businessman Plays a Key Role As Aide to Mobutu

By Leon Dash

Washington Post Foreign Service

KINSHASA, Zaire—Maurice Templesman, an American friend and business associate of President Mobutu Sese Seko, and reputedly a person of influence in this country, had a say in the recent appointment of the new U.S. ambassador to Zaire, according to one U.S. diplomat here.

In fact, the diplomat said, the local American business community knew about the appointment of Robert Oakley even before the U.S. Embassy did.

In Washington, such views of Templesman's role are described as exaggerated if not utterly wrong. But in Kinshasa, the New York diamond and metals businessman is viewed as a mover and shaker with important political ties to both Democratic and Republican organizations back home.

It was Templesman, sources here said, who put together the international combine that owns 80 percent of the world's richest copper and cobalt lode, lying under 900 square miles of savanna just outside Kolwezi, in Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba Province.

The rest of Zaire's mining operations in the area is owned by Gecamines, the government company, which is forbidden to touch the rich lode. The story of how the wealth nearby came to be owned by outsiders provides a rare glimpse into the labyrinth of interlocking relations between industry and government in developed nations, and a Third World dictator.

Those who know Templesman say that he "grew up in African metals" as a salesman, middleman and investor. His father had established the firm of Leon Templesman & Son long before independence fever swept Africa after World War II.

Maurice Templesman, according to one diplomat, shrewdly anticipated Africa's changing political tide in the late 1950s and early 1960s and began to "move in with the new regimes." Today, his firm has branch offices throughout West Africa, dealing primarily in diamonds, but including metals as well.

Templesman's involvement with Mobutu dates back to the 1960s, when Mobutu was looking for markets for Zaire's industrial diamonds. According to U.S. diplomatic sources, both men share business interests in Zaire's two main diamond mining concerns, MIBA and Britmond.

U.S. Bureau of Mines figures show Zaire as the world's principal producer of industrial diamonds. More important, however, are Zaire's reserves of the world's total industrial diamond reserves estimated at 680 million carats, more than 500 million are located in Zaire's south-central Kasai province. Total yearly export sales in industrial and gem diamonds from the two companies run into the hundreds of millions of dollars.

Mobutu's rise from a salaried army officer in 1965 to one of the world's richest men is mainly the result of his personal control of Zaire's diamond exports, Western officials say.

The exact nature of Templesman's involvement with Mobutu is not known. Templesman's office in New York would not disclose even general information about him. But a diplomatic source who knows both men describes their relationship as "very personal" and said that both are reaping substantial earnings from the gem diamond trade.

When Mobutu sought to put together a second copper mining company in Shaba province to offset Zaire's total reliance on Gecamines, he turned to Templesman. According to business sources here, Templesman brought together foreign investors from the United States, France, South Africa and Japan to form the Tenke Fugurume Mining Society, in which he and Mobutu also each have a personal share.

The Templesman group is represented in Kinshasa by Larry Devlin, a retired Central Intelligence Agency official who served as the agency's station chief when Mobutu came to power in a 1965 U.S. supported coup. Devlin's assistant is Col. John Gerassi, who formerly headed the U.S. military mission to Zaire.

"Larry can talk to Mobutu any time he wants to," said a Western source who knows Devlin. Devlin, who operates out of a third floor office in Kinshasa's Texaco Building, was unavailable for comment.

After an initial investment of \$250 million for roads and down payment on mining equipment, Tenke Fugurume now needs an estimated \$400 million more to start assembling the plant.

The project has been stymied since 1976, when the Benguela Railroad, which gives the mining region in southern Zaire access to seaports in Angola, was closed during the Angolan civil war. It remains closed because of antigovernment guerrillas operating in the neighboring country.

One investor, Standard Oil of Indiana, recently sold its 28 percent interest to a French government mining company. Standard apparently was frustrated by the continued disruption of the crucial railroad.

Templesman is believed to have helped Mobutu with advice on political matters in Washington. Mobutu's lobbyist in Washington is William Blair, former U.S. ambassador to Denmark and the Philippines and one-time law partner of Adlai Stevenson.

Templesman has made campaign contributions to both Republicans and Democrats. In 1972, he contributed \$5,000 to Richard Nixon's election campaign. This year he gave \$1,000 each to the reelection campaigns of Sens. Frank Church (D-Idaho) and George McGovern (D-S.D.).

In Zaire, Templesman's influence is considerable. "Things get very personal here," said a senior diplomat, "and to get along with the chief of state is all that matters."

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ON PAGE A13

THE WASHINGTON POST
30 December 1979

Mobutu's Staying Power Is Attributed To His Political Skill and Raw Force

By Leon Dash

Washington Post Foreign Service

LUBUMBASHI, Zaire—A squat cement monument, topped with a chocolate-brown arm gripping the replica of an Olympic-style flaming torch, dominates the main roadway leading into this regional capital of Shaba Province. Close by, a large faded green billboard spells out in yellow letters: "Mobutu Sese Seko—Our Only Hope."

Variouly known in the government-run media as "The Guide," "Our Savior" and "The Prophet," the charismatic and imperious 49-year-old Mobutu has maintained himself in power through ruthless suppression and the shrewd use of what one Western diplomat called "illusions, mirrors and gimmickry."

An Army general in the turbulent five years following independence in 1960, Joseph Mobutu, as he was then known, came to power in a U.S.-backed coup in November 1965, when Zaire was still called the Congo.

Although he originally pledged to run the country only five years, Mobutu Sese Seko Kuru Ngbendu Wa Za Banga, as he is now known, has for the past 14 years presided over this potentially rich Central African country's brief ascendancy toward prosperity and its subsequent rapid degeneration into threadbare poverty.

Mobutu's enormous staying power is attributed by political observers to his skillful political manipulations that fluctuate between occasional cosmetic reforms and steady reliance on raw power.

He formed Zaire's only legal political party, the Popular Movement for the Revolution, appointed himself head of the government's legislative, judicial and executive branches, and created a network of party informers and an efficient secret police organization, known as the National Documentation Center.

Mobutu also molded all labor unions into one, which was incorporated in his party. University students, large numbers of whom were killed when they demonstrated against Mobutu at

the outset of his rule, were eventually brought into the party framework.

Although he permitted nationwide elections in 1977 for a legislative council, there was never any doubt where the ultimate decision-making authority lies.

Yet under his rule, Zaire's debt to Western governments and banks has grown to \$5 billion while domestic corruption has reached such proportions that an estimated 40 percent of all government funds winds up in the pockets of government officials.

In the process, Mobutu has advanced from a salaried Army officer to become one of the world's richest men.

Mobutu started out as a popular national figure whose government brought stability following Zaire's political turmoil of the early 1960s. His emphasis on 'cultural African nationalism, or Zairism "authenticity," also found popular acceptance.

First, he changed the name of the country from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Zaire, then created Zaire's distinctive attire, the so-called abacost. He justified his one-man rule as consistent with pre-colonial Zairian traditions.

In the early 1970s, while still enjoying popularity at home, Mobutu also took an active role in Third World affairs, criticizing South Africa and leading the Africa-wide break of diplomatic relations with Israel following the 1973 Middle East war.

In that period he startled Washington by his public charges that the CIA had tried to assassinate him and topple his government. Diplomats saw this as a ploy to gain credibility in the Third World. "You aren't somebody in the Third World until the CIA tried to assassinate you," one European diplomat said.

By 1976 Zaire was in dire economic straits. As a result of mismanagement, corruption and a drastic drop in the world price of copper, Zaire's main export and revenue source, Mobutu became increasingly dependent on Western banks and governments.

The civil war in Angola closed the Benguela railroad, leaving Mobutu

dependent on South Africa's railways to the ports of East London and Durban. In turn, he muted all criticism of South Africa's racial policies.

Mobutu also has reached a compromise with the Roman Catholic Church after an open conflict over a decree prohibiting Western names. Pope John Paul II is scheduled to visit Zaire next year, a tribute to the changed relationship.

While growing increasingly resentful of the oil-rich Arab nations, whose support he had wooed, Mobutu has mended his relations with the United States. He visited President Carter in Washington last September.

His popularity at home declined sharply after Angola-based rebels invaded Shaba in 1978 and economic difficulties that followed the drop in copper prices. But he continued to run Zaire with an iron hand, eliminating all dissent. An unknown number of political prisoners are tortured.

In an effort to preclude any coups, Mobutu has sought to divide potential opponents by setting ethnic groups against each other. "He took his lesson from the Belgians," Zaire's former colonial rulers, one Zairian said.

Mobutu's closest advisers are all from his Equateur region while key military men come either from the president's province or from Upper Zaire in the northeast. But the generals report directly to him and informants say that his soldiers are "recruited from all tribes except those" in the rebellious Shaba region.

"This is how he maintains Shaba's security and his own," one source said.

By excluding the Shabans from the government, according to the sources, Mobutu has made other ethnic groups wary of the southern tribes.

"It is like juggling," one Zairian described Mobutu's policies. "It keeps everybody off balance."

Mobutu has done the same with Western countries that support his government. "We're his major supporters," a European diplomat said. "But he does the same thing to us he does to everyone, plays us off, one against the other."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-12THE WASHINGTON POST
30 December 1979

People of Zaire Direct Suppressed Anger at Mobutu, U.S.

Want Grips Once-Rich African Nation

By Leon Dash

Washington Post Foreign Service

KINSHASA, Zaire — Ekofo Mabamba spat with disgust as he looked over his crowded, dismal neighborhood in the Livulu slum. "None of us have enough food to eat," he said.

The words poured out in an angry stream as he moved from the gray light of his front door into the small living room lit with a kerosene lamp. "We can say nothing about it, or we go to jail."

Once a week, on Wednesday mornings, Catholic priests in the slum dole out small quantities of protein-rich soy beans.

"The priests only feed the children they can see, the weakest," Ekofo said. "There are too many to feed."

Ten thousand malnourished children under 4 years of age are brought yearly to Kinshasa's Mama Yemo Hospital, named after President Mobutu Sese Seko's mother. For the last two years, well over half of them have died there. Officials said the annual child mortality rate in some rural areas of this mineral-rich country of 27 million people may be much higher than 50 percent.

Ekofo (not his real name) is one of nine Zairians interviewed who asked that their names not be used for fear of arrest or reprisals, fears that help explain the absence of

public outcry about conditions. As one Western observer put it, "The squeaky wheel doesn't get the oil here: he gets thrown in jail."

Most of their suppressed anger is directed at Zaire's military head of state and authoritarian president for the past 14 years who is reportedly one of the world's richest men.

But beyond Mobutu, 49, Zairians condemn the West, particularly the United States, for what they perceive as vital support for a corrupt and mismanaged regime that has brought one of Africa's potentially richest countries to the brink of insolvency.

The perceived U.S. identification with Mobutu appears to parallel in many ways Iranians' view of America's backing for shah. Both men are said to have been put in power by the CIA. Despite obvious cultural, religious and economic differences between Zaire and Iran, they face similar development problems accompanied by rising expectations.

The undertone of Zairian interviews also suggests a growing tendency in the developing world to scrutinize U.S. support for various Third World dictators, a tendency that will confront Washington with new problems in the post-Iran period.

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CIA ESTIMATES

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WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
2 JANUARY 1980

Soviet Oil Output Decline Possible, Some Experts Say

United Press International

The world's largest oil producer, the Soviet Union, may be hard pressed to hit its oil production goal this year, an oil industry weekly says.

Some experts think that Russian production could peak at 12.2 million barrels a day this year and then fall, the Oil & Gas Journal reported. Soviet oil production in 1979 was estimated at 11.7 million barrels a day.

While the pessimistic forecast raises some fear among major consuming nations that Russia might soon become a net oil importer, competing with the West for tight supplies, a Soviet government economist said the fear was unfounded.

"Skepticism voiced in the West about the U.S.S.R.'s capability of fulfilling its oil export commitments is groundless," said the economist.

"Output growth will continue, and the 1980 increase will be 420,000 barrels a day," the economist said in the article.

The production growth prospect for western Siberia, Russia's oil field area, have been "greatly extended," said another Soviet official.

"The drop in our oil output growth rate should not be associated with signs of oil hunger," said the official. "The U.S.S.R.'s ability to con-

centrate its efforts and resources on crucial problems is well known."

The pessimists note the 1980 output target of 12.12 million barrels of crude and condensate was scaled down from the original target of 12.4 million to 12.8 million barrels.

If Moscow hit its 1980 goal, it would contradict a CIA forecast which predicted no rise in Russian production this year and a gradual decline in the decade.

Soviet production was a record 11.868 million barrels of crude oil and natural gas liquids in October, up from 11.7 million barrels a month earlier and 11.65 million barrels the previous October, an indication the target might be met.

However, the nation's performance on annual production goals in the past four years offered little cause for optimism. Production in 1976 was 10,000 barrels a day under the goal, and the Oil & Gas Journal said production shortfalls increased in the following years to 500,000 barrels in 1979.

The CIA forecasts that Soviet production will start declining in the early 1980s and slide to 10 million barrels of crude and condensate in 1985. The most recent CIA study predicts 1980 output will be 11.6 million to 11.8 million barrels a day — about the same as 1979.

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ON PAGE D-9

THE NEW YORK TIMES
2 January 1980

Doubts Raised On Soviet Oil

TULSA, Okla., Jan. 1 (AP) — The Soviet Union remains the world's largest oil producer but will be hard-pressed to reach its 1980 output goal of more than 12 million barrels a day, according to a petroleum industry publication.

The Oil and Gas Journal noted yesterday that Moscow's revised 1980 goal of 12.12 million barrels a day compares with an estimated 11.7 million barrels a day produced in 1979. The "original Soviet 1980 target was 12.4 to 12.3 million barrels a day, set just before the start of the current five-year plan," the magazine said.

But the magazine added that new Soviet analyses assert "that because of persistent and worsening problems in exploration and development, Soviet oil production in 1980 is likely to fall short of its goal by 400,000 to 800,000 barrels a day."

Soviet oil output far outstrips the No. 2 producer, Saudi Arabia, with 9.5 million barrels a day, and the third-ranked United States, with 8.6 million.

The Central Intelligence Agency last October forecast a 1980 Soviet oil output of 11.6 million to 11.8 million 42-gallon barrels a day, indicating an insignificant gain or possibly a decline from 1979.

The Oil and Gas Journal said the Russians fell short of revised goals by 10,000 barrels daily in 1978; 80,000 barrels daily in 1977; 170,000 barrels daily in 1978, and 500,000 barrels a day in 1979.

The C.I.A. estimates that production will continue to decline in the early 1980's and drop to a level of about 10 million barrels a day in 1985.

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SUPPORT FOR CIA

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-4THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
2 January 19780Tal Gulliver

What Role For The CIA?

We can't really have it both ways on how we think American intelligence agencies, like the Central Intelligence Agency, should function in the world.

The national debate on the CIA and other agencies was already going on when those hoodlums seized the American hostages in Tehran. Congress and President Carter were already in the process of trying to lay down clear guidelines for the CIA and other intelligence operations. The seizure of hostages in Tehran will now play a part in that debate.

What do we really want the CIA to do?

The agency came under fire after Watergate and other investigations held varied amounts of dirty linen out for all to see. The CIA had been involved in drug experiments on people who were not told what was being done, in conspiracies to overthrow constitutional governments, in assorted bizarre plots to kill certain foreign leaders.

Some of these things were undoubtedly bad

things, things that most Americans would neither approve nor condone.

And yet, in the wake of the Iranian crisis, some quite respectable folk are deploring the notion that we do not have a greater "covert" ability, even recalling with nostalgia the time when the CIA literally helped install a friendly government in Iran. In other words, the notion is being pushed that the CIA (or some agency) have the capability to fool around with the politics and governments of other countries in ways very similar to those criticized in congressional investigations.

This theme, the role of the CIA (or some other agency) in covert activities, may indeed come to be the main national debate after the Iranian crisis is resolved.

George Ball, formerly of our state department, has been critical of this country's longtime support of the now deposed shah of Iran. But Ball also has suggested that the fierce criticism of the CIA may well have been a factor in leading the Iranians to want to try the American hostages as spies. "While emasculating the CIA, we wallowed so masochistically in the disclosure of its wickedness," said Ball, "that we have created the impression not only that the agency is guilty of

every misdeed but also that it is 20 feet tall, with almost magical capabilities for evil."

Some pundits and politicians are already saying that there will be a great national wave of recriminations and blame after the current crisis in Iran is over. Who let the shah in? Why didn't our intelligence people know more? Who "lost" Iran?, the questions would go.

I don't believe that Americans have responded with great maturity to the painful efforts to deal with crazies who have taken some of our citizens hostage. It is my belief that the same maturity will preclude any finger-pointing kind of search for somebody to blame when all this is over.

But there will be—and should be—a national discussion of our intelligence agencies, of what we want them to be, of we think about covert operations, even of Sen. Howard Baker's notion that there should be a 50,000-member military strike force, capable of being moved anywhere in the world on short notice.

Meanwhile, most CIA people probably do the best they can in the most difficult kinds of jobs, catching it on the chin when they presumably had done too much and now catching it again when some say they did too little.



BUSINESS WEEK
31 DECEMBER 1979

International outlook

Edited by Sol W. Sanders

The CIA: Trying to put 'Humpty-Dumpty' together

When Senate Select Intelligence Committee staffers were called together a few weeks ago for a meeting on a new version of the proposed charter for the Central Intelligence Agency, none of the committee Senators showed up. That demonstrates the new mood in Washington toward intelligence activities: Liberals up for reelection no longer consider CIA-bashing a politically profitable sport.

Long gone are the white-hot indictments of U. S. intelligence excesses that marked the Church committee's hearings in 1975. And that committee's sharpest liberal critics of the CIA—Senators Frank Church (D-Idaho) and Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.), along with the present committee chairman, Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), have quieted down.

In fact, one of Washington's most discussed questions—the subject of a half-dozen seminars bringing together academics and intelligence cadre over the past few weeks—is: what is wrong with U. S. intelligence and how can it be beefed up? A White House strategist complains woefully: "You can't put Humpty-Dumpty back together again so quickly." And he, like many observers inside and outside government, is concerned about a number of problems. The combination of flagging morale, the loss of CIA veterans, and the discrediting of American intelligence among both friend and foe have probably cut into analytic capabilities. This problem—worsened by an orchestrated campaign by the Soviet's KGB secret police to discredit the CIA—has been exacerbated by years of trying unsuccessfully to replace the personal, clandestine collection of information with technology.

Moreover, friendly foreign intelligence apparatuses are becoming disinclined to work with U. S. intelligence because of American legislative insistence on openness of files. Finally, the demoralization of the service has been aggravated by bad blood between White House Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Stansfield Turner and the agencies for which

he now holds the purse strings. These include not only the CIA, but all other U. S. intelligence services. And the hard feelings have intensified since Turner was publicly criticized by President Carter for intelligence failures in connection with Iran.

War or paralysis. All this comes at a time when there is growing consensus in the U. S. security bureaucracy—and growing acceptance by the public—that America is on the defensive around the world. The Iranian situation, for example, has dramatized for the world the incapacity of the U. S. to carry out clandestine activities. The aim, presumably, of the inquiries of 1975 was to restrain excesses, such as plans to assassinate Fidel Castro. But the effect has been to limit the U. S. to the choice between all-out war and virtual paralysis.

The problem of U. S. credibility with both friend and foe is complicated and may have been exaggerated by defenders of the *status quo ante* in the intelligence community. But it is true that the general atmosphere in the U. S. makes foreign networks and individuals reluctant to work with Americans now. U. S. law, for example, requires that requests for government documents be honored under the Freedom of Information Act—even if the requests come from such Communist sources as East Germany and Cuba. True, the law permits authorities to hold material back to safeguard national security. But because of constant pressure from civil rights activists for liberal interpretation of the law and because of the huge administrative load placed on all government departments, the release of material becomes almost a matter of individual judgment—sometimes by inexperienced personnel.

It now seems unlikely that Congress will fulfill the original intent of some legislators of laying out a detailed charter to govern U. S. intelligence action. However, if it does so it will clearly have to consider not only the protection of individual liberties, but also the reconstruction of American intelligence in an increasingly hostile world. ■

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WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
2 JANUARY 1980

Sadat Enters 2nd Decade in a Strong Position

By Dean Brellis

Time-Life News Service

At the start of the 1970s, Anwar Sadat, who had just replaced Gamel Nasser as president of Egypt, was given very little chance of lasting more than a few months.

Now, a decade later, Sadat remains president of Egypt and has accomplished what had been considered impossible — peace with Israel.

Along the way, Sadat has just about made himself the most unpopular leader in the Arab world — unpopular, that is, outside Egypt. Within his own country of 40 million, the path he has followed, namely peace with Israel, has received a favorable response from the majority of Egyptians.

But in the rest of the Arab world, whether it be conservative Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, or radical Algeria, Libya or Iraq, he is rated "the most dangerous man in the Arab world." The reason: Sadat has refused to water down his peace initiative. He also spurned an offer of \$5 billion not to sign the Camp David accords and after the shah fell willingly paid host to the once-powerful monarch.

Sadat, at the same time, described the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as "a lunatic." As a result, contracts for Sadat's life have been put out by Marxist-oriented Palestinian groups.

But Sadat remains alive and well, and as volatile and visionary as ever. How does one explain the man's survival in what is essentially a hostile Arab world?

To begin with, as Sadat himself has declared, it is impossible for any combination of Arab powers to threaten war against Israel without Egypt.

In the chaotic atmosphere of insecurity brought to the Middle East by the rise of Khomeini to power and Soviet interference in Afghanistan, the Egyptian army stands as the single most powerful Moslem army

in the area.

With its new-found treaty with Israel, the Egyptian military strength can be deployed to protect the delivery of oil from the gulf to Japan, Western Europe and the United States.

In particular, where the Egyptian army would most logically be sent is Oman and the crucial Strait of Hormuz. Western intelligence sources say that the most dangerous point of conflict in the entire area is Oman. On its borders stand Cuban and Ethiopian troops backed up by Soviet equipment and advisers.

The Soviet navy has major units, including nuclear submarines, posted in the former major British naval base at Aden. Sultan Qaboos of

Oman has publicly declared that he can cope with any South Yemen military move against his country. But he says he will need help if "foreign forces" strike against Oman.

Western military sources say that Egypt's military forces could be airlifted into Oman quickly and efficiently. Although Sadat and Qaboos do not admit that Egyptian troops are now in Oman, it is a widely held belief of Western intelligence sources that at least 200 Egyptian officers are in Oman as the advance party for the arrival of major Egyptian military assistance.

It should also be noted that Oman was the only Arab country to support unequivocally Sadat's peace

initiative with Israel. Two others who went along did so discreetly.

The military intelligence sources say that Sadat has already received assurances from Israel that if Egypt has to make a major commitment of troops to Oman, the Israelis will take up positions in the western desert of Egypt facing Libya as a deterrent to any Libyan ambitions to move in.

Libya's Col. Muammar Kadhafi has openly threatened to "destroy" Sadat and would obviously contemplate making a move, were Egyptian troops to leave their present frontier facing Libya.

"Sadat would never leave those positions unmanned," says one of Sadat's generals. "He has firm assurances from Israel, especially from (Israeli Defense Minister Ezer)

Weizman, that when Egypt needs help, especially against Kadhafi, Egypt will have it."

By Sadat's own reckoning, every move he has made these last 10 years, including his treaty with Israel, is not a passing fancy but a permanent part of a new Middle East.

Sadat believes without reservation that after he passes, the treaty with Israel will remain. He believes that his policies of the past decade, from throwing out the Russians to starting a new but limited war with Israel in October 1973, then making peace with Israel, are designed to maintain Egypt's integrity as the first nation of the Arab world.

He does not feel weakened by ostracization from the rest of the Arab world — far from it. "They need Egypt more than Egypt needs them," he says.

He is intensely proud that the Egypt he began to lead at the beginning of the '70s, now enters the '80s the dominant military and intellectual power of the Arab world. That is his strength and why he survives. He is an Egyptian first.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A21THE WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1980*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

Unease in Oman

MUSCAT, Oman—This anti-communist, pro-Western redoubt on the Arabian peninsula's southern shore is convinced of Soviet complicity in the November assault against the Grand Mosque in Mecca, deepening belief here that the Russian bear is on the march in the Persian Gulf.

Omani leaders claim their intelligence leaves no doubt; the Mecca attack was hatched in communist South Yemen under Soviet auspices as an audacious effort to overthrow the conservative royal government of Saudi Arabia, the world's richest oil state. To Oman, this represents ultimate arrogance in the Kremlin and blatant disrespect for the United States in its Iranian ordeal.

Oman's answer is to intensify its appeal to the rich but nervous Persian Gulf hereditary monarchies and to Western powers, particularly the United States, for new aircraft and ships to patrol the strategically vital Straits of Hormuz against the expanding Soviet presence. But beyond hardware, the Omanis want a tougher U.S. posture since the United States permitted the shah of Iran to fall and has suffered the humiliation in Tehran.

While the Mecca assault stunned all Islam, it especially disconcerted the conservative sultanate of Oman, thanks to reports from its intelligence service (which, like its armed services, is run by British officers). Those reports reject the official Saudi attribution of the attack to religious fanatics not connected with any foreign power.

Omani intelligence contends that the cadre for the Mecca assault was trained in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), the Soviet outpost on the Arabian peninsula. Although some arms were of British manufacture for the purpose of "deniability," they were supplied from South Yemen. Furthermore, Omani intelligence contends that the attack on Mecca, if successful, was to be followed by uprisings at Medina and "other places in Saudi Arabia."

Similar reports come from intelligence services of other nations, and even some Saudi officials have hinted as much. While U.S. officials reject the Omani report as evidence of a tendency here to find Russians under every bed, they concede the Mecca terrorists got arms from South Yemen.

Whatever the degree of Soviet complicity, it was taken here as evidence of Moscow's arrogance. "It stunned me," one Omani official told us. "I would think the Russians would want to ensure the reelection of a weak president like Carter, or better still, Kennedy, and not make any trouble. It shows just how arrogant they are."

Physical evidence of that arrogance is the growing Soviet naval presence here. According to Omani intelligence, eight to 12 Soviet nuclear submarines are berthed in permanent pens in South Yemen alongside several surface warships.

Until recently, a Krivack-class Soviet destroyer (bristling with electronic listening equipment) was on station in the Straits of Hormuz, through which passes Persian Gulf oil destined for the Western world. Lt. Tom Hammon, British commander of one of Oman's two missile-firing fast patrol boats, told us it was recently replaced by a Kotlin-class destroyer. "It doesn't matter," he said. "They've always got somebody out there."

With the Iranian navy departed following the shah's fall, the only counterweight is Oman's competent but tiny navy, which patrols the straits. Accordingly, Sultan Qaboos, Oman's 38-year-old pro-Western ruler, has asked financial help from the Gulf states and the West to buy patrol boats, mine sweepers, helicopters and patrol planes.

There was sharp public criticism from leftist, heavily armed Iraq, which decries Oman's breaking of Persian Gulf solidarity to endorse the Camp David accord. The Gulf's jittery hereditary states backed away from Oman

after Baghdad's blast. But Omani officials claim many Arab states—including Iraq—privately expressed interest in helping Oman police the straits. "I can assure you," one official here told us, "we want no part of help from Iraq."

It does want help from the United States; an aid package of defensive arms has been approved in the State Department. The recent U.S. delegation seeking emergency basing facilities received a warm reception here.

Oman's position is a welcome for the U.S. naval presence "just over the line of the horizon." Such force—out of sight, but nearby—reassured this thinly populated (around 500,000) nation whose armed forces, though numbering only about 15,000, are excellent by Mideast standards. Nevertheless, the sultan's government remains uneasy as it compares the Kremlin's arrogance with Jimmy Carter's restraint in this cauldron of world conflict.

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FORMER CIA EMPLOYEES

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
1 January 1980

World Gun Ring Reported Found With Arrest of 2

P.L.O. Is Cited as a Buyer of Multimillion in Arms

By CHARLES KAISER

Two men accused in Manhattan last week of selling 10,000 machine guns to two New York City undercover detectives are part of a large international gun-running organization that sells at least \$10 million in arms each year, according to investigators in New York, Washington and Britain.

Documents seized in simultaneous raids by New Scotland Yard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Manhattan District Attorney's office indicated that the group had access to, in the words of one investigator, "all kinds of weapons," including radar-controlled anti-aircraft missiles, powerful explosives, poisons and remotely controlled bombs.

The sources of the weapons were said to range from British and American factories to terrorist movements that had exhausted their needs for some weapons and wanted to sell them for cash.

P.L.O. Listed as Customer

Documents seized by investigators identified customers of the organization as former President Idi Amin of Uganda, the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Libyan Government.

Frank Edward Terpil, a former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency, was one of the men arrested recently in New York. According to William H. French, president of Adco Airlines, a European-based freight line, Mr. Terpil was part of an effort to persuade United States officials to permit the export of eight C-130 airplanes that were purchased by the Libyans eight years ago. The cargo planes have not been delivered because of Libyan support for terrorist causes.

Mr. Terpil and the second suspect seized in New York, George Gregory Korkala, also told the undercover detectives that they employed 11 men, including former officers of the United States Special Forces, who would travel "anywhere" to train terrorists.

The detectives from the Manhattan District Attorney's office, who pretended they were Latin American revolutionaries from an unspecified Caribbean country, taped hundreds of hours of conversations with the two men with concealed recorders. The undercover officers arrested Mr. Terpil and Mr. Korkala after traveling with them to England.

Leader of Ring at Large

Investigators interviewed in Washington and Britain said that the leader of the group was still at large and that he was the target of a Federal grand jury in Washington that is looking into illegal arms sales. A Federal prosecutor described Mr. Terpil as a "lieutenant" in the group and Mr. Korkala as a soldier.

The organization maintained at least two "safe houses" in England, where its confederates regularly sought refuge until both places were raided 10 days ago by Scotland Yard, investigators said. Both of the men arrested here were reported to have bragged in the taped conversations of their access to fraudulent American passports, which they said they had provided to fugitives from justice.

Many of the group's activities are assertedly centered in Britain because the laws regulating arms sales are much more lenient there than in the United States. Gustave Newman, a lawyer for Mr. Korkala, conceded that his client was planning to sell the 10,000 machine guns for more than \$2 million, but he contended the transaction would have been legal because it was supposed to have taken place in England.

Like Mr. Newman, James LaRossa, the lawyer for Mr. Terpil, contended that all of his client's activities were "legitimate" and "licensed." Matthew Crosson, an assistant Manhattan district attorney who is prosecuting the case here, responded in court that "no one is licensed to sell arms to Latin American revolutionaries."

Bail Denied to Two

Mr. Newman and Mr. LaRossa tried unsuccessfully to persuade acting Justice Joan B. Carey of State Supreme Court in Manhattan last week to free both defendants on bail. They remain at separate jails in Brooklyn and the Bronx pending arraignment on an indictment filed last Thursday. It accuses them of illegal weapons possession. The charges carry a maximum penalty of 25 years in prison.

A Scotland Yard investigator said the group had extensive contacts among high-ranking American and British military officials. British authorities were said to be particularly concerned about the group's access to "end user certificates," the official documents necessary for the legal export of arms from Britain or the United States.

Mr. Terpil and Mr. Korkala promised to provide an end-user certificate for the export of the 10,000 machine guns from England, with their final destination listed as the Philippines, according to Mr. Crosson. The prosecutor contended that the alleged conspirators knew that destination to be false.

Mr. Terpil, 40 years old, is married, with three children, and lives in McLean, Va. Mr. LaRossa said Mr. Terpil was an employee of Oceanic International at 200 Connecticut Avenue N.W. in Washington.

He was honorably discharged from the Army in 1955 and then joined the Central Intelligence Agency. According to Robert M. Morgenthau, the Manhattan District Attorney, Mr. Terpil was dismissed from the agency in 1971.

'Safe Houses' Reported

A Scotland Yard investigative report says Mr. Terpil purchased the Hunters Lodge Hotel in Crewe, England, as a "safe house" for slightly more than \$500,000 in 1978. The group's other safe house was said to be a mews house in the Bayswater section of London; it was raided by plainclothes detectives on Christmas Eve.

The Scotland Yard investigative report speculates that the Hunters Lodge Hotel — described by another British police officer as "sort of a country club" — was either operated by "an international crime syndicate" or "more probably" was part of a clandestine C.I.A. network in England.

Officials of the C.I.A. have insisted to both Scotland Yard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation that Mr. Terpil was no longer employed by them. The agency has declined public comment about the case.

Mr. French, the European freight airline president, who was interviewed by The Times in Athens last week, said that Mr. Terpil was formerly employed by his company.

Mysterious Disappearance Recounted

In February 1976, Mr. French said, Mr. Terpil offered him the use of a room at his office in Washington and then "disappeared" eight months later, leaving Mr. French to pay the rent on the office.

"Even his wife didn't know where he went," said Mr. French, who remembered Mrs. Terpil badgering him about her husband's whereabouts.

The airline president said Mr. Terpil "persistently asked" him to participate in a "lobbying effort" to persuade Washington officials to permit the export of the eight C-130 airplanes purchased by the Libyans but never delivered to them. Mr. French said he refused to get involved in this effort.

Carol Bruce, an assistant United States Attorney in Washington, who is conducting the grand jury investigation of the gun-running organization, said she was "aware of the effort to get the C-130's out of Georgia," but she refused further comment on the case.

Other Federal investigators said the Libyan Government had made known its willingness to pay anyone who could get the highly versatile transports out of the country a commission of at least \$1 million for each airplane.

Mr. Terpil was said to have boasted in taped conversations of training terrorists in Libya, including Carlos Ramirez, the Venezuelan-born terrorist who some intelligence agencies believe was responsible for the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. Other analysts believe at least four terrorists use the name "Carlos," and they say that is why he has never been apprehended.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
3 January 1980

U.S. Asks Judge to Bar C.I.A. Data Disclosure

WASHINGTON, Jan. 2 (UPI) — The Government asked a Federal district judge today to prevent a dismissed officer of the Central Intelligence Agency from disclosing classified information, including details of alleged South Korean payoffs to Congressmen.

The former officer, C. Philip Liechty, contends in a lawsuit against a former supervisor that he was dismissed because he kept prodding his superiors to turn over to the Justice Department information about South Korean payoffs to members of Congress. Mr. Liechty said that he reported the information to high officials of the agency in 1974. The Justice Department did not begin a broad investigation into Korean influence-buying in Congress until two years later.

In court papers filed in in Alexandria, Va., the Justice Department argued that

Mr. Liechty's case "may be expected to disclose information detrimental to the national security, if not properly protected."

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THE WASHINGTON POST
3 January 18

U.S. Acts to Enter Suit For Security Reasons

The federal government asked yesterday to intervene in a civil suit involving a former CIA agent and a current CIA agent to prevent the possible disclosure of unnamed national security secrets.

Federal officials asked U.S. District Judge Oren R. Lewis in Alexandria to let the government join CIA agent Robert F. Bodroghy as a defendant in the \$2 million slander and defamation of character suit brought against Bodroghy by former agent C. Philip Liechty.

The suit concerns remarks Bodroghy allegedly made about Liechty during a child custody fight Liechty is having with his estranged wife. In that suit, Liechty gave a deposition about purported national security matters which Lewis placed under seal at government request.

The judge told Justice Department attorneys on Dec. 21 he would not take similar actions on alleged national security matters unless the government officially entered the case. Lewis scheduled a hearing on the government's motion for Friday.

Liechty has said outside of court that CIA officials "covered up" information about attempts by Korean officials to bribe American congressmen in the early 1970s. The CIA has declined comment.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
3 January 1980

U.S. Seeks Wider Gag in CIA Agent's Suit

Lawyer Asks Disclosure Of Surveillance Data

By Allan Frank
Washington Star Staff Writer

The U.S. government yesterday asked a federal judge to prevent former CIA agent C. Philip Liechty, who served in South Korea, from divulging any agency secrets in the course of a private lawsuit.

At the same time, Sol Z. Rosen, Liechty's attorney, asked that the government be forced to disclose any surveillance it has conducted of him in connection with the case.

Papers filed with Senior U.S. District Judge Oren R. Lewis by the Justice Department and the CIA ask the judge to forbid Liechty, who was a covert operations officer, from divulging any agency secrets.

Liechty has said he objected to inadequate reporting by his CIA superiors in South Korea in the early 1970s of their knowledge of illegal payoffs by the Korean CIA to American congressmen.

The Justice Department has asked Lewis to allow the government to enter a harassment and invasion of privacy lawsuit filed by Liechty against his former boss, Robert F. Bodroghy.

The judge on Dec. 12 and Dec. 14 agreed to seal Liechty's answers to written questions from Bodroghy and to order Liechty not to disclose information in the depositions.

At a Dec. 21 hearing, Lewis indicated he would entertain a motion

from the government for a more-widespread gag order in the case.

At that same hearing, Justice Department attorney Stanley D. Wright revealed that Rosen and Liechty's other attorney, Thomas Fortune Fay, were being subjected to security checks. Papers filed by Rosen yesterday asked Lewis to order the government to disclose whether it has conducted any wiretaps of his office and home telephones and whether other surveillance of him has been conducted for the security check.

Other papers filed by Fay and Rosen recently included excerpts of the questions that were asked of Bodroghy during the taking of depositions Dec. 27.

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MISCELLANEOUS

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THE WASHINGTON POST
PARADE MAGAZINE
30 December 1979

Walter Scott's **personality parade**

Q. Stanfield Turner, director of the CIA, seems to take a lot of flak from the press. Isn't he bright? Isn't he a former Rhodes scholar? — Bill Clair, San Diego, Cal.

A. Admiral Turner is indeed bright. He was ranked No. 25 among 820 graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of '47. He and classmate Jimmy Carter both applied for Rhodes scholarships, and it was Turner who was awarded one.

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THE ARLINGTON JOURNAL & GLOBE
26 December 1979

Names in the News

Briglia Is Honored For CIA Service

The Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner, has awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal posthumously to Frank A. Briglia of Vienna in recognition of his outstanding service to the Central Intelligence Agency. Briglia, who was deputy director of the CIA's Office of Research and Development, and his wife, N. Belle Briglia, were killed in an automobile accident in August.

The medal, which is the agency's highest award for performance of outstanding service, was accepted by the Briglias' four sons in a recent ceremony at CIA headquarters in Langley. The citation accompanying the award commends Briglia for adding "new analytic and collection capability to the intelligence community" through his "insight and persistence." His engineering and managerial contributions to the agency are described as "reflecting the highest credit on him and the United States government."

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WASHINGTON STAR
30 DECEMBER 1979

The World

Manila Holds 16 on Plot Charges

MANILA, Philippines — Military authorities yesterday announced the arrest of 16 persons allegedly involved in a plot with American dissidents to topple the government, murder top officials and set off bombs in Manila.

The military also declassified secret documents in the supposed plot and said they had seized huge quantities of explosives and documents on urban terrorism marked "CIA."

Metropolitan Manila Commander Brig. Gen. Prospero Olivas said he could not say if the initials referred to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The 16 included a Philippine-born U.S. citizen, two Manila newspaper executives and 13 others.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
29 December 1979

Syria Says Defecting Envoy Worked for Cairo Intelligence

By Bernd Debusmann
Reuter

DAMASCUS, Syria, Dec. 28 — The Syrian government, surprised by the resignation of its ambassador to the United Nations, accused him today of collaborating with Egyptian intelligence and misusing his official position.

Ambassador Hammoud Choufi announced his resignation last night at a New York news conference at which he accused the government of President Hafez Assad of corruption, repression and opportunism. He said he would join the efforts to forge an opposition front abroad.

Choufi, 52, was the highest official to defect since Assad seized power nine years ago. He has been ambassador to Buenos Aires, Rome and Moscow, and chief of the United States section at the Foreign Ministry.

The ministry said Choufi was ordered home Dec. 7, after presenting views at the United Nations contrary to Syrian policy. He refused to heed the order.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised Choufi of its decision to transfer him to Damascus [and] punish him for his involvement and collaboration with the intelligence service of the Egyptian regime," a statement said.

Choufi, it added, misused his official position "in the service of the

Camp David policies," referring to the accords signed in September 1978 by the United States, Israel and Egypt. The agreements paved the way for last March's Egyptian-Israeli peace pact, which is regarded as treason to the Arab cause by Syria and most other Arab states.

Choufi's resignation coincided with a congress of the Syrian Baath Party, which opened last Saturday against a background of sectarian violence and widespread economic discontent.

At least 120 people were reported to have died over the past six months in violence aimed chiefly at members of the minority Moslem Alawite sect, of which Assad is the most prominent representative.

The government has blamed the Moslem Brotherhood, an extremist organization pledged to fight Western influence on Islam, for the violence. The state-run press has accused Saudi Arabia and Jordan of training brotherhood activists.

At his news conference, Choufi said he believed the only solution to Syria's problems lay in "the formation of a viable and formidable front, built upon the involvement of all political forces and sectors of the Syrian people."

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
2 January 1980

A Bad Bill

By William H. Schaap

WASHINGTON — The parliamentary record is chillingly direct: This bill, the lawmaker admitted, "could subject a private citizen to criminal prosecution for disclosing unclassified information obtained from unclassified sources." The quotation, however, is not from any Latin-American dictatorship, nor from Eastern Europe; it is, unfortunately, from the Congressional Record, and the speaker is the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Edward P. Boland.

In October, a bill known as the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, was quietly introduced, and, if it passes, investigative journalists and Government whistle-blowers are both in for big trouble.

The bill, proposed, authored and promoted by the Central Intelligence Agency, makes it a crime for anyone who has had access to information that identifies undercover intelligence personnel to disclose such information, and also makes it a felony for anyone else to do so with the "intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States."

The first provision would completely stifle criticism and reform from within the intelligence community; the second would eliminate scrutiny from the outside. Indeed, the bill would represent the insidious beginning of an Official Secrets Act. It would criminalize the writings of Philip Agee, John Stockwell, Frank Snepp and others, even though they exposed large-scale violations of law, even though they laid bare systematic lying to Congress, even though they totally belied the high moral tone of C.I.A. propaganda.

This law would also strike at the heart of investigative journalism. For example, it would have criminalized the disclosure of regular C.I.A. payments to King Hussein of Jordan; it

would have prevented exposure of the key role the C.I.A. and military intelligence played in torture and murder in Vietnam; it would have prohibited exposure of the backgrounds of the intelligence officers and agents involved in Watergate.

That the bill is "limited" to information that identifies officers and agents is of little significance. It is virtually impossible to expose illegal or immoral activity within government without disclosing who is responsible for, or involved with, the illegalities.

The requirement that journalists' activity, to be criminal, be carried out with intent to impede intelligence activities is another smokescreen. From the C.I.A.'s, and from a prosecution's, viewpoint, any disclosures would be considered an impediment to operations; the motives of the discloser would be of little real significance. What is more, the bill is not even limited to the protection of legal activities.

This bill is unnecessary and unwise. Even the Justice Department advised against it, noting that existing espionage laws adequately protect national security.

Laws such as this must be strictly limited to protecting what is in fact secret, and to what is in fact damaging to the national security. Anything more represents a serious infringement of the First Amendment.

This is the difference between the laws and the Constitution of this country and those of countries that have Official Secrets Acts. Such laws allow the government to prohibit the disclosure of information that the government declares to be secret — regardless of reality. Such laws shield immoral and illegal conduct; they are not aimed at external enemies, but at whistle-blowers and reformers in government, and at journalists outside.

We must be aware of this attack on our rights and our responsibilities.

William H. Schaap, a lawyer, is co-editor (with Ellen Ray and Louis Olf) of the CovertAction Information Bulletin.

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ON PAGE **23**TO THE POINT
14 DECEMBER 1979**SPECIAL REPORT=**

UNITED STATES

**Playing more and more
into Soviet hands**

By Allan C Brownfeld

IN the US, many today hold the view that in the late Forties and Fifties Americans overestimated the aggressive intentions and subversive behaviour of the Soviet Union and its agents in the US. The view is widespread, in addition, that no real threat to the national security exists at the present time and, as a result, that it is entirely proper to dismantle the internal security apparatus which has been, many argue, a threat to civil liberties.

In an important new book *Self Destruct, Dismantling America's Internal Security* (Arlington House, 1979), Robert Morris takes sharp exception to these prevailing views. He believes that the Soviet Union, from the end of World War Two until today, has striven all too successfully to weaken the US, with a view to its ultimate destruction. He shows how the US, for a variety of reasons, has become a party to the on-going process of its own destruction.

Robert Morris is well qualified to tell this story. During World War Two he served as an officer in Naval Intelligence and in 1950 became chief counsel to the Senate Internal Security Sub-committee. It was largely the record he compiled as chief counsel that inspired the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association to commend the sub-committee for its work over the years. He has also been a judge in New York City, president of the University of Dallas and president and founder of the University of Plano.

In his foreword, William Rusher, publisher of *National Review*, writes: "Some people may choose to scoff at Morris's deep concern as dated or old-hat — but have they looked at the world around them? Since Morris last retired as chief counsel to the Internal Security Sub-committee in 1958, the Soviet Union has:

"Drawn at least abreast of the US as a military superpower.

"Established a spacious island base just 120 km off the coast of Florida.

"Come within inches of taking full control of Indonesia and Chile.

"Drawn India into its orbit.


"Quarter-backed the communist conquest of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

"Erupted with permanent naval forces and bases into both the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

"Deployed at least 30000 surrogate Cuban troops on half-a-dozen fronts all over Africa — and nonetheless persuaded bemused Republican and Democratic administrations alike to believe it is sincere about wanting 'detente'. If what we have been witnessing is 'detente', no wonder the Russians want it!"

Morris points out that, "Within the brief time-interval of 20 years, the position of the US has declined from that of the undisputed leader of a confident world alliance of free peoples to

that of a beleaguered island in a rising sea of totalitarian despotism . . . When I left Washington early in 1958, security agencies were maintaining surveillance over subversives. Today, the subversives are discrediting security agents. Colonel Rudolph Abel, the Soviet spy, was arrested and convicted then. Today former FBI officials L Patrick Gray, W



CIA: internal protection

Mark Felt and Edward S Miller are under indictment for measures undertaken to track down the terrorist Weathermen."

The decline of the US capacity to protect its internal security is indeed dramatic. In 1958, the US was protected internally by several committees of the Congress, the Subversive Activities Control Board, the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice, the counter-intelligence departments of the army, navy, air force and coast guard, counter-intelligence departments of law enforcement agencies, including police departments, and of course the FBI and the CIA.

Now, in 1979, the House and Senate internal security committees, the Subversive Activities Control Board and the internal security division of the Justice Department have all been abolished. In addition, writes Morris, "The counter-intelligence departments of the armed forces and of law enforcement agencies have been emasculated, and many of our leaders are

trying to strip the FBI of its intelligence-gathering function and to weaken the role of the CIA."

All of this has not come about because the threat from the Soviet Union has declined. Morris shows the reader in great detail that it has, in fact, increased. He points out, however: "One of the first purposes of a conspiracy is to convince its targets that no conspiracy exists. The misinformation, camouflage and incessant propaganda of the communist apparatus, neatly complemented by the self-deception and gullibility on our own part, have conditioned us to accept with indifference the growth of a menace to our very existence.

"And as this threat, now clear and unmistakable, becomes more proximate and more ominous, a strange response is setting in. Instead of shoring up our defences in the face of such a threat, we are dismantling our ramparts and treating as meddlesome extremists those who would halt that dismantling."

It is Morris's view that the nation's internal security requires the maintenance of an intelligence-gathering organisation that can assess the strength, the motivation and the intentions of every real or potential enemy. The US, he argues, must also maintain a counter-

intelligence force that will preserve it from misinformation from potential enemies, from their penetration of the US apparatus, and from the disloyalty or ineptness of its operatives.

US intelligence has, in recent years, largely failed to understand what the Soviet Union was doing in the world — and what was taking place in such trouble-spots as Iran and Nicaragua. Major-General George Keegan, former head of US Air Force Intelligence, stated that "During the past five years, I have watched at first-hand the culmination of 25 years of consistent underestimates of the Soviet threat . . ."

General Keegan's explanation for this atmosphere is that estimates of Soviet strength have been deliberately understated and falsified to conform to what the politicians want to hear.

This grim book should cause its readers much concern. When before in history has a country under concerted attack, dismantled its means of defence? Robert Morris hopes that it is not too late to restore the nation to sanity.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
1 January 1980

'A-Blast' Was No Lightning Bolt, Panel Decides

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

A board of outside experts named by the White House to decide whether an atomic explosion took place near South Africa Sept. 22 has ruled out almost every other explanation for the event.

In a meeting convened by the White House Office of Science Policy just before Christmas, the panel of seven unidentified experts concluded there was no reason to suspect that the Vela satellite which spotted the Sept. 22 event had malfunctioned, or that what the satellite saw was caused by an enormous strike of lightning, as another theory suggested.

"The signal the satellite saw still looks in every way like a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere," one White House source said. "The trouble is, we still have no absolutely no separate data that would corroborate that it was an atomic explosion."

The most solid such data would be radioactive fallout from the explosion, which took place (if it was an explosion) in the middle of the night Sept. 22 above a wide expanse of the South Atlantic and Indian oceans. The nearest country to the source of the explosion was South Africa, which led to wide speculation that the South Africans had exploded their first atomic bomb.

Late in November, New Zealand thought it had detected fallout in its rainwater, but officials retracted that statement shortly thereafter, saying they could not be sure. One organization in New Zealand that measures radioactivity around the countryside said it had seen no evidence of fallout.

Some scientists suggested the Vela satellite had made a mistake, either by malfunctioning or mistaking a "superbolt" of lightning in the clouds above the ocean for a nuclear explosion. The panel convened by the White House was asked to look carefully into each possibility.

At the meeting convened by the White House before Christmas, the outside panel just about ruled out these possibilities.

White House sources said the panel concluded the satellite was in excellent working condition. Each time the satellite was interrogated from the ground, the sources said, it returned the correct information. What's more, the satellite has never repeated its Sept. 22 observation, suggesting it saw a real event in the skies near South Africa that night.

The lightning superbolt was described as "unlikely," because its signature is nothing like what was written in the sky the night of Sept. 22.

What the satellite saw was a double pulse of light that is the characteristic fingerprint of a nuclear explosion, in which a fireball briefly disappears when the shock wave makes it opaque from space, then reappears when the wave dissipates.

The panel convened by the White House has also concluded that a lightning strike quickly followed by a meteor burning up in the atmosphere does not explain the event of Sept. 22. Said one White House source: "The statistical chance of that happening got bad very quickly once we started looking at it."

Despite the evidence that an atomic explosion took place Sept. 22, the White House has not disbanded its panel of seven experts. The White House will convene the panel at least once more after it has researched even the remote possibility that the Vela satellite may have mistaken a double glint of sunlight off another satellite.